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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the interaction between the conflicting ideologies of crusade and 
commerce, during the period when the Turkish maritime emirates of Anatolia became 
the primary target of western crusading endeavour. Through the close study of papal 
documents and archival evidence from the Italian mercantile republics, two principal 
areas are focussed on: firstly, the extent to which the temporal and spiritual 
mechanisms (e.g. trade licences and indulgences) introduced by the popes of the 
fourteenth century  encouraged the Italian mercantile republics to participate in a 
crusade; secondly, the analysis of the policies of commercial exchange and military 
opposition adopted by the Latin states with regard to the Turks in the Aegean. The 
crusades in the Aegean are discussed in six chapters which broadly reflect the activities 
of the principal participants: 1) crusade negotiations during the pontificates of Clement 
V and John XXII: distractions to an Aegean crusade under Clement V; extrication from 
French influence under John XXII; gradual replacement of Byzantium as a target of the 
Aegean crusades during the 1320s; and the temporal and spiritual concessions granted 
by the popes to those Latin resisting the Turks in the Aegean; 2) the Zaccaria of Chios: 
their defence of the Aegean from Turkish attacks and the privileges they received from 
the papacy for this; 3) Venetian commercial activities in the Aegean: their alliances 
with and activities against the various Turkish emirates; 4) the 1334 naval league: the 
first anti-Turkish coalition; 5) the neglect of the Aegean crusades under Pope Benedict 
XII (1335-1342); 6) the Crusade of Smyrna and the climax of Latin efforts against the 
Turks in the first half of the fourteenth century (1343-1351). Although trade and 
crusade have often been regarded as incompatible by historians of the crusades (such 
as Stephen Runciman and Aziz Atiya), they both formed an integral, and inseparable, 
aspect of crusade policy and of western perceptions of the Turks. 
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Introduction 
 
The Aegean Sea was of the greatest strategic importance for whoever controlled it; 
without it, no state could establish itself as the supreme power in the eastern 
Mediterranean, as the Byzantines had done before 1204 and the Ottomans were to do 
after 1453. It lay at the heart of the great trade routes extending from Egypt and Syria 
to the south, and from the kingdoms of Mediterranean Europe in the west. These 
trade routes passed through Aegean waters – by way of Constantinople – to the 
lucrative markets of the Black Sea. Many important harbour-cities in Greece, Thrace 
and Asia Minor also lay on its shores, and allowed access to the interiors of those lands 
and beyond. Moreover, Asia Minor and the Aegean islands were the sources of much 
natural wealth, such as alum from Phokaia and mastic from Chios, which were 
produced in these lands and exported to the West. The Aegean islands gained 
heightened significance because of their proximity to one another and their strategic 
location; Rhodes, for example, was within eyesight of the Turkish coast and 
commanded the trade routes running from Famagusta and Alexandria in the south, to 
Constantinople and the Black Sea in the north.1 The high concentration of islands 
within the Aegean did, however, make the region notoriously difficult to police and as 
a result shipping was vulnerable to piracy. This was compounded by the lack of a 
dominant power in the region, where the Latins, Greeks and Turks all vied for control, 
but rarely enjoyed supremacy.  
Since the Fourth Crusade, there had been a permanent Latin settlement in the 
Aegean made up primarily of the Venetians who had fought alongside the Frankish 
knights in 1204. By 1261 the Byzantine emperor had opened up the Black Sea trade 
routes to the Genoese and, in the following years, also to the Venetians. Control of the 
Aegean islands thus became an essential prerequisite for the fulfilment of the 
commercial ambitions of the maritime republics.2 The expansion of Latin trade in the 
Aegean and Black Sea coincided with the emergence of Turkish warrior-nomads on the 
old Seljuk frontier in Anatolia, who replaced Byzantine control of that region with a 
                                                        
1 See the relevant photographs in Appendix V. 
2
 M. Balard, ‘Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans in the fourteenth century’, NCMH, vi. 825-38, at 825-
6. 
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patchwork of Turkish emirates. These Turks, ‘with great demographic potential and a 
heightened holy-war ideology’ began to make incursions into the Aegean and directly 
threaten the Latin colonies there.3 It is not surprising, therefore, that in this region of 
trade, conflicting cultures and religious beliefs, the Crusade emerged as an essential 
component for the defence and expansion of Latin possessions.4 But unlike in previous 
centuries, the main participants in these crusades were the Italian mercantile republics 
and not the kings and knights of western Europe. It was the Italian merchants who 
formed the bulwark of Christian resistance to, and contact with, the Turkish maritime 
emirates. 
The priorities of the mercantile republics contrasted greatly to those of the 
papacy and, some would say, with the traditional ideals of crusading. This thesis, 
therefore, has two objectives: firstly, to look at the changing attitude towards the 
Turks in this period, as they began to dominate western crusade thinking; and 
secondly, to study the relationship between the papacy and the maritime republics in 
the context of an Aegean crusade, or in other words, the relationship between 
mercantile objectives and the crusading ideals of the popes.  
The interplay between “religious” and “commercial” motivations is central to 
the understanding of holy war. However, in the context of the maritime republics, it 
has not often received the balanced assessment which it deserves. This view is in part 
influenced by the Venetian involvement in the Fourth Crusade, but also the result of 
the critical accounts of contemporary writers.5 Those accounts written before the loss 
of Jerusalem in 1187 paint a generally positive image of the Italian republics, but 
afterwards this portrayal changed. This is illustrated by James of Vitry, the Bishop of 
Acre in the years 1216-28, who wrote that the Italian merchants at Acre ‘rarely if ever 
                                                        
3 H. Inalcik, ‘The Ottoman Turks and the crusades: 1329-1451’, HC, vi. 222-75, at 227.  
4 I generally adhere to the ‘pluralist’ definition of the Crusade. This is summed up by Jonathan Riley-
Smith: ‘A crusade was a penitential war which ranked as, and had many attributes of, a pilgrimage. It 
manifested itself in many theatres of war: Palestine and the eastern Mediterranean regions [...] also 
North Africa, Spain, the Baltic shores, Poland, Hungary, the Balkans and even Western Europe’. J.S.C. 
Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, 2002), 87. Also see N. Housley, Contesting 
the Crusades (Oxford, 2006), 2-13. 
5
 For a detailed discussion on the influence of the Fourth Crusade on historiography, see The Latin 
Conquest of Constantinople, ed. D.E. Queller (London, 1971), esp. 21-5, 38-44, 57-66, 86-90; and also S. 
Schein, ‘From “milites Christi” to “mali Christiani”: the Italian communes in western historical literature’, 
I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di Gerusalemme / The Italian communes in the Crusading Kingdom 
of Jerusalem, ed. G. Airaldi and B.Z. Kedar (Genoa, 1986), 680-9, at 684; J. Philips, The Second Crusade: 
Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (London, 2007), 264-5. 
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listened to the Word of God’.6 Moreover, they fought against each other rather than 
against the ‘treacherous infidels’. In Vitry’s view, they had ‘more to do with trade and 
merchandise than with warring for Christ’.7 Contemporaries closely associated with the 
Crusade in the fourteenth century sometimes shared this view. The Venetian crusade 
theorist Marino Sanudo Torsello accused the Genoese of accruing great wealth in their 
lands in Greece, which they kept against the will of God.8 This sentiment was echoed 
by another crusade propagandist, Pierre Dubois, who wrote that if a Catholic ruler 
were able to recover the lands of the East, he should control trade and regulate prices 
in order to curb the ‘daily increasing greed of the merchants’.9  
Some historians, influenced by these accounts, have subsequently portrayed 
trade and crusade as two contrasting concepts which cannot be reconciled. This is 
illustrated by Aziz Atiya, who remarked that ‘The Italian citizen, whether in Venice, 
Genoa or elsewhere, had lost or almost lost his medieval religious scruples in view of 
his material gains from trade. This is exemplified by the famous Venetian saying which 
is often quoted – Siamo Veneziani, poi Christiani’. The author summed up that by the 
fourteenth century ‘Piety alone *had become+ helpless in the face of economic motives 
and interests’.10 The fervently pro-Byzantine Stephen Runciman, also, not surprisingly, 
adopted a similar view. He wrote in his History of the Crusades that ‘one of the 
difficulties in organising the later Crusades was the lack of economic inducement’, and 
that ‘the Italian maritime merchants [...] were the shrewdest money-makers of all 
time’. The author concluded that ‘their arrogance, their rivalries and the cynicism of 
their policy, caused irreparable harm *to the crusades+’.11 
                                                        
6 James of Vitry, Lettres de Jacques de Vitry: 1160/1170-1240, évêque de Saint-Jean d'Acre, ed. 
R.B.C. Huygens (Leiden 1960), 85-6 (letter 2). 
7 James of Vitry, Historia Orientalis, ed. F. Moschus (Douai, 1597), 136; Schein, ‘“milites Christi”’, 683. 
8 Marino Sanudo Torsello, ‘Hopf’s so-called “Fragmentum” of Marino Sanudo Torsello’, ed. R.L. Wolff, 
The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume (New York, NY, 1953), 149-59, at 153. The Genoese have more of a 
reputation in sources as being profiteering and acquisitive: B.Z. Kedar, Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and 
Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-Century Depression (London, 1976), 10. 
9 Pierre Dubois, De recuperatione Terre Sancte: dalla “Respublica Christiana” ai primi nazionalismi e alla 
politica antimediterranea, ed. A. Diotti (Florence, 1977), 158; T. Mastnak, Crusading Peace: Christendom, 
the Muslim World and Western Political Order (London, 2002), 274; Schein, ‘“milites Christi”’, 689. 
10 A.S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1938), 114-16. 
11 Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1951-4), iii. 351-2, 365. Also see A.T. Luttrell, 
‘Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the fourteenth century’, PBSR 26 (1958), 195-212, at 
195, who mentioned the ‘opportunist exploitation of crusading ideals’ by the Venetians. 
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However, these claims of a total division of spiritual and commercial motives 
are far too simplistic. They paint an overly negative view of the maritime republics, 
who by the fourteenth century had come to form the backbone of crusading against 
the Turks in the Aegean. To say that the maritime republics were devoid of any pious 
motivations would be to take the Namierite view that principles and ideas are rarely 
determinants of human action. In Namier’s view, it would be ‘an ironic habit of mind to 
believe that the wishes of men are expressed by their utterances; even more ironical, 
or naive, to judge of the essence of mass movements by the pronouncements or 
professions of those who manage to filch them’.12 As Quentin Skinner has shown in 
quite another context, separating supposedly contrasting motivations is an impossible 
task for the historian – professed principles, even if they were insincere, still acted as a 
causal motivation for actions.13 Thus, when the Venetians and the Genoese cited the 
defence of Christendom as the motivations for their actions – as they often did – this 
still affected their deeds, even if the defence of their trade routes was the priority. As 
shall be seen, in the fourteenth century Aegean, the papacy relied on the mercantile 
republics for the successful execution of a crusade and they, in turn, were eager to 
couch their actions in the language of the Crusade; thus trade and crusade became 
blended together as commercial interests became amalgamated with the defence of 
the faith. 
 
 
                                                        
12
 This is from Namier’s essay: ‘Human Nature in Politics’, in L. Namier, Personalities and Powers 
(London, 1955), 1-7, quote at 4;  J. Brooke, ‘Namier and Namierism’, History and Theory 3 (1963-4), 331-
47, at 341.  
13 Q. Skinner, ‘The principles and practice of opposition: The case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole’, 
Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb, ed. N. 
McKendrick (London, 1974), 93-128. 
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Economic or religious history? The historiography for the Aegean crusades  
In some senses this separation of the “commercial” and “religious” aspects of later 
medieval crusading is reflected in the historiography of the Aegean crusades. The 
works most extensively employed in this thesis fall into the following categories: those 
which focus on the mercantile activities of the Latin states in the East, especially the 
economic histories of the maritime republics of Venice and Genoa (e.g. the works of 
Zachariadou, Balard and Lopez); and those which focus on the crusades from the 
perspective of the Church, especially the implementation of “crusade mechanisms” 
(such as the granting of tithes, indulgences, and other privileges)14 in the kingdoms of 
western Christendom (e.g. the works of Housley, Setton and Tyerman); in addition to 
this it is also necessary to make mention of the work of those specialising in the 
Turkish emirates and Byzantium during this period (e.g. the works of Lemerle, Inalcik 
and Laiou). For this reason, this thesis aims to blend together, where possible, both 
commercial and crusade history, and the sources which go with them, in an effort to 
produce a balanced assessment of the motivations of the principal players in these 
crusades – the Venetians, the Genoese and the papacy. 
 Many of the works which focus on trade in the eastern Mediterranean provide 
vital information on the activities of the Latins in the Aegean and their contact with the 
Turks, either in terms of commercial exchange or military opposition. For instance, the 
monograph of Elizabeth Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the 
Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415), appears to be the closest work to this 
research question.15 Indeed, the author provides a thorough treatment of Venetian-
Turkish commerce in the southern Aegean, especially the commercial agreements 
between the Cretans and the emirates of Aydin and Menteshe, the trading patterns of 
the Venetians during the times of a crusade, and the influence of Black Sea trade on 
the economies of the Aegean, which are all highly relevant to this investigation. 
                                                        
14 Chrissis has defined these “crusade mechanisms” as ‘the sum of all the distinguishing characteristics 
connected with the Crusade’. I have found this definition a useful one to adopt for this study: N.G. 
Chrissis, Crusading in Romania: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282 
(University of London, PhD thesis, 2008), 10, n. 5. 
15
 Zachariadou has published a number of other highly relevant articles, e.g. ‘The Catalans of Athens and 
the beginning of Turkish expansion in the Aegean area’, SM 21.2 (1980), 821-38; ‘Holy war in the Aegean 
during the fourteenth century’, LGEM, 212-25; and a useful edited volume: The Ottoman Emirate (1300-
1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 11-13 January 1991, ed. E.A. 
Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993). 
14 
 
Judging by the title alone one may even assume that a study into the integration of 
commercial and religious motivations has already been made. However, under closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that the assessment of the crusading motivation during 
this period takes a secondary role when compared to the analysis of mercantile 
activities in Zachariadou’s work. This is primarily because the focus of the work is on 
Venetian Crete and not the papacy. Therefore, a crucial detailed analysis of the 
Crusade from the perspective of the Church is not undertaken. Consequently, the 
historical background, which is where the Crusade is dealt with in most detail, offers 
little explanation as to why people took the cross and how the crusades were 
organised on the part of the Church, especially in relation to preaching, finance and 
recruitment.16 For example, the indulgences granted to those fighting in the Aegean – 
integral to the understanding of the crusades – are not discussed in detail.17  
Apart from Zachariadou, detailed investigations of the Venetians and Genoese 
in the eastern Mediterranean have also been provided by Michel Balard, Robert Lopez, 
Eliyahu Ashtor and Kate Fleet, who have all focussed, to some extent, on commercial 
relations between the Latins and Turks.18 Their studies are extremely useful for 
understanding east-west commerce, in particular the minutiae of commercial activity. 
In the case of Balard and Lopez, their work also provides useful information on the 
Genoese in the Aegean, especially the lords of Chios, which is supplemented by the 
articles of Miller and Gatto.19 The detail provided by these studies is essential for 
understanding the reality of the life for the Latins in the Aegean, especially the political 
and economic context in which they decided to either participate in a crusade or not. 
However, the focus of the work is not on the Crusade, thus there is little assessment of 
wider Christian-Muslim interaction outside of the sphere of mercantile activity, 
especially in the form of papal policy towards the Turkish emirates and the changing 
                                                        
16 Ibid., 1-89. This historical background does, however, help to make sense of the political turmoil in the 
Aegean during the early fourteenth century and provides a wealth of detailed references. 
17 E.g. Ibid., 9, 30, 34-5. 
18 M. Balard, La Romanie génoise, xiie – début du xve siècle, 2 vols (Rome, 1978); R. Lopez, Storia delle 
colonie Genovesi nel Mediterraneo (Bologna, 1938); E. Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages 
(Princeton, NJ, 1983); K. Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of 
Genoa and Turkey (Cambridge, 1999). 
19 R. Lopez, Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante (Milan, 1933); W. Miller, ‘The Zaccaria of 
Phocaea and Chios, 1275-1329’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 31 (1911), 44-55; L. Gatto, ‘Per la storia 
di Martino Zaccaria, signore di Chio’, Bulletino dell’ “Archivio Paleografico Italiano”, n.s., 2-3, part 1 
(1956-7), 325-45. 
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perception of the Turks within western Christendom, both of which had a significant 
influence on Christian-Muslim relations within this period. 
The work of historians who specialise in the crusades has filled the other side of 
this gap. Unlike the work of the economic historians, the work of the crusade 
historians rarely focuses on the detail of daily activity in the Aegean, but is instead 
important for the understanding of the political situation in Europe and the effect 
which that had on western perception of, and participation in, campaigns in the East. 
One of the most extensive studies is that of Kenneth Setton, in his four-volume work, 
The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571).20 As the title suggests, Setton’s research is 
primarily concerned with the political situation in western Europe and the papal 
domain, especially the relations between the papacy, the French Crown and the 
Venetians. Setton is extremely thorough in describing some aspects of crusade 
preparation, in particular, papal crusade funding and the organisation of Humbert of 
Vienne’s crusade of 1346.21 Despite this, the possible motivations of the crusaders are 
not discussed in as much detail. For example, while Setton mentions that the Smyrna 
crusaders were given some ‘quite unusual’ spiritual privileges, he does not divulge 
what these privileges were.22  
A more detailed analysis of the crusade mechanisms introduced by the popes 
of the fourteenth century has been provided by Housley.23 Housley’s monograph on 
the Avignon Papacy and the crusades, in particular, gives an especially lucid account of 
the different crusade policies adopted by the Avignon popes and covers a detailed 
discussion of the spiritual privileges they introduced (both of which are lacking in the 
studies of Zachariadou and Setton) as well as financial aspects of the Curia’s crusade 
                                                        
20 Volume one contains two chapters which are relevant to this topic: Setton, PL, i. 163-223. Also see his: 
Catalan Domination of Athens: 1311-1388 (Cambridge, MA, 1948); ‘The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380’, 
HC, iii. 167-224. Setton has also published a work in Spanish, which in contradiction to what is stated in 
the inside cover, is not a translation of an earlier work: Los catalanes en Grecia (Barcelona, 1975). 
21 E.g. Setton, PL, i. 165, 169. 196. 
22 Ibid., i. 196. 
23 Housley has published an extensive amount of highly relevant research, e.g. The Avignon Papacy and 
the Crusades, 1305-1378 (Oxford, 1986); The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the 
Crusades Against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford, 1982); ‘The Franco-papal crusade 
negotiations in 1322-3’, PBSR 48 (1980), 166-85  (reprinted in HVR, item XII); ‘Angevin Naples and the 
defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the naval league of 1334’, Byzantion 51 (1981), 548-56  
(reprinted in HVR, item XIII); ‘Pope Clement V and the crusades of 1309-10’, JMH 8 (1982), 29-43 
(reprinted in HVR, item XI).  
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policy.24 In this work, the author also makes the important link between the 
expeditions to the Aegean, such as the naval league of 1334, and the change in 
crusade policy from proposals originating in Paris and Avignon, to those propagated by 
the local Aegean powers who had political and economic interests in the region.25 This 
is a theme that has been adopted and expanded on throughout this thesis. 
 The works of Housley and Setton have been supplemented by those of 
Christopher Tyerman and Sylvia Schein, who have studied the attempts of the papacy 
and the French Crown to recover the Holy Land. Tyerman has predominantly explored 
the crusader ideologies of the French monarchy, who are often depicted as expressing 
sincere devotion to crusade despite their inability to participate.26 Schein, likewise, has 
provided detailed information on the motivations of the French kings, as well as the 
crusade policies of Pope Clement V.27 These works are useful, although they are not 
specifically concerned with crusades against the Turks in the Aegean. In addition to 
this, it is worth mentioning those works closely related to crusade history, such as 
studies dedicated to the ideology and impact of the crusade theorists who operated in 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century;28 works dedicated specifically to the 
Avignon popes and, at times, their crusade policies;29 and the studies on individual 
expeditions to the East, such as the Crusade of Smyrna.30 
                                                        
24 E.g. Housley, Avignon, 129-40, 159-198. 
25 Ibid., 14, 25. 
26 E.g. C.J. Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land’, War and 
Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham & J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 170-81, at 181; ‘Philip 
V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 
57 (1984), 15-34. 
27 E.g. S. Schein, Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274-1314 
(Oxford, 1991); ‘Philip IV and the crusade: a reconsideration’, Crusade and Settlement: Papers Read at 
the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and Presented to R.C. 
Smail, ed. P.W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), 121-6.  
28 Of particular importance is: A. Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the 
Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (Aldershot, 2000); C.J. Tyerman, ‘Marino Sanudo Torsello 
and the lost crusade: lobbying in the fourteenth century: the Alexander Prize essay’, TRHS 32 (1982), 57-
73; A.E. Laiou, ‘Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: the background to the anti-Turkish 
league of 1332-1334’, Speculum 45 (1970), 374-92; A. Cocci, ‘Le projet de blocus naval des côtes 
égyptiennes dans le Liber secretorum fidelium Crusis (1321c) de Marino Sanudo il Vecchio (1279c.-
1343)’, La Méditerranée médiévale: Perceptions et représentations (Paris, 2002), 171-88. Also see 
Housley, Avignon, 112, 161, 200-1,205, 243-4, 293; Schein, Fideles, 114-28, 200-18; J.N. Hillgarth, Ramon 
Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1971). 
29 A good introduction to the Avignon popes is provided by G. Mollat, The Popes at Avignon: 1305-1378, 
trans. J. Love (London, 1963). There are many useful works regarding specific popes and the crusades: S. 
Menache, Clement V (Cambridge, 1998); G. Durrholder, Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann XXII 
(Strasbourg, 1913); F. Giunta, ‘Benedetto XII e la crociata’, Anuario de estudios medievales 3 (1966), 215-
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Standing somewhere in between those works dedicated to the Crusade and to 
the commercial history of the East, is the work of Anthony Luttrell, David Jacoby and 
Stefan Stantchev. Luttrell has published a large number of articles and chapters which 
focus on particular aspects of Hospitaller Rhodes, nearly all of which are connected to 
crusades in the Aegean in some way.31 Jacoby, similarly, has contributed numerous 
studies dedicated to the political, economic and social life of the Latins in the East.32 
Stantchev, on the other hand, has focussed on the economic policies of the medieval 
papacy, especially their implementation of the trade embargo.33 Stantchev’s thesis, 
therefore, bridges the gap between church and economic history, which this study also 
aims to do. However, his main concern is for the use of the embargo within the 
context of the assertion of papal primacy, and not as an instrument of crusading policy 
per se (i.e. it is not used to denote the changing perceptions of the Turks, or the 
justifications for crusading against them). 
Finally, there is the work of those historians specialising in the Turkish emirates 
of Anatolia and the restored Byzantine empire: Lemerle,34 Inalcik35 and Wittek36 have 
all studied the Turkish emirates, especially those of Aydin and Menteshe. Aydin 
became the principal target of crusading aggression, so Lemerle’s work on the emirate 
                                                                                                                                                                  
34; L. Gay,  e Pape Cl ment VI et les a aires d'Orient (1342-1352) (Paris, 1904); D. Wood, Clement VI: 
The Pontificate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope (Cambridge, 1989). 
30 The most recent and relevant of these is: A. Demurger, ‘Le pape Clément VI et l’Orient: ligue ou 
croisade?’, Guerre, pouvoir et noblesse au Moyen Âge, Mélanges en l'honneur de Philippe Contamine, 
ed. J. Paviot & J. Verger (Paris, 2000), 207-14. Also see M.C. Faure, ‘Le dauphin Humbert II à Venise et en 
Orient (1345-1347)’, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire 27 (1907), 509-562; S.M. Theotokes, ‘E prôte 
summachia tôn kuriarchôn kratôn tou aigaiou chata tês kathodou tôn tourkôn archomenou tou 14 
aiônos’, Epeteris Etaireias Byzantinon Spoudon 7 (1930), 283-98. 
31 Luttrell’s works are too numerous to cite individually. Most of his publications can be found in five 
volumes of Variorum Reprints, listed as LVR1; VR2; LVR3; LVR4; LVR5 in the bibliography.  
32 Of particular relevance to this study are: D. Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun oriental en 
Méditerranée, XIe-XVe siècles’,  ’alun de M diterran e: colloque international, Naples, 4-6 juin 2003-
Lipari, 7-8 juin 2003, ed. P. Borgard, J.-P. Brun & M. Picon (Naples, 2005), 219-67; ‘Creta e Venezia nel 
contesto economico del Mediterraneo orientale sino alla meta del Quattrocento’, Venezia e Creta: atti 
del convegno internazionale di studi, Iraklion-Chanià, 30 settembre – 5 ottobre 1997, ed. G. Ortalli 
(Venice, 1998), 73-106; ‘Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305-1332): Un nouveau témoignage 
de Marino Sanudo Torsello’, SM 15.1 (1974), 217-61. 
33 S. Stantchev, Embargo: The Origins of an Idea and the Implications of a Policy in Europe and the 
Mediterranean, ca. 1100 – ca. 1500 (University of Michigan, PhD thesis, 2009). 
34
 P. Lemerle,  ’ mirat d’Aydin, Byzance et l’occident: Recherches sur ‘ a geste d’Umur pacha’ (Paris, 
1957). 
35 H. Inalcik, ‘The rise of the Turkish maritime principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the crusades’, BF 
9 (1985), 179-217. 
36
 P. Wittek, Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.-15. Jh. (Istanbul, 
1934). 
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of Aydin, is especially useful for this study, not least because it provides a critical 
assessment of Düstūrnāme of Enveri – one of the key Turkish sources for this period. 
These works also help to shed light on the often confusing political situation in Asia 
Minor during the early fourteenth century. The Byzantinists, in a similar vein, fill in the 
gaps for Latin interaction with the Greeks during this period. The most important of 
these being the studies of Laiou,37 Geanakoplos38 and Gill.39 Laiou, in particular, is 
helpful for the earlier part of this thesis, where crusades against the Byzantines had yet 
to be replaced by crusades against the Turks. These works also provide a detailed 
treatment of discussions over Church Union and Byzantine participation in the naval 
league of 1334. 
  
 
Sources for the Aegean crusades 
The historiographic gap found between those works dedicated to the commercial 
activities of the Latins in the Aegean and those discussing the Crusade in a more Euro-
centric context is, in many ways, a result of the sources which tend to be relevant for 
events in the Aegean or for the discussions of the Crusade in Europe. The prevalence 
of archival sources for the fourteenth century means that they often form the core of 
research for this period, including the crusades. Unfortunately chronicles and letters 
from the crusaders themselves are often hard to come by for the later crusades, thus it 
is often necessary to fill the gaps left in the documentary sources with that provided by 
the dryer archival evidence.40 For this reason, an assessment of crusader motivations 
usually takes an unavoidably high-diplomatic slant. 
  The Vatican Archivio segreto contains many documents integral for the 
understanding of papal crusade policy. Of especial importance to this study are the 
papal letters in the Registra Avenionensia and the Registra Vaticana.41 The majority of 
                                                        
37 A.E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282-1328 (Cambridge, 
1972). 
38 D.J. Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the crusades: 1261-1354’, HC, iii. 27-68. 
39
 J. Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198-1400 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1979). 
40
 E.g. Housley, Avignon, 7. 
41 The Registra Avenionensia letters are drafts, rather than copies of the original letters. The Registra 
Vaticana registers are parchment copies of the common letters in the Registra Avenionensia series. They 
are thus at least two removes from the original letters, which are drafted or registered in the Registra 
Avenionensia. The Registra Vaticana are, however, more legible and easier to handle. Where possible I 
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the letters in these registers are so-called common letters – those issued in response 
to written petitions submitted to and approved by the Roman Curia. They consist 
usually of favours of some kind being conferred on individuals or institutions. Amongst 
the other letters found in these registers are ‘secret’ letters. These usually contain 
political correspondence and were not issued as a result of a petition, but from curial 
initiative.42 Most of the registers of the popes relevant to this study (Benedict XI to 
Clement VI) have been published by the Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes 
et de Rome amongst others.43 However, it is worth noting that these publications are 
not always complete. This is illustrated by the common letters of John XXII which are 
only published in calendar form, therefore, important documents such as the granting 
of indulgences (on petition) in Achaia and for the naval league of 1334 are not printed 
in full.44 When this is the case, it has been necessary to consult the original 
manuscripts.45 Overall, the papal registers are extremely useful for portraying the 
papal reaction to events in the Aegean and European crusading trends in general. They 
are also the sources which provide the most detail about the spiritual privileges which 
were granted for the crusades – an important aspect in identifying crusader 
motivations. When used in conjunction with other sources, they can also help to clarify 
specific details of a crusade, such as: dates, finance, numbers of men involved, galleys 
contributed, etc. Throughout this study, emphasis has been placed on the problem of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
have attempted to consult the Registra Avenionensia letters first, but these are sometimes extremely 
damaged and hard to read, see Appendix II. A detailed discussion of the Registra Avenionensia and 
Vaticana series is given by L.E. Boyle, A Survey of the Vatican Archives and of its Medieval Holdings 
(Toronto, 1972), 103-31, esp. 114-15.  
42 P.N.R. Zutshi, ‘The letters of the Avignon popes (1305-1378): A source for the study of Anglo-Papal 
relations and of English ecclesiastical history’, England and her Neighbours, 1066-1453. Essays in honour 
of Pierre Chaplais, ed. M. Jones & M. Vale (London 1989), 259-275, at 261; Idem, ‘The personal role of 
the pope in the production of papal letters in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’, Vom Nutzen des 
Schreibens: soziales Gedächtnis, Herrschaft und Besitz im Mittelalter, ed. W. Pohl & P. Herold (Vienna, 
2002), 225-36, at 225-6; Boyle, Vatican Archives, 149-50. 
43 BXI; CV; JXXII Secrètes; JXXII Communes; BXII Communes; BXII France; BXII Autres; CVI France; CVI 
Autres. 
44 Some texts are printed in full in Appendix III. The registers of Clement VI also contain some very 
inadequate summaries of important documents, take for example the bull Insurgentibus contra fidem, 
proclaiming the Crusade of Smyrna: CVI France, i. nr. 433.  
45
 In addition to this, substantial lacunae exist in the Vatican Archives, partly as a result of losses 
suffered and partly because documents have been omitted from the papal registers (only those seemed 
especially significant were copied into bound volumes). Moreover, some of the registers are based on 
letters which were never dispatched, or were re-worded at a later date: Boyle, Vatican Archives, 105-7; 
Housley, Italian Crusades, 9-12; A.J. Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade (Leiden, 
2000), 7-8. 
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using common letters as an indicator of papal policy. The initiative in issuing them did 
not lie with the pope, so they are in many senses, more informative about the 
motivations of those making the petitions than of the papacy.46 
The other core body of archival sources for this study are those from the 
Venetian State Archives, namely the deliberations of the Venetian Great Council and of 
the Senate. Many of these have been summarised, although when the summaries have 
proved to be insufficient, manuscripts, such as those from the Deliberazioni del 
Maggior Consiglio and the Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, have been consulted.47 The 
Venetian archives provide a clear picture of Venetian state policy in the Aegean, as 
they describe the decisions of the various councils, either in Venice or on Crete, often 
regarding the Turkish emirates, the Byzantines, and the other Latin powers in the 
Aegean. They thus provide a  valuable account of Venetian attitudes towards these 
different groups in the context of crusading or commercial exchange. In particular, 
they (at times) give names to the various Turkish emirs whom the Venetians were 
dealing with. This is helpful as many other sources often use the cumbersome blanket 
term of Turchi and rarely make any distinction as to which emirate a particular group 
of Turks originate from.48 Like the papal documents, the Venetian archives also provide 
specific details and dates for the intricate preparations precluding a crusade.49  
However, the Venetian archives do not give the full picture of Latin 
involvement in the Aegean, as they do not concern the other great maritime republic 
of Genoa, whose activities are partially held in the Genoese State Archives. These 
would ideally provide more information on the involvement of the Commune of Genoa 
in the Aegean crusades, but unfortunately for the early fourteenth century many of 
                                                        
46 Zutshi, ‘letters of the Avignon popes’, 266-7. 
47 Examples of the relevant summaries and calendar entries of these registers and others can be found 
in TD; TR; DVL; I libri commemoriali della Republica di Venezia regesti, ed. R. Predelli, 4 vols (Venice, 
1876-83); Le deliberazioni (Senato): Serie “mixtorum”, ed. R. Cessi & P. Sambin, 2 vols (Venice, 1960); Le 
deliberazioni del Consiglio dei XL della Repubblica di Venezia, ed. A. Lombardo, 2 vols (Venice, 1957); 
‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias: 1281-1385’, Istorika krêtika engrafa ekdidomena ek tou arheiou 
tês Benetias, ed. S.M. Theotokes, 2 vols (Athens, 1933-7); ‘Apophaseis meizonos symvouliou Venetias, 
1255-1669’, Istorika krêtika engrafa ekdidomena ek tou arheiou tês Benetias, ed. S.M. Theotokes, 2 vols 
(Athens, 1933-7). 
48
 Where possible I have tried to identify which Turks are being referred to, but because of the 
vagueness in many of the western sources, this is often unavoidable: Setton, PL, i. 181-2, n. 88; 
Zachariadou, TC, 117-21. I have used Turkey to refer to Turkish ruled Asia Minor.  
49
 A detailed discussion of the relevant Venetian archival sources can be found in D. Jacoby, ‘Social 
Evolution in Latin Greece’, HC, vi. 175-221, at n. 1, pp. 175-80, esp. 176-7. 
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the records are notoriously fragmented.50 Nevertheless, publications of Genoese 
archival material for this period, mostly notarial records, do contain some documents 
which are of use to this study. Notably those which record alum shipments from the 
Genoese colonies in the East, or evidence of Genoese trade with the Turks in the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.51 In addition to the archives of Venice and 
Genoa, published archival documents relating to the Hospitallers of Rhodes and the 
Catalans in the Aegean have also be utilised for this study.52 As have the accounts of 
merchants, such as Francesco Pegolotti and Pignol Zucchello.53 
 This substantial archival evidence has been supplemented by the use of 
chronicle sources. These are common for the period, but sporadic in their coverage of 
the Crusade and thus vary greatly in importance. For the earlier part of this study, the 
chronicle of Ramon Muntaner is invaluable, both as a source for the expansion of the 
Turkish emirates, and as one for the Catalan involvement in the crusade plans of the 
early fourteenth century.54 His work is unusual in that it described events in the East 
from someone who was there at the time. Many other western chronicles also report 
on events in the Aegean, but they can be of dubious reliability because of their 
distance from events, their primary focus is also often on events in Europe. 
Nevertheless, these sources can still be used to provide an example of European 
perceptions of the Turks.55 In contrast, the work of the crusade theorist Marino 
Sanudo Torsello, is that of one familiar with events in the Aegean and extremely well 
informed on crusading matters.56 He gives an insight into papal crusade policy as well 
                                                        
50 C.F. Wright, The Gattilusio Lordships in the Aegean 1354-1462 (University of London, PhD thesis, 
2006), 18; K. Fleet, Trade relations between the Turks and the Genoese, 1300-1453 (University of 
London, PhD thesis, 1994), 1-2. 
51 E.g. Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1356, 1357, 1530, 1667, 1675, 1723. 
52 E.g. CGH; DOC. 
53 Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, La Pratica Della Mercatura, ed. A. Evans (New York, NY, 1936); Pignol 
Zucchello, Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello (1336-1350), ed. R. Morozzo della Rocca, (Venice, 
1957). 
54 Ramon Muntaner, The Catalan Expedition to the East: from the Chronicle of Ramon Muntaner, trans. 
R. Hughes (Barcelona, 2006). 
55 E.g. William of Nangis and Continuator, Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 a 1300, avec 
les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 A 1368, ed. H. Géraud, 2 vols (Paris, 1843); Giovanni Villani, 
Nuovo cronica, ed. G. Porta, 13 books in 3 vols (Parma, 1990-1). The Crusade of Smyrna, however, 
attracted significant attention from western chroniclers, e.g. Anonimo Romano, Cronica, ed. G. Porta 
(Milan, 1979); Giorgio Stella, Annales Genuenses, ed. G.P. Balbi, RISNS 17.2 (Bologna, 1975). 
56
 The most important of Sanudo’s works for this study are the Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis and the 
collection of letters, printed in Gesta Die per Francos, ed. J. Bongars, 2 vols (Hannover, 1661), ii. 
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as developments in the Aegean, which is mirrored by some of the other theorists 
operating at this time.57 
 In addition to the western sources, a number of Greek and Turkish sources are 
also of importance. The Greek authors George Pachymeres, Nikephoros Gregoras and 
John Kantakouzenos all give accounts of Byzantine relations with the Turks at this time, 
such as the Ottoman advances and Greek alliances with certain emirs.58 On the Turkish 
side, the epic poem, the Düstūrnāme by the poet-chronicler Enveri (the Brilliant) 
contains a vast amount of information on the life of Umur of Aydin, such as the 
frequent Turkish raids in the 1330s, treaties with Christian powers, the alliance with 
Kantakouzenos and the Crusade of Smyrna.59 
 
 
Structure of thesis 
In order to provide a balanced assessment of the motivations and response of the 
principal players in the Aegean crusades, this thesis has blended together commercial 
and crusade historiography and sources. It is divided into 6 chapters, and in 2 parts: 
the first part focuses on the ‘The Emergence of a Crusade to the Aegean: 1300-1327’, 
namely the change in perception of the Turkish emirates throughout this period, as 
they became a principal motivating factor for a crusade; the second part is dedicated 
to ‘The Response to the Turks in the Aegean: 1327-1351’, which covers the western 
response to the threat from the Turkish emirates, namely the 1334 naval league and 
the Crusade of Smyrna. These parts are preceded by a historical background, which 
provides a brief survey of crusading since the fall of Acre and the emergence of the 
Turks in western Anatolia and the Aegean. 
Although it would be tempting to begin this thesis with the first instances of 
crusading mechanisms being introduced for action specifically against the Turkish 
                                                        
57 E.g. William Adam, ‘De Modo Sarracenos Extirpandi’, RHC Ar, ii. 519-55; ‘Directorium ad Passagium 
Faciendum’, RHC Ar, ii. 367-517. 
58 George Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. A. Failler, trans. V. Laurent, 5 vols (Paris, 1984-2000); 
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, ed. L. Schopen & I. Bekker, 3 vols (Bonn, 1829-55); John 
Kantakouzenos, Eximperatoris Historiarum, ed. L. Schopen, 3 vols (Bonn, 1828); see also Sources for 
Turkish History in the Hospitallers’ Rhodian Archive: 1389-1422, ed. A.T. Luttrell & E.A. Zachariadou 
(Athens, 2008), 24. 
59
 Enveri,  e destān d'Umūr Pacha (Düstūrnāme-i Enverī), trans. I. Mélikoff-Sayar (Paris, 1954); see also 
Sources for Turkish History in the Hospitallers’ Rhodian Archive, 22-3. 
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emirates in the Aegean (during the early 1320s), it is instead necessary to start by 
analysing the context in which a crusade against the Turks emerged during the early 
fourteenth century. Thus Chapter 1 begins with a study of the crusade policies of 
Popes Benedict XI and Clement V, with specific reference to those instances where the 
Turks were mentioned in crusade negotiation, but did not form the primary target of a 
crusade, and to those instances where alternative crusading proposals were discussed 
in preference to an Aegean expedition. In this chapter it is shown that changes in 
attitudes towards the Turks, and subsequently in crusading policy, were brought about 
as much by events in western Europe as by the activities of the Turks in the Aegean. 
During the pontificate of Clement V (1305-1314), the strong French influence over the 
papacy resulted in a crusade to the Holy Land and Constantinople taking precedence 
over a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean. This changed in the 1320s, during the 
pontificate of John XXII (1316-1332), when, partly in order to extricate itself from 
French influence, the papacy turned towards the Latin mercantile republics of the 
Aegean to launch a smaller-scale crusade against the Turks. This reliance on the 
mercantile republics meant that the papacy began to integrate more economic 
mechanisms into its crusading policy.  
In contrast to Chapter 1, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on military action (sometimes 
in the form of a crusade) and commercial exchange “on the ground” in the Aegean, 
from the perspectives of the Genoese and the Venetians respectively. Chapter 2 
focuses predominantly on the Zaccaria lords of Chios (c.1300-1329); their commercial 
activity in the Aegean, the ways in which they resisted the Turks, and their relationship 
with the Avignon popes in this regard. This involves a discussion of the various 
economic and spiritual privileges they received from John XXII and the success of these 
measures in facilitating the defence of the Aegean. Chapter 3 studies the activities of 
the Venetian government and merchants in the Aegean (1300-1327). It is during these 
years where Venetian policy changed from one of indifference towards the Turks to 
one of active opposition. Thus the Republic’s dealings with the Aegean powers and the 
papacy are discussed in detail. Especially the complex web of commercial treaties and 
truces formed with the Catalans of Athens and the Byzantines, who were both cited by 
the popes as allies of the Turks and legitimate targets for a crusade.  
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Chapter 4 continues with an assessment of the role of Venice in a crusade 
against the Turks; namely the evolution of plans for an anti-Turkish coalition (1327-
1334) and the  attempts of the Republic to persuade the papacy and France to 
participate in this expedition. It is shown that the Venetians were the prime movers 
behind the formation of this league. In contrast, John XXII was reluctant to follow the 
lead of Venice until the very last moment. The reasons for the belated response of the 
papacy and France towards the naval league are therefore discussed as well as the 
activities of the league in the Aegean. Chapter 5, focuses on the pontificate of Benedict 
XII (1334-1342), where there was a reduction of crusade impetus. The reasons for the 
pope’s apathetic Aegean policies are discussed, as well as the measures taken by the 
Latin states in the Aegean to preserve their possessions, without papal support. As will 
be seen, it is during this period, that crusade impetus shifted even further to the Latins 
of the East. 
Chapter 6 makes up the final part of this thesis and the climax of negotiations 
for an anti-Turkish crusade during the Crusade of Smyrna (1343-1351). This crusade 
has been documented in rich detail in the sources, thus a background of events is 
provided. After this, a discussion of the papal, Venetian and Genoese contributions 
towards the crusade are undertaken. Here it is discovered that Pope Clement VI, as 
John XXII had done before him, granted wide-ranging spiritual and temporal privileges 
to crusaders in order to encourage participation, including to Venice, which had 
previously been refused economic concessions. Finally the reasons for the decline and 
end of the Crusade of Smyrna are explained, including the dire economic situation in 
the Aegean and the outbreak of the Black Death. The Thesis ends with a conclusion 
summing up the main points of the thesis and an assessment of the motivations to, 
and response of, the Latins and the papacy to the Aegean crusades. 
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Historical Background: 1291-1300 
 
Crusading after the fall of Acre 
The fall of Acre on 18 May 1291 brought to an end almost 200 years of Latin 
settlement in the Levant. Not surprisingly, the news of the collapse of the city re-
awakened crusade fervour in western Christendom and ushered in a period of 
heightened enthusiasm for the recovery of the Holy Land.1 As will be shown, the 
strategies formed during these years would continue to influence crusade thinking 
throughout the fourteenth century. 
One of the most significant developments in crusade planning  after 1291 was 
the growth of interest in the use of economic apparatus to facilitate the recovery of 
the Holy Land, as propagated by a number of the crusade theorists in their De 
recuperatione terrae sanctae treatises.2 These proposals were not often overly new in 
themselves, but they nevertheless triggered some widespread changes in crusade 
strategy, in that existing plans, such as the apostolic embargo on trade with Muslims, 
and efforts to aid the kingdoms of Cyprus and Lesser Armenia, would be given more 
attention than before. It was assumed at this time that the naval superiority of the 
West and an economic blockade of Mamluk trade, which depended on the 
cooperation of the maritime republics, would pave the way for the liberation of the 
Holy Places. Therefore, in August 1291 Pope Nicholas IV urged Genoa and Venice to 
make peace with one another in order to prevent any trade with Egypt. This was 
followed by the proclamation of a total ban on all trade with Muslims, which would 
form the backbone of papal decrees for the rest of the Avignon period.3 Of the 
theorists, Fidenzio of Padua was amongst the first to adopt this strategy; he wrote that 
the Mamluks were especially vulnerable to a trade embargo because they depended 
on the import of war materials, such as timber and pitch from the West.  Moreover, 
                                                        
1 Schein, Fideles, 264-5; N. Housley, The Later Crusades from Lyons to Alcazar, 1274-1580 (Oxford, 1992), 
22. 
2
 The most detailed assessment of the crusade theorists is given by Leopold, Recover, passim. Also see 
Schein, Fideles, 74-111; Atiya, Crusade, 47-154; J. Delaville le Roulx, La France en Orient au XIV
e
 siècle, 2 
vols (Paris, 1886), i. 13-27. 
3 Stantchev, Embargo, 183; Housley, Avignon, 201. The origins of the trade embargo can be traced back 
to the Third Lateran Council of 1179. This is discussed in detail by Stantchev, Embargo, 26-7, 45-71. Also 
see Ashtor, Levant Trade, 17; Schein, ‘“milites Christi”’, 685. 
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they relied on Christian imports of other goods and the tariffs levied on Christian 
merchants, as well as slaves to sustain their army.  According to Fidenzio a fleet of no 
less than 30 galleys would be needed to cut off Egypt in preparation for a general 
crusade.4 This idea of economic warfare was henceforth adopted by many other 
theorists, including Charles II of Anjou and Ramon Lull.5 The immediate defence of the 
remaining Christian strongholds in the Levant – Cyprus and Armenia – was also actively 
propagated by the popes and theorists at this time. These states had assumed 
increased importance as it was widely believed that they could be used as stepping 
stone to the Holy Land. Moreover, since the loss of Acre, they had grown in 
commercial importance, despite being surrounded by powerful Muslim rulers and 
vulnerable to attack.6  
A handful of small-scale expeditions were launched at this time in an attempt 
to implement the strategies of the theorists. In 1293, Nicholas IV placed Manuel 
Zaccaria in charge of a fleet which raided the ports of Candelore (Alanya), on the 
southern coast of Asia Minor, and Alexandria in Egypt.7 In the same year the Templars 
also equipped six galleys in Venice for the defence of Cyprus.8 This was also the case in 
1304 when Frederick III of Sicily, who had previously refused to spearhead a crusade to 
Constantinople, asked for and received papal permission to send ten ships under the 
command of his half-brother Sancho of Aragon to capture Byzantine islands in the 
Aegean, which were to be used as a base for enforcing the embargo.9 Throughout the 
pontificate of Clement V, the crusading strategies formulated during the last years of 
the thirteenth century, concerning Cyprus, Armenia and the embargo, would continue 
to predominate.10 Even as the Turks began to take precedence over the Mamluks, as 
the target of crusading aggression, this line of thinking – as is demonstrated by the 
work of Marino Sanudo – never really disappeared. In fact, as the menace of the Turks 
                                                        
4 For Fidenzio of Padua, see Schein, Fideles, 91-102; Idem, ‘“milites Christi”’, 687; Leopold, Recover, 119-
23; Stantchev, Embargo, 31. 
5 For more on these: Schein, Fideles, 102-111;  Idem, ‘“milites Christi”’, 687; Leopold, Recover, 20-3 and 
passim; Hillgarth, Lull, 4-5;  
6 Schein, Fideles, 77-9. Also see Menache, Clement V, 102-3. 
7
 Tedisio Doria was co-captain of the Genoese fleet, it was joined by galleys from Cyprus: J. Richard, ‘Le 
royaume de Chypre et l’embargo sur le commerce avec l’Egypte (fin XIII
e
-début XIV
e
 siècle’, Académie 
des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1984), 120-34, at 123; Schein, Fideles, 77-8. 
8 Schein, Fideles, 78 
9
 For more on Sancho’s expedition to the Aegean: Laiou, Constantinople, 138, 145, 147. 
10 E.g. the treatises of Fulk of Villaret and James of Molay: ch. 1, pp. 46-7. 
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grew, economic tools such as the trade ban began to be used to shift crusading 
impetus from the Holy Land and towards the Aegean. 
 
 
A new enemy: the emergence of the Turks in the early fourteenth century 
We have seen how crusading strategy developed in the final decade of the thirteenth 
century, but it must be remembered that crusade planners in Europe were largely 
unaware of events in the Aegean. These would eventually come to the fore as the 
Turks became the primary target of western crusading endeavour. This section will 
briefly outline the formation of the Turkish emirates in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries. 
The disintegration of Byzantine control in Asia Minor during the last decades of 
the thirteenth century was coupled with, and exacerbated by, a period of extreme 
violence and disorder for the Turkish tribes of the region.11 Demographic pressure 
from the East and the weakness of the Byzantine Asia Minor frontier drew many 
Turkish tribes further into western Anatolia.12 Before the end of the thirteenth 
century, this widespread political fragmentation had led to the emergence of 
numerous small principalities and relatively autonomous tribal domains in parts of 
Anatolia.13 These formulated into the establishment of various emirates, or beyliks, 
centred around the ruling house of a head Turkish chieftain.14 By the end of the 
century these emirates had occupied the Anatolian coastal regions of the Aegean – 
something which had not been achieved since the initial Seljuk expansion of the 
eleventh century. Among these was the emirate of Menteshe which by 1269, already 
                                                        
11 C. Kafadar, Between the Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, CA, 1995), 5. 
The last decades of the eleventh century had signified the beginning of the Islamization of Asia Minor, 
where Byzantine control and military power were gradually ceded to Turkic émigrés arriving in Anatolia. 
For a detailed discussion of this: S. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the 
Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Los Angeles, CA, 1971), passim; 
C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History 
c.1071-1330, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), 1-32, 64-72; W.L. Langer, & R.P. Blake, ‘The rise of 
the Ottoman Turks and its historical background’, American Historical Review 37 (1932), 477-80. 
12 It is necessary to point out here that the Turkish inhabitants of Anatolia in the late thirteenth century 
were ethnically and linguistically different from those of the eleventh century. The inhabitants of 
Turchia, or Rūm, were divided into different communities of religious, linguistic and political affiliation. 
The Ottomans, for example, were mostly Muslim and mostly Turkish speaking (although not all as a 
native tongue): Kafadar, Between the Two Worlds, 4. 
13
 Ibid., 6. 
14 For more on this: Zachariadou, TC, 105-14. 
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controlled the coastal region of Caria.15 By the late 1270s there is evidence of these 
emirates participating in trade with the Venetians of the Aegean and by the early 
1300s they had began to encroach upon both Latin and Byzantine possessions in the 
Sea.16  
Contemporary Byzantine sources give a vivid testimony to the plight which was 
befalling the empire at this time. A letter from the Patriarch of Constantinople 
Athanasios I, dated 1299-1300, urged Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos to return to 
Constantinople from Thessalonica as soon as possible because of the impending threat 
from the Turks:  
 
My lord emperor, if you had not been here, such terrible misfortunes 
would not have befallen my Christian brethren, nor would the 
patrimony of Christ [...] have ended up being devoured by the 
murderous Ishmaelites.17  
 
By 1302 the first references to Turkish incursions into the Aegean appear. 
George Pachymeres, when mentioning the resignation of patriarch John Kosmas in July 
1302,18 reported that the Turks (Persians), who came from the interior of Asia Minor, 
had moved to the coastal regions. There they had constructed boats and forced the 
native inhabitants to flee. According to Pachymeres, it is with these boats that the 
Turks had attacked and plundered the Cyclades and proceeded to raid a number of 
other Aegean islands including Chios, Samos, Karpathos and Rhodes. These assaults 
were so severe that they deprived the islands of almost all their inhabitants and 
caused great suffering to those who were left on the islands and on the mainland. Even 
the lands of the interior were being rapidly destroyed by the Turks and every day new 
                                                        
15 H. Theunissen, ‘Ottoman-Venetian diplomatics: the Ahd-names. The historical background and the 
development of a category of political-commercial instruments together with an annotated edition of a 
corpus of relevant documents’, Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies 1.2 (1998), 1-698, at 68. 
16
 Zachariadou, TC, 3-7. 
17 Athanasios I, The Correspondence of Athanasius I Patriarch of Constantinople: Letters to the Emperor 
Andronicus II, Members of the Imperial Family and Officials, ed. & trans. A.-M.M. Talbot (Washington, 
DC, 1975), nr. 1, 3. 
18 D.M. Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1993), 109. 
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disasters were being announced to the emperor, who was unable to deal with one 
tragedy after another.19  
This bleak picture was corroborated by the account of the Catalan chronicler 
Ramon Muntaner, who when referring to the winter of 1302-3, commented that the 
Catalan general Roger of Flor had ordered his army and fleet to winter in Chios ‘since 
the Turks were in the habit of raiding all these islands with their boats’.20 The 
contemporary writer Marino Sanudo also commented that the Turks had bought the 
‘cruellest destruction’ to the islands near the Turkish mainland, to such an extent that 
the whole area was devastated.21 The Turkish advance was so swift that by c.1305 the 
important Byzantine city of Ephesos on the Aegean coast had fallen to the Turks of 
Menteshe, possibly under the leadership of the emir’s son-in-law Sasa.22 It is in this 
political vacuum that the first instances of Latin contact with, and resistance against 
the Turkish emirates would be made. 
 
                                                        
19
 George Pachymeres, iv. bk. x, pp. 376-7. 
20
 Ramon Muntaner, 52. 
21 Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, 29. 
22 This is the date argued by A. Failler, ‘Éphèse fut-elle prise en 1304 par les Turcs de Sasan?’, Revue des 
études byzantines 54 (1996), 245-8. Lemerle has given the date as 24 October 1304: Lemerle, Aydin, 20-
1. For more on Sasa and the problematic dating of his reign, see Ibid., 19-24. 
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Part I: The Beginning of Crusades to the Aegean: 1302-1327 
 
Chapter 1. The Role of the Papacy in the Aegean Crusades 
 
1.1. The Focus of Crusading during the Pontificates of Benedict XI and Clement V: 
The Role of France and Distractions to an Aegean Crusade 
 
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the popes and the rulers of France 
remained the two chief supporters of the crusading tradition. During the first half of 
the century the target of a crusade shifted from the Holy Land and Constantinople to 
the Aegean and the Turkish maritime emirates of Anatolia. This shift was brought about 
initially by the Franks in the Aegean, primarily the Venetians, Genoese and Hospitallers, 
but was later adopted and supported by the papacy and, to a lesser degree, the French 
Crown. However, this change was not quick in coming: despite the acknowledgment of 
the threat posed by the Turks in the early 1300s, it took another twenty years for 
indulgences and other privileges to be granted specifically to those fighting against 
them.  
This chapter will explore the process of this change in crusade strategy and the 
context in which it occurred, in an effort to establish the reasons why a crusade in the 
Aegean against the Turks came to prominence during the mid-fourteenth century. It 
will focus on the following areas: i) the influence of the French Crown on papal 
crusading policy, especially the presence of pre-existing crusading traditions to 
Constantinople and Jerusalem; ii) the methods in which John XXII attempted to 
extricate himself from dependency on the French over crusade planning; iii) the 
implementation of crusade mechanisms in the Aegean, such as during the Hospitaller 
passagium of 1308-10 and in Achaia during the 1320s. 
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1.1.1. French influence on the papacy at the turn of the fourteenth century 
The split between the French Crown and the Curia arising during the conflict between 
King Philip IV of France (1285-1314) and Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) in the 1290s, 
would jeopardise crusade proposals for the opening years of the fourteenth century. 
The dispute arose in 1296 over church taxation in France and escalated into a contest 
over temporal-spiritual supremacy. During this time, Boniface VIII excommunicated the 
French king, who in turn accused the pope of, amongst other crimes, murder, sodomy 
and heresy.1 At the time of Boniface’s death, Philip had emerged triumphant and, after 
defeating the Flemings and English, had  asserted himself as the dominant force in 
international affairs.2 For the papacy, the scandal over the conflict with Boniface VIII, in 
particular the charges levelled at the pope, would mar papal prestige and ultimately 
compromise the independence of Benedict XI and his successor, the first of the 
Avignon popes, Clement V.3 For Philip IV, the conflict gave him the confidence to 
elevate his position to that of protector of both Church and pope, as well as champion 
of the Holy Land.4 
The influence which the French Crown had over the early Avignon Popes, 
especially Clement V, has been well documented in papal historiography. Ludwig 
Pastor, in his monumental work on the history of the popes, commented that: 
 
The essential character of that new epoch in the history of the Papacy, 
which begins with Clement V. and John XXII., consists in the lasting 
separation from the traditional home of the Holy See and from the 
                                                        
1 For a recent treatment of the affair between Boniface and Philip and its consequences see Mastnak, 
Crusading Peace, 229-78, esp. 229-39; S. Menache, Clement V (Cambridge, 1998), 191-9. Also see Philip 
the Fair and Boniface VIII: State vs. Papacy, ed. C.T. Wood (New York, NY, 1967); M.M. Curley, The 
Conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV, the Fair (Washington, DC, 1927); Mollat, Popes, 
46-9; M. Barber, The Trial of the Templars (Cambridge, 1978), 23-5; Hillgarth, Lull, 121-3. For a detailed, 
if dated, account of Boniface’s pontificate, see T.S.R. Boase, Boniface the Eighth: 1294-1303 (London, 
1933). 
2
 M. Jones, ‘The last Capetian and early Valois kings, 1314-1364’, NCMH, vi. 388-421, at 390, 396. 
3 Mastnak, Crusading Peace, 239-41. 
4 Mastnak, Crusading Peace, 244; J.R. Strayer, ‘France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most 
Christian King’, Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History: Essays by Joseph R. Strayer 
(Princeton, NJ, 1971), 300-14; Schein, ‘Philip IV’, 122. 
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Italian soil, which brought the Popes into such pernicious dependence on 
France and seriously endangered the universal nature of their position.5 
 
The importance of the relationship between the papacy and French kings has also been 
emphasised by more recent scholars, such as Norman Housley, who stated that:  
 
The election of Bertrand de Got as Pope [Clement V] in June 1305 was a 
diplomatic triumph for the French monarchy [...] for Bertrand had always 
had good relations with Philip IV and showed that he could be amenable 
to the wishes of the French King *...+ Throughout Clement V’s reign the 
influence exercised over papal affairs by Philip and his counsellors was 
profound and far reaching.6 
 
The personal crusading ambitions of the French kings were almost always associated 
with the Holy Land and Philip IV was no exception. The Capetian tradition of crusading 
which Philip inherited had been amplified by the canonisation of his grandfather Louis 
IX in 1297.7 As Joseph Strayer has shown, the involvement of the Capetian kings in the 
crusade had begun to form an integral part of royal propaganda and to become the rex 
Christianissimus Philip IV had to uphold the crusading tradition.8 The king expressed his 
interest in the Holy Land in a number of ways: he supported his brother Charles of 
Valois’s plans to recapture Constantinople (as a stepping stone to the eventual 
recovery of the Holy Land);9 and proposed to lead a crusade to the Holy Land in person 
(such as was discussed at the Council of Vienne). As will be shown, both of these had a 
                                                        
5 L. Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages, ed. & trans. F.I. Antrobus, et al., 
40 vols (London, 1894-1953), i. 58. 
6 Housley, Avignon, 12. Also see Housley, ‘Clement V’, 29-43, at 29-31; A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Crusade in the 
fourteenth century’, Europe in the Later Middle Ages, ed. J. Hale (London, 1965), 122-54, at 127. 
7 The deeds of Louis IX were further augmented by the completion of John of Joinville’s Vita of St Louis 
in 1309:  John of Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. & trans. M.N. de Wailly (Paris, 1874), 408-13. For 
an more on the Capetian tradition see J. Richard, Saint Louis: Crusader King of France, trans. J. Birrell 
(Cambridge, 1992), 87; J.S.C. Riley-Smith, ‘The Crown of France and Acre: 1254-1291’, France and the 
Holy Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades (Baltimore, MD, 2004), 45-62; N. Housley, 
‘France, England and the “national crusade”, 1302–86’, in France and the British Isles in the Middle Ages 
and Renaissance: Essays by Members of Girton College, Cambridge, in Memory of Ruth Morgan, ed. G. 
Jondorf and D. N. Dumville (Woodbridge, 1991), 183-201, at 185–6 (reprinted in HVR, item VII). 
8 Strayer, ‘France: The Holy Land’, 306-7. 
9
 Schein, ‘Philip IV’, 123. Charles, as a Capetian prince, also shared in his brother’s ancestral obligation to 
go on the crusade and was urged to pursue the deeds of his ancestors: CV, ii. nr. 1768 (March 1307). 
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profound effect on the crusading policies of Popes Benedict XI (1303-4) and Clement V 
(1305-14).  
 
 
1.1.2. Franco-papal plans to recover Constantinople: the proposed crusade of Charles 
of Valois 
The popes of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were aware of the 
decline of Byzantine power in Asia Minor at the hands of the emerging Anatolian 
Turkish emirates. However, since the pontificate of Pope Martin IV (1281-5), the Curia 
had shown that it was more willing to organise a crusade against the Greeks than to 
promote an alliance with them – a policy favoured during the pontificate of Gregory X 
(1271-6) and his immediate successors. Because the papal policy of aggression towards 
Byzantium had become firmly established by the end of the thirteenth century, in the 
early years of the fourteenth century the desire of the Curia to proclaim a crusade 
against the Byzantine empire, often with the further objective of liberating the Holy 
Land, took precedence over a crusade against the Turks.10  
The treaty of Caltabellota ended the war in Sicily, which involved the houses of 
Anjou and Aragon, and marked a turning point in relations between the Byzantine 
empire and Latin Christendom.11 It released the competing kingdoms of Europe from 
the conflict in Sicily and enabled them to turn their attention towards the Byzantine 
empire. After the treaty of Caltabellota was agreed, Charles of Valois, who had married 
the titular Latin Empress of Constantinople Catherine of Courtenay in 1301,12 
legitimised his claim to the Latin empire of Constantinople by renewing the Treaties of 
Viterbo; he could now regain an empire which was considered rightfully his by law.13 In 
1303 Nicola Boccasini, who came from a poor family with no connection to the 
                                                        
10 Schein, Fideles, 158-60; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 43-4.  
11 Laiou, Constantinople, 130. 
12 The marriage took place on 28 January 1301. For a background of Charles of Valois’s claims to 
Constantinople, see Laiou, Constantinople, 52-4; Schein, Fideles, 159-60; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 42-
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the proposed Angevin recovery of the Latin empire of Constantinople: J. Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou: 
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quarrelling factions of Rome, was elected as Pope Benedict XI. He was quick to 
renounce Boniface VIII’s excommunication of Philip IV, returning all privileges to him, 
and turned his attention towards the East in the hope that the leading powers of 
Europe would side with him and heed his call for a crusade.14 Consequently, in the early 
years of the fourteenth century, plans to recover Constantinople became fervently 
upheld in the courts of both Paris and Avignon. 
Pope Benedict XI, King Philip of France and his brother Charles of Valois all 
recognised that Franco-papal cooperation was essential for the realisation of a 
successful mission to Constantinople. Without it no expedition would carry the 
appropriate crusade mechanisms imposed by the Holy See, such as indulgences and 
church tithes, or enjoy the recruitment benefits which often resulted from an 
association with the crusade. This was demonstrated on 20 June 1304, when Benedict 
XI issued two bulls concerning the proposed recovery of Constantinople to be led by 
Charles of Valois. These bulls gave details of the first instances of crusade mechanisms 
being applied to the Aegean area in the fourteenth century. The first bull, In supreme 
preeminentia, urged Bishop Guy of Senlis to make available to Charles of Valois all the 
legacies, redemptions of vows and other revenues which had been allocated to the 
kingdom of France for the aid of the Holy Land, with the exception of tithes.15  
The second bull, addressed to all of the Christian faithful, granted them the 
same indulgences for accompanying Charles as they would gain from making the 
passage to the Holy Land.16 This was a reiteration of the crusading indulgence first 
issued by Pope Innocent III – and more specifically by Honorius III in 1222 – which was 
used throughout the period of the Avignon Papacy (1309-78).17 As Housley describes, 
this indulgence amounted to: 
                                                        
14 J.R. Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton, NJ, 1980), 274-9. 
15 BXI, nr. 1006, cols. 606-7; Setton, PL, i. 164, n. 7. The rulers of the fourteenth century, especially the 
French, were no doubt aware of the extraordinary cost of crusading and the need to secure church 
subsidies. Louis IX’s crusade of 1248-54, for example, cost the king six times the average annual revenue 
of France. Of this amount, two thirds came from proceeds from the French Church: J. Richard, Saint 
Louis: Crusader King of France, trans. J. Birrell (Cambridge, 1992), 111-12. A half-yearly French royal 
account of 1316 demonstrates that at times almost half of the revenue of the French Crown came from 
church taxes: Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 172. 
16 BXI, nr. 1007, col. 608 (in eiusdem Terrae subsidium transfretarent). This was repeated by Clement V 
in a bull issued in January 1306: CV, i. nr. 247, p. 45 (transfretaretis in Terre sancte subsidium). 
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 Housley, Avignon, 128-9. For the implementation of the crusade indulgence in Romania specifically, 
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[T]he full remission of the poena which arose from sin, together with a 
promise of greater joy from heaven, provided that the crusader was truly 
repentant and had submitted to canonical confession, thus being 
absolved of the culpa (guilt) of his sins [...] The point was that a proper 
administered crusade indulgence amounted to a guarantee of the 
immediate admission of the crucesignatus to heaven after death.18 
 
Furthermore Benedict XI also granted a full remission of penance, with the exception of 
heavenly reward, to those who were not able to travel overseas in person, but who 
could pay for someone else to travel at their expense.19 As shall be seen, indulgences of 
this magnitude were only extended to crusades specifically against the Turks during the 
Smyrna crusades of the 1340s.  
Only seven days after issuing the preliminary crusade bulls, another letter was 
dispatched from the Curia to Charles of Valois stating that the proclamation of the 
cross and the concession of the tithe on church proceeds, which had been granted to 
him, were now being suspended. Although Benedict stated in the letter that the 
privileges and apostolic protection would be re-issued at the opportune time, namely 
once the situation in France had improved, it is hard to gauge how realistic his plans for 
a crusade were.20  After all, the pope had only granted Charles the levying of lesser 
church proceeds in France which were extremely limited when compared to the 
generous tithes issued by his successor Clement V. Benedict’s attitude towards a 
crusade is hard to determine as he died only weeks after the original letters were 
written. Nevertheless, considering the precarious position of the Curia at Benedict’s 
accession, it would be fair to assume that the pope’s main priority lay in the restoration 
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of papal prestige and reconciliation with the French Crown. His provisional plans of a 
crusade to Constantinople were probably regarded as an ideal way of achieving this.21 
 With specific reference to this study, the crusade bulls of Benedict XI’s 
pontificate are of particular significance because they demonstrate that the Curia was 
aware of the threat from the Turkish emirates of Anatolia to the Byzantine empire as 
early as the summer of 1304. Indication of this is given in the bull In supreme 
preeminentia where Benedict stated that: 
 
Certainly, zeal itself for the faith should fire the hearts of the faithful to 
free the empire itself from the hands of hostile sons. For if (which God 
forbid!) it should happen that that same empire fell to the Turks and 
other Saracens and infidels, by whom the said Andronikos is being 
continually attacked, it would not thereafter be able to be easily rescued 
from the hands of those same peoples. O what serious danger and huge 
confusion the whole Roman mother Church and the whole Christian 
religion would suffer if (which may God avert!) such a loss were to 
occur!22 
  
This acknowledgement of the Turkish threat is important because it suggests that the 
papacy was willing to sanction a crusade against the Greeks as a way of defending 
Christian lands in the East from the Turks.23 It seems that Benedict’s words were wholly 
original in their use of the Turkish threat as a justification for crusading against the 
Greeks. Some have argued that Benedict’s words merely repeated those of earlier 
popes, who had also mentioned the threat by the Turks to Byzantium during the reign 
of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos. However, it is important to understand that the 
threat posed by the Anatolian Turks was not used by previous popes as a justification 
for a crusade against the Greeks, in the way it was used by Benedict XI.24 The only 
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mention of the Turkish threat by the papacy during the reign of Michael VIII was in 
connection with Theodore Metochites’s negotiations with Pope Gregory X (1271-6) for 
a joint crusade against the Anatolian Turks, and not when referring to a crusade against 
the Greeks.25  
 Eleven months after the death of Benedict XI, Bertrand of Got was elected Pope 
Clement V, on 5 June 1305. Clement came from a well-known Gascon family and had 
excellent political connections with the Curia and the kings of England and France.26 His 
association with the crusade existed before becoming pope; during his time as bishop 
of Albano he was dispatched by Boniface VIII to England to negotiate peace with France 
in an effort to facilitate a crusade to the Holy Land. Clement’s concern for the Holy 
Land is evident in an encyclical issued after his coronation, in which he stated that he 
wished to organise a crusade to rid the Holy Land of the ‘Babylonian enemy’.27 This 
attitude towards the Crusade is reflected by the dramatic increase in crusade proposals 
during his reign. Clement’s primary crusade objective was the recovery of Jerusalem, 
but for the majority of his pontificate Charles of Valois’s crusade to Constantinople 
took precedence, both as a crusade in its own right and as part of an expedition to the 
Holy Land.28  
Clement was quick to reverse the decision, taken by Benedict XI in June 1304, to 
postpone the proclamation of Charles of Valois’s crusade to Constantinople. On 14 Jan 
1306, the new pope issued a series of crusade bulls, granting indulgences, tithes and 
other privileges, which were elaborations of those issued by Benedict XI in 1304, with 
one, addressed to Bishop Guy of Senlis, being almost an exact copy of Benedict’s bull In 
supreme preeminentia.29 Yet despite these similarities, Clement’s initial crusade 
preparations seem to suggest that he was more serious about launching a crusade than 
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his predecessor. One indication of this can be found in the extent of the tithes which 
Clement granted for the proposed crusade to Constantinople. Unlike Benedict, who 
had specifically excluded church tithes from those revenues conceded to Charles of 
Valois, and had limited the concession to France, the financial grants made by Clement 
were far more generous.30 The registers stipulate that in the kingdoms of France, 
Naples and Sicily a two-year tithe on all ecclesiastical incomes was to be collected for 
the crusade to Constantinople, with the exception of the Hospitallers and Templars 
who were exempted in each case.31  
Clement also went to great efforts to encourage fuller participation in the 
crusade from those Mediterranean states whose assistance was deemed most 
important for the project to succeed. He stated that Frederick of Sicily and Philip of 
Taranto, the younger brother of King Robert of Naples, could receive the proceeds 
from tithes collected in Sicily and Naples respectively if they accompanied Charles on 
crusade.32  He also dispatched letters to the doges of Venice and Genoa encouraging 
them to provide maritime assistance for the forthcoming expedition.33 The letters had 
some success as, on 19 December 1306, Venice concluded a treaty with Charles, which 
stipulated that the crusader fleet was to depart from Brindisi between March 1307 and 
March 1308.34  
In the letters of 1306 Clement V clearly expressed his anguish at the activities of 
the schismatic Greek Church and he called for many barons and counts to join Charles 
‘fervently and powerfully’ in the recovery of Constantinople.35 It is clear that the 
overwhelming stimulus for the mission, as was indicated in Benedict XI’s letters, was 
the unification of the Churches and the recovery of Constantinople. The justification of 
seizing Byzantine lands to defend them from Turkish attacks was also apparent, 
although this was copied word-for-word from a previous letter of Benedict XI.36 Anti-
Turkish motivations were also cited in another bull, that written to the doge of Venice 
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granting the Republic indulgences if they were to join the crusade. In the letter 
Clement V suggested that by conquering Constantinople the crusaders would cause the 
‘souls of the Parthians or the Turks’ neighbouring the empire to be broken and that 
‘trembling Arabs’ would flee from the appearance of the Christian armies. However, 
the overall rhetoric of the letter places far more emphasis on correcting the errors of 
the Greeks, than defending the East from Turkish aggression.37   
Interestingly, Angeliki Laiou has shown that the equivalent letter sent by 
Clement V to Genoa, which urged the Commune to join Charles of Valois’s expedition, 
made far more of the Turkish threat to the Byzantine empire than that sent to Venice. 
According to Laiou, the letter to Genoa made the threat of the Turks to the empire the 
primary justification for the mission. She has rightly attributed this to the ‘special 
position of the Genoese in the Byzantine empire’ at that time. The Commune had 
vested interests in Byzantium and was a rare Latin ally of Andronikos II, thus, it had far 
more to lose from the recapture of Constantinople, than Venice, which was openly 
hostile to the empire. As Laiou has shown, Clement V therefore ‘very intelligently 
insisted on the one thing that the Genoese feared above all, the possible Turkish 
domination of the East’.38 
 On 3 June 1307, Clement V further advanced the crusade to Constantinople by 
issuing a bull of excommunication against ‘the supporter of the ancient schism’ 
Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos and his allies.39 In the months preceding the 
excommunication, the pope extended the preaching of the crusade from Southern 
Italy, Sicily, the Veneto, the March of Ancona and the diocese of Città di Castello to 
include Romagna and Ravenna.40 In addition to this, Philip of Taranto was granted a 
two year tithe on all ecclesiastical proceeds in the principality of Achaia, in Romania 
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and other lands, for the recovery of occupied Angevin lands from the Greeks.41 The 
excommunication was supplemented on the same day by a re-imposition of the tithe in 
Sicily which had been initially postponed.42 Once again, Frederick of Sicily was allowed 
to keep the proceeds of the tithe, if he decided to accompany Charles of Valois on 
crusade. Furthermore, Charles was granted financial aid by his brother King Philip IV 
who conceded the French tithe to him because the ‘business of the aforesaid empire’ 
needed to be accelerated. Clement rewarded Philip for his generosity with an 
additional tithe for one year.43 
By the beginning of 1308 the project had, in theory, the support of the major 
Latin powers of the Mediterranean, with the exception of Genoa. At the same time the 
search for suitable allies in the East had also begun in earnest, and it is in the dealings 
between Charles of Valois and the Christians in the East that more information can be 
gleaned about the role of the Anatolian Turks in providing a motivation for this 
crusade. One such ally for the crusade was the Catalan Grand Company who had been 
fighting the Byzantines with notable success since May 1305. The Company had 
originally been employed as mercenaries to fight the Turks in Anatolia by the Byzantine 
Emperor Andronikos II, but had turned against their employers after disputes over 
payment.44 Charles, after being informed of this turn of events, no doubt identified the 
Catalans as a potential means of conquering Constantinople inexpensively and 
quickly.45 Accordingly, in 1307 Theobald of Cepoy, acting as Charles’s ambassador, was 
dispatched to the Aegean to negotiate an alliance with the leader of the Catalans, 
Berengar of Rocafort.46 In the summer of the same year Ramon Muntaner, one of the 
leaders of the Catalan expedition, reported that Berengar ‘swore alliance to Sir Charles 
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and made the entire Company do the same’.47 Robert Burns has even claimed that the 
Catalans ‘counted in their number elements of a genuine crusade’.  48 Indeed, according 
to Ramon Muntaner they flew the banner of the Holy Apostolic Father ‘in the name of 
God and the Holy Catholic faith [...] against the emperor and his soldiers, who were 
schismatics’.49 
However, as Muntaner explains, the Catalans took little notice of Charles of 
Valois as their new overlord and, more importantly, received no papal sanction for 
their actions.50 In fact, it would be difficult to argue that the Catalans were motivated 
by a desire to fight the enemies of the Church. Muntaner’s account hints at both anti-
Greek and anti-Muslim sentiments within the Company, but does little to 
counterbalance his admission that the Catalans began their eastern expedition under 
the employment of the Greeks and later allied with the Turks. Furthermore, Muntaner 
does not disguise the fact that after the Catalans had allied themselves with the Turks, 
they conquered the Latin duchy of Athens, killing its Catholic ruler, for which they were 
later excommunicated.51  
As well as the Catalans, Charles of Valois also sought the support of non-
Catholic powers in the Aegean area and the Balkans. In 1307, there is evidence to 
suggest that he also opened negotiations with Greek conspirators unhappy with the 
rule of Emperor Andronikos II.52 It is interesting to note that some of the Greeks 
involved – notably John Monomachos, Constantine Limpidaris and the monk 
Sophronias (who were all from Asia Minor)53 –  appear to have been motivated by the 
need for a powerful outside ruler to defend the empire against the Turks. In particular, 
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Sophronias lamented the invasions of the Turks and the destruction of the cities of Asia 
Minor;54 Limpidaris wrote that many Christians of Asia Minor would defect to the Turks 
and convert to Islam unless help was forthcoming;55 and Monomachos stated that 
Anatolia was being ‘ravaged by the pagans and by other enemies’ which put the rest of 
the empire in danger of being lost.56 This concern is understandable considering the 
inability of the Byzantine government to provide for the defence of the eastern regions 
of the empire. Moreover, the regions under Turkish attack – in Asia Minor – were those 
native to the conspirators.  
For his part, Charles was no doubt aware of his position as a possible saviour of 
the Eastern empire and he may well have used this as a bargaining chip to gain Greek 
support for his planned crusade. This would certainly fit into the pattern of justifying 
the crusade as a means of defending eastern lands from Turkish attacks, as had at 
times been expressed in the crusade bulls issued by Benedict XI and Clement V. 
However, determining the exact level of anti-Turkish motivation in the negotiations 
with the Greek conspirators is hard to establish as the sources only give evidence for 
the Greek side of the negotiations. Charles was certainly aware of the potential of using 
the Turkish threat for a motivation for his crusade, but it can only be speculated as to 
what extent he did this. Certainly, in regard to negotiation with his Latin counterparts, 
the Turks usually only played a minor role in justifying the mission. This is the case in 
the documents concerning the confirmation of the Valois-Venetian alliance, which 
make no further reference to the Turkish threat as a justification for the crusade.57 In 
the end, the exact outcomes of Charles’s negotiations with the Greek conspirators 
remain obscure and it seems that they ultimately came to nothing. 
Despite the stepping up of crusade efforts in the spring and summer of 1307, 
and negotiations with foreign parties, the approaching deadline in the alliance between 
Charles of Valois and Venice, which stipulated that a crusade should not depart after 
March 1308, was never met. In the end, the proposed expedition did not materialise, 
despite the best efforts of the pope. This was in part due to the death of Charles of 
Valois’s wife Catherine of Courtenay in October 1307, which resulted in his claim to the 
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Latin empire being transferred to his daughter Catherine of Valois,58 but also in part 
due to the escalating conflict in Flanders. This prevented much of the French nobility 
from leaving the kingdom on crusade and restricted Charles’s access to the tithes he 
had previously been granted by his brother in France.59 As shown earlier, at times 
Charles of Valois’s planned crusade to Constantinople was linked to the defence of the 
East from Turkish attack, but this only seemed to form a subsidiary motivation. It 
probably played more of a role in negotiations with those in the East than between 
Charles and the papacy, who were mostly concerned with rectifying the errors of the 
Greek Church and fulfilling dynastic ambitions. 
 
 
1.1.3. Franco-papal plans to recover the Holy Land: the Council of Vienne 
The last great crusade initiative of Clement V’s pontificate – the Council of Vienne – 
marked a confirmation of French influence over crusade negotiation.60  The rulers of 
western Europe were invited to attend the Council, along with the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy of Christendom, but only Philip IV of France attended in person.61 This 
reflected the mood of the whole Council, where Franco-papal negotiations dominated 
affairs. For Philip IV, the papal adoption of the suppression of the Templars, which had 
been undertaken in France since 1307, was an integral prerequisite to the launching of 
a crusade to the Holy Land. In a sense, the king used the Templar affair as a bargaining 
chip at Vienne; he would participate in a forthcoming crusade, but only once the 
suppression of the Order had been ratified by the pope. Thus Philip IV’s promise to take 
the cross was only made after the bull Vox in excelso, which promulgated the 
suppression of the Temple, had been issued.62 On 3 April 1312 the pope issued the bull 
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Redemptor noster to levy a six-year tenth on the entire Catholic Church for a 
forthcoming passagium generale to the Holy Land. This was to be led by Philip IV and 
was to depart no later than March 1319.63 The correspondence concerning this crusade 
reflected the influence of the French Crown on the proceedings of the Council and no 
reference to the Turkish presence in the Aegean was made.64 
However, Clement’s attention was not only focussed on the Holy Land. On the 
30 April the proceeds of the Vienne tenth were extended to include Philip of Taranto’s 
defence of the principality of Achaia from the Greeks.65 In December of the same year 
Clement had revived Valois plans to recover Constantinople by authorising a marriage 
between Philip of Taranto and Catherine, the daughter of Charles of Valois.66 A bull 
issued to Philip on 7 May 1312 stated that Philip would travel overseas with 2,000 
cavalry and 4,000 infantry to areas of Romania against the schismatic Greeks residing 
there. Moreover, all who accompanied Philip to fight against the schismatics would 
receive the same indulgences as those going in aid of the Holy Land.67 Thus Clement’s 
policy at Vienne, mirrored that of the earlier years of his pontificate: the support of an 
expedition to recover Constantinople, as a passagium particulare paving the way for a 
general French-led expedition to the Holy Land.68 Clement took further measures to 
protect Philip’s lands in the build up to his passagium by threatening the Catalans of 
Athens with excommunication if they did not cease to harass him.69  
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The crusading zeal shown by the French crown was not, however, shared by 
everyone. Paulino Veneto, when commenting on the Council, remarked that nothing 
followed the passage, except for a ‘great scandal of the Christian people’.70 This view 
was shared by the anonymous author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi who wrote that:  
 
It escapes my memory how Clement’s rule has profited the Church: he 
gathered men at Vienne and granted indulgences for the Holy Land, 
collected a vast amount of money, but it has not profited the Holy Land 
at all. He has granted tenths to kings and plundered the churches of the 
poor, it would be better for rectors to not have a pope than be subjected 
to so many daily exactions. Among all the provinces, England alone feels 
the burden.71 
 
Although this accusation is overly harsh on Clement V, it is clear that many prelates, 
especially those from England, found the pope’s taxation oppressive.72 Moreover, 
comments such as these may reflect general dissatisfaction over the protracted, 
expensive, and ultimately fruitless negotiations with the French over a grand crusade 
to the Holy Land. In the end Clement V was unable to launch a passagium generale or 
even a passagium particulare to the Aegean or the Holy Land, despite having finally 
managed to gain active crusade participation from the most powerful ruler in Europe – 
in the following months the plans for a crusade fell apart, after the deaths of Clement V 
(20 April 1314) and King Philip of France (29 November 1314).73  
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1.1.4. The first Aegean crusade: the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes 
Plans for a crusade to Constantinople and the Holy Land were the principal areas of 
Franco-papal crusade negotiation during the pontificate of Clement V. As noted before, 
even these plans were at times blended with wider Latin operations in Frankish Greece 
and the Aegean, such as the defence of Achaia from the Greeks or the defence of Asia 
Minor from Turkish expansion. This diversion of impetus from the two principal areas 
of crusading is even more starkly represented in the Hospitaller seizure of Rhodes, in 
particular the passagium to the Aegean in 1310.74 This mission constituted the first 
papal-supported expedition to the East and also an anomaly in Clement V’s pontificate. 
It signified a crusade that was organised with limited influence from the French, but 
was ultimately carried out without much control from the papacy either.  
The origins of the expedition, at least from a papal perspective, were 
disconnected from the Aegean. In fact, by the beginning of 1306 the issue of providing 
defence for the kingdoms of Cyprus and Lesser Armenia, had come to prominence in 
the Curia.75 Clement V requested that the masters of the military orders meet with him 
at Poitiers to advise him on the most effective way of liberating the Holy Land, which, 
in turn could also provide a way of aiding Armenia and Cyprus. It is in this regard that, 
on 6 June 1306, Clement V wrote to the masters of the two military orders, Fulk of 
Villaret of the Hospital and James of Molay of the Temple.76 The tracts written in 
response to this request were quite different: James of Molay advocated a full-scale 
passagium generale to Egypt or Syria;77 while Fulk of Villaret suggested a more realistic 
                                                        
74
 The island was an ideal base for the Hospitallers for a number of reasons. It was positioned well 
enough for intervention in three of the principal areas of crusading in the East at this time: the 
reconquest of Constantinople, the defence of Armenia and Cyprus, and even the recovery of the Holy 
Land. The island was also comparatively large and fertile and was situated off the coast nearest to the 
emirate of Menteshe – the most aggressive of the emirates in the early fourteenth century. It was thus 
ideally suited to fighting the Turks as well as policing shipping in the region: Housley, Avignon, 11. Also 
see the description of Rhodes by Ludolph of Sudheim, Description of the Holy Land, and of the Way 
Thither, trans. A. Stewart, PPTS 12 (London, 1895), 34. For more information on the initial missions to 
the island, see Ch. 2, pp. 78-9. 
75 Schein, Fideles, 194-6; Menache, Clement V, 101-5. 
76 They were to meet on 1 November 1306: CV, i. nr. 1033 (6 June 1306); A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers 
and the papacy, 1305-1314’, Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst-, und Landesgeschichte: Peter Herde zum 
65. Geburtstag, ed. K. Borchardt & E. Bunz, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1998), ii. 595-622, at 599-602 (reprinted in 
LVR5, item V). 
77 For more details on the treatise of James of Molay: S. Menache, ‘The last Master of the Temple: James 
of Molay’, Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar 
Presented to Malcolm Barber, ed. N. Housley (Aldershot, 2007), 229-40, at 233-4; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers 
and the papacy’, 599-600; Schein, Fideles, 201-2; Cocci, ‘Le projet de blocus naval’, 178. 
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smaller-scale expedition, or passagium particulare, which would enforce the embargo 
on Mamluk trade and harass the coasts of Egypt and Syria in preparation for a later 
passagium generale.78 In the end, Fulk of Villaret was unable to attend the meeting 
with the pope in 1306 because he was engaged in his mission to Rhodes.79 
Nevertheless, the master arrived in France the following year where he was apparently 
well received by the pope.80 On 5 September 1307 Clement V granted the Hospitallers 
the island of Rhodes in perpetuum.81 
The objectives of the passagium being discussed by Villaret and the pope are 
unclear at this point. The Hospitaller expedition to Rhodes in 1306 and the arrest of the 
Templars in 1307,82 certainly would have made any possible intervention in Armenia 
seem unlikely, especially considering that neither master had provided much advice on 
the aid of Cyprus and Armenia in the treatises of 1306. Moreover, as neither master 
had proposed a crusade in conjunction with French attempts to recover Constantinople 
– which in either case was beginning to founder by 1307 – it is possible that a limited 
expedition to the Aegean was beginning to emerge as the most likely outcome of the 
negotiations.83 Clement V may have even viewed a Hospital passagium as a means of 
launching a semi-independent, minor crusade, without interference from the French 
Crown.84 Indeed, in either 1307 or 1308, Villaret submitted a redrafted proposal to the 
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pope which emphasised that the recovery of Jerusalem could be achieved without the 
participation of a western monarch.85  
The reaction of the rulers of Europe to the Hospitaller passagium also suggest 
that it may have been intended by Villaret and the pope as primarily a papal-Hospitaller 
enterprise with minimal outside interference. This seems to have been why Philip IV of 
France, who had initially promised to support the expedition with a payment of 
100,000 gold florins,86 later withdrew his support.87 The inability of rulers to tie the 
Hospitaller campaign to their own objectives may also provide a reason for why James 
II of Aragon opposed the Hospitaller campaign. He correctly assumed that it would only 
be used to consolidate the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes and was wary of any 
expedition that might divert valuable Hospitaller revenues and men from the ongoing 
conflict with the Moors in Iberia.88 According to the king, the island was too far from 
Egypt to be used as an effective base against the Mamluk Sultan and, moreover, it did 
not lie on the sailing routes to Alexandria.89  
Eventually, in the summer of 1308, it was decided that an expedition of 1,000 
knights, 4,000 infantry and 40 galleys should depart from Brindisi on 24 June 1309. 
Papal letters stated that it was intended as a preliminary passagium for the defence of 
Cyprus and Armenia, to be followed at a later date by a general crusade to the Holy 
Land.90 Papal support for the expedition was indicated by the appointment of a special 
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legate, Pierre of Pleine Chassagne, bishop of Rodez.91 In addition to these measures, 
Clement V proclaimed a total embargo on trade with Mamluk Egypt.92 The passagium 
eventually departed from Brindisi in early 1310. The latter stages of the crusade are 
obscure, but the enterprise ended up consolidating the Hospitaller possession of 
Rhodes without ever coming close to recovering the Holy Land or providing aid for 
Cyprus and Armenia.93 Clement V may well have felt that the passagium never fulfilled 
its intended objectives, but as has been noted, these are extremely hard to identify. It 
is also hard to determine exactly what role Fulk of Villaret played in the diversion of the 
passagium; considering the plight of the Templars at this time, it seems plausible that 
he may have deliberately misled the pope in order to gain support for his enterprise 
and ensure the survival of the Order.94 
Although the passagium was almost certainly not envisaged by Clement as a 
means of defending the Latins of the Aegean from Turkish attack, some evidence of 
anti-Turkish motivations in the sources do exist. For example, the accounts of Bernard 
of Gui and Amalric Auger both stated that the island was inhabited by the ‘impious 
Turks’ who were dwelling there under the rule of the emperor of Constantinople.95 
Furthermore, Bernard of Gui also claimed that ‘from that time, the island of Rhodes 
and other surrounding islands were brought back under the power and rule of the 
Christians, with the Turks utterly subjugated. Furthermore, there were many harbours 
in that place and from there lies open a suitable passage for Christians to the Holy 
Land’.96 The papal document confirming the possession of Rhodes in 1307 also made 
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mention of the ‘schismatics and infidels’ who opposed the Hospitallers.97 Whether the 
Turks had actually settled on Rhodes before 1306 is unlikely, but they had certainly 
raided Rhodes in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and some were 
probably employed by the Greeks to garrison Feraklos against the Hospitaller 
invasion.98 The references to the Turks during the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes 
highlight the increasing threat which the Turks posed to the islands of the eastern 
Aegean by 1307. The vulnerability of Rhodes was certainly recognised by Fulk of 
Villaret who had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a treaty with Andronikos II which 
would allow the Hospitallers to hold Rhodes as his subjects on condition that they 
defend the island from Turkish attack.99  
Whether the Hospitallers engaged in any effective action against the Turkish 
emirates in the early years of their occupation of Rhodes is hard to determine. The 
gestes des Chiprois reported that some of the Turkish emirates had been forced to pay 
the Hospitallers tribute, after the Order had reduced areas of the Anatolian mainland 
to obedience.100 It is also possible that the Order held various castles on the Anatolian 
coast, although this remains unclear.101 However, as Elizabeth Zachariadou has pointed 
out, the relations between the Hospitallers of Rhodes and the neighbouring Turkish 
emirates were, on the whole, friendly and peaceful in these early years.102 It is likely 
that the newly established order on Rhodes was wary of antagonising its neighbours in 
the Aegean. Indeed, the need for security and the financial constraints imposed by the 
subjugation of Rhodes seem to have led the Hospitallers to adopt a policy of 
cooperation in regard to the neighbouring emirates, which seems to have involved the 
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conclusion of some trade agreements.103 In fact, in 1311 it is reported that 250 
merchants from Rhodes were visiting the ports of Menteshe to purchase provisions 
and animals.104 The Hospitallers may even have acquired some territories on the 
Anatolian mainland through their alliance with the emir of Menteshe.105  
Certain rulers of Europe may not have been enthusiastic about the Hospitaller 
passagium, but the popular response was certainly favourable. The so-called “Crusade 
of the Poor” of 1309 – the most significant outbreak of popular enthusiasm during 
Clement V’s pontificate – was, according to contemporaries, partly a reaction to the 
Hospitaller expedition. It is likely that the Clement V’s proclamation of the preliminary 
Hospitaller passagium in 1308-10, combined with the issuing of indulgences at that 
time, led to the misinterpretation of the expedition as being one general crusade.106 
This resulted in thousands of ‘simple folk’ from England, Picardy, Flanders, Brabant, 
and Germany taking the cross and marching on Rome.107 Even though the destination 
of the expedition was still unknown at this stage, the Chronicon Elwacense and the 
Annals of Ghent both suggested that the participants wished to liberate the Holy 
Land.108 As the destination of the expedition remained unclear, it is also possible that 
some of the participants, who were well informed of Hospitaller activities, may have 
considered that the mission would travel to Rhodes. As has been shown, James of 
Aragon predicted that the passagium would be used to secure Rhodes and certain 
members of the Venetian Senate also believed that the mission was destined for the 
Aegean.109 In addition to this, the contemporary chronicler Ptolemy of Lucca wrote 
that the Hospitallers were going to capture the island of Rhodes and made no 
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reference to Jerusalem as the target of the crusade.110 The author of the Annales 
Paulini also specified that the pope granted indulgences for the aid of Cyprus and 
Armenia.111 Furthermore, the attraction of resistance against either the Greeks or 
Turks was regarded as a sufficient motivating factor by Fulk of Villaret, who, in 1313, 
wrote an appeal to Latin colonists from the West to help defend Rhodes from 
schismatic Greek and impious Turks.112 These indicate that the Hospitaller crusade may 
have still attracted a large response, even if it was known by some that it was not 
destined for Jerusalem.  
The lack of clarity surrounding the target of the Hospitaller passagium makes is 
impossible to say whether the Crusade of the Poor represented a popular response to 
crusades in the Aegean or not. Nevertheless, the episode still proved that a crusade 
and the granting of indulgences which went with it could inspire a dramatic expression 
of zeal amongst the populace. Various chroniclers from France, England and Germany 
all commented on the great and generous indulgences issued by Clement V to the 
crusaders who would go in aid of the Holy Land (and in some instances Cyprus and 
Armenia).113 This is corroborated by the Annales Paulini which suggested that the pope 
conceded ‘indulgences of faults and penalties such as have not been heard of in this 
generation’.114 Indeed, some of the indulgences issued by Clement V in 1308 for the 
Hospitaller passagium were generous. To raise funds for the crusade, the pope 
decreed that those who donated a sum of money for the expedition could gain an 
indulgence: the full crusade indulgence for those who paid the full cost of partaking in 
the crusade to Jerusalem or a lesser indulgence for those who contributed smaller 
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sums of money.115 Contemporaries were certainly impressed by the amounts of money 
raised for the campaign, and although the intention of the pope was to keep the 
number of volunteers low whilst at the same time raising sufficient funds for the 
passagium, the indulgences still seem to have the undesired effect of triggering an 
outburst of popular enthusiasm.116 The actual crusade indulgence itself, as issued by 
Clement V, remained no more liberal than those issued in the past, but the common 
understanding of the indulgence was that it formed a complete quittance of former 
sins, and it is possible in this instance that the chroniclers were merely commenting on 
the supreme value of the crusader indulgence, rather than making any educated 
comment on the particular form granted by the pope.117  
The reaction given by contemporary chroniclers to the Crusade of the Poor is a 
mixed one. Many reflect ecclesiastical disapproval and condemn the ill-discipline of the 
army, such as the anonymous author of the Annales et Notae Colbazienses, who 
commented that the army was like a headless tribe running through the world.118 In 
contrast to this, Ptolemy of Lucca, reported that the Hospitaller fleet was destroyed by 
a disastrous storm after leaving Italy, which the author claimed was an act of divine 
vengeance for the mistreatment of the common crusaders by the papacy and the 
Hospitallers.119 The whole episode clearly contrasts with the view, held by some, that 
Europe experienced a fall in crusading zeal during the late medieval period.120 
Therefore, it is evident that Clement V’s pontificate marked the domination of 
the French over crusade policy, as seen by the papal support of plans to recover 
Constantinople and the Holy Land, even though the Turks did feature as a subsidiary 
motivation for these enterprises at times. The Hospitaller passagium was, in contrast, 
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the first and only expedition to travel to the Aegean, but, as noted earlier, it did this 
almost independently of papal control. The papal registers for the last years of 
Clement’s pontificate reflect the Curia’s contrasting priorities: on the one hand they 
describe the plight of the Holy Land and the need to necessitate its liberation ‘from the 
hands of the Agarenes’;121 on the other hand they report the reality which faced the 
Latin states in the Aegean, who were ‘labouring to oppose the schismatic Greeks’.122 In 
both cases, however, they ignored the far more pressing need to protect these lands 
against the emerging Turkish maritime emirates which would come to the fore during 
the pontificate of Pope John XXII (1316-34). 
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1.2. The Extrication from French Influence over Crusade Organisation during the 
Pontificate of John XXII 
 
1.2.1. The situation in Europe during the apostolic vacancy of 1314-1316 
Although the pontificate of John XXII signified a shift of impetus for a crusade towards 
the Aegean and the Turks, in the years immediately after Clement V’s death  a number 
of incidents occurred, ranging from political turmoil to natural disaster, which 
tempered the enthusiasm of the papacy and the rulers of Europe for a crusade. When 
these problems escalated, the pope and kings alike became distracted from organising 
a crusade to either the Holy Land or Aegean. The first of these problems arose from the 
convoluted accession of both John XXII and Philip V of France, which contributed to a 
vacancy in the Apostolic See and a struggle for the French Crown, lasting for almost 
two years, in which a discussion of a crusade was put to one side.  
The problems of the election of the next pontiff arose from a sharp division 
amongst the cardinals charged with the task of appointing the new pope. The cardinals, 
23 in total, arranged themselves loosely into three opposing factions; those of the 
Gascon, Italian and Provençal parties. The smaller Italian and Provençal groups joined 
forces to block the election of the Gascon candidates, this resulted in a stalemate as 
neither side could obtain the required two-thirds majority. On 28 June 1316, after 
almost two years of fruitless negotiation, Philip of Poitiers intervened and forced the 
cardinals to arrive at a decision by sealing off the Dominican convent at Lyon, where 
the cardinals were housed. Over a month later, on 7 August, the name of Cardinal 
Jacques Duèse, the favourite of Philip of Poitiers and King Robert of Naples, was 
accepted.123 Pope John XXII, ‘born in Cahors and of base lineage’, was crowned in Lyon 
on 5 September, 1316.124 The apostolic vacancy also coincided with a period of turmoil 
for the French Crown, in which two kings, Louis X (November 1314 – June 1316) and his 
son John I (November 15 – 20, 1316) died within two years. Although Philip IV’s 
brothers Charles of Valois and Louis of Evreux wielded  great authority over the 
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kingdom during this period, it was Philip of Poitiers, the brother of Louis X, who 
became the new king in November 1316.  
In addition to the Franco-papal succession disputes, large areas of Northern 
Europe were inflicted with widespread hardship and suffering after the outbreak of the 
Great Famine in 1315-22.125 The famine may have contributed to a rise in crusade 
zeal,126 but it is more likely that the economic decline of the regions most affected by 
crop failure did more to interfere with a crusade than inspire it.127 The situation in the 
Low Countries and Northern France was made worse than in other areas because of 
the outbreak of war between France and Flanders in 1316, which worsened the effects 
of the famine.128  
These intermittent Franco-Flemish clashes constituted another major threat to 
the realisation of a crusade as the pontificate of John XXII progressed and were 
exacerbated as the English began to interfere in the disputes. This would reach a climax 
in the later 1330s with the outbreak of the Hundred Years War. Signs of growing 
Franco-Flemish tension were already evident in the earliest Franco-papal 
correspondences of 1316, when it was clear that for the French the quelling of 
disturbances in Flanders would take precedence over a crusade.129 Likewise, after the 
breakdown of Anglo-French relations during the Saint Sardos incident in October 1323, 
French crusade negotiations were shelved by Charles IV. A good example of the 
diversion from the crusade is illustrated by the actions of Charles of Valois – he was the 
primary candidate to lead a passagium in 1323 but two years later he was placed in 
command of French troops in Gascony, where he led them against the English.130 
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 If the attention of the French was drawn away from the crusade by Flanders 
and England, then the papacy was equally distracted by the escalation of the conflict in 
Northern Italy between Guelph and Ghibelline factions. During the papal vacancy the 
pro-imperial rulers of Lombardy had united to threaten the papal partisans in the area, 
so on his accession, John XXII adopted a more aggressive policy than his predecessor in 
an attempt to rally his supporters.131 The conflict became focussed into a contest over 
the control of Genoa, after the outbreak of civil-war in the city in 1317.132 On the 
accession of Charles IV the war in Italy intensified and in January 1322 Milan was 
placed under interdict and indulgences were promised to those who would fight 
against the city.133 In general, the French kings opposed papal engagement in Italy 
because it was seen as a distraction from a crusade, but despite their protests, they 
were unable to prevent the pope from committing to increased military and financial 
involvement in the conflict, which characterised the mid 1320s.134 
 Finally, after 1313, nearly all of Latin Europe became involved in the contest 
between the newly elected Holy Roman Emperor, Louis IV of Bavaria (1314-1347) and 
the pope.135  This gave new virulence to the Guelph-Ghibelline conflict in areas of 
Northern Italy, especially Lombardy and Tuscany, after Louis IV sided with the Visconti 
of Milan against the papal Guelphs in 1323.136 In response to this action John XXII 
vowed to depose the emperor; the ensuing struggle saw Louis accuse the pope of 
heresy in 1324, the pope excommunicate the emperor in the same year, and the 
election of an antipope in 1328.137 Because of these events, recent historians have 
rightly observed that much of John XXII’s pontificate, especially the early years, were 
marked by the dilution of the crusade to the Holy Land as it jostled for attention 
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amongst more pressing matters such as the Franco-Flemish war and the worsening 
conflict in Italy.138  
 
 
1.2.2. The decline of Franco-papal crusades to Constantinople and the Holy Land and 
the emergence of the passagium particulare 
Clement V’s pontificate was marred by the reliance on the French Crown for a crusade, 
to either Constantinople or the Holy Land, which never materialised. He was willing to 
grant generous church tithes which enabled these proposals to develop, even though 
they eventually failed. In fact, the only expedition which did travel to the East was the 
Hospitaller passagium of 1308-10, which had no direct input from the French Crown 
and minimal control from the pope. John XXII, in contrast to Clement V, was far more 
autonomous in his approach to the crusade. In financial matters he was unwilling to 
grant church tithes to the French kings for a crusade on the level which his predecessor 
had. Consequently over the course of John XXII’s pontificate, in dealing with the French 
Kings Philip V and Charles IV, a more affordable and realistic passagium particulare 
began to take precedence over a general crusade to the Holy Land. Likewise, the reigns 
of Philip V and Charles IV witnessed a decline of interest in re-establishing the Latin 
empire of Constantinople. This change in strategy, coupled with the growing reports of 
Turkish attacks on the Latins in the Aegean, led to a formation of crusade policy which 
was no longer reliant on French influence and could be directed to serve the immediate 
needs of the Latins in the Aegean.  
Upon his coronation John XXII expressed a wish to recover the Holy Land from 
the infidels, as many popes had done before him.139 This was to be achieved through a 
general passage to be led in person by Philip V of France.140 Meanwhile, reports of 
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defeats suffered by the Christians of the East circulated in western Europe,141 meaning 
that a passagium particulare in aid of these Christians, to be led by Philip’s cousin, 
Louis of Clermont, also ran parallel to the discussions of a general crusade.142 For Philip 
V, the crusade represented an opportunity to push for new crusade tithes at a time 
when the six-year Vienne tithes issued by Clement V in 1312 were coming to an end. 
Indeed, this must have been a pressing matter as in 1316 just under fifty percent of 
royal receipts came from church taxes.143 Initially John XXII ceded to some of Philip’s 
financial demands; in September 1316 he confirmed a four-year tithe levied on the 
French Church by Clement V and introduced a new four-year grant of annates.144 
However, as time progressed it became clear that instability in Europe, especially the 
protraction of the conflict in Flanders, and renewed pleas for aid from Cyprus and 
Armenia, would render a general crusade to the Holy Land untenable.145 As this 
happened, and the likelihood of Philip going on crusade in person diminished, John XXII 
made efforts to limit the amount of church funding that the king could receive for his 
planned general passage.146 Philip V did receive some papal grants during this time, 
but, as Tyerman has shown,  these were not specifically for the crusade and were, 
nevertheless, not as extensive as those issued by Clement V.147 On 21 March 1318, 
John XXII wrote to Philip V that ‘on account of reasons which are relevant to the 
usefulness of the aforementioned general passagium overseas and which concern your 
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participation, let the passagium particulare *instead+ take place at present’.148 In 
September of the same year, Philip appointed Louis of Clermont as the captain-general 
of this proposed passagium particulare.149 
 The change in strategy did not, however, help to expedite the crusade. Within 
months Louis of Clermont’s passagium also became bogged down by haggling over the 
necessary finances for the expedition, such as in 1319, when funding was refused by 
the pope on the grounds that the French needed to provide more concrete plans 
before any tithes would be granted.150 Eventually funding for both Louis of Clermont’s 
passagium particulare and the Philip V’s general crusade were granted in June 1321, 
but these concessions were strictly limited by the pope; he refused to grant a new 
tenth for the passagium particulare and only agreed to grant church proceeds for 
Philip’s crusade on condition that the king swore to go on crusade in person – if he 
failed to do so, the proceeds would be returned to the Church.151 But by that time the 
king had contracted a fatal illness which would lead to his death in January 1322.152  
John XXII’s financial dealings with the next French king, Charles IV, were very 
much a continuation of his policy towards Philip V. Towards the end of 1322 and the 
beginning of 1323 the decision was made to launch a preliminary passagium to the 
eastern Mediterranean for the aid of Cyprus and Armenia and the disruption of trade 
with Egypt.153 This was to be followed by a larger passagium particulare, which would 
be used to bolster the preliminary expedition, and then, in the distant future, a 
passagium generale to the Holy Land.154 From two letters sent by Charles IV to the 
pope, it can be seen that the king was willing to levy a lay tax to fund part of the 
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preliminary passagium.155 However, the French Crown was in severe debt,156 and it is 
evident that Charles IV still expected the Church to front the majority of the cost for his 
project,157 as well as conform to a number of other demands issued by the king.158 
Because of these factors, it comes as no surprise that the project was rejected by the 
cardinals in the Curia.159 To make matters worse, the king failed to adequately outline 
the details for the following passagium particulare and once again demanded a 
disproportionate amount of funding from the Church.160 Negotiations progressed more 
smoothly after Charles of Valois put himself forward as the captain of the passagium 
particulare in 1323, and John XXII agreed to grant a two-year tenth for the preliminary 
passagium.161 However, this tenth was no greater than that issued to Philip V, and the 
pope still refused to contribute funds from the papal Camera.162 Subsequently, in the 
following months events fell into a predictable routine as the king rejected a renewed 
offer from the pope, who in turn refused to improve his previous proposal.163 Finally, 
after almost two years of fruitless negotiations and wrangling over who was to fund the 
crusade, the negotiations died out. On 7 November 1323, John XXII wrote to Charles IV 
informing him that the Armenians had agreed a fifteen-year truce with the Mamluk 
sultan.164 
The failure of these negotiations was a reflection of three things. Firstly, for the 
pope the time was wrong for a crusade – Europe was wracked by warfare, the Spanish 
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kingdoms were fighting the Moors and the Hospitallers were disabled by debts.165 
Secondly, even when John XXII granted Philip V and Charles IV crusade tithes, he 
tempered them by restraints and clauses far stricter than had been imposed 
previously; he questioned their ability to go on crusade in person and was unwilling to 
let the Church bear the brunt of crusade expenses as it had done under Clement V.166 
Thirdly, by imposing restraints upon crusade finance John XXII showed that he was 
reluctant to allow the French to dominate crusade policy; i.e. by limiting the amount of 
crusade revenue the French were entitled to, the papacy was beginning to distance 
crusade negotiations from the French Crown altogether.167 Furthermore, in the one 
instance when a Franco-papal crusading fleet did materialise, in 1319, John XXII was 
willing to divert it to further his own interests in Italy, contrary to French desires.168 
This may have spelled the inglorious end of one particular expedition, but it did 
symbolise a degree of papal independence from the French Crown in crusading 
matters. As will be shown, John XXII was also busy focussing his attention elsewhere in 
the East: towards the Latins of Achaia and the Aegean islands, who were defending the 
faith far more effectively than the French could at this point and required minimal 
expenditure of church revenue. 
In fact, by the 1320s there were signs that the threat posed by the Turks was 
beginning to filter into the crusade negotiations with the French kings. This was the 
case in 1322 and 1323 when John XXII issued a number of letters concerning the 
passagium particulare to Armenia, in which he lamented the repeated attacks suffered 
by the Armenians at the hands of the Saracens, Tartars and Turks. These references to 
the Turks are brief, but (rather surprisingly for a papal letter of this early period) there 
is specific mention of a certain Haramano Turcomanorum domino, who had invaded 
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Armenia.169 This is of course a reference to the Karaman Turks who occupied the south-
eastern region of Anatolia. The Karaman Turks were a threat to Cyprus and Armenia, 
but not to the Latins in the Aegean, who were mostly dealing with Menteshe and 
Aydin. Reports of attacks from the Turks of Menteshe and Aydin in the Aegean and 
Greece had, by the 1320s, become more widely known in western Christendom, from 
the reports of the Hospitallers, the Zaccaria and the Venetians, but the pope seems to 
have made no effort to associate these events with an Armenian or Holy Land crusade 
at this time.  
Because of the financial constraints imposed on these Franco-papal crusade 
negotiations, a general crusade to the Holy Land had begun to give way to a passagium 
particulare, either to the East in general or to aid Cyprus and Armenia (as a stepping 
stone to the Holy Land). Throughout this time, it is not surprising  that the recovery of 
Constantinople also began to feature less and less in the Franco-papal crusade 
proposals. Louis of Clermont had supplanted Charles of Valois as the leader of a 
passagium for most of Philip V’s reign and even when Charles of Valois had regained 
his previous prominence under Charles IV, his former interest in an anti-Greek crusade 
was not rekindled. He was, of course, no longer the titular Latin emperor of 
Constantinople. His indifference to his former title, and that of his Angevin son-in-law 
Philip of Taranto, also shows how little a crusade against Byzantium was now 
supported in the French court. This change in attitude is demonstrated in a proposal 
made by Charles IV to the pope in 1323 that the Byzantine emperor should be 
requested to help with any forthcoming crusade.170  
It has, however, been suggested by some scholars that the Franco-papal 
crusading fleets were, at times, intended for an attack on Constantinople.171 For 
example, Walter Norden, the strongest proponent of this view, claimed that Amaury of 
Narbonne’s flotilla of 1323 was to be used against the Greeks. His argument centred 
around the theory that Louis of Clermont was to be designated captain of the fleet 
which was to be diverted to Constantinople, following the advice proposed by the 
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bishop of León in his crusade treatise.172 However, as Laiou has pointed out, there is no 
evidence to suggest that Louis of Clermont was to be made captain of the galleys of the 
1323 fleet, or that the fleet was associated with the bishop of León, who in any 
instance advocated a land and not seaborne crusade.173 In fact, unlike the bishop of 
León, many of the crusade theorists of the 1320s began to lose interest in a crusade to 
Byzantium as Latin aggression towards the empire began to peter out.174 It has also 
been shown that the Franco-papal crusade negotiations during the first decade of John 
XXII’s pontificate focussed on the recovery of the Holy Land or the defence of Cyprus 
and Armenia and not on the recapture of Constantinople. 
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1.3. Papal Support of “Local” Resistance Against the Turks Under John XXII 
 
1.3.1. Papal-endorsed campaigns in Achaia 
French interest in the Byzantine empire may have petered out by the 1320s, but this 
was not the case for the Angevin lords of Frankish Greece. It has been seen that, 
throughout the pontificate of Clement V, Philip of Taranto involved himself in the 
planned crusade of Charles of Valois to recover Constantinople and then actively 
pursued his own claims to the Latin empire, once he had been made titular Latin 
Emperor (through his marriage to Catherine of Valois).175 Once he had become titular 
emperor, Philip granted the principality of Achaia to Louis of Burgundy, who in return, 
promised to assist his liege in a campaign to recover the Latin empire.176 Louis’s 
expedition to Achaia in 1316 lacked papal backing, but in the following years, John XXII 
would make attempts to form an Angevin coalition in Achaia, for which indulgences 
were granted and the Turks were specifically cited as a target.  
 In 1318 the pope wrote the first of many letters to try and form a papal-
endorsed alliance between Venice and the Angevin rulers of the principality of Achaia. 
The motivating factor for this was a wish to defend areas of Angevin controlled Greece 
from the repeated attacks of the Catalan Grand Company, who in 1311, had killed the 
Duke of Athens Walter of V Brienne at the battle of Cephissus, and seized his duchy for 
themselves.177 The duchy of Athens, as a vassal state of Achaia, was obviously a 
concern for the Angevins, and later their attempts to protect the Morea would be 
interwoven with the papal-endorsed campaigns of Walter VI of Brienne to re-establish 
his duchy. In 1318 John XXII sent two letters to the doge of Venice urging the Republic 
to join this coalition, after the Angevins Robert of Naples, Philip of Taranto and their 
younger brother John of Gravina, had written in a similar vain to the doge in the 
previous year.178 In these documents the pope cited the Catalan alliance with the Turks 
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moyen âge, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, Extrait de collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France: 
Mélanges historiques, 5 vols (Paris, 1873-86), iii. nr. 8, pp. 43-4 (4 September 1319). See also: Setton, 
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and the schismatic Greeks as a justification for opposing them. In one letter the pope 
claimed that the newly appointed Catalan Vicar-General, Alfonso Fadrique, had been 
responsible for  introducing Turks into the island of Negroponte which they were now 
plundering at will.179 In the other letter the pope claimed that the Catalan Company 
had increased its strength by adding schismatic Greeks and Turks to its numbers ‘in 
alliance and in friendship’.180 This, claimed the pope, had enabled the Catalans to 
ravage Greece unchecked and inflict irreparable harm on the Christians in the area.181 
As has been noted, the primary purpose of these letters was to enlist the Venetians in a 
papal-Angevin coalition against the Catalans; for this reason the Turks and Greeks were 
not identified in the papal documents as the main target of the forthcoming campaign, 
unlike in the correspondence with the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers where they 
remained the principal enemy of the Latins. Therefore, although the Greeks and Turks 
did play a part in the justification for a campaign to Achaia, they were only a subsidiary 
motivation, mentioned in the context of their alliance with the Catalans.  
Despite the pope’s exhortations, the Venetians refused to commit to an 
Angevin-papal coalition. In June 1320 Philip of Taranto, who had been at the papal 
court in Avignon since 1318,182 wrote another letter to the doge, this time requesting 
that the Venice assist in the recovery of the Latin empire.183 In the letter, Philip 
informed the doge that Angevin ambassadors were being sent to Venice discuss the 
renewal of the treaty originally agreed between the Republic and Charles of Valois in 
1307.184 The doge replied to Philip of Taranto in November 1320; his exact answer 
remains unknown, but it was probably negative as the 1307 treaty was never 
renewed.185 Nevertheless, Angevin attempts to recruit Venetian assistance for an 
expedition to Achaia continued; in September 1324 Robert of Naples requested a 
Veneto-Angevin alliance against the schismatic Greeks, and the ‘impious society’ of the 
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Catalans.186 The reply from the doge showed where the priorities of the Republic lay: 
‘the lord doge answers that he *already+ has a treaty with the lord emperor of the 
Greeks and with those from the [Catalan] Company. Because of this, he is not able to 
make any union against them’.187 A month later, the pope also wrote to the doge, this 
time commending the interests of Walter of Brienne, the titular Duke of Athens, but 
Venice  refused to support his claims.188 Ultimately, these Angevin pleas proved to be 
in vain and Venice never again formed an alliance against the Byzantine empire. 
Evidently for the Serenissima, the ending of a valuable trade agreement with the 
Byzantines and the severing of a truce with the Catalans at a time when piracy was on 
the increase in the Aegean, was too great a sacrifice to make. 
 In the early 1320s, unperturbed by Venice’s continued rejection of an anti-
Catalan alliance, Philip of Taranto continued the preparations for his forthcoming 
campaign to Achaia: in 1321 and 1322 he sent provisions to his forts in Corfu and the 
Morea, and in May 1323 he pledged mutual assistance with his brother John of Gravina 
in their efforts to protect the principality.189 The Angevin registers showed that during 
1322-4 great amounts of money and provisions were sent to the Morea in preparation 
for an expedition.190 Philip eventually made two attempts to lead an army to the 
Morea, but both had to be aborted, once in 1323 when he lacked sufficient money,191 
and again in 1324 when he did not have enough men.192 In the end Philip was 
restricted by the wars in Italy. The task then fell to John of Gravina who, in January 
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1325, successfully led a fleet of 20 galleys from Brindisi to Frankish Greece.193 After 
stopping off at Cephalonia and Zante, the fleet arrived in Clarentza, the chief port of 
the Morea (opposite Zante). Here John secured the allegiance of numerous Frankish 
lords, amongst them two of lords of Negroponte, the duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, 
and the lord of Chios, Martino Zaccaria.194 The army laid siege to the Greek fortress of 
Karytaina in the centre of the Morea but had to turn back to Clarentza as the weather 
worsened in the winter of 1325. In the spring of 1326, probably because of financial 
constraints, John was forced to return with his army to Italy. He was never to return to 
Greece.195 Despite the effort that had gone in to planning and funding the expedition, it 
appears that John of Gravina achieved very little whilst in Achaia.196  
Throughout all this, it is necessary to consider whether any of these Angevin 
operations constituted a crusade or not. Unlike the expedition of Louis of Burgundy, 
the campaigns of Philip of Taranto and John of Gravina did receive papal backing and 
there are many examples of the pope making a concerted effort to drum up support for 
the forthcoming Angevin operation. In 1319 John XXII asked that the Frankish nobles in 
Greece remain loyal to their Angevin overlords, in 1323 he urged the Patriarch of 
Constantinople and the archbishop of Patras to protect their people in the Morea from 
becoming enslaved by the Catalans and Turks, and in October 1325 he once again 
tempted Venice with the chance of participating in the enterprise by commending the 
interests of Walter of Brienne, the rightful heir to the duchy of Athens.197 More 
importantly, on 29 November 1322, the pope issued a bull granting indulgences for 
three years to all the faithful who were in the principality of Achaia and would die in 
action or of wounds received against ‘the schismatic Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and 
the Turks and other diverse nations of infidels’ (these are indulgences granted in 
articulo mortis). John XXII wrote that the faithful had endured attacks, plunder, 
imprisonment and other manifold torments at the hands of these ‘people who 
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disregard God’. Therefore, in return for their defence of the faith, the following 
spiritual concession was granted:  
 
[S]o that you and the other faithful of Christ may, in this temporal world 
which you hope to exchange for live everlasting, be the more greatly 
encouraged in the defence of the Catholic Faith against the schismatics 
and those same infidels, we, trusting in the mercy of almighty God and, 
by His approval, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, grant to all of 
you and other faithful of Christ to whom it shall happen that, in defence 
of the Catholic Faith, they die in war or battle, or subsequently from 
wounds received in such war or battle against the schismatic Greeks, the 
Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other aforesaid diverse nations of 
Infidels, in the principality of Achaia and in other territories and lands of 
the faithful adjacent to that same principality or in those same nearby 
inhabited [lands], full remission of all your sins about which you are truly 
contrite and have made confession. The present communication to be 
valid for a period of at least three years hereafter.198  
 
The bull was issued in response to a petition at the Curia and not at the behest of the 
pope, but unfortunately the original petition does not exist.199 Therefore, the exact 
identity of those who were granted the indulgences, and the exact context of the papal 
decision remains ambiguous. It would seem from circumstantial evidence that the 
indulgences were issued in conjunction with the Angevin campaigns to the Morea and 
probably to Angevin vassals who would take part in Philip of Taranto and John of 
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Gravina’s planned expeditions to the region. The dating and length of the indulgence 
certainly suggest this (the indulgence was valid from November 1322 to November 
1325, the years in which the Angevin plans reached their zenith). However, the purpose 
of the Angevin expeditions, as clearly stipulated in other papal correspondence, was to 
defend the region from the Catalans of Athens, who do not feature anywhere in the 
papal document issuing the indulgences, which were granted only to those fighting 
against ‘the schismatic Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other diverse 
nations of infidels’. Although it is known that the Greeks and Turks had often been 
cited in papal documents as allies of the Catalans, there is still no concrete link to the 
Catalans. Consequently, connecting these indulgences to the Angevin campaigns 
against the Catalans remains problematic, even if the dating of the document and the 
citing of the schismatic Greeks and Turks suggests a connection with the Angevin 
defence of Achaia.200 It appears as if the mention of the schismatic Greeks was 
justification enough for these indulgences. The Turks and the other infidels were, in 
turn, legitimate targets in association with the Greeks. 
 
 
1.3.2. The granting of papal privileges to the Zaccaria of Chios  
Running parallel to the privileges granted to those fighting the Greeks and Turks in 
Achaia was John XXII’s support of the Latins against the Turks in the Aegean. This came 
in the form of indulgences and other privileges granted to the Latin rulers of Chios, the 
Genoese brothers Martino and Benedetto II Zaccaria. The activities of the brothers 
against the Turks and the consequences of the papal support they received for this will 
be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, but now it is important to analyse 
the nature of the privileges granted by the pope. 
 By 1319, news had arrived at the Curia of one, or maybe more, Latin victories 
against the Turks in the Aegean led by the Zaccaria of Chios in alliance with the 
Hospitallers of Rhodes. Sometime before March 1320, a petition had been made at the 
Curia by representatives of the Zaccaria, asking for a licence to ship mastic, the unique 
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product of Chios, to Mamluk Egypt. The original petition no longer exists, but from the 
papal response some details of the justification and specifications of the licence can be 
gleaned, these are as follows: The island of Chios was surrounded by the Turks 
(presumably from Aydin) who sought to conquer it. Until now the brothers had been 
able to defend the island through the maintenance of a garrison (armatam militiam) on 
Chios, which was derived from mastic ‘which originates on that said island’. However, 
the Genoese civil war had prevented the Zaccaria from selling mastic to Christian 
merchants and this lack of revenue led to the soldiers of the garrison being sent home. 
This meant that ‘great dangers of destruction’ threatened Chios and ‘all of the faithful’ 
on the neighbouring islands. In response to this petition, on 5 March 1320, John XXII 
dispatched a letter to Benedetto II and Martino Zaccaria allowing them ‘by special 
favour [...] the unrestricted right to carry mastic to parts of Alexandria and Egypt [...] 
for a period of up to at least two years’. Furthermore, the Zaccaria would be permitted 
to carry back, on the same ships, any merchandise they wished on their return from 
Mamluk lands.201 The licence was renewed for a further four years in 1322 and again 
for three years in 1325.202 
The timing of this licence is important in the context of John XXII’s eastern 
policy. The 1320s saw the beginning of papal licences allowing limited trade with 
Mamluk Egypt, as well as the granting of absolutions to those who had incurred 
ecclesiastic censure for illicit trade.203 However, the mastic concession was not only 
granted within this framework, but actually formed one of the earliest examples of this 
change in strategy: John XXII granted licences throughout his pontificate, but these 
were more commonly issued in the late 1320s and early 1330s.204 In fact, the mastic 
licence was issued a time when the total embargo on all trade with Mamluk Egypt was 
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being reinforced, which, in turn, impeded the mastic trade.205 This was the case in 1318 
when a shipment of mastic from Chios, apparently destined for Egypt, had been seized 
off Cyprus by the galleys of the Lusignan kings.206 The mastic licence was, therefore, 
one of the earliest trade licences to signify a change in the papal policy in the East, 
away from one aimed at limiting the power of Mamluk Egypt. 
The full importance of this licence in understanding the papal perception of the 
Turkish threat has not yet been fully realised by historians. Many scholars have 
commented on the concession granted to the Zaccaria, suggesting that it was a reward 
for their fight against the Turks, but none link it to the change in papal policy which it 
clearly represented.207 It can be interpreted as signifying a shift in crusade impetus 
from plans focussed on the recovery of the Holy Land to a strategy based on immediate 
defence of Christian lands from the Turkish emirates, as it specifically links resistance 
against the Turkish maritime emirates on the one hand (the maintenance of the 
garrison on Chios), with limited trade with Mamluk lands on the other. It is easy to see 
from the perspective of the Curia why this licence was granted: after all, the money 
gained from the increase in the mastic trade would, in theory, enable Chios to be 
defended properly, without seriously strengthening the Mamluk sultanate (mastic was 
regarded as a ‘clean merchandise’ and its export did not have the same implications as 
military materials, which still remained strictly forbidden).208 Nevertheless, it implied 
for Pope John XXII, that limited trade with Egypt was less undesirable than the loss of a 
Christian-ruled territory to the Turks.209 This use of economics by the popes to 
implement policies in the east would be continued by John XXII and expanded on by 
Clement VI. 
The change of the perception of the Turks is further illustrated by the 
implementation of other crusade mechanisms in the Aegean by John XXII. In 1323, and 
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again in 1325, the pope supplemented the Zaccaria trade privileges with an important 
spiritual concession: the granting of three-year indulgences to Martino Zaccaria and all 
his followers (stipendiarii dicte catholice fidei professores ac omnes Christifideles).210 
These indulgences were to be granted in articulo mortis: 
 
[T]o you and to the aforesaid paid troops (stipendiarii) and faithful to 
whom it shall happen that, in the defence of the oft-mentioned faith, 
they die in war or battle against the Turks and other aforesaid nations of 
infidels on Chios and other inhabited islands or lands adjacent or near to 
that Island of Chios or subsequently die from wounds received in such 
war or battle, we grant remission of all your sins about which you are 
contrite in heart and have made oral confession.211 
 
The indulgences were specifically to be granted to those ‘who could be found from the 
island of Crete all the way to the state of Caffa’ and who, ‘fired by the zeal of devotion’, 
wished to assist Martino ‘in pursuing such an endeavour against those Turks’.212 An 
example of the issuing of indulgences in articulo mortis, to those fighting in Achaia in 
1322 was seen earlier. As Housley has suggested, this kind of concession had become 
the standard papal response to a situation which required some spiritual reward for 
military service, but could not be afforded full-scale crusade preaching; either because 
it would not benefit from such a measure, or because the Church could not allow for 
the necessary expense or organisation. As a result, the Curia was far more liberal in its 
granting of indulgences in articulo mortis than in preaching a general crusade. These 
indulgences were also less complicated for the recipient; it is unlikely that any took the 
cross, since the legal framework of the vow would be hard to implement. Instead the 
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soldier would be granted the indulgence at the point of death, after a priest had heard 
his confession.213 
Even though these indulgences can be seen as a downgrading of the privileges 
afforded to a full-scale crusade, the ones that have been seen nevertheless constituted 
the first examples of indulgences being granted specifically for fighting against the 
Turks alone (the Achaia indulgences issued a year earlier included Greeks and other 
infidels). This, in conjunction with the trade licences granted in 1320, and, to a lesser 
extent the 1322 Achaia indulgences, gives the overall impression that John XXII’s wider 
eastern policy was starting to come to terms with the growing menace of the Turks in 
the Aegean. Even though these concessions had been granted on petition from those 
Latins in the East, and not at the behest of the pope, they still indicate that the Curia 
was aware of the growing power of the Turkish maritime emirates, probably those of 
Menteshe and Aydin, and that it agreed with those Latins in the East that a boost in 
personnel and economic incentives were needed to oppose them. Furthermore, the 
papacy was coming to the realisation that a coalition of the Latins in the East, 
independent of French influence, was the most effective way of combating the Turks.  
 
 
Chapter 1 Overview 
 
This chapter has shown how the influence of the French Crown had a profound effect 
on the crusade policies of the popes in the early fourteenth century. Both Clement V 
and his predecessor Benedict XI recognised that the Turks were posing a threat to 
Christians in the Aegean, but their presence alone was not enough to justify launching 
a crusade against them. This was a result of two main factors: firstly, reports in the 
West of Turkish incursions in the Aegean were patchy and infrequent; secondly, the 
pre-existing traditions of planning a crusade to Constantinople or to the Holy Land, 
championed by the French King Philip IV and his brother Charles of Valois, took 
precedent. The exception to this was the Hospitaller passagium of 1308-10 which was 
carried out independently of French influence and with minimal papal control. 
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The deaths of Clement V and Philip IV in 1314 came at a time when Turkish 
aggression in the Aegean was on the increase and by 1320 reports of major attacks on 
Venetian, Genoese and Hospitaller possessions had reached the Curia. The heightened 
awareness of the Turkish threat, coupled with the repeated failure of the French to 
launch a crusade to either Constantinople or the Holy Land, contributed to the 
recognition of the Turks as a legitimate target of a crusade. This was manifested not in 
a large-scale passagium to the Aegean, organised by the papacy and nobility of 
Europe, but in response to requests for support of small-scale “local” resistance 
against the Turks. This came in the form of indulgences granted in articulo mortis by 
John XXII to those fighting against the Turks and other enemies of the faith in Achaia, 
and of similar indulgences and trade licences granted to the Zaccaria lords of Chios. 
The indulgences granted to the latter marked the first issued specifically for fighting 
against the Turks.  
These papal privileges were still relatively minor and not comparable to the 
tithes and indulgences granted to major expeditions, such as the planned crusade of 
Charles of Valois or the Crusade of Smyrna, but they still demonstrate a turning point 
in papal crusade strategy. By the 1320s support of the Latins in the East, at their 
request, against the Turks was beginning to replace a policy of organising a major 
French-led expedition to either Constantinople or the Holy Land. 
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Chapter 2. The Zaccaria of Chios: Resistance Against the Turks 
 
2.1. Genoese Establishment and Activity in the Aegean during the Early Decades of 
the Fourteenth Century 
 
After helping the Greeks recapture Constantinople in 1261, the Genoese enjoyed 
favoured status in Romania and controlled access to the Black Sea, a new source of 
wealth in eastern trade.1 Just over a decade later, the Genoese brothers Benedetto I 
and Manuel Zaccaria were granted the town of Old Phokaia by the Byzantine Emperor 
Michael VIII Palaiologos, situated on the Asia Minor coast, some 50 kilometres 
northwest of the gulf of Smyrna. During this time the Genoese also had colonies at 
Pera opposite Constantinople, and Caffa in the Black Sea, amongst others.2  Genoese 
dominance in the Aegean was enhanced after a victory over her great maritime rival 
Venice at Curzola in 1299 and it could be said that by 1300 the Commune of Genoa 
was at its prime. It is important to understand that unlike the Venetians, the Genoese 
in the eastern Mediterranean often acted independently of the Commune: the 
colonies were usually governed with limited interference from the doge and 
administration of the homeland and the ships used by Genoese sailors and merchants 
were often constructed and owned by private individuals.3 Because the Genoese often 
acted alone or as vassals of other states, it is far harder to establish a definitive 
Genoese ‘policy’ towards events in the Aegean. Nevertheless, the Genoese did 
maintain some form of unity in the area and often shared common interests and, more 
importantly, common enemies. Although the private nature of Genoese operations in 
the Aegean makes it difficult to assess an overall Genoese policy, it does not 
necessarily limit an understanding of the policies of the Genoese privateers 
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39-47. 
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themselves. The Zaccaria lords of Chios, for example, were principal players in the 
early Latin contact with, and resistance against, the Turkish maritime emirates. A great 
deal of information regarding their activities in the Aegean exists, mostly from the 
Papal Archives, consequently this chapter will focus largely on their activities. 
 
 
2.1.1. The Genoese in the Aegean during the early 1300s: the crusade of Charles of 
Valois, the Hospitaller passagium and first contact with the Turks 
Before outlining the establishment of the Zaccaria on Chios, it is worth exploring the 
role of the Genoese in the crusading plans of Clement V’s pontificate, especially the 
planned expedition of Charles of Valois and the Hospitaller passagium of 1310, to gain 
an appreciation of the attitude of the Genoese towards the crusading plans which 
dominated the early fourteenth century. 
The reliance of Byzantium on Genoese maritime support made the Commune a 
potentially invaluable ally for Charles of Valois’s planned crusade to Constantinople. In 
contrast to Venice, Genoa was already firmly established in the eastern Aegean and 
her naval support was therefore sought in preference to that of her maritime rival. 
Accordingly, Charles of Valois dispatched ambassadors to Genoa, who were present in 
the city at the end of 1305, some weeks before he wrote to Venice.4 A letter from 
Christiano Spinola, a friend of James I of Aragon, who also acted as his informer, 
reported that the Valois ambassadors at Genoa were seeking information about the 
number of vessels which would be needed for the conquest of Constantinople and 
whether the Commune would allow Charles to hire them. As an incentive, the Genoese 
were apparently promised ‘every liberty and everything which will seem best for the 
commune’ if the mission was a success.5 As was seen in the previous chapter, Clement 
V augmented Charles’s appeals to Genoa by also writing to the government of the city 
on 14 January 1306, urging them to partake in the forthcoming crusade and warning 
them of the perils of Turkish domination in the Aegean.6 Despite the papal 
admonitions and Charles of Valois’s generous offers of trade privileges to the Genoese, 
                                                        
4 AA, iii. nr. 69 (5 December 1305); Laiou, Constantinople, 205, n. 20. 
5
 DOC, nr. 31, p. 37.  
6 See above, ch. 1, p. 39; Laiou, Constantinople, 204, n. 18.  
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the Commune refused the proposal later in 1306.7 Evidently for Genoa the strategic 
benefits gained from the recapture Constantinople would not outweigh the expense 
and risk of participating in a crusade. This was in contrast to the Venetians, who allied 
themselves with Charles of Valois in December 1306. The decision of the Venetians, in 
turn, naturally changed the Genoese stance in regard to the crusade from one of non-
involvement to active opposition; the ongoing conflict between the two maritime 
republics resulted in various clashes during the years of Charles of Valois’s crusade 
preparations, and in this sense, it could be said that the Genoese were (theoretically) 
obstructing the crusade.8 
The Valois-Venetian alliance of 1306, as well as making the Genoese opponents 
of the planned crusade to Constantinople, also led them to form closer ties with the 
newly established Hospitallers of Rhodes, who, in the early 1300s, were in almost 
perpetual confrontation with the Venetians. Already in May 1306 the Genoese corsair 
Vignolo de Vignoli had agreed to assist the Hospitallers of Cyprus in their conquest of 
Rhodes.9 On 23 June the Hospitallers fleet left Limassol to rendez-vous with the 
Genoese galleys belonging to Baldo Spinola and Michael della Volta. The joint forces 
advanced on Rhodes where Vignolo had gone ahead to reconnoitre the situation. The 
attack was a partial success and by 1307 the Hospital had gained a foothold on the 
island.10 In return for their assistance, Vignolo and the other Genoese received certain 
privileges from the Hospital. For Vignolo, these included the retention of a casale on 
Rhodes, already granted by the emperor of Constantinople, and the grant of another 
casale on the island, as well as one third of the revenue and produce from the 
surrounding islands.11 The Genoese continued to support the Hospitaller enterprise to 
                                                        
7 DOC, nr. 31, as Laiou has stated, the author of this letter, Christiano Spinola, thought that Genoa would 
decline Charles’s offer of an alliance: Laiou, Constantinople, 205, n. 21. 
8 Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 743-8. 
9 The text of the original Hospitaller agreement of 1306 is in J. Delaville le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers en 
Terre Sainte et à Chypre: 1100-1310 (Paris, 1904), 274-276, n. 2. 
10
 For details of the initial expedition, see Luttrell, Town of Rhodes, 76; Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 745-9; 
Luttrell, ‘Feudal tenure’, 756-7; Zachariadou, TC, 10-11. The main town held out for several years, 
apparently until its surrender in August 1309. The conquest was not fully completed until after the 
arrival of Master Fulk of Villaret with a fleet from the West in 1310: Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and the 
papacy’, 596-7. 
11 Luttrell, ‘Feudal tenure’, 756-7; Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 746. 
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Rhodes and in 1308-9 the Commune had begun to build galleys for Fulk of Villaret’s 
passagium.12  
However, once the conquest of Rhodes had been completed by the 
Hospitallers, relations with the Genoese deteriorated. This was largely a result of the 
Hospitaller enforcement of the papal ban on trade with Egypt. Initially the Genoese 
had exploited the embargo as a cover to legitimise attacks on rival merchant vessels, 
but once the Hospitallers had established themselves on Rhodes, they had begun to 
seize Genoese ships in an effort to enforce the embargo.13 Genoese reprisals ensued, 
and from this point onwards each side began to seize the vessels belonging to the 
other.14 By 1311 the conflict had escalated to a point where certain Genoese corsairs, 
under the command of Antonio Spinola, offered the Turkish emir of Menteshe, 
probably Masud, 50,000 florins to attack Rhodes and seize Hospitaller brethren in 
Turkey.15 A papal letter of 26 November 1311 addressed to the citizens of Genoa 
ordered them to repay the Hospitallers for the damage this caused. The letter is clear 
evidence of Clement’s exasperation at the deeds of the Genoese:  
 
Antonio [Spinola] [...] by his evil suggestions incited a certain Saracen of 
those lands, Madachia by name, strengthened by much support, to an 
extent that he caused to be captured and wickedly detained several 
merchants and some others, about 250 in number, who had come with 
their vessels to those same lands of Turkey [...] to the serious detriment 
                                                        
12 CGH, iv. nr. 4830, 4840-1. In one document, Fulk of Villaret gave a list of ports where the Hospitaller 
galleys were being constructed, which included Genoa: Janue duodecim [galeas] et navem unam, ultra 
aliam magnam: nr. 4841 (27 January 1309). Also see TD, i. nr. 192. 
13 For example, in 1313 the Genoese merchant Jacob of Nerono had his goods arestata et detenta in 
Rodo by the Hospitallers: Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1813, p. 1107. For more examples of this, see Luttrell, 
‘Genoese’, 757-61. 
14 For example, in the crusading proposals made by Henry II of Cyprus in 1311, it is reported that during 
the winter of 1310, the Hospitallers had seized a Genoese galley returning from Alexandria. The 
Genoese retaliated by seizing Hospitaller vessels off Rhodes, which were taken to Turchia and sold to 
the Turks: text in L. de Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le regne des princes de la maison de 
Lusignan, 3 vols (Paris, 1852-61), iii. 118-25. The event is described in Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 757-8. 
15 CV, vii. nr. 7631-2. 26; Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 759-60; Zachariadou, TC, 12. This letter marks the first 
specific reference to a Turkish emir. He is named Madachia, this was probably Masud, the Menteshe-
oglu: Zachariadou, TC, 109. 
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of that same Hospital and also to the immense loss of the aforesaid faith 
and island.16  
 
The letter went on to suggest that the continuous Genoese conflict with the 
Hospitallers had seriously begun to threaten the existence of the Order on Rhodes.17  
 Despite protests from the pope, the hostilities between the Hospitallers and 
the Genoese allied with Menteshe continued for at least two more years. In 1312 a 
Turkish fleet of 23 vessels, presumably from Menteshe, was sighted near Rhodes and 
pursued by the knights to Amorgos. There the ships of the Turks were burned and 
almost the entire force of over 800 men was destroyed. The Hospitallers themselves 
also took serious losses of 57 brethren and 300 foot soldiers.18 The willingness of the 
Genoese and Hospitallers to side with the Turks at this point can be attributed to the 
great instability of the region in the early years of the fourteenth century. In the 
immediate aftermath of Byzantine losses in Asia Minor and the Aegean, neither the 
Hospitallers, the Genoese privateers, nor the Turks were firmly established in the area. 
Thus each side sought alliances to maximise their own security. In this fragmented 
political situation papal policies, such as the enforcement of the trade embargo with 
Egypt, were used more as a pretext to pursue personal interests and rivalries rather 
than anything else.  
During this time the civil strife in Genoa, which had been rumbling for some 
years, erupted into all-out conflict. In 1313, after the death of Emperor Henry VII, the 
leaderless city became consumed by fighting amongst the two leading Ghibelline 
families, the Doria and the Spinola. By 1316 the whole of Liguria was preoccupied by 
civil war. Although this devastated Genoese trade and further accentuated the 
detachment between the homeland and the colonists in the East, many of the 
Genoese in the Aegean, such as those on Chios, were able to prosper despite the 
problems in mainland Italy.19  
                                                        
16 CV, vii. nr. 7631,  p. 5.  
17
 CV, vii. nr. 7631, pp. 5-6. 
18
 Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols (Paris, 1891-3), i. 393; Luttrell, 
‘Genoese’, 760; Zachariadou, TC, 12.  
19 Epstein, Genoa, 194-5. For contemporary accounts of the early civil-war, see for example: Giovanni 
Villani, ii. bk. 10, ch. 87-118, pp. 294-322; Giorgio Stella, Annales Genuenses, ed. G.P. Balbi, RISNS 17.2 
(Bologna, 1975), 82-102. 
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2.1.2. Establishment of the Zaccaria on Chios and participation in the alum and 
mastic trades 
The Zaccaria family came to international prominence during the mid to late thirteenth 
century, when the brothers Benedetto I and Manuel Zaccaria formed ties with the 
Byzantine imperial family.20 This began in around 1264 when Benedetto I Zaccaria was 
sent as an ambassador to the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos.21 A few 
years later, the Zaccaria were granted imperial permission to mine alum in the 
mountains to the east of the town of New Phokaia.22 Alum was vital for the textile 
industry as it formed the most effective fabric mordant – or fixative for dyes – known 
at the time.23 According to the manual of Francesco Pegolotti, Phokaia alum was 
amongst the best available and most extensively mined.24 The sources attest to the 
strenuous activities of the brothers in the extraction of the chemical, if Muntaner is to 
be believed, by 1305 they had some 3,000 Greek miners working for them.25 The 
Genoese had managed to accrue great wealth from the alum trade of Konya during the 
mid thirteenth century and the Zaccaria brothers were able to gain much power and 
                                                        
20 For more on the Zaccaria during the early thirteenth century, see Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 43; Lopez, 
Benedetto Zaccaria, passim; Idem, ‘Familiari, procuratori e dipendenti di Benedetto Zaccaria’, 
Miscellanea di Storia Ligure in onore di Giorgio Falco (Milan, 1962), 209-49, at 209-20. 
21 ‘Annales Januenses: 1249-1269’, ed. H. Pertz, MGHSS 18 (Hannover, 1825), 226-66, at 249; Miller, 
‘Zaccaria’, 43, n. 6. Three years early Benedetto had been captured by the Venetians in a battle off Tyre: 
‘Les gestes des Chiprois’, 747. 
22 George Pachymeres, ii. bk. v, pp. 534-8; translation of this passage in Lopez & Raymond, Medieval 
Trade, 127-8. The site was granted sometime between 1267-75: M. Balard, ‘The Genoese in the Aegean 
1204-1566’, LGEM, 161; Idem, ‘Latins in the Aegean’, 825; Fleet, European and Islamic Trade, 83, n. 28. 
New Phokaia (Yeni Foça) lies around twelve miles northeast of Old Phokaia, the alum mines lie on the 
hill of Şaphanedağ, about two kilometres inland from the town. I owe special thanks to Dr Mümtaz Çolak 
for showing me around these mines in 2010. For more information on this, see Çolak, M., Thirion-Merle, 
V., Blondé, F., & Picon, M., ‘Les régions productrices d’alun en Turquie aux époques antique, médiévale 
et modern: gisements, produits et transports’, L'alun de Méditerranée: colloque international, Naples, 4-
6 juin 2003-Lipari, 7-8 juin 2003, ed. P. Borgard, J.-P. Brun & M. Picon (Naples, 2005), 59-68. Also see L. 
Özgenç, ‘Economic geology of Şaphanedağ (Foça – Izmir) alunite deposit’, Bulletin of the Geological 
Congress of Turkey 7 (1992), 64-9, esp. 66-7. 
23 Alum also had a number of other uses, for more information see C.S. Singer, The Earliest Chemical 
Industry: An Essay in the Historical Relations of Economics & Technology illustrated from the Alum Trade 
(London, 1948), xvii-xviii; R. Lopez, ‘Majorcans and Genoese on the North Sea route in the thirteenth 
century’, Revue belge le philologie et d'histoire 29 (1951), 1163-79, at 1167-70; A.A.M. Bryer, ‘The 
question of the Byzantine mines in the Pontos: Chalybian iron, Chaldian silver, Koloneian alum and the 
mummy of Cheriana’, Anatolian Studies 32 (1982), 133-50, at 146-7. 
24
 Phokaia alum was apparently the second best, after that of Karahissar (Koloneia). It was mined at 
around 14,000 cantara a year, which equates to roughly 800 metric tons per year: Francesco Pegolotti, 
367-70; Lopez & Raymond, Medieval Trade, 353-5; Bryer, ‘Byzantine mines’, 148. For contemporary 
accounts on how alum was refined, see Singer, Earliest Chemical Industry, 92-4. 
25
 Ramon Muntaner, 127-8; cf. George Pachymeres, ii. bk. v, pp. 534-8; Lopez & Raymond, Medieval 
Trade, 127-8. 
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prosperity from the export of this product to the West in the same way.26 Evidence of 
this can be found in archival records which attest to the Zaccaria exporting sizeable 
quantities of alum from Phokaia to northern Europe in 1268,27 127828 and in 1298.29 
During this time, the Zaccaria brothers also became renowned for their daring 
maritime exploits against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt. In 1288 Benedetto Zaccaria 
was instrumental in helping evacuate the citizens of Tripoli to Cyprus, before its 
capture a year later,30 and in 1293 Manuel Zaccaria was placed in charge of a fleet by 
Pope Nicholas IV, which raided the ports of Candelore (Alanya), on the southern coast 
of Asia Minor, and Alexandria in Egypt.31 Their accomplishments reached their zenith 
in the early fourteenth century, when the brothers were granted the island of Chios by 
the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II.32 The island was important for a number of 
reasons: strategically it lay at the crossroads of shipping routes between 
Constantinople and the Black Sea in the North, to Syria and Alexandria in the South, by 
way of Rhodes and Famagusta.33 It also protected New Phokaia and provided an 
important repository for alum, where it could be held until ferried to northern 
Europe.34 Finally, the island was rich and fertile: it provided an abundance of wine and 
other agricultural produce, the most important of which was mastic gum, a product 
                                                        
26 William of Rubruck, The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great 
Khan Möngke, 1253-1255, trans. P. Jackson (London, 1990), 273. The Asia Minor alum trade became 
more important after 1291 when the economic blockage of Egypt, where alum was also mined, was 
strengthened: Jacoby, ‘Creta e Venezia’, 95-9; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 241. 
27 This is a letter from Benedetto Zaccaria appointing Daniele de Mari to sell 201 sacks of alum and 1 
pondus of mastic: Lopez & Raymond, Medieval Trade, 219-20. 
28
 Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1356-7; also in ‘Les Galères génoises dans la Manche et la Mer du Nord à la fin du 
XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe siècle’, ed. R. Doehaerd, Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome 19 
(1938), 5-76, at 33-6, nr. 13, 14; E.B. Fryde, ‘Italian maritime trade with medieval England (c. 1270–c. 
1530)’, Recueils de la Société de Jean Bodin 32 (1974), 291-337, at 293, n. 7 (reprinted in E.B. Fryde, 
Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), item XIV); Lopez, ‘Majorcans and Genoese’, 
1176; D.M.S. Avery, Seville: between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, 1248-1492: Pre-Columbus 
Commercial Routes from and to Seville (University of St Andrews, MPhil thesis, 2007), 77-8, 81. 
29 Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1530. Full translation in E. Briys, & D.J. Beerst, ‘The Zaccaria deal: Contract and 
options to fund a Genoese shipment of alum to Bruges in 1298’, Helsinki XIV International Economic 
History Congress (August 2006), 1-133, at 76-8. 
30 Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 44. For more on this, see Lopez, Benedetto Zaccaria, 131-60. 
31 Richard, ‘Le royaume de Chypre et l’embargo’, 123; Schein, Fideles, 77-8. 
32
 Zachariadou, TC, 7-9. Chios was going to be granted to Manuel Zaccaria in c.1305, but nothing came of 
the agreement. A few years later Benedetto seized the island which was then officially granted to him by 
the emperor. He almost definitely held it by 1309. 
33 M. Balard, ‘Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans (1300-1400)’, The Cambridge History of the Byzantine 
Empire: c.500-1492, ed. J. Shepard (Cambridge, 2008), 834-51, at 850. 
34 E.W. Hunt, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550 (1999), 183. 
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derived from trees native to Chios and extremely popular in the East.35 Mastic was 
listed as one of the items held by the Zaccaria in Genoa, for export to France, in 1268 
and was exchanged for cloth with a merchant on Rhodes in 1309.36 
The granting of the island was significant because the Zaccaria of Chios were to 
come into intense conflict with the Anatolian Turks, mostly from the emirate of Aydin, 
in the following decades of the century. Pachymeres suggested that by c.1305 the 
Turks had occupied the whole of the Anatolian coastal region uninterrupted, except for 
the area of Adramyttion and Phokaia, which were held by the Zaccaria. According to 
Pachymeres, the Genoese had been able to preserve these regions because of their 
military boldness. Manuel had, in fact, previously asked Andronikos II if he could be 
given control of some of the Aegean islands (including Chios) and granted a levy to 
equip boats for their defence against the Turks, although this did not come to 
anything.37 It is interesting that the reason given by Pachymeres for Manuel’s request 
to hold Chios from the emperor was a desire to defend the island against the Turks, 
which tallies with the motivations of the Greek conspirators who dealt with Charles of 
Valois in 1307. At this point it is difficult to outline deeds of the Zaccaria against the 
Turks. Benedetto I died in 1307 and the island passed to the control of his son and heir, 
Palaiologos Zaccaria, who ruled jointly with Manuel Zaccaria until the latter’s death in 
1309/10. Palaiologos, in turn, died in 1314. After his death, joint-control was assumed 
by his two sons Benedetto II and Martino Zaccaria, while Phokaia passed to the 
stewardship of Andreolo Cattaneo della Volta and his family.38  
                                                        
35 The Pistacia Lentiscus tree, which produces mastic, is native to the Mediterranean, but only produces 
gum when grown on Chios. For more on mastic production, see C. Belles, Mastiha Island, trans. C. 
Sachtouri (Athens, 2005), 29-95, 245-83; J. Perikos, The Chios Gum Mastic (Athens, 1993), 13-21. 
Because whoever ruled Chios had a natural monopoly on mastic production, it was sold at the highest 
possible rate: R. Lopez, Storia delle colonie Genovesi nel Mediterraneo (Bologna, 1938), 284. Various 
travel writers mention Chios as the place of mastic production. For example: Ludolph of Sudheim, 
Description of the Holy Land, 29; William of Boldensele, ‘Des Edelherrn Wilhelm von Boldensele Reise 
nach dem gelobten Lande’, Die Edelherren von Boldensele oder Boldensen, ed. C.L. Gotefend (Hannover, 
1855), 18-78, at 32. According to Sanudo, great quantities of mastic were exported to the Mamluk 
sultanate: Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, 24-5. 
36
 Lopez & Raymond, Medieval Trade, 219-20 (1268); Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1675 (1309). 
37
 George Pachymeres, iv. bk. xii, pp. 608-9. 
38
 The della Volta probably still owed fealty to the Zaccaria of Chios. The Cattaneo were shipping alum to 
Bruges in 1311: Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1723; also in ‘Les Galères génoises’, ed. Doehaerd, nr. 25; M.-L. Heers, 
‘Les Génois et le commerce de l’alun à la fin du Moyen Age’, Revue d'histoire economique et sociale 32 
(1954), 31-53, at 33-4; Argenti, Chios, i. 57; Lemerle, Aydin, 52. Miller incorrectly named Benedetto II 
and Martino as the sons of Benedetto I, when in fact they were the sons of Palaiologos: Miller, 
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It is hard to prove whether Chios was more prosperous in the first years of 
Martino and Benedetto II’s rule than it had been under their predecessors, primarily 
because of the lack of notarial documents relating to Chios.39 Nevertheless, some 
indication of the increased prosperity of the island can be found in the high level 
coinage issued by the brothers.40 Similarly, the granting of canonries in England to 
three sons of Palaiologos Zaccaria – Anthony, Aufredo and John, in May 1317, might 
also provide evidence of the growth of the Zaccaria trade to north-western Europe 
during this time,41 most probably from the increased shipment of alum to the cloth 
manufacturers of England and Flanders.42 Already in these early years, Martino 
Zaccaria’s efforts to distance himself from his legitimate overlord, the Byzantine 
emperor, and form stronger links to the crusade plans of the Latins of Romania can be 
seen. For example, in 1317 he spread the Zaccaria domain into the Frankish lands of 
Achaia by purchasing the district of Chalandritsa situated in the hinterland of Patras in 
the Peloponnese.43 It is also likely that in these years the brothers came to control the 
fortress of Smyrna on the Turkish mainland, which may have been in Genoese hands 
                                                                                                                                                                  
‘Zaccaria’, 47; corrected by Argenti, Chios, i. 56, n. 1. The best treatment of the genealogy of the 
Zaccaria family is given by A. Mazarakis, ‘A martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria (1307-1310)’, 
trans. M.J. Tzamali, Nomismatika Chronika 18 (1999), 111-18, esp. 112, 116. 
39 For example, records of the trade in mastic during the first Genoese occupation of the island are 
extremely rare: Balard, Romanie génoise, i. 120. 
40 Some coins bore their names with the inscription ‘servants of the emperor’ and the figure of St 
Isidore, the patron saint of Chios, e.g. ‘SERVORVM INPATORIS’, or ‘M.&.B.Z.SVI.IMP...S.ISDOR’SYI’: 
Schlumberger, Numismatique de l'orient Latin, 2 vols (Paris, 1878), ii. 413-5; A. Mazarakis, ‘The Chios 
mint during the rule of the Zaccaria family (1304-1329)’, Nomismatika Chronika 11 (1992), 43-52, at 43-
6, 51; D. Promis, La Zecca di Scio durante il dominio dei Genovesi (Turin, 1865), 34-6; D.M. Metcalf, 
Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, 2nd ed. (London, 1995), 
290-1; Argenti, Chios, i. 59; Lemerle, Aydin, 53; Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 48, n. 25. 
41 The entries refer to the sons of ‘Palyalogus Catharia’: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Avenionensia, 
reg. 7, ff. 39v-40v, 99v-100v; Registra Vaticana, reg. 66, f. 141, ep. 3543; f. 141v, ep. 3544; f. 175v, ep. 
3654; summaries in Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal 
Letters (1198-1513), ed. W.H. Bliss et al., 19 vols (London & Dublin, 1893-1998 in progress), ii. nr. 156-7, 
159; JXXII Communes, i.  nr. 3441-2, 3444. The canonries were Ripon, Lichfield and Hereford. Also see J. 
Harris, ‘Edward II, Andronicus II and Giles of Argenteim: a neglected episode in Anglo-Byzantine 
relations’, Porphyrogenita, 77-84, at 81. 
42 The textile industry of northern Europe certainly relied on alum exports from the East at this time: 
Ashtor, Levant Trade, 4-6; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 258-9; E.B. Fryde, ‘The English 
cloth industry and the trade with the Mediterranean: c.1370 – c.1480’, Produzione, commercio e 
consumo de panni dei lana (nei secoli XII – XVII), ed. M. Spallanzani (Florence, 1976), 343-63, at 346-8 
(reprinted in E.B. Fryde, Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), item XV). 
43
 John Ferrandez of Heredia, Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea: Compilado 
por comandamiento de Don Fray Johan Ferrandez de Heredia maestro del Hospital de s. Johan de 
Jerusalem: Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles (Osnabruck, 1885, reprinted 1968), 137; Miller, 
‘Zaccaria’, 48; Lemerle, Aydin, 53. Martino bought the fief of Chalandritsa from Aimon of Rans: Topping, 
‘Morea’, 119-20.  
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since as early as 1304.44 Consequently, the rule of Benedetto II and especially Martino, 
can be seen as the golden age of the Zaccaria dominion in the Aegean.45 
                                                        
44 Zachariadou, TC, 8, wrote that Martino had been the lord of the fortress since at least 1326. William 
Adam, writing in around 1316-17 mentions a fortress on the Turkish mainland controlled by the lords of 
Chios, this probably refers to the fortress at Smyrna. There is a possibility that he was referring to the 
fortress at Phokaia, but that was under the command of the Cattaneo della Volta family, not the 
Zaccaria: William Adam, 537 (Est eciam quoddam castrum in terra firma Turchorum [...] cuius dominium 
partim est predictorum dominorum qui in supradicta insula dominantur). Our knowledge of the actual 
domain of the Genoese on the Turkish mainland remains patchy, for a discussion see  Lemerle, Aydin, 
53-4; H. Ahrweiler, ‘L’histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations 
Turques (1081-1317), particulièrement au XIII
e
 siècle’, Travaux et Mémoires 1 (1965), 1-165, at 10, 41. 
45 Balard, Romanie génoise, i. 468. 
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2.2. Resistance of the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers to Turkish Expansion in the 
Eastern Aegean 
 
2.2.1. The earliest major conflict with the Turks: an important naval battle near 
Chios in 1319 
By the end of the second decade of the fourteenth century, Martino Zaccaria had 
begun to eclipse the deeds of his brother and become the real figurehead of the 
Zaccaria family in the Aegean, and it is through his military exploits against the Turks, 
more than anything else, that Martino gained his great reputation. One of the earliest 
and most explicit demonstrations of this can be found in the summer of 1319 where 
his force, allied with that of the Hospitallers of Rhodes under the command of Albert III 
of Schwarzburg, the Grand Preceptor of the Hospital, destroyed a superior Turkish 
force, probably dispatched by Emir Mehmed of Aydin, off the coast of Chios.46  
The battle is recorded in two letters written to the pope, one from Albert of 
Schwarzburg himself, the other from Gerard of Pins, who was acting as the temporary 
papal governor (vicarius) of the Order. These letters, which describe the encounter in 
great detail and provide an unusually descriptive account of a Turkish-Christian naval 
conflict in the Aegean, have been published in full by Joseph Delaville le Roulx and 
Ludwig Gatto.47 Because of the notable richness of each account, the event is worth 
recounting here in detail. 
In June the Hospitallers at Rhodes learned that the Turks of Ephesos (Aydin) 
had assembled a fleet of 32 vessels which were to be used for an imminent attack on 
Chios and the neighbouring islands: 
 
Certainly, most holy father, in those past days the perfidious Turkish 
enemies of the Christian faith have newly arrived in some areas of 
                                                        
46 For Mehmed see Lemerle, Aydin, 30. Mehmed ruled from c.1308-25. 
47 The letters are summarised in JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 8374, 10269. The full text of the letter of Gerard 
of Pins (nr. 8374) is published in Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 337-8. The full text of the letter of Albert of 
Schwarzburg (nr. 10269) is published in Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365-7. An account of 
the episode is also given by Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 8-9; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 331-
2; Argenti, Chios, 57-8; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 288-9. For a more fanciful account, with 
apparently no bearing on the sources, and the misidentification of Orkhan the son of Osman as the 
leader of the Turkish fleet, see W. Porter, A History of the Knights of Malta or the Order of the Hospital 
of St. John of Jerusalem, 2 vols (London, 1858), i. 222-3. 
87 
 
Rhodes and have armed 32 vessels, as was publicly said, to destroy the 
island of Chios and they intend to go subsequently to the other islands of 
Romania.48 
 
From the two letters it is evident that in the same month Albert of Schwarzburg raised 
a fleet of around 24 ships to be used for the impending conflict. The force probably 
consisted of three galleys, two horse transports (uxeriae) and nineteen other vessels (a 
combination of parescalmi, barcae and lignae) together with eighty brethren and other 
mounted soldiers.49 According to Schwarzburg’s letter, the Hospitallers arranged to 
rendez-vous with Martino Zaccaria and his fleet of ‘one galley and six to eight *other] 
boats and ships’ at Chios at the end of June.50 Whilst at Chios, Schwarzburg learned 
that the Turks were preparing to sail from Ephesos with 2,600 men, ten galleys, and 
nineteen other armed vessels of sixty-eighty oarsmen each.51 Both sources agree that 
the Christian fleet remained at Chios for some time, until it advanced from the port on 
Monday 23 July, the day of the battle.52  
Upon hearing news of the advance of the Turkish fleet, the Hospitallers, along 
with Martino Zaccaria and his vessels, sailed out to a distance of two miles looking for 
the Turks and ‘found them near the lands of Chios at about the hour of Vespers’.53 At 
this point, a fleet of eleven galleys ‘arrived unexpectedly from Genoa’. At first the 
Hospitallers were wary that these may have been Byzantine vessels, taking the side of 
the Turks, but after sending out scouts, they were identified as allies. Once the 
Christians had received this reassurance, they ‘bravely proceeded in battle line against 
the Turks and attacked them immediately at that hour’.54 According to Gerard of Pins 
the battle was ‘hard and cruel’, but the Christian galleys gained the upper hand after 
                                                        
48 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 337. 
49 Albert’s letter reads: ‘galleys, husseria cum equis [horse transports], lignae, parescalmi, and armed 
barcas both large and small, numbering 24, with 80 brethren and other mounted soldiers’: Delaville le 
Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365; Gerard of Pins’s letter reads: ‘three galleys and two uxeria with some 
other parastalmi’. Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 337. 
50
 una sua galea et VI vel VIII barcis et lignis: Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 366. 
51 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365. 
52 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338; Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365.  
53
 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365-6; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338. 
54 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 366; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338. 
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the first blow.55 The Turkish armada was heavily defeated; Schwarzburg claimed that 
3,000 Turks were killed or captured and only 400 managed to escape with six small 
vessels because of the approaching darkness.56 These figures are probably exaggerated 
and Gerard of Pins has suggested the more plausible figure of 2,000 Turks killed or 
wounded and 20 ships lost, with twelve escaping in the night.57 After the battle, the 
Hospitaller fleet put in at Leros on their return to Rhodes. Here the Knights re-took the 
castle on the island, which had been previously under their control but had been 
seized by over 2,000 Greek rebels earlier in the year. Once the castle had been 
captured, the Greek survivors were brought back to Rhodes and sold into captivity.58 
 
 
2.2.2. Dating of the battle 
As this battle constituted one of the largest Latin conflicts with the Turks before the 
victory at Adramyttion by the fleet of the naval league in 1334, it is important to 
determine exactly when it occurred. Despite the battle being extremely well 
documented, with two detailed accounts surviving, some confusion over the exact 
year of the encounter still exists. This ambiguity has stemmed from the inaccurate 
dating of one of the two principal sources for the battle, which have been used in the 
calendar of common letters for John XXII. The first being the letter of Gerard of Pins to 
the pope, dated 1 September 1318.59 The second being the letter of Albert of 
Schwarzburg to the pope, dated 3 September 1319.60 There is no doubt that the two 
letters recount the same event, which means that one of the letters has been 
incorrectly dated. These dates have, in turn, influenced the descriptions of historians, 
with the majority of scholars favouring 1319,61 but some, such as Gatto, Hill and 
Pistarino favouring 1318.62  
                                                        
55 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338. 
56 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 366.  
57 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338, 332, n. 1; Argenti, Chios, 58, n. 2. 
58 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 366; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338.  
59
 JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 8374; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 337-8. 
60
 JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 10269; Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365-7. 
61 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 8-9; Argenti, Chios, 57-8; Balard, Romanie génois, i. 121; 
Lemerle, Aydin, 30, 54; A.T. Luttrell, ‘Cos after 1306’, Istoria – Texne – Archaiologia tes Kw (Athens, 
2001), 401-4, at 403-4 (reprinted in LVR5, item VIII); Idem, ‘The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Prospectives, 
problems, possibilities’, Die geistlichen Ritterorden Europas, ed. J. Fleckenstein & M. Hellmann 
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To add to the confusion, both letters have been published in full: the letter of 
Albert of Schwarzburg in the early twentieth century, by Delaville le Roulx, and the 
letter of Gerard of Pins by Gatto in the 1950s. Delaville le Roulx did not refer to Gerard 
of Pins’s letter in his work, Gatto, on the other hand, referred to both letters in his 
work but has made no effort to rectify the obvious discrepancy in the dates, instead 
maintaining that the battle was fought on 23 July 1318, and that both letters were 
written in September 1318.63 Likewise, Philip Argenti, has referenced both letters, 
dating them to 1319, but has provided no explanation for the anomaly in the two 
documents.64 The confusion over the year of the battle has led certain scholars to 
assume that there were in fact two separate battles which were reported to the pope. 
Housley has referenced the letter of Gerard of Pins in the papal registers (1318) and 
Delaville le Roulx’s transcript of Albert of Schwarzburg’s letter (1319) as providing 
details of two different battles, when in fact they recount the same event.65 Similarly, 
Anthony Luttrell has, at times, claimed that more than one battle took place.66 
Thus the discrepancy in the dating of the sources needs to be explained.67 Both 
documents recall that the battle was fought on 23 July of the second Indiction of their 
respective years; this can be 1318 if the Greek indiction is used (commencing on 1 
September), or 1319 if the Bedan indiction is adopted (commencing on 24 
September).68 However, one particular passage of Albert of Schwarzburg’s letter states 
that the battle was fought on Monday the 23 July – as the 23 July only fell on a 
Monday in 1319, then it must be assumed that the battle was fought in 1319 and not 
1318 (the date used for Gerard of Pins’s letter in the papal registers and that given by 
Gatto).69 To clarify the sequence of events: the battle took place on Monday 23 July 
1319. In September of that year both Gerard of Pins and Albert of Schwarzburg wrote 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(Thorbecke, 1980), 243-66, at 253, n. 39 (reprinted in LVR2, item I); Zachariadou, Trade, 14, n. 54; Idem, 
‘Holy war in the Aegean’, 215, n. 20. 
62 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 331-2; G. Hill, A History of Cyprus, 4 vols (1949-52), ii. 274; Pistarino, ‘Chio 
dei Genovesi’, 15. 
63 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 331. 
64 Argenti, Chios, 58, n. 3. 
65 Housley, Avignon, 289, n. 126. 
66
 Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 288-9, who claims there were three battles in 1318, 1319 and 
1320. This is altered to two battles in 1318 and 1319: Luttrell, ‘Corrigenda et Addenda’, 288-9 (LVR1 
item XXV). This is corrected to one battle in Luttrell, ‘Prospectives’, 253, n. 39. 
67 This has been discussed by Luttrell, ‘Cos’, 404, n. 30; Luttrell, ‘Prospectives’, 253, n. 39.  
68
 Luttrell, ‘Chios’, 404, n. 30; see also Sources for Turkish History in the Hospitallers’ Rhodian Archive, 31. 
69 die lune de mane XXIII mensis julii, secunda indictione: Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365. 
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to Pope John XXII to announce the victory, the letter of Gerard of Pins has been 
mistakenly dated to 1318. It is even possible that a coin minted by Martino Zaccaria 
displayed the figure of St John in specific reference to the battle, which was fought on 
the eve of the Feast of St John.70  
 
 
2.2.3. Additional conflicts with the Turks 
Although it is clear that only one major naval battle took place off Chios in 1319, there 
is evidence to suggest that other encounters between the Hospitallers, Genoese and 
Turks occurred in the years immediately before and after this year. The problematic 
dating of many of these accounts merely highlights the ambiguity surrounding the 
early conflicts between the forces of the Turkish emirates and the Christians. This is 
especially the case with any Hospitaller operations against the Turks between the 
years 1313-1319, where evidence is particularly scarce. 
In a letter sent by John XXII to Albert of Schwarzburg, dated 1 March 1319, the 
pope wrote that he had recently been informed of a victory of the Hospitaller fleet 
‘against the enemies of the Christian faith’.71 This allusion to an earlier encounter may 
be a reference to the Hospitaller battles with the allied Genoese and Menteshe Turks 
in 1312-13 (the years when Schwarzburg was probably Grand Preceptor), but the tenor 
of the letter suggests that Schwarzburg had achieved other more recent victories over 
the Turks, possibly allied with the Zaccaria in 1317 or 1318. This is certainly plausible, 
and is supported by the account of William Adam who, writing sometime before 1319, 
noted that the Turks did not dare to inhabit parts of the Asia Minor coast ‘because of 
the said lords of the said island [of Chios+ who do not permit them to rest there’.72  
Furthermore, a similar battle to that of 1319 has been described by Giovanni 
Villani, but is dated to 1320. He wrote that a Turkish admiral, with a fleet of over eighty 
galleys and other vessels, went to attack the island of Rhodes. The Hospitaller 
commander of Rhodes, with four galleys and 20 smaller ships and accompanied by six 
Genoese galleys, who were returning from Armenia (Erminia), intercepted the Turkish 
                                                        
70 This is claimed by Mazarakis, ‘Chios mint’, 49, 52. 
71 The pope wrote that Albert had ‘carried back the palm of victory’, in reference to this victory. Full text 
in Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 343-4, quote at 343; summary in JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9026. 
72 William Adam, 537; Lemerle, Aydin, 53. 
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fleet. They fought with the Turks and defeated them, capturing a large part of their 
fleet and sinking the rest. Next, they went to a small island where there were around 
5,000-10,000 Turks. Here the Christians captured them all and, after killing the old, 
sold the young into slavery.73 The numbers of the fleet given by Villani are very similar 
to the battle of 1319 – the Hospitallers had ‘four galleys and 20 smaller vessels’ allied 
with ‘six Genoese galleys’.74 As in 1319, they were far outnumbered by the Turkish 
forces, which consisted of ‘eighty galleys and other vessels’.75 The similarities between 
this battle and that of 1319 suggest that Villani may have been recounting the same 
event, but had incorrectly dated the battle of 1319 to 1320.76 This is possible as Villani 
probably began recording what he saw in the later 1320s, and not at the time when he 
would have heard of the news of the battle.77  
A Latin version of the travels of Ludolf of Sudheim, a pilgrim who visited the 
East between 1336 and 1341, describes another Hospitaller-Genoese victory over the 
Turks. According to Sudheim, 50 Turkish vessels were chased to Kos (Lango) by the 
Hospitallers, who were then defeated by their Turkish opponents and pursued into the 
hinterland of the island. On hearing this, Martino Zaccaria of Chios (Nycolao de Sya) 
sailed to rescue the Christians. According to the author 6,260 Turks were killed (with 
an English woman killing over 1,000 of them!).78 Sudheim provides no date for this 
battle, and his account is obviously highly unreliable, not least because his journey to 
                                                        
73 The numbers of Turks captured varies according to what edition of Villani is used. 5,000 is given in the 
Porta edition (vol. ii. bk. 10, p. 323), 10,000 is given in the Muratori edition: Florentini Historia 
Universalis, ed. L.A. Muratori, RIS 13 (Milan, 1728), cols. 1-1002, at 501. 
74 il comandator di Rodi con IIII galee e con XX piccioli legni, e coll’aiuto di VI galee de’ Genovesi : Villani, 
ii. bk. 10, p. 323. 
75 LXXX tra galee e altri legni: Villani, ii. bk. 10, p. 323.  
76 Luttrell has adopted this view by suggesting that ‘the battle mistakenly described as occurring in 1320 
derives from a wrongly dated account of that of 1319’: Luttrell, ‘Corrigenda et addenda’, 288-9, at 288. 
The battle is also reported in the Annales Ecclesiastici, where Villani is the source, and dated to 1322. 
The author mentions that the island was attacked by the Turks throughout these times and that 
historians are in disagreement about date of this battle, suggesting that there perhaps only one battle 
occurred: AE, xxiv. nr. 47, p. 187. Wittek has dated the battle to 1320/21: Wittek, Mentesche, 65-6. The 
battle is also mentioned by a number of authors who accept Villani’s date of 1320: Delaville le Roulx, 
Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 79, n. 1; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 330, n. 4; Zachariadou, TC, 14, n. 55; Idem, 
‘Holy war in the Aegean’, 215, n. 21. 
77 Villani probably began recording what he saw after 1322 and began writing his account sometime 
between the mid 1320s and early 1330s. The narrative of Villani’s work for these years also focuses 
primarily on factional conflicts within Florence, and not on events in the wider world (i.e. the Aegean): L. 
Green, Chronicle Into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century 
Chronicles (Cambridge, 1972), 164-9.  
78
 ‘Ludolph of Sudheim, ‘Ludolphus de Sudheim, De itinere Terre Sancte’, ed. G.A. Neumann, Archives de 
l'Orient Latin, 2 vols (Paris, 1881-4), ii. 305-77, at 333. 
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the East and composition of his work began at least a decade after the events he was 
recounting. Luttrell has suggested that Sudheim’s account may be a garbled version of 
the account given by a Cypriot source.79 This account is brief, and merely stated that in 
1319 the vessels of the Knights of Rhodes had defeated a Turkish fleet off Chios, 
leaving 3,000 Turks dead or wounded.80 Neither of these descriptions provide any 
further clue regarding the date of another battle with the Turks, in fact these reports, 
and that of Villani, were all probably recounting a confused version of the original 
battle of 1319.  
However, the account of William Adam and the allusions to past conflicts in the 
papal letters do suggest that the Hospitallers and the Zaccaria of Chios were engaged 
in more widespread military action against the Turkish emirates, rather than just the 
one isolated battle which occurred in 1319. In the context of the emerging power of 
the emirate of Aydin these conflicts are extremely important. They are evidence that 
the Aydin Turks had sufficient maritime capabilities and manpower to consider the 
possible conquest of Chios, and that the Latins too were able to mobilise significant 
forces to resist them. In an effort to do this more effectively, the Genoese and the 
Hospitallers had also put aside their differences to form a united front against the 
Turks. Furthermore, these events had not escaped the notice of those in western 
Europe: the various garbled and misdated reports of battles between the Turks and 
Christians at this time undoubtedly stemmed from the accounts given to Pope John 
XXII in September 1319.  
This contests Zachariadou’s argument that the Turks did not pose a significant 
threat to the Latins before their alliance with the Catalans of Athens in 1318, and that 
their raids off the coast of Asia Minor at this time were ‘rare and on a small scale’.81 
The letter of congratulations from the pope in March 1319 and the battle off Chios 
later in that year are evidence of the important role which the Genoese and the 
Hospitallers played in combating Turkish incursions into the Aegean. These events 
challenge the presumption that Venice was the first of the Christian Aegean powers to 
                                                        
79 Luttrell, Town of Rhodes, 216; Idem, ‘Cos’, 403-4. 
80
 Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi, i. 400. 
81 Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 822-3. 
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feel the brunt of the Turkish attacks.82 Indeed, from the above accounts, it is clear that 
the Turkish attacks were more than just an effort to create a deserted buffer-zone.83 
The geographical position of Rhodes and Chios alone, both of which lie within eyesight 
of the Turkish coast, provide a reason for why these islands, and not those of the 
Venetians who occupied the territories towards the west of the Aegean, came under 
more sustained attack from the Turks in the second decade of the fourteenth century.  
                                                        
82
 E.g. Housley, ‘Angevin Naples’, 550. 
83 As claimed by Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 822; cf. Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, 29. 
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2.3. Relations with the Papacy and the Rise of Martino Zaccaria 
 
2.3.1. Papal support for the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers 
Pope John XXII clearly understood the importance of the Hospitaller and Genoese 
naval victories and rewarded the participants for their efforts. Albert of Schwarzburg, 
in particular, benefitted from the concessions of the pontiff. Since 1312, when he was 
granted the grand-preceptorship of Cyprus for half of its value by Fulk of Villaret 
(30,000 instead of 60,000 bezants per year), Schwarzburg had been on bad terms with 
his fellow brethren. After refusing to pay the required rent for his position he was 
removed from Cyprus by John XXII in 1317.84 Schwarzburg was only restored to his 
former position once the pope had learned of his successes against the Turks in March 
1319. This was at the same time as the pope granted him the Commandery of Kos 
(Lango), if he could recover it from the infidel Turks.85 In addition to this, he allowed 
the Hospitallers to split the Grand Commandery of Cyprus in half so that Schwarzburg 
could continue his role there.86 John XXII also took measures to protect the 
Hospitallers from potential bankruptcy, possibly because he realised the importance of 
their role in the Aegean and understood that their actions against the Turks and the 
conquest of Rhodes had cost the Order dearly. So, in order to save the Hospitallers, 
John XXII introduced a series of financial reforms on their behalf and, in 1319, 
intervened to instate Hélion of Villeneuve, an able administrator, as the next grand 
master (1319-46).87  
 It has been seen in the previous chapter that John XXII also granted the 
Zaccaria spiritual and temporal rewards for the services against the Turks, in the form 
of the mastic trade licence in 1320 and grant of indulgences in 1323.88 Both of these 
                                                        
84 Hill, Cyprus, ii. 274. 
85 Full text in Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 341-3; JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9025; Luttrell, ‘Cos’, 403. Also see 
Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 343-4; summary in JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9026. 
86 The other half of the Grand Commandery of Cyprus was granted to Maurice of Pagnac. Gatto, 
‘Martino Zaccaria’, 339-44; JXXII Communes, ii. 9022-3, 9025-6; Hill, Cyprus, ii. 274-5. 
87 A detailed study of Hospitaller debts has been carried out by A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers and their 
Florentine bankers: 1306-1346’, Karrissime Gotifride: Historical Essays Presented to Professor Godfrey 
Wettinger on his Seventieth Birthday, ed. P. Xuereb, (Msida, 1999), 17-24, at 18-19 (reprinted in LVR5, 
item VI). See also: Mollat, Popes, 19-20; Housley, Avignon, 284-5. There is much material in the papal 
registers relating to Hospitaller debts, see for example: JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 236, 320, 453-4, 728, 917-8; 
JXXII Communes, i. nr. 4450-72; ii. nr. 5691, 6929, 7316-23, 7596, 7604; iii. nr. 13407; iv. nr. 14454. 
88 See above, ch. 1, pp. 70-3. 
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privileges were granted through petitions from the Zaccaria, which were summarised 
in the papal responses. These documents are consequently very informative for 
establishing how the Zaccaria projected their own motivations to the papacy and the 
rest of Europe. It is sometimes claimed that mercantile families such as the Zaccaria 
were devoid of pious motivations; Runciman and Atiya would have it that they used 
the Crusade merely a veneer to exploit economic advantage.89 This, in some senses, 
may be true. After all, the Zaccaria, in defending the Christians of the Aegean, were 
also defending their own interests – the mastic farms on Chios, the alum mines at 
Phokaia and the trade routes which their industry relied upon. It is natural for any 
state to defend itself when attacked and the Zaccaria may have just been fortunate 
that in protecting their own realm they were also acting as defenders of the faith. 
Whether this is the case or not, will never be known, but it is clear that the brothers 
were aware of their position in the Aegean, and made a conscious attempt to portray 
their actions as being motivated by a willingness to defend Christian lands from the 
Turks. This is most clearly represented in Martino Zaccaria’s petition for indulgences in 
1323: 
 
Since your petition, as presented to us, indeed stated that you and the 
island of Chios, which you command, are placed in the midst of the Turks 
and other infidel nations from whom it happens that you frequently 
suffer hostile taunts and many attacks, in which you have had numerous 
fine successes with strength granted to you by the right hand of the 
Lord, to whom we accordingly give humble expressions of thanks; and 
since it may thus sometimes happen that some of those faithful to Christ 
and paid troops (stipendiarii), whom you retain, at your own expense, 
with a view to suppressing the audacious deeds and heinous assaults of 
those same Turks and infidels, are wounded and die in encounters and 
battles with those same Turks and infidels, you have humbly requested 
                                                        
89 See Introduction, p. 11, for more on this. 
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us that we compassionately deign to make provision in this regard both 
for you and for them. 90 
 
Here, the petitioners had clearly made much of the numerous victories won by the 
Zaccaria over the Turks (presumably referring to events around 1319), that the family 
were paying for the employment of various soldiers from their own funds, and that the 
purpose of this force was to hold back the Turkish advances. The couching of their 
deeds in the language of the Crusade was evidently a success as the pope approved 
the request. The possibility that Martino Zaccaria had some genuine concern for his 
own spiritual wellbeing and that of his followers must also not be discounted. It is not 
known exactly what spiritual concessions Martino had requested, but those he 
received (indulgences in articulo mortis) had less of a recruitment benefit than those 
granted for participation alone, so they cannot be dismissed as being solely requested 
for practical reasons.91 
The high standing of Martino Zaccaria in the Aegean at this time is further 
illustrated by the final clause of the letter, which decreed that anyone attacking his 
possessions would incur sentence of excommunication:  
 
[W]e determine and decree by the authority of the present 
communication that each and every person who presumes to make 
attacks or hostile assaults with those same Turks and infidels against 
you, or with them, against those same paid troops (stipendiarios) and 
faithful on the aforesaid Chios or other islands and lands adjacent or 
near to the Island of Chios or, with them, against that same Island of 
Chios, if they, as is foreseen, form any alliance, association or coalition 
with those Turks and infidels for the purpose of making such attacks or 
hostile assaults against you and the aforesaid paid troops (stipendiarios) 
                                                        
90 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 344-5. 
91 It still must have been thought that participants would fight better if they had a guarantee of spiritual 
and material “wages”. Unfortunately it is extremely hard to gauge the response to these indulgences: 
Housley, Avignon, 133. 
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and faithful or knowingly give them help, advice or support in this 
regard, by that very deed shall incur sentence of excommunication.92 
 
This further demonstrates the importance attached to the Zaccaria for the defence of 
the faith by the Curia. It is also interesting to note that Venetian territories were 
included amongst those where the indulgences could be granted. The suggestion that 
some Venetians might fight for the Genoese Zaccaria is perhaps a reflection of the high 
regard with which they were considered by the pope at this time – the Venetians were 
also suffering from Turkish attacks in these years, but they did not receive the same 
levels of papal support for their anti-Turkish actions.93 
 
 
2.3.2. The effect of the papal concessions and the rise of Martino Zaccaria 
The amount of extra revenue the papal concession for mastic generated for the 
Zaccaria is extremely difficult to determine as very few records of mastic shipments 
exist for the period in question, especially to Mamluk lands.94 Nevertheless, various 
different sources provide glimpses of the wealth and prosperity of Chios and the 
Zaccaria in these years, which could plausibly have been a result of the papal 
privileges. Firstly, the trading concession must have been regarded as being effective 
by both the Zaccaria and the papacy, as it was renewed for four years in 1322 and for a 
further three years in 1325.95 At this time, the high quality of gold and silver coinage 
struck on the island also reflects a strong degree of economic prosperity, which David 
Metcalf has suggested was attributed to the ‘steady inflow of Byzantine and Italian 
money from the sale of mastic’.96 The contemporary Turkish Manaqeb al-‘arefin also 
stated that Umur of Aydin had subjugated Chios (Saqez Adasi) under the final years of 
                                                        
92 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 345. 
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94 For example, we know that a merchant traded mastic in Savona in 1327: Les relations commerciales 
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95 For examples of the money the mastic trade brought to the Mahona of Chios, see Argenti, Chios, i. 
125, 268, 305. 
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 Metcalf, Coinage of the Crusades, 289-90. Also see G. Lunardi, Le monete delle colonie Genovesi 
(Genoa, 1980), 179-88; Mazarakis, ‘Chios mint’, 51. 
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Martino’s rule, where the Turks carried away ‘more mastic than can be described’.97 In 
addition to this, it must also be considered that the brothers were still gaining 
significant funds from the shipment of alum to the West – as with mastic, records 
giving precise details of the alum trade at this time are scarce, but it is known that in 
1322 and 1323 consignments were shipped to Southampton and Pisa, which may well 
have originated from Phokaia.98 Moreover, John Kantakouzenos wrote that during the 
late 1320s the income of Martino Zaccaria had reached 120,000 hyperpyra per year.99 
The size of the Zaccaria forces, as given by some of the crusade theorists, also 
suggest that the island was economically prosperous at this time. According to the De 
Modo Sarracenos Extirpandi, written by the Dominican friar William Adam in around 
1316-17,100 the Turks were afraid to approach within twelve miles of Chios, because of 
the Zaccaria, who ‘maintained at all times and at their own expense, around one 
thousand infantry, one hundred cavalry, and two galleys, well equipped and choicely 
armed, for use against the Turks and the nearby Saracens’.101 In another tract, the 
Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum, written in 1331-2, the anonymous author 
commented on the modified galleys used by Martino Zaccaria in his fight against the 
Turks; these vessels were surrounded with a defensive wall and protected by large 
towers, capable of housing 400 men or more, and were armed with ballistas of 
different types.102 According to Nikephoros Gregoras, Martino had become so 
powerful that, by the late 1320s, he had forced several of the Turkish emirates to pay 
him tribute.103 The ability of Martino to afford such an army at his own expense was 
                                                        
97 Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki, The Feats of the Knowers of God (Manaqeb al-‘arefin), trans. J. O’Kane 
(Leiden, 2002), 665. 
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certainly a reflection of the prosperity of Chios during his reign, and it can be 
presumed that the benefits of the papal trade licence played a part in enabling him to 
maintain the force for over a decade.  
There can be no doubt that the Zaccaria brothers, especially Martino, also 
benefitted from the heroic reputation which their exploits against the Turks gave rise 
to in the West. As has been seen, by the 1320s Martino’s fame had spread across 
Europe thanks to reports of his naval victories over the Turks. Praise for their exploits 
also came from the crusade theorists, in particular William Adam, who stated that 
‘neither man nor woman, nor dog or cat, nor any living animal’ would have remained 
on any island near the Turks, ‘had not the said lords opposed *the Turks+ manfully and 
powerfully’.104 To confirm this perception, the influential Marino Sanudo Torsello 
named Martino Zaccaria as a key player in his provisional anti-Turkish fleet sometime 
in the early 1320s.105 By this time, the Genoese of Chios were clearly considered by 
many in Europe, as well as in the East, as the ‘shield of defence’ against Turkish 
expansion.106 
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that Martino took steps to cement his 
reputation as the principal Latin ruler in the Aegean, by forming stronger links with the 
Frankish lords of Greece and carving out his own dynasty in the area. By the mid 1320s 
he was referred to as the lord of Damalâ (on the eastern tip of the Argolid in the 
Morea) which he acquired sometime before 1325 through his marriage to Jacqueline 
de la Roche, and lord of Chalandritsa (in the north-east of the Morea), which he 
acquired in 1317, as well as the lord of Chios. In addition to these territories, he had 
also acquired the lordship of Veligosti (just south of the centre of the Morea) also 
through his marriage to Jacqueline de la Roche and seems to have controlled the 
harbour fortress of Smyrna.107 Martino’s eldest son, Bartolommeo also held land in 
Greece; he became marquis of Boudonitza in 1327 and was appointed lord of Damalâ 
                                                        
104 William Adam, 533; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 329; Lemerle, Aydin, 53-4. 
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107 Nobilis Martini Zacharie de Castro Domini Insulae Chii, et Castorum Calanuse et Damale: Saggio di 
codice diplomatico: Formato sulle antiche scritture dell’archivio di stato Napoli, ed. A. Minieri Riccio, 2 
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by his father.108 The acquisition of these minor lordships must have improved 
Martino’s standing amongst the nobility of East and West, seeing as, in May 1325, 
Philip of Taranto and his wife Catherine of Valois bestowed upon him the grand title of 
King and Despot of Asia Minor. In doing so, they promised to grant him the islands of 
Chios (which he already governed), Marmara, Oenoussai (Fenosia), Tenedos, Lesbos, 
Samos, Icaria and Kos, in return for his assistance in conquering the Byzantine empire 
(Martino promised to provide Philip or his successors with 500 knights and six galleys a 
year for the campaign).109 Although this granting of titles was a somewhat hollow 
gesture, as Philip did not possess the territories to bestow them in the first place, the 
decision of Philip and his wife (with their strong links to the French and Angevin royal 
families) to trust their dynastic ambitions to Martino Zaccaria demonstrates how 
powerful he had become in the Aegean and how widely his reputation had spread.  
At the same time as forming ties with the nobility of Frankish Greece, Martino 
also took overt steps to free himself from Byzantine suzerainty and exclude his brother 
from the co-rulership of Chios. He made clear attempts to extend his realm beyond the 
emperor’s patrimony in Chios by issuing coinage bearing his name alone in Damalâ, 
which bore no reference to imperial sovereignty.110 He also minted a new currency, 
bearing only his name in Chios, thus scrapping the dual-name coinage he had shared 
with his brother before.111 By 1322 papal letters exist addressed only to Martino 
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Zaccaria, and not with his brother as before.112 Eventually Martino attempted to force 
his brother to renounce his co-governance of Chios in return for an annuity of 6000 
gold coins from the revenue of the island.113 The discord between the two brothers 
had become so great that, in 1328, John XXII wrote to the brothers urging them to 
settle their differences.114 
 
 
2.3.3. The collapse of the Zaccaria dominion in the Aegean 
Martino Zaccaria may have been exacting tribute from some of the Turks in the latter 
1320s, but this does not mean to say that he was at peace with all of them. In the 
years immediately preceding the loss of Chios in 1329, cracks in the Zaccaria Aegean 
empire were beginning to show. From around 1326 Umur, the son of Emir Mehmed of 
Aydin, laid siege to the Genoese castle in the harbour of Smyrna, which he took in 
1328/9.115 In 1327 he also launched naval attacks on the Zaccaria lands in the Morea 
(primarily Damalâ), in an effort to draw military resources away from the conflict in 
Smyrna.116 Martino was obviously weakened from the concerted attacks of Umur, and 
although he had the resources to begin the construction of a castle in Chios town, he 
was unable to resist the arrival of an army, under the command of the Byzantine 
Emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos and apparently allied with the Venetian duke of 
Naxos, which took the island in September 1329.117 According to Kantakouzenos, 
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Martino would have been torn to pieces by the disgruntled Greek population if he had 
not been taken to Constantinople, where he was imprisoned until 1337.118 It is not 
surprising that Andronikos III wished to seize Chios from Martino: his construction of 
the castle at Chios town, which was in breach of the terms of his investiture, and 
willingness to side with Philip of Taranto, the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople, 
were open provocations of the Greeks. The attacks by Umur of Aydin, provided the 
emperor with the ideal opportunity. 
The loss of Smyrna and Chios within such a short amount of time somewhat 
contradicts the strong image of Martino Zaccaria as portrayed in the western sources, 
perhaps calling into question the effectiveness of the papal favours granted to him. 
However, if the Greek and Turkish sources are analysed closely, some explanations for 
why Martino’s dominion collapsed so quickly can be formulated. Firstly, it is clear from 
the Düstūrnāme of the Turkish poet Enveri that Martino deliberately withdrew his 
forces from the citadel of Smyrna, before it fell to the forces of Aydin.119 This was done 
either in an effort to bolster the garrison at Chios, as suggested by Lemerle, or because 
Martino had reached an agreement with Umur.120 Secondly, it is clear from the 
account of John Kantakouzenos that the island of Chios fell to the treachery of 
Benedetto II Zaccaria more than any military weakness on behalf of his brother. 
According to Kantakouzenos, once the imperial forces had disembarked and 
approached Chios town, Benedetto II, who was in command of one of the fortresses, 
handed it over to the emperor. Martino duly surrendered in the face of overwhelming 
opposition.121 The fact that Martino had initially refused to surrender to Andronikos III, 
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suggests that he was confident of victory over the Greeks. This account seems 
plausible and agrees with what is known about the fractured relationship between the 
two brothers. Martino Zaccaria may well have maintained a force capable of defending 
Chios alone from external attack, but it is likely that manpower shortages prevented 
him from being able to adequately extend his protection to the other Zaccaria 
possessions in the region (this was clearly the case at Smyrna). Thus Pope John XXII’s 
call for men to aid the Zaccaria against the Turks in exchange for indulgences would 
seem to be a necessary but ultimately unsuccessful measure. More than anything, it 
was Martino’s neglect of his brother, coupled with the appearance of two highly 
competent generals in Andronikos III and Umur of Aydin, which caused the ultimate 
collapse of Martino Zaccaria’s dominion in the Aegean.122 
 
 
Chapter 2 Overview 
 
As has been seen in this chapter, the defence of the Aegean was reliant on the close 
cooperation of the papacy and those Latins operating in the region. This was 
demonstrated by the Zaccaria, a powerful family of Genoese merchants who became 
rulers of Chios and, in alliance with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, formed the backbone of 
Latin resistance against the Turks. In contrast to what is often assumed, it was they 
who most effectively resisted Turkish attacks during this period and not the Venetians. 
This was recognised by the pope, who granted the brothers Martino and Benedetto II a 
trade licence allowing them to export mastic to the Mamluk sultanate. The trade 
licence is of the utmost importance to this study for two reasons: firstly, it shows that 
the defence of Latin colonies from the attacks of the Turkish maritime emirates was 
considered as more important that enforcing the trade embargo on Egypt, meaning 
that the Turks were starting to become regarded as the primary Muslim threat in the 
eastern Mediterranean; secondly, the concepts of trade and crusade were becoming 
blended together in the thinking of the Curia and the merchants operating in the East: 
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the Zaccaria couched the defence of their trade routes as the defence of the faith, and 
the pope granted commercial privileges, alongside spiritual rewards, to facilitate the 
merchants’ anti-Turkish activities. 
 The success of these measures is hard to establish. Martino Zaccaria certainly 
accrued much wealth during his time as lord of Chios. He even extended his Aegean 
empire into the Morea and was made King and Despot of Asia Minor by Philip of 
Taranto. However, Martino overextended himself and lost his territories after 
successive attacks from Umur of Aydin and the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III. The 
Zaccaria control of Chios demonstrated that mercantile families could survive in the 
region and prosper against the Turks with papal support, but there were limits to this. 
The alienation of both Greeks and Turks was evidently too great to bear. 
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Chapter 3. The Venetians in the Aegean: Conflicts and Alliances 
 
3.1. Venetian Establishment and Activity in the Aegean during the Early Decades 
of the Fourteenth Century 
 
By the end of the thirteenth century, Venetian possessions in the Aegean area 
included the large islands of Crete in the southern Aegean, Negroponte in the western 
Aegean and the district of Modon-Coron on the south-eastern tip of the Morea, as well 
as a scattering of other smaller islands and districts. These regions were extremely 
important for the defence and expansion of Venetian trade in the eastern 
Mediterranean, primarily because they offered protection for the trade routes running 
from Constantinople to the western Mediterranean. In the context of the highly 
fragmented political situation in Romania, the size of the Venetian possessions, 
coupled with the power of a maritime empire behind them, made Venice of great 
importance. Crete, in particular, was the dominant island in the region, and was said to 
be the most prized of Venetian colonies overseas. For this reason, Venetian assistance 
in any crusade to the Aegean was highly valued. 
Venice, in contrast to Genoa, had a strongly centralised government arranged 
into various councils and headed by the doge. These councils made decisions based on 
news from abroad and sent orders to their citizens in the East to carry out. Fortunately 
many of the deliberations surrounding the decisions made by the administration have 
been preserved in the archives of Venice, and it is therefore possible to provide a 
detailed outline of Venetian policy in the Aegean.1 Over the course of this chapter it 
shall be shown how this policy shifted from one based on participation in a crusade to 
recover Constantinople, and indifference to the Turks, to one based on mutual 
cooperation with the Byzantines and other Latin states in the Aegean, against the 
Turks and their Catalan allies. Although the Venetians did not always cooperate with 
the papacy in Aegean affairs, their plans for a naval league, as suggested by the likes of 
Marino Sanudo Torsello, would come to dictate crusading policy in the Aegean for the 
time period covered in this study. 
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3.1.1. Early Venetian contact with the Turks 
As Zachariadou has pointed out, materials which shed light on Venetian relations with 
the Turkish emirates during the first decades of the fourteenth century are extremely 
scarce. Two important sources for this, the deliberations of the Venetian Senate and 
the decisions of the Cretan Great Council do not survive before 1332 and 1344 
respectively.2 Nevertheless, some examples of commercial exchange between 
Venetian merchants and those from the Turkish emirates do survive for the first years 
of the century. In 1301 and 1302 Venetian traders were present in the port of Makre 
on the Turkish mainland, where they exchanged various commodities.3 In the same 
years, two rulings of the Venetian Senate showed that horses were being imported 
from Turkey to Crete: one from 3 November 1300 stated that money coming from 
penalties imposed on Cretan feudatories was to be reserved for the purchase of horses 
from Turkey; the other, from 3 June 1302, approved the loan of money to those 
Cretans who wished to import Turkish horses to the island.4 It is also likely that the 
Venetian authorities on Crete concluded a commercial agreement with the emirate of 
Menteshe sometime before 1318. This treaty, as with others later in the century, was 
almost certainly delegated by the mother city to the Venetian authorities on Crete.5 
 After a long period of peaceful coexistence the Venetians suffered the first 
Turkish attacks on their colonies in the summer of 1318. One explanation for the 
peaceful coexistence before this time is that many of the Turkish emirates were busy 
fighting the Byzantines on land and the Genoese and Hospitallers in the eastern 
Aegean islands. The Venetians, situated as they were in the west of the Aegean and on 
the mainland of Greece, were not convenient targets at this stage. It is also worth 
noting that the Venetians were pursuing the most beneficial policy for the Republic at 
this point; the Byzantines, Genoese and Hospitallers who were resisting the Turks were 
rivals of the Venetians, so whilst they were struggling against the Turks in Asia Minor 
and along the Aegean coast, Venice was trading peacefully with their enemies. Despite 
this, Venice had not always been on good terms with the Turks. The joint Byzantine-
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Turkish defeats of the Venetians at Kos in 1283 and 1284 are examples of how both 
sides were willing to revert to force to protect their commercial interests.6 This policy 
was adopted by the Republic once Turkish maritime power had grown to the extent 
where attacks on Venetian territories were commonplace, after this point Venice 
became one of the primary advocates of an anti-Turkish crusade.  
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3.2. Truces and Alliances with the Turks and Catalans, 1302-1321 
 
3.2.1. Combating Catalan piracy in the Aegean, 1314-1318 
Because of the concentration of her possessions in the western Aegean, Venice was 
involved to some extent in almost all of the campaigns launched in Frankish Greece 
during the first half of the fourteenth century. In these early years the primary enemy 
of Venice was the Catalan Company, which after seizing Athens in 1311, began to make 
ever more penetrating incursions into Venetian-ruled colonies (especially Negroponte) 
and to disrupt the Republic’s shipping in the Aegean. It was to be the Catalan alliance 
with the Turks which would signify the first Turkish attacks on Venetian possessions 
and a change in Venetian policy in the Aegean. For this reason, it is important to 
outline the pattern of Venetian conflict with the Catalans prior to 1318. 
 Since their arrival in the Aegean, the Catalans had made intermittent contact 
with the Venetians in the area. This developed into negotiations in 1307, when Venice, 
as an ally of Charles of Valois, helped to recruit the services of the Catalan Company 
for the crusade to Constantinople. From the outset, relations between the two sides 
were turbulent. A good example of this is given by Ramon Muntaner, who reported 
that the Venetian galleys carrying Charles’s ambassador, Theobald of Cepoy, attacked 
a contingent of Catalans at Negroponte before agreeing an alliance with them in the 
summer of 1307.7 Even after the Catalans had allied themselves to the cause of Charles 
of Valois, Venice, although now theoretically allied with the Company, still viewed 
them with suspicion. This would prove to be justified as in early September 1308 the 
Serenissima heard of Catalan plans to attack Negroponte and agreed to arm galleys for 
the defence of the island.8  
After the Catalans had seized the duchy of Athens in 1311, their piratical 
depredations against Venetian possessions in Greece and the Aegean increased. 
Andrea Dandolo wrote that in 1314 vessels were being sent by Venice for the 
‘conservation of the island of Negroponte’ from these attacks.9 Two years later, the 
                                                        
7
 Ramon Muntaner, 130-4. 
8 TD, i. nr. 150; Ramon Muntaner, 142-4. 
9 Andrea Dandolo, Chronica Brevis: 46-1342, ed. E. Pastorello, RISNS 12.1 (Bologna, 1938), 329-73, at 
371; cf. TD, nr. 227; Ptolemy of Lucca, ‘Clement V Secunda Vita (excerpt from Historia Ecclesiastica)’, 
VPA, i. 24-53, at 40 (in this edition of Ptolemy of Lucca the Turks are mentioned as allies of the Catalans 
109 
 
security of the area had declined further as the government took steps to reinforce the 
region with various dispatches of galleys: in April 1316 the Great Council agreed to 
send more ships to Negroponte and Crete, ‘for the persecution of pirates and the 
salvation of our people’,10 and in December the Council of the Eighteen were given the 
task of preparing the armament of a fleet for the protection Negroponte and Romania 
from piracy.11 By 1318, clashes between the two sides were commonplace, such as in 
April, when a Venetian soldier, Albertino Barbaro, was seriously injured whilst ‘fighting 
manfully in the city of Negroponte against the Catalans’. He was later granted service 
in the Giustizia nuova in recognition of his service.12  
The Republic’s initial willingness to support the dynastic rights of certain 
Frankish lords in the region in an effort to defend Venetian territories from further 
Catalan attacks can be seen when, in 1315, the Venetian Senate agreed to assist Louis 
of Burgundy, who had been granted the principality of Achaia by Philip of Taranto, in 
his mission to relieve Angevin Morea from further depredations of the Company:13 
 
Since the lord prince of Achaia has written to us that he is intending to 
travel through our city to his principality and has sent messengers to 
enquire about his undermentioned voyage; the motion has been passed 
that four armed galleys of our commune, together with their fittings and 
weapons, be lent to him, with our commune being given good security 
that the galleys and our arms and items which he receives on loan from 
us be returned to our commune within two months after he departs 
from Venice and that the galleys themselves, when leaving and 
returning, may not be used to carry or bring any merchandise. Also, that 
the prince himself be granted licence to buy in Venice and take away 100 
helmets, 200 crossbows, 40,000 arrows (falsatores), 300 shields and 
20,000 horseshoes and 60,000 horseshoe nails, and wine and grain 
                                                                                                                                                                  
at this time, although the Muratori version of the same text does not include the Turks in the same 
passage). Also see Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 238-40. 
10
 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Clericus-Civicus, f. 38; summary in TD, i. nr. 347. 
11 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Clericus-Civicus, f. 72; summary in TD, i. nr. 363. 
12 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Clericus-Civicus, f. 147; summary in TD, i. nr. 399 (full 
text in Appendix, p. 305). 
13 See above, ch. 1, p. 65. 
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appropriate for himself and his people and the horses, except that, for 
biscuits for the crews of the galleys, we shall have biscuits of the 
commune given to them. Also, that he may charter ships suitable for 150 
horses.14 
 
Louis, with Venetian assistance, reached his territories in Greece at around February 
1316, after a delay of two years. His military expedition was a success as he defeated a 
Catalan army, under the command of Ferdinand of Majorca, at Manolada on 5 July, 
1316.15 However, Venetian hopes that this would put an end to the Catalan 
domination of the region were dashed after Louis died of a fever only weeks after the 
battle and the principality fell to his widow Matilda of Hainault.16 Over the following 
two years Achaia reverted back to Angevin control as Matilda was forced to marry 
John of Gravina who became the new overlord of the principality.17   
 As was shown in an earlier chapter, the Angevins, following Louis of Burgundy’s 
example, also attempted to secure Venetian aid for their planned campaigns to Achaia. 
In March 1317 the three brothers, Robert of Naples, Philip of Taranto and John of 
Gravina, wrote to Doge Giovanni Soranzo urging him to take action against the ravages 
of the Catalans in the Morea.18 Their pursuit of a Venetian alliance was supported by 
John XXII who also sent two letters to the doge exhorting the Republic to join an anti-
Catalan coalition in the Aegean, but these offers were rejected.19 The refusal of the 
Republic to support Frankish action against the Catalans, as it had done in 1315-16, can 
be explained by the conclusion of a peace treaty sometime between 1316-17, between 
Venice and the Catalan Company. The details of the treaty remain obscure, but it 
seems to have applied to Venetian possessions in general, with the exception of those 
                                                        
14 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Presbiter, f. 142; summary in TD, i. nr. 320 (full text 
in Appendix, p. 300). 
15 Ferdinand was the younger son of James I of Majorca: Topping, ‘Morea’, 110-11; Laiou, 
Constantinople, 255. 
16 Topping, ‘Morea’, 112-14. 
17 Topping, ‘Morea’, 115; Caggese, Roberto d’Angiò, ii. 309-12; Laiou, Constantinople, 254; W.S.C. 
Baddeley, Robert the Wise and His Heirs: 1278-1352 (London, 1897), 167-73; Setton, Los catalanes, 20; 
Durrholder, Kreuzzugspolitik, 24. 
18 DOC, nr. 89-91.  
19 DOC, nr. 94, dated 8 May 1318; Commerce et expéditions, iii. nr. 8, pp. 43-4, dated 4 September 1319. 
See also: Setton, Domination, 26; Idem, Los catalanes, 21. The Angevin expeditions to Achaia and the 
papal support for these enterprises are discussed in ch. 1, pp. 65-70. 
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in the Morea, or those which had previously been at war with the Company 
(presumably including the Venetians of Negroponte).20 Despite this treaty, relations 
between the two sides worsened after the Catalan Company appointed a new and 
more aggressive vicar-general, Alfonso Fadrique, the illegitimate son of Frederick II of 
Sicily, in 1317.21 In March of that year, John of Gravina, Philip of Taranto and Robert of 
Sicily again wrote to the doge, informing him of the devastation inflicted by the 
Catalans under the command of Alfonso Fadrique, but as was the case before, no 
alliance was forthcoming.22 Venice was evidently confident of being able to deal with 
the Catalans on its own terms, and not get dragged into Angevin struggles in Achaia. 
 
 
3.2.2. The Catalan-Turkish alliance and the first attacks on Venetian possessions 
In contrast to the Catalans, Venetian interaction with the Turks for these early years, 
although very thinly illustrated in the sources, appears to have been carried out in an 
amiable manner. However, the policy of the Serenissima with regards to the Turks 
changed in the summer of 1318 after the Catalans formed a military alliance with the 
most powerful Turkish maritime emirates, especially that of Aydin.23  
In two letters dated June and July 1318, from the Duke of Crete, Niccolò Ziani, 
to the doge, attacks of the Turks and the Catalans on the Aegean islands are reported. 
These letters are especially important because they mark the first point at which the 
Venetians came into direct conflict with the fleets of the Turkish emirates. The first 
letter, dated 21 June 1318, reports that the Turks had inflicted ‘damage, depredation 
and much plunder on the islands of the Archipelago’.24 This included a raid on Santorini 
(ruled by Andre Borozi) where ‘many beasts and other things’ had been seized, as well 
as goods from Cretan merchants; and the sack of Karpathos (ruled by Andrea Corner) 
where the Turks, using a fleet of sixteen armed ships, had captured around three 
hundred men and animals and taken them back to Asia Minor. Finally, the duke of 
                                                        
20 The text of the treaty has not been preserved, although it is mentioned in a document of June 1318: 
DOC, nr. 95; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 241-2; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 825; Loenertz, Ghisi, 136-7. 
21
 Setton, ‘Catalans’, 173; Idem, Domination, 27. 
22 DOC, nr. 89-91 (17 and 18 March 1317). 
23 Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 824. The Catalans had first formed ties with the Turks of Aydin during their 
campaigns in Asian Minor: Ramon Muntaner, 109-10; Enveri, verses 1085-1116. 
24 DVL, i. nr. 61, p. 107; DOC, nr. 96, p. 115. 
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Crete warned that the Turks were preparing an attack on his island with 26 ships, five 
of which were thought to be Catalan vessels.25 In the second letter, written almost a 
month later, it is learned that the Turks had launched another attack on Santorini and 
were planning an attack on Negroponte with 24 small boats and armed vessels, which 
were to be complemented by two armed galleys supplied by ‘Lord Alfonso *Fadrique+, 
the brother of King Frederick *of Sicily+’.26  
The Catalan-Turkish alliance was corroborated in a report sent from the baillie 
of Negroponte, to the doge in June 1318: 
 
On June 21 we learned from a trustworthy source that a ship of 48 oars 
has been armed at Athens. It is to carry two ambassadors [...] to the 
[Greek] emperor, and is to leave Athens tonight. We have also learned 
from the same reliable informant that another ship is being armed at 
Athens, which is to take [another] two ambassadors of Don Alfonso 
[Fadrique] [...] with two Turkish ambassadors into Turkey. They are going 
to enlist a goodly number of Turks, from 1,000 to 1,500.27 
  
However, the Turkish and Catalan attacks in these years did not trigger an immediate 
policy change from Venice. The Serenissima continued to refuse overtures from the 
pope and his Angevin allies for an anti-Catalan coalition in the Morea and instead 
preferred to negotiate peace with the Catalans.28 Examples of this can be found in June 
1319 when a peace treaty was concluded for six months and again in 1321 and 1331, 
when the same treaty was renewed.29 But in the years between these treaties, Catalan 
piracy remained widespread and by the winter of 1321 piratical attacks against 
Venetian possessions had become intolerable.30 As before, these attacks were carried 
out by the Catalans with Turkish assistance, and once again, Venice aimed to negate 
them through a peace treaty with the Catalans, which was agreed in May 1321. The 
                                                        
25 DVL, i. nr. 61; DOC, nr. 96. 
26
 DVL, i. nr. 63, p. 110 (16 July 1318); DOC, nr. 101, p. 122. 
27
 DOC, nr. 98, p. 119. Partial translation in Setton, ‘Catalans’, 179. 
28 Setton, Domination, 26-7, 32-5; Idem, ‘Catalans’, 177-80. 
29 DVL, i. nr. 70; DOC, nr. 109; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 244-5; Loenertz, Ghisi, 144-6; Setton, Domination, 27, 
34-5; Idem, ‘Catalans’, 179-80; Idem, Los catalanes, 14-15; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 829. 
30 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 5, nr. 205, p. 238. 
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clauses of this treaty give clear evidence of Catalan collusion with the Turks. They 
stipulated that Alfonso Fadrique was to not ally himself with the Turks ‘the enemies of 
the Catholic faith’. He was also forbidden from allowing the Turks into his territories, 
or aiding them in any way. Furthermore, Alfonso was required to inform the Republic if 
he knew of any preparations the Turks were making for an attack on Venetian 
territories.31  
 Venetian contact with the Turkish emirates may have been relatively peaceful 
before 1318, but within three years, the Republic was beginning to regard them as a 
serious threat to the security of its colonies and trade in Greece and the Aegean. As 
has been shown, the Hospitallers, the Zaccaria and the Byzantines already shared this 
view. The papacy too was also beginning to acknowledge the vulnerability of the 
Christians of the East in the face of Turkish expansion. Although Venice was still 
unwilling to participate in a papal-led expedition to the Morea, now that it was not 
immune from Turkish attacks, it would begin to lay the foundations of a common anti-
Turkish league in the Aegean. 
                                                        
31 Alfonso was, however, permitted to maintain his current agreements with the Turks, as long as he did 
not contract any new ones: DOC, nr. 116, p. 142; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 244-5; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 829; 
Idem, TC, 15. 
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3.3. Reconciliation with Byzantium  
 
3.3.1. Initial hostility: Venice and the crusade of Charles of Valois 
Before analysing Latin negotiations for an anti-Turkish coalition, which came to 
dominate crusading policy against the Turks for the remainder of the period, it is 
necessary to first take a look at the relationship between Venice and Byzantium. This 
began to take on a more conciliatory approach after the collapse of Franco-papal plans 
to recover the Latin empire. As shall be seen, this change in attitude, coupled with the 
mutual threat posed by the Catalans and Turks in the Aegean, eventually led to 
Byzantine inclusion in crusade negotiations. 
In 1302 Venice agreed a peace treaty with the Byzantines, after being at war 
with the empire and the Genoese, since the 1290s.32 However, this treaty proved to be 
a temporary measure as the Republic was quick to cooperate in the proposed crusade 
to Constantinople being organised by Charles of Valois.33 As well as being granted the 
full crusader indulgence for their participation, the Venetians were also to be 
guaranteed a renewal of the privileges which they had held in the Latin empire of 
Constantinople before 1261.34 This agreement provided a necessary commercial 
incentive for the Republic, which would have to break the treaty with the Byzantines 
and jeopardise the security of its galleys in preparation for the crusade.35 As was 
outlined in an earlier chapter, the crusade was primarily justified by the pope as a 
means of ending the Church schism, although interestingly, the excommunication of 
Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos by Pope Martin IV in 1281 was also mentioned, 
possibly in the hope that the Venetians would recognise the parallels between Charles 
                                                        
32 TD, i. nr. 73-5. The treaty was confirmed by a Venetian copy of the contract, dated October 1302, and 
a Byzantine imperial response, dated March 1303: DVL, i. nr. 7-8. Also see Lane, ‘Venetian merchant 
galleys’, 186-7. For more on the Veneto-Genoese war, see TD, i. nr. 10, 13 ,16, 28-30, 39, 48, 50, 65, 67-
70; DVL, i. nr. 1-2; F.C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (London, 1973), 83-5; Laiou, Constantinople, 
101-14; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge, 1988), 
220. 
33 CV, i. nr. 248; DVL, i. nr. 21, 24, 27-8 (January 1306 to March 1307). The Venetian Senate decided to 
delay a meeting with Charles of Valois’s embassy in July 1301. It is possible that Charles wished to seek 
an alliance with the Venetians from this date, although the document is inconclusive. TD, i. nr. 30. 
34 CV, i. nr. 248; DVL, i. nr. 27; Setton, PL, i. 165-6. 
35 In the Venetian response the crusade was justified as a defence of the true faith and the recovery of 
the Latin empire. In reflection of the anti-Greek motivations behind the crusade, no mention of the 
Turkish expansion into the Aegean was made: DVL, i. nr. 27, p. 50. 
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of Valois’s efforts and those of his great uncle Charles of Anjou over 30 years earlier.36 
It is worth noting that the Turkish threat to Christian lands in the East was not used as 
a motivation for the crusade, probably because the Venetians, with their colonies 
situated towards the west of the Aegean and without such close links to the Byzantines 
as the Genoese, were not as concerned about the loss of Greek territories to the Turks.  
 As was to be expected from such an expedition, the Venetians soon disagreed 
with Charles of Valois over the organisation of his crusade. In May 1307 the Senate 
reported that Charles had complained about the increased price demanded by the 
Republic for the transport of men and arms for the crusade. The Venetians had 
justified the price by maintaining that without adequate investment, the campaign 
would cause more harm than good for the Venetians in the Aegean.37 This was no 
understatement as from 1307 Venetian merchants in the region began to experience 
increased disruption to their trade as a result of their alliance with Charles of Valois, 
primarily from sailors in the pay of the Byzantine emperor, such as the Genoese 
commander Andrea Morisco.38 Consequently, from 1307 to 1308 the Senate took 
measures to reinforce its outposts in the Aegean and ensure greater security of trade: 
in one instance, they allocated 2,000 hyperpyra for the rebuilding of the fortifications 
at Modon-Coron and Negroponte; in another, they agreed to dispatch all available 
ships to Modon for the care of maritime defence.39 
The decline of security in the Aegean meant that Venice was eager for a 
crusade to embark as soon as possible. Charles of Valois was, however, running into 
delays in his preparations. In July 1309 he informed the Serenissima that the crusade 
was to be delayed until the following February, because of problems in securing 
subsidies from the pope and the French king.40 The doge replied to Charles in 
September claiming that, because the expenses and the dangers threatening Venetian 
                                                        
36 CV, i. nr. 248. This may have been a reference to the Treaty of Orvieto which heralded an alliance 
between the two powers in 1281: W.A. Percy, ‘A reappraisal of the Sicilian Vespers and of the role of 
Sicily in European history’, Italian Quarterly 22 (1981), 77-96, at 90; J.B. Holloway, Twice-Told Tales: 
Brunetto Latino and Dante Alighieri (New York, NY, 1993), 126-8. 
37 TD, i. nr. 133; DVL, i. nr. 32. 
38
 TD, i. nr. 138. Also see Laiou, Constantinople, 235.  
39
 TD, i. nr. 138, 146, 151, 168-9. Orders to ensure naval security were also issued to the commanders of 
the other Venetian fleets in the region. These were Petro Contarini, captain of the galleys of Cyprus-
Syria, Michele Morosini, captain of the galleys of Alexandria, and Marco Minotto, captain of galleys for 
the care of the colonies of Romania: TD, i. nr. 151. 
40 DVL, i. nr. 41, p. 75; Setton, PL, i. 167. 
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sailors were too great to bear, the postponement until February was the final one that 
could be tolerated.41 But even this delay proved too great and, in May 1309, the 
Serenissima decided that negotiations for a truce with the Byzantine empire could be 
opened.42 A treaty was finally agreed with the Byzantines which was to last for 12 
years from 14 August 1310, thus effectively putting an end to Charles of Valois’s 
crusade plans.43  
 
 
3.3.2. The change in Venetian relations with Byzantium and the discussion of Church 
Union 
The Venetian policy towards Byzantium softened even further after the large-scale 
Catalan and Turkish raids in 1318.44 This was a reflection of the changed attitudes of 
both emperor and doge; Andronikos II was beginning to express a new flexibility 
towards western diplomacy, and Giovanni Soranzo was starting to accept the position 
of the restored Byzantine empire in the Aegean.45 A good example of this new-found 
amity can be found in the decision of the Venetian Great Council in 1318 to grant two 
galleys to Theodore I Montferrat-Palaiologos (the son of the Andronikos II) on ‘account 
of the respect and love of the said emperor and his son’.46 In 1321, negotiations 
between the two sides were put on hold after the outbreak of civil war in the 
Byzantine empire, between Andronikos II and his grandson, the future Emperor 
                                                        
41 DVL, i. nr. 42; Laiou, Constantinople, 235; Setton, PL, i. 168. This view was shared by Clement V who, in 
October 1309, forwarded the doge’s letter to Philip of France reminding him that it was necessary, for 
the honour of the house of France, for him to continue working for the successful completion of the 
crusade: DVL, i. nr. 43; Laiou, Constantinople, 235; Setton, PL, i. 168. 
42 TD, i. nr. 174, 181. 
43 TD, i. nr. 207, 216, 225, 228; DVL, i. nr. 46. Also see Marino Sanudo, ‘Hopf’s so-called “Fragmentum”’, 
153. 
44 DVL, i. nr. 72-9. For more details on these negotiations see Laiou, Constantinople, 273-7. 
45 This included Venice giving up the hope of re-establishing the Latin empire of Constantinople. In 
October 1320 the Republic agreed that Charles of Valois should abandon his claim to six ships which had 
been equipped in Venice for his crusade against Byzantium: Laiou, Constantinople, 253, 267-9. 
46 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Fronesis, f. 8 (23 November 1318); summary in TD, i. 
nr. 408 (full text in Appendix, p. 306). For more on Theodore’s mission, see DVL, i. nr. 68-9, 73; Laiou, 
Constantinople, 265; Idem, ‘A Byzantine prince Latinized: Theodore Palaeologus, Marquis of Montferrat’, 
Byzantion 38 (1968), 386-410. 
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Andronikos III, but were resumed again in 1323-4 when Andronikos II granted the 
Venetians a new five-year treaty.47  
During these years, Andronikos II also began to court the idea of Church Union 
with the West in an effort to further secure western favour.48 In 1324 he sent the 
Genoese Bishop Hieronymus of Caffa to Avignon to open up Union negotiations with 
Pope John XXII and Charles IV of France. Soon after, the Venetian crusade theorist 
Marino Sanudo put himself forward as an ambassador for the Union negotiations.49 
The negotiations ended in 1327 when the re-ignition of the civil war forced Andronikos 
II to terminate negotiations; although Union was a useful tool in international 
diplomacy, it still risked triggering widespread domestic anger.50  
It has been argued that Union negotiations were undertaken by Andronikos to 
stave off western crusading aggression, but this has been convincingly challenged by 
Laiou on the grounds that there was no longer a western threat to Byzantium.51 As has 
already been noted, John XXII did not launch any campaigns against Byzantine 
Constantinople during the 1320s and even the abortive Angevin plans to defend 
Achaia were intended as small-scale campaigns against the schismatic Greeks of the 
Morea and not as major expeditions against Andronikos II. Philip of Taranto still 
harboured hopes of restoring the Latin empire during these years, but his plans 
received little support in Europe and never got beyond the planning stage. Moreover, 
as has been seen, the Franco-papal crusade negotiations of the 1320s were not aimed 
at the recovery of Constantinople.52 
                                                        
47 For a discussion of the civil war, see, Nicol, Last Centuries of Byzantium, 162-9; Laiou, Constantinople, 
284-90; G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. J. Hussey (Oxford, 1956), 499-502. The 
Latin text of the chrysobull is published in DVL, i. nr. 98. The negotiations are discussed in detail by 
Laiou, Constantinople, 308-10. 
48 A detailed account of the Union negotiations with references is given by Laiou, Constantinople, 315-
29. Also see AE, xxiv. nr. 39-41 (pp. 267-8), 26-7 (pp. 307-8); Durrholder, Kreuzzugspolitik, 30-57; 
Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the crusade’, 47-50; Gill, Byzantium, 192-4; Nicol, Last Centuries of 
Byzantium, 177-8; Housley, Later Crusades, 54-6; H. Omont, ‘Projet de réunion des églises grecque et 
latine sous Charles le Bel en 1327’, BEC 53 (1892), 254-7. 
49 Two of Sanudo’s letters from 1324 concerning the union are published in Marino Sanudo Torsello, 
‘Epistolae’, Gesta Dei per Francos, ed. J. Bongars, 2 vols (Hannover, 1661), ii. 289-316, at 299 (letter 7), 
299-300 (letter 8); Laiou, Constantinople, 321-2. 
50 Laiou, Constantinople, 322-9. 
51 Ibid., 315-21. The primary proponents of the opposite theory being: AE, xxiv.  nr. 39-41, pp. 267-8; 
Norden, Papsttum und Byzanz, 674-5, 683-9; Omont, ‘Projet de réunion des églises’, 254-7. 
52 See above, pp. 58-64. 
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A more convincing reason for the opening of Union negotiations at this time 
was the dramatic loss of the Byzantine held territory in Asia Minor at the expense of 
the Ottoman Turks and other emirates.53 Indeed, the plight of the Greeks in these 
regions was so dire that even some Latin sources, not usually sympathetic to the 
Greeks, commented on the extent to which the Turks had ravaged the empire.54 The 
documents relating to the Union negotiations do not specifically link these discussions 
with an alliance against the Turks at this stage, but is highly likely that the weakness of 
Andronikos’s Anatolia border had a decided influence on his decision to court the 
West.55 From the papal perspective, the schismatic Greeks would certainly need to be 
reconciled with the Church of Rome before any alliance could take place and 
Andronikos was evidently aware of this. The emperor was also in close contact with 
Marino Sanudo for most of these negotiations. Sanudo himself viewed Church Union 
as an essential prerequisite for a crusade – it is likely that his opinion had influenced 
Andronikos II.56  
                                                        
53 Brusa, one of the last major cities left in Greek hands fell to the Ottomans in 1326: P. Charanis, ‘An 
important short chronicle of the fourteenth century’, Byzantion 13 (1938), 335-62, at 341-3; Laiou, 
Constantinople, 291-3; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 379. 
54 ‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, 448-51; William Adam, 539-40. 
55 Laiou, Constantinople, 328-9; Nicol, Last Centuries of Byzantium, 178; Harris, ‘Edward II, Andronicus II 
and Giles of Argenteim’, 77. 
56 This is discussed in detail by Laiou, Constantinople, 320-9. 
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3.4. Marino Sanudo and Initial Plans for an Anti-Turkish League, 1321-1327 
 
3.4.1. Marino Sanudo Torsello and the first mention of a league against the Turks 
So far a two-fold change in Venetian policy in the Aegean has been outlined. On the 
one hand, the Republic’s attitude towards the Byzantine empire had changed from one 
of involvement in a crusade against the Greeks, to one of reconciliation, signified by 
the widespread discussion of treaties and agreements which can be seen as a step 
towards the Union negotiations of the 1320s.57 On the other, the Venetian stance 
towards the Turks had shifted from one of amicable indifference, to one of serious 
concern over the threat they posed to Venetian possessions and trade overseas. This 
change in attitude was reflected in the work of the Venetian merchant, politician and 
crusade theorist Marino Sanudo Torsello. His work gives an insight into the perspective 
and motivations of a Venetian statesmen and a well-informed European aristocrat to 
crusades in the Aegean. In particular, his work can be extremely informative in 
reflecting the Venetian policy towards the Turks and Byzantium in the years building 
up to the anti-Turkish league of 1334.58 Therefore, it is necessary to take a look at 
Sanudo’s background and early work before discussing the earliest discussions for an a 
coalition against the Turks. 
  Sanudo was one of the few fourteenth-century crusade propagandists to 
possess an intimate knowledge of both European politics and the Latin East, 
descended as he was from a powerful family of politicians and merchants. He first laid 
out his proposal for a crusade in his Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis written sometime 
between 1306-21. He spent much of this time travelling around the courts of Europe 
and the eastern Mediterranean, where he acquainted himself with popes, kings and 
crusaders (such as the Master of the Hospital Fulk of Villaret). On 24 September 1321, 
he presented a copy of the Liber Secretorum to John XXII. The papal appointed 
commission gave his work a favourable assessment, and although his plans were 
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 This has been suggested by Laiou, Constantinople, 308. 
58 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 374-5. Laiou has argued that Sanudo had Venice’s interests at heart. As a Venetian, 
Sanudo certainly had an innate bias towards the Republic, but he maintained that he worked for no-one. 
It is important to remember, as Tyerman has suggested, that Sanudo was devoted to the crusade, rather 
than a particular patron or employer: Tyerman, ‘Sanudo’, 171-2. 
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shelved for the immediate future, Sanudo was to play an important role in reshaping 
Aegean crusade policy.59  
 For the majority of the years 1306-12, when Sanudo wrote the first two books 
of the Liber Secretorum, Venice had been willing to adopt a hostile policy towards 
Byzantium – she had agreed to participate in Charles of Valois’s crusade preparations 
until 1310 and was open to the idea of a crusade to recover Constantinople at the 
Council of Vienne. Even so, in his early work, Sanudo was not primarily concerned with 
a crusade against Byzantium, but rather a crusade to liberate the Holy Land by way of 
Egypt.60 On the rare occasions where Sanudo did discuss the possible conquest of the 
Byzantine empire, he cited the Church schism as the primary motivation for this.61  
The Anatolian Turks were also largely overlooked in the earlier part of the Liber 
Secretorum, probably because they did not constitute a direct threat to Venice at this 
time. In a reflection of the Venetian policy of cooperation with the Turks in this early 
period, Sanudo even went as far as to suggest that Venice and the papacy could 
negotiate ‘in a friendly manner’ the purchase of provisions for a crusade from the 
Turks ‘who hold the entire land from Candeloro to Makre’.62 But as relations between 
Venice and the Turks deteriorated after 1318, Sanudo’s attitude towards the emirates 
also changed. Around the years 1322/3 he wrote a marginal note in the Liber 
Secretorum amongst his discussion of a fleet of galleys to be used for the blockade of 
Egyptian trade.63 In the note, Sanudo suggested that the fleet ought to be made up of 
ships belonging to Martino Zaccaria of Chios,  Guglielmo Sanudo of Naxos, the 
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 For this and a general background to Sanudo and his early work, see Marino Sanudo Torsello, Book of 
the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross, trans. P. Lock (Aldershot, 2011), 1-19; Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber 
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60 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 375-7. 
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62 Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, 67; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 378; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 823; Idem, TC, 
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Guglielmo Sanudo: ‘Le projet de blocus naval’, 185. 
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Hospitallers of Rhodes, and the forces of the Ghisi, Crete, Cyprus, and the titular Latin 
Patriarch of Constantinople. Sanudo added that if this Christian fleet were formed, the 
Latins of Greece and the Aegean ‘would be more secure from Turkish raids and the 
inroads of other Saracens’, and ‘protected from the Society of Catalans and other evil 
doers’.64 As can be seen, the interest of this passage lies in the future history of a 
united Christian fleet to be used against the Turks in the Aegean. In a few years time 
the government of Venice would adopt the same approach as Sanudo and western 
crusading policy would also follow suit.65 
 
 
3.4.2. Initial anti-Turkish league discussions 
Sanudo spent the years 1322-3 at the papal and French courts advising them on the 
best ways of launching a crusade to aid Armenia and liberate the Holy Land. During this 
time he made tentative efforts to combine the Franco-papal proposals to aid Armenia 
with a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean, probably airing his idea of a common 
union against them.66 In the years following the breakdown of the Franco-papal 
negotiations, the pope placed more attention of the anti-Turkish efforts of the Latins in 
the Aegean, such as the issuing of indulgences in 1322-3, and efforts to recruit Venice 
for a Angevin alliance in Achaia. In March 1325, as John of Gravina’s fleet was crossing 
to the Morea, the first discussion by the Serenissima of the possibility of forming a 
societas against the Turks was made.67 Around the same time a letter from Sanudo 
was sent to the Bishop of Capua and the Chancellor of the kingdom of Naples 
informing them of renewed Turkish hostilities towards the Republic. In it, Sanudo 
reported that a Turkish fleet had attacked Naxos and Negroponte, seizing many 
captives from the latter.68  
Hereafter, an increasing number of Turkish attacks on Venetian possessions 
were reported. For these events, Sanudo, who produced numerous letters about the 
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 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 378. 
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 For example: Sanudo suggested that reinforcements for the Armenia passagia should be made 
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67 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 8, nr. 175, p. 296; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 379-80; Idem, Constantinople, 313-
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Turkish and Catalan raids in Romania, remains the primary source of information. In 
1326-7 he warned that the Turks and Catalans were close to seizing Achaia, 
Negroponte and other areas of Latin Greece.69 The below account vividly describes the 
feeling of urgency with which Sanudo reported these attacks:  
 
[R]everently and having to speak with great need; it behoves our Lord to 
be aware of the Turks, who rule over and reside in Asia Minor, and who 
are swiftly infesting the islands of Romania and especially those lands 
which are part of the principality of the Morea; in this way if they do not 
have aid, they will be lost; and especially the island of Negroponte which 
will emerge in the hands of those from the [Catalan] Company, and if 
they come, they will themselves hold the principality of the Morea.70 
 
The Catalans had clearly formed a strong alliance with the Turks at this time and 
Sanudo wrote in the same year that Alfonso Fadrique had refused to hand over Turkish 
soldiers who had taken refuge in Karystos to the Venetian authorities.71 These Turks 
were likely to have been from the emirate of Aydin who in early 1327 had launched 
raids on parts of the Morea, including Martino Zaccaria’s territories in Damalâ.72 By 
April of that year the war had spread to Negroponte and in May the Senate agreed to 
commission nine sapientes to organise reinforcements for the region. This was 
followed up by the granting of 3000 ducats to Marco Gradenigo, the new Baillie of 
Negroponte, for the defence of the island.73 However, this offer came too late as 
Negroponte was lost to the Catalans by the end of the year.74 The Catalan victory was 
probably facilitated by their Turkish allies, who, according to Sanudo had earlier in that 
year ‘risen in great magnitude’ on the island.75 
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 Probably because of the intensification of the war in the Morea and 
Negroponte, the Serenissima began to act upon its decision to form an alliance against 
the Turks two years earlier. In July 1327 the Senate decided to dispatch letters to the 
duke of Crete and the baillies of Negroponte and Constantinople, instructing them to 
discuss with Andronikos II, Martino Zaccaria, the Master of the Hospitallers, and others 
about the possibility of forming ‘a societas against the Turks for the defence of our 
lands’.76 Unfortunately the text of the discussion has been lost, but it is known that in 
December of that year, ten Venetian galleys were dispatched for the protection of the 
Adriatic and Romania, which were certainly for defence against the Turks and may 
have been connected to the union.77 Likewise, ambassadors were sent between 
Constantinople and Venice, but the sources are silent as to their specific mission.78 It 
must be remembered though that these embryonic negotiations over some form of 
coalition against the Turks were at this stage being carried out at the behest of the 
Serenissima and not Sanudo. He was certainly keeping the Senate informed on events 
in the Aegean, but with the exception of the marginal note in the Liber Secretorum 
written in the early 1320s, there is nothing to suggest in his writing that he was actively 
promote a full anti-Turkish league. This would not be reflected in Sanudo’s writings 
until 1329-30, in the intervening years he was acting some years behind official 
Venetian state policy.79 
  What can be seen from the events of the 1320s is that throughout the decade 
Venice had become increasingly embroiled in a war with the Turks and Catalans in the 
Aegean (primarily the Morea and Negroponte). On most occasions this consisted of 
fighting against the Catalans who had recruited Turkish assistance. This differed from 
the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers, whose lands were far enough to the east to avoid 
repeated conflict with the Catalans (with the exception of Martino Zaccaria’s 
possessions in the Morea), but who instead suffered raids from the Turks alone. It 
could be said that in these years the concept of a naval blockade on Muslim trade, 
which was proposed by Sanudo and many other theorists, had evolved into a Christian 
fleet to be used to fight against the Turks; the blockade required a flotilla of Christian 
                                                        
76 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 10, nr. 194, p. 341. Also see Ibid., i. bk. 10, nr. 202, p. 342.  
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galleys, as did the naval league.80 This, as shall be seen, became more clearly 
articulated in 1332. Moreover, as the threat of the Turks increased, the importance of 
an embargo on the Mamluk sultanate had decreased. The pope had signified as much 
by allowing the Zaccaria to trade mastic with the Mamluks a few years earlier. In 1326 
Sanudo adopted a similar stance when he wrote that Christians should be allowed to 
trade in omnibus mercibus with the Saracens, with the exception of ‘iron, weapons, 
timber, pitch, [slave] boys and girls, and any other commodities formerly banned’.81 
This opinion was also voiced by contemporary Venetians who, unlike the Zaccaria, 
were fiercely punished for illicit trade by the pope.82  
In fact, the Venetians, like the Zaccaria, had repeatedly requested permission 
from the Curia to export clean merchandise to Egypt (made in 1317,83 131984 and 
132785), but had been refused on each occasion.86 These requests were made on the 
grounds that the Venetians were different from other nations: their livelihood 
stemmed from foreign trade and not from agriculture, thus they needed free trade 
with Egypt in order to survive. Unlike the Zaccaria, they had not portrayed their actions 
in the Aegean as being motivated by the defence of the faith, suggesting that the 
Serenissima may have been slightly out of touch with the changing attitude of the 
papacy towards the Turks. Another factor in the papal refusal may have been the 
Republic’s repeated reluctance to participate in an Angevin expedition to the Morea, 
which would, as the letters stated, also combat the Turks. 
As has been seen, the papacy had been actively pursuing the idea of an alliance 
against Catalans and Turks in the early 1320s. Venice had rejected these overtures 
because on most occasions a Catalan truce was more favourable, and more 
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importantly, the Republic did not want to jeopardise peace with the Byzantines who 
had proved to be reliable and submissive allies since 1310. Despite the Serenissima’s 
repeated refusal to join the papacy and the Angevins, in 1328 John XXII once again 
tried to revive an alliance in Achaia.87 Again Venice declined the offer, proving that it 
only wished to participate in a union on its own terms, i.e. when the Turks were the 
primary target (not the Catalans) and when the Byzantines were regarded as possible 
allies. In contrast, the papacy had probably not yet envisaged an alliance of this scale 
by this stage and was not yet ready to consider the inclusion of Byzantium. 
Nevertheless, the pope’s repeated attempts to form an Veneto-Angevin coalition in 
the Morea, during the years where Venice was proposing an anti-Turkish league, does 
show that the Curia had warmed to the concept of a Christian alliance against the 
Turks.  
 
 
Chapter 3 Overview 
 
As was seen in the early part of this chapter, the Venetians maintained relatively 
peaceful relations with the Turkish maritime emirates during the early years of the 
fourteenth century. However, in 1318, when the Republic began to suffer from the 
attacks of the Turks, who were allied with the Catalans of Athens, the attitude of the 
Serenissima began to change. Venice favoured a policy of negotiation with the 
Catalans, and repeatedly refused to join in a papal-led expedition against them, but it 
took steps to form an Aegean coalition against the Turks, first advocated by Marino 
Sanudo. 
 Running parallel to the change in attitude towards the Turks was also a new 
policy of reconciliation with Byzantium. During the first decade of the century, the 
Republic had agreed to assist Charles of Valois in his crusade to Constantinople, but 
after this collapsed, and the Catalans and Turks emerged as another hostile force in 
the Aegean, the Venetians began to consider the Byzantines, who had also suffered at 
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the hands of the Turks and Catalans, as possible allies. In the mid 1320s, as the Senate 
began to discuss the initial plans for an anti-Turkish naval league, its original 
proponent, Marino Sanudo, was acting as an ambassador for Church Union 
negotiations. The Venetians were unable to receive papal support for their naval 
league against the Turks, probably because of their willingness to come to peace with 
the Catalans, but in the following decade this would change. 
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Part II: The Aegean Crusades in Practice 
 
Chapter 4. The Anti-Turkish League, 1327-1334 
 
4.1. The Venetian Search for Allies 
 
4.1.1. The Rise of the emirate of Aydin 
We have already seen that in the late 1320s Venice made efforts to organise a 
Christian alliance against the Turks, but for various reasons these initial proposals 
came to nothing: the French were more interested in a Holy Land or Armenian 
crusade, Martino Zaccaria had lost Chios and was held captive in Constantinople, 
Byzantium was weakened by almost a decade of civil war, and the pope, despite 
showing a willingness to support the Latins in Achaia, Chios and Rhodes, was more 
preoccupied with events in Italy and Germany. Nevertheless, despite of these setbacks 
Venice persevered with the idea of a Christian alliance against the Turks and in 1332 
the Republic embarked upon another series of negotiations that would eventually lead 
to the successful forming of the 1334 anti-Turkish league. This chapter aims to explore 
the motivations of the individual states who were courted for this league. It explains 
why they participated, how their aims differed, and how their involvement manifested 
itself in practice.  
However, before this explanation is undertaken, it is necessary to analyse what 
happened in the Aegean during the late 1320s and early 1330s, which made the 
proposition of a league more favourable to the West, and allowed the Latins to single 
out which of the Turkish emirates needed to be checked. This was the continued rise in 
power of the maritime emirates of Anatolia, especially those of Aydin, situated in the 
fertile Meander Valley, and Karasi, in the north-west of Anatolia, near the Gulf of 
Adramyttion.1 It has already been shown, from the large Turkish fleets raised in the 
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second and third decades of the century, that these particular emirates experienced a 
dramatic growth in authority and confidence during this period.2 Especially in the case 
of the emirate of Aydin, which launched numerous raids from its Aegean ports, 
particularly Smyrna and Ephesos, the former Byzantine cities that had grown into  
prosperous trade-centres under the House of Aydin.3 
During this time it has been shown that Aydin and other of the Turkish emirates 
allied themselves with the Catalans and also maintained amicable relations with some 
of the other Latin Aegean states. However, this changed in the summer of 1329 when 
Aydin broke the alliance it had held with the Catalan Company.4  During these months, 
Turkish corsairs (probably from Aydin) attacked Athens, prompting Alfonso Fadrique to 
agree a peace treaty with Venice in April 1331. As with the Veneto-Catalan treaties of 
1319 and 1321, clauses were included in the treaty preventing Alfonso from forming 
any new alliances with the Turks or aiding them in any way,5 but unlike on previous 
occasions, the Catalans, who had now suffered the depredations of the Turks first 
hand, showed greater sincerity in their desire to maintain good relations with Venice.6 
Therefore, by 1330 the first reports of the Turks acting alone and attacking all of the 
Latin possessions in the Aegean, including those of the Catalans, are made. This played 
into the hands of the Venetians who had always proposed that the Turks, in particular 
those of Aydin, should be the primary target of a Christian league.7  
 In 1333, on a visit to the coast of Asia Minor, Ibn Battuta commented on the 
strength and prosperity of the Turkish kingdoms there, in particular the emirate of 
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Aydin.8 This emirate had been founded by the Aydin-oglu Mehmed beg, whose sons 
Hizir and Umur ruled Ephesos and Smyrna respectively.9 The reign of Mehmed saw the 
establishment of Aydin as a major Anatolian power, but it is Umur who gained the 
most illustrious reputation in the family, primarily from his audacious raids against the 
Latin states of the Aegean. Umur’s exploits became so legendary that an epic poem 
was written documenting his life, in it the emir was depicted as a brave jihad warrior 
and scourge of the Latins in the Aegean.10 The sense of the power and wealth of Aydin 
is indicated by their construction of the Great Mosque at Birgi in 1312, which still 
stands today. Alongside the mosque can be found a family türbe, dated to 1334, where 
Mehmed and Umur were buried.11  
We already know that from the second decade of the fourteenth century the 
Aydin-oglus had been able to construct large fleets to assault Latin possessions in the 
Aegean. After the seizure of Smyrna from the Genoese in 1328/9, the fleets of Aydin, 
under the command of Umur, were able to launch raids into the Aegean with 
increasing regularity and destructiveness.12 It is not surprising that Venice, the 
principal advocate of an anti-Turkish league, bore the brunt of these attacks. This 
situation had become so desperate that by April 1332 the Duke of Naxos, Niccolò 
Sanudo, had concluded a treaty with the Turks.13 Again in June the Venetian Senate 
discussed whether Negroponte should also conclude ‘some arrangement with the 
Turks’.14  Unsurprisingly, the island became a tributary of the Aydin-oglus later in that 
year.15  Marino Sanudo confirmed the increasing threat which the Turks now posed to 
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the Latins in the Mediterranean and even warned that they now posed a threat to the 
Adriatic Sea and the European kingdoms beyond.16 Further evidence of Turkish 
supremacy may be seen in the cost of Turkish slaves which had rocketed during the 
1330s because of their scarcity, this was in contrast to Greek slaves who were 
numerous and cheap.17 The concern over the Turkish threat was further expressed in 
numerous papal letters written in the years 1333-4,18 by which time it was clear that, 
contrary to the claims of William Adam and the Directorium, the Turks could not be 
easily subjugated.19 By this point, it was evident that only an alliance of the Christian 
powers could put an end to Turkish expansion into the Aegean. 
 
 
4.1.2. Venetian attempts to organise a local Aegean league 
During this period of escalating conflict with the Turks, Venice first and foremost 
attempted to protect its commerce in the Aegean. A good example of this was given in 
April 1331 when the duke of Crete concluded an agreement with Emir Orkhan of 
Menteshe. Venice seems to have been on relatively good terms with the emirate, 
allowing trade to be conducted between the two sides.20 Grain and other foodstuffs 
had been imported to the Venetian colonies throughout the 1320s, and the 1331 
treaty was probably intended to guarantee some form of imported food security for 
the Venetians at a time when the repeated Turkish raids made the Serenissima anxious 
of future food shortages.21 This concern was not without good reason; the Aegean had 
become even more turbulent and insecure than before, as was clearly indicated by the 
absence of a clause in the treaty which ensured the mutual protection of Venetian and 
Menteshe merchants. Evidently neither the duke of Crete nor Orkhan could guarantee 
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protection for the other’s traders.22 If the treaty was intended to bolster the Republic’s 
failing trade networks then it failed. A year later, the Senate banned trade with all of 
the Turks on account that it aided the cause of the enemy, who ‘continuously arm and 
march to the offence and detriment of the Christians’.23 However, the trade ban did 
not take into account the desperate situation of the Venetian colonies in the Aegean, 
many of which had come under such sustained attack that they had been forced to 
conclude separate treaties with the emirates. The Duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, had 
taken this measure in April 1332, as had the baillies of Negroponte later in the year 
and also possibly Bartolommeo II Ghisi, the lord of Tenos and Mykonos.24 By this time 
the Venetian archipelago and Negroponte were paying tribute to the Turks and most 
of the remaining Venetian colonies were on the brink of doing likewise.  
It is therefore not surprising to learn that in these years the Senate had been 
making urgent attempts to organise a naval league to fight the Turks, consisting of 
local Aegean powers, such as Byzantium and the Hospitallers. In 1331 the Senate urged 
the baillies of Negroponte and the duke of Crete to unite in opposition to the Turks.25 
This was followed on 7 July 1332 by the doge urging Crete and Negroponte to form a 
union with the Hospitallers, Niccolò Sanudo and Bartolommeo II Ghisi.26 When the 
initial agreement for a league was drawn up in September 1333, Niccolò Sanudo and 
Bartolommeo II Ghisi were not mentioned and their names had disappeared from the 
documents concerning the league. This may have been because they did not want to 
compromise the peace they had agreed with the Turks through the payment of 
tribute.27   
The unwillingness of many of the Venetian colonies to compromise their 
tenuous peace agreements with the Turks meant that the Republic also turned its 
attention towards the Byzantine empire. It has been shown that Venice had previously 
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made attempts to maintain close relations with Byzantium in the 1320s, but after the 
deposition of Andronikos II in 1328, the new emperor Andronikos III had adopted a 
policy of collaboration with the Turks; in the first three years of his reign he had 
concluded treaties with the emirates of Karasi, Sarukhan and Aydin.28 Andronikos III 
also adopted an aggressive policy towards the Latins – he was responsible for the 
deposition and imprisonment of Martino Zaccaria in 1329 and he had also forced the 
Genoese lords of Phokaia to recognise his suzerainty,29 but by recruiting Niccolò 
Sanudo in his siege of Chios, the emperor had proved that individual Latin states could 
be persuaded to side with him if it served their interests.30 This was definitely the case 
for Venice, which still regarded the Byzantine empire as a powerful entity in the 
Aegean and made efforts to extend a policy of rapprochement to the new emperor.31 
This was signified on 4 July 1332 when the Republic agreed a six-year treaty with 
Andronikos III,32  and three days later when envoys were dispatched to Constantinople 
to discuss the possibility of Byzantine involvement in an anti-Turkish league.33 On 18 
July Petro Zeno, the Baillie of Negroponte and Petro de Canale, Captain of the Adriatic 
Gulf, were given full powers to create a union with all interested parties, especially the 
Byzantines and Hospitallers.34  
In early 1332, the Senate had also ordered emissaries to be sent to Naples in 
order to recruit King Robert for the alliance.35 At the same time Marino Sanudo wrote 
that he too had been at the court of Naples discussing with King Robert, Philip of 
Taranto and the Master of the Hospitallers, Hélion of Villeneuve, the problem of the 
Turks.36 The Republic was aware that the Angevins had a vested interest in Latin 
Greece and must have regarded them as being open to the proposed alliance. In 
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contrast, at this stage Venice had not even broached the subject of a league with the 
French, another traditional crusading ally. In the end, Robert of Naples failed to 
commit himself to the league.37 On the other hand, the Catalans stated that they were 
willing to assist Venice against the Turks, but the Republic, probably still suspicious of 
their motives, rejected the offer.38 
 
 
4.1.3. The papacy and negotiations for a naval league against the Turks 
From 1329-31 the Venetian Republic negotiated with papal representatives for support 
of a naval league against the Turks. Unfortunately in most of these cases the full texts 
of these requests have not been left and it is therefore hard to establish exactly what 
was discussed or if anything was agreed. For example, in December 1328, Isnard the 
Archbishop of Thebes was sent by the pope to Venice with the task of promoting the 
Angevin union against the schismatics in Achaia.39 As had been the case in previous 
years, the Republic was not interested in participating in this venture. But a month 
later, Marino Sanudo reported that Isnard had been in Venice asking on behalf of the 
pope that the Republic arm galleys for use against the Turks (pro facto Turchorum).40 
The following month Sanudo wrote again that the archbishop was still in Venice, 
making his case for aid against the Turks and that the Senate had been ordered to 
respond to his requests.41 At some point, the Senate appointed two people to talk with 
Isnard, but nothing is known of the outcome of these negotiations.42 Again in 1330 and 
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1331 other sources report that Doge Giovanni Soranzo had written to the pope to 
secure papal support for a naval league, but again the exact details or results of these 
correspondences are not known.43 All that is known is that negotiations between the 
Venetians and the pope were ultimately fruitless as John XXII did not commit to a 
Venetian organised anti-Turkish league until 1333, some eight years since Marino 
Sanudo had first proposed a provisional naval league and six years since the Venetians 
had adopted the same strategy.  
To understand the reasons for the delay in papal participation in a naval league, 
it is necessary to study the Aegean in the wider context of papal policy in Europe and 
Frankish Greece. Up until the late 1320s, the pope had been distracted by wars in Italy. 
Marino Sanudo had written that these wars were responsible for Christian disunity and 
the diversion of papal resources, which prevented a common front from being 
established against the Turks. However, by the end of the decade, and after the failure 
of John XXII’s Guelph policy, the attention of the pope once again shifted back to the 
East.44 But this did not immediately result in a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean. 
Instead, the papacy shifted its focus towards Jerusalem and the new French King, 
Philip VI of Valois, who had been crowned in 1328. French dealings with the Venetians 
over the forthcoming crusade are dealt with in more detail later, but for now it is 
worth noting that Philip VI immediately showed an enthusiasm for a crusade to 
recover the Holy Land, and that the pope, although now aware of the threat being 
posed by the Turks in the Aegean, did not ignore such an opportunity. Accordingly, 
Philip VI was granted church tithes in 1328 and 1330 and in 1331 he received 
indulgences for a crusade which was to depart before March 1334.45 As shall be seen, 
this general passage was to play an important role in the eventual realisation of an 
anti-Turkish fleet. 
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 As well as focussing on the Holy Land, in the early 1330s John XXII also 
continued his attempts to re-establish Angevin control of Greece, by supporting the 
campaign of Walter VI of Brienne, the titular Duke of Athens and son-in-law of Philip of 
Taranto, to recover his duchy from the Catalan Company.46  As in the previous decade 
these proposals were not designed to be compatible with a Venetian coalition against 
the Turks but were instead intended as an alternative to it.47 On 14 June 1330 John 
XXII wrote to the Latin bishops in Romania ordering them to preach a crusade to 
support Walter’s expedition, for which indulgences were granted.48 A ban of 
excommunication was also to be proclaimed against the entire Catalan Company if 
they did not return Athens to Walter within six months.49 In July, Robert of Naples 
released his feudatories from their obligations so they could partake in Walter’s 
forthcoming crusade and in November he published the crusade bull (issued on 14 
June) throughout his kingdom.50 The participants in the crusade were granted the 
same indulgences as those which the Apostolic See had granted for going in aid of the 
Holy Land. Unlike in the letters associated with the papal-Angevin attempts to recover 
the Morea in the 1320s, the pope did not use a Catalan alliance with the Turks and 
Greeks as a motivation for a crusade against them. Instead the excommunicate 
Catalans were identified as the sole targets of the crusade, in one instance they were 
labelled as  ‘schismatics, sons of destruction, and pupils of iniquity’.51 
In late August 1331 Walter of Brienne departed from Brindisi with a sizeable 
army consisting of 800 French knights and 500 Tuscan infantry, gathered at 
considerable personal expense.52 He headed to Greece, occupying the island of Leukas, 
and the towns of Vonitza and Arta in the south of Epirus. In February 1332 the pope 
ordered the archbishop of Patras to reiterate the excommunication of the Catalans 
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issued in 1330.53 The army crossed the peninsula with the aim of engaging the Catalans 
under the command of the new Vicar General, Nicholas Lancia, but this strategy failed 
as the Catalans refused to meet Walter in open battle. Consequently the Frankish army 
ran out of funds and was forced to return to Brindisi in late summer 1332.54 Walter 
and the pope had hoped for Venetian assistance in the campaign, but as was the case 
in the previous decade, the Serenissima showed no desire to jeopardise the chance of 
peace with the Catalans for the re-establishment of Angevin prominence in Greece.55 
To prove this, the Republic agreed a truce with the Catalans in April 1331, at a point 
where Walter was near the end of his preparations for the Athenian campaign. As 
Setton has pointed out, at no point did the native Greek population of the Morea, 
clearly not too dissatisfied with Catalan rule, offer assistance to Walter of Brienne.56 
This episode was not dissimilar to the campaign of John of Gravina in 1325; the 
pope had tried and failed to reassert Angevin power in the Greece by encouraging a 
prince to fulfil his dynastic ambitions at the expense of the Catalans. For both 
campaigns papal support was provided to encourage participation and a sizeable army 
was recruited for each expedition, but in 1325 and again in 1331, the pope failed to 
gain crucial Venetian support for the enterprise.57 Moreover, both expeditions 
suffered from a lack of coherent planning whilst in Greece and were forced to 
withdraw because of shortages of money without achieving anything of significance.  
 Papal interest in re-establishing Angevin supremacy in the Morea was not 
surprising in the 1320s, when the Catalans were wreaking havoc on the Latin states 
there, but for the pope to persist in supporting a failed policy at a time when he was 
aware of the danger posed by Turkish incursions into the Aegean, shows that even as 
late as 1331 John XXII was still unwilling to participate in a Venetian led coalition 
against the Turks. In fact, it seems as if the repeated refusal of Venice to participate in 
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a papal-endorsed Angevin expedition to the Morea, and the tendency of the Republic 
to side with the Catalans was one of the main reasons for the slow adoption of the 
naval league by the Pope. This is reflected in a letter written by John XXII to the doge 
of Venice in July 1332, only months before the final agreement to take part in the 
league: 
 
Bitter was the blow which your letters dispatched to us have delivered: 
indeed, through them we have learned most displeasingly how that wild 
Turkish beast has cruelly oppressed you in persons and property during 
these times. We have held deliberation on this with our brothers and, 
with their advice, have arranged for certain means of support [...] and, 
upon the arrival of envoys of our most blessed son of Christ, Philip, 
illustrious king of the Franks, [...] we shall also arrange for more 
extensive support. 
 However, take heed, sons, you who harbour (tenetis) and 
welcome (recipitis) schismatics and enemies of God in your lands, that 
those things do not occur because of your remissness: for we read that, 
by the enemies of God and of the Israelite people, the Lord scourged 
that same Israelite people most harshly. Be zealous, therefore, to throw 
schismatics and heretics out of your lands or to lead them back to the 
unity of the Church; if you do this, we trust in the Lord that he may 
return to your defence, because the father of mercies himself had 
prepared these things for your deliverance: otherwise we fear that he 
may have to turn his hand more harshly against you.58 
 
This thinly veiled threat is a clear indication that the pope believed that the 
depredations being inflicted on Venetian possessions were a result of divine 
retribution for continued failure to resist the Catalans. Punishment for intermittent 
Venetian treaties with the Turks and reconciliation with Byzantium may have also been 
an underlying theme in this letter. Venice was, after all, at war with an enemy that it 
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had been trading intermittently with in the past – in direct contravention of the 
apostolic ban on all commerce with Muslims. It is interesting to note at this point that 
John XXII had in the previous year granted Walter of Brienne permission to trade with 
Mamluk Egypt, possibly in order to better finance his expedition.59 When this is 
contrasted with repeated refusals to grant Venetian subjects a similar licence, it is easy 
to see how papal economic mechanisms directly reflected the priorities and attitude of 
the pope himself. 
Finally, another aspect of papal policy which further separated Venetian and 
papal thinking before 1332 was the attitude towards Byzantium. As has been noted, at 
this stage Venice’s plans for a Christian alliance against the Turks depended on the 
involvement of Andronikos III. John XXII, on the other hand, did not yet regard the 
Greeks as trustworthy allies; it is true that Union negotiations had thawed relations 
between the Greek and Latin Churches during the 1320s, but the pope still labelled the 
schismatic Greeks as enemies of the Latins in the East. It has already been shown that 
in the papal-Angevin attempts to recover the Morea from 1318-28, the Greeks had 
been cited as schismatic allies of the Catalans. This attitude prevailed into the 1330s 
where, in a letter dated April 1330 to Philip VI, the pope claimed that the schismatic 
Greeks were threatening Hospitaller Rhodes.60 This document was written shortly after 
the conquest of Chios by Andronikos III so it is not surprising that the new emperor 
was deemed as a potential threat to the island. However, Venice did not share this 
view, and these fundamental differences in Venetian and papal policy explain why 
John XXII was still unwilling to commit himself to a Venetian-led anti-Turkish league at 
this time.  
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4.1.4. The French and negotiations for a naval league against the Turks 
Philip VI ascended the French throne in 1328 and within a year rumours had reached 
Venice that he was planning to launch a crusade to the Levant. He had initially 
entertained ideas of a crusade to fight the Moors in Granada, but a rousing sermon by 
the Patriarch of Jerusalem Pierre de la Palud, after his return from Cairo, had reignited 
traditional French zeal for a crusade to liberate the Holy Land and the king’s thoughts 
turned to Jerusalem.61 As Henneman has suggested, Philip’s energetic crusade plans 
helped to secure church subsidies.62 From 1328-31, the king was granted tithes and 
indulgences for the forthcoming crusade.63  The preparations for the crusade were still 
focussed on the Holy Land and did not share the objectives held by the Venetian in 
their plans for a naval league. The French court was aware that the threat of the Turks 
had gown in recent years,64 but their interest outside of the Holy Land, if existent at all, 
was primarily restricted to Armenia.65 This attitude was reflected in the findings of a 
crusade committee in February 1332 which concluded that a sea route, consisting of 
one general crusade to the Holy Land, would be more preferable than a passagium 
particulare to blockade trade in the East or fight the Turks.66 Unlike Venice, anti-
Byzantine feeling also prevailed within the French court in these years, although this 
was to change in the near future.67 
There is no evidence that Venice courted the French for a league against the 
Turks in these early years. Rather surprisingly it was Philip VI who first brokered 
negotiations between the two sides over a crusade, suggesting that Venice did not 
regard the French as playing an important role in an anti-Turkish alliance at this stage. 
In November 1331 Philip wrote to Doge Giovanni Soranzo to ask him for logistical 
advice for his proposed crusade to the Holy Land. In the letter, Philip requested that 
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the Republic send envoys to Paris, to inform him of the likely number and cost of ships 
and supplies needed for a crusade, and whether Venice was prepared to provide 
them.68 The doge took this opportunity to expand his plans for the naval league by 
linking it to the forthcoming French expedition. In his reply of 11 May 1332, Giovanni 
Soranzo provided the king with the advice he requested for the recovery of the Holy 
Land and also stressed the need to protect the Aegean from the Turks: 
 
[T]hat as from now, 20 or 30 armed galleys are to be sent to hold firm 
and persist in that place in order, as will be seen, to inflict damage on 
the sultan and his lands and people and on the ships and vessels of the 
Turks, who are the most evil persecutors of the Christian faith, and also 
to prevent the supply of timber, arms and other items to the said sultan 
and so that non enter or leave his lands. And truly, unless this fleet and 
protection are sent ahead, we do not see how the passagium could 
succeed, especially because the iniquity and audacity of the Turks is 
increasing daily and, as they increase, provisions from parts of the Black 
Sea, where they are most readily available, have become unobtainable. 
Indeed, very great damage can and will, both now and hereafter, befall 
the Christian lands and the peoples of those regions and the aforesaid 
voyage. If the aforesaid fleet and protection are sent ahead, the ships 
and the incursions of the Turks will, with Christ’s grace favouring us, thus 
be defeated, because they will be forced to abandon the sea and coastal 
regions, and every advantage will result for the aforesaid passagium and 
the Christian people.69 
 
Here the doge suggested that before a passagium was to depart for the Holy Land, a 
fleet of ships was needed to blockade trade in the East. This notion was not original in 
itself, but for the first time it is reported that the fleet being used to combat Turkish 
piracy could be used to pave the way for a Holy Land crusade. Thus the doge directly 
linked the Turkish expansion into the Aegean with the liberation of Jerusalem – the 
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clearest example yet that the concept of fleet intended to enforce the trade embargo 
had evolved into an anti-Turkish league. According to the doge, provisions would be 
needed from the Black Sea if a passagium was to succeed, and therefore, the Turks 
and their fleets which dominated the Aegean, would need to be driven from the coast 
of Asia Minor before a general passagium could depart. This is very informative for 
both French and Venetian policy towards a crusade at this time. For Venice, the letter 
confirms what is already known; that a crusade to the Holy Land was to take second 
place behind a crusade to the Aegean – the Republic agreed to help Philip in his 
enterprise, but it stressed that the Turks needed to be subdued before this could 
happen. For the French, the letter shows that a crusade to Jerusalem was paramount, 
and that a crusade to the Aegean would only be considered if it was advantageous to 
the passagium generale. The Venetians were aware of the French obsession with the 
Holy Land and the letter is also an example of the adroit diplomacy of the doge, who 
had found a way of reconciling the conflicting agendas of the two sides. 
 Shortly before this letter was written, Marino Sanudo also wrote to Philip VI. 
This document, as the letter written by Giovanni Soranzo, was drawn up in response to 
the passagium generale proposed by the king.70 In a similar vein to the doge, Sanudo 
lamented the expansion of the Turks into the Aegean and proposed that a ‘first army’ 
of 10-15 well-armed galleys with three hundred men on each be used against the 
Turks, the Mamluk sultan and other enemies.71 In addition to this, Sanudo advised the 
king on the numbers of men and ships he would need for the main crusade. On both 
accounts he recommended a smaller force than in the official letter from the doge.72 
Whether or not Sanudo was acting as an official spokesman for Venice is hard to say, 
but either way he had a difficult job persuading the king to participate in a crusade to 
the Aegean.73 Interestingly, he adopted a similar tactic to the doge in that he 
attempted to link the passagium generale with a preliminary passagium to fight the 
Turks. However, Sanudo was less explicit about the reasons why the Turks needed to 
be subdued and did not justify it on the grounds that Black Sea provisions would be 
needed for the crusade army. Either way, by the time Venice had replied to Philip VI’s 
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original letter, in May 1332, a local Venetian-led anti-Turkish league with the 
participation of the Hospitallers and Byzantium was nearly at the point of completion. 
The Serenissima had demonstrated that although it wished for both French and papal 
involvement in an alliance against the Turks, it would proceed without their help if the 
situation in the Aegean warranted immediate action. 
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4.2. The Initial Formation of the Anti-Turkish League, 1332-1334 
 
4.2.1. First agreement of the anti-Turkish league at Rhodes, September 1332 
The preparations for an anti-Turkish league progressed quickly in the late summer of 
1332. On 20 July, the Senate agreed to order the captain of the galleys of Romania to 
transport as much biscuit as possible from Modon to Negroponte for the fleet which 
was gathering against the Turks.74 On 26 August Andronikos III informed the doge that 
he was open to the idea of ‘union, alliance and league, for the persecution of the Turks  
and defence of the Orthodox faith’.75 The emperor also reported that he had asked 
Petro de Canale, the Venetian ambassador who had been ordered to organise a union 
by the Senate in the previous month, to act as an imperial agent in the forthcoming 
discussions.76 On 6 September, Canale, now a representative of both Venice and 
Byzantium, met with the Master of the Hospitaller Hélion of Villeneuve and a number 
Venetian plenipotentiaries at Rhodes to finalise the arrangements for the league.77 The 
record of the meeting began by listing the damages which the Turks had inflicted upon 
the Latins and Greeks of Romania. It then reported that the envoys had entered 
mutually and harmoniously into a ‘union, confederation, league and alliance *...+ for 
the exaltation and praise of the divine name and the confusion of the said Agarenes’. It 
was decided that 20 armed galleys would be furnished for a period of five years; of 
these the Greek emperor would provide ten, Venice six and the Hospitallers four. This 
fleet was to gather in the harbour of Negroponte by 15 April 1333, then it would be 
ready to proceed against the naval and land forces of the ‘Agarenes and Turks’ for the 
defence of the Christians.78 On the next day Canale and Villeneuve agreed that the 
captain-general of the fleet should be a Venetian.79 In the following months the 
Venetian Senate acted on its commitment to the league and decreed that the duke of 
                                                        
74 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Misti del Senato, reg. 15, f. 24v; TR, i. nr. 23. 
75 unione, societate et liga ad persecutionem Turchorum et fidei defensionem orthodoxe: DVL, i. nr. 116, 
p. 227. 
76 DVL, i. nr. 116, p. 227. Also see Setton, PL, i. 180; Lemerle, Aydin, 91. 
77 DVL, i. nr. 116, pp. 225-7. The September 1333 agreement of the league is described by a host of 
scholars, namely: Lemerle, Aydin, 91-2; Setton, PL, i. 180-1; Zachariadou, TC, 24-5; Housley, Avignon, 25-
6; Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 87-8; Loenertz, Ghisi, 157-8. For Byzantine, Hospitaller and 
Catalan perspectives, see Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 50-1; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 386; Nicol, Last Centuries, 
177-9; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 293; Setton, Domination, 36. 
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 DVL, i. nr. 116, p. 226. 
79 DVL, i. nr. 117, p. 229. 
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Crete must raise the necessary money to arm two galleys ‘for the union against the 
Turks’.80 
 
 
4.2.1. The rebellion on Crete and the delay of the league, 1333 
The date of the mobilisation of the fleet at Negroponte in April 1333 came and went 
with no sign of action. One reason for this was the beginning of an uprising on Crete in 
the summer of 1333, which was discussed in detail by the Venetian Senate.81 The first 
record of the rebellion dates from 29 September 1333, where the Senate, after hearing 
of the uprising, agreed to dispatch one armed galley to assist the duke of Crete.82 Only 
weeks later, in mid October, news had reached Venice of the spread of the revolt 
causing the Senate to order the two galleys which were intended to be used for the 
anti-Turkish league to remain at Crete to combat the rebels.83 Although this action was 
decided almost six months after the original muster date for the league on 15 April, 
the trouble on Crete had been brewing since late 1332. This provides some 
explanation as to why the fleet did not take action in the spring of 1333, and certainly 
why it was not ready again until 1334. Ironically, the Cretan rebellion was probably 
triggered by the taxes levied on the island to fund the construction of two of the 
league’s galleys in 1332.84  
 During the midst of the Cretan uprising the Serenissima received news from the 
duke of Crete and the Hospitallers of quarrels among the Turks. Hélion of Villeneuve 
suggested to Venice that it should form an agreement with Orkhan, the Emir of 
Menteshe, against other Turks, probably those of Aydin. The Senate instructed the 
duke of Crete to investigate this prospect and, with the consent of the other members 
of the league, to come to an agreement with the emir.85 In November 1333 the Senate 
accepted the Cretan proposal for an alliance with Menteshe for the import of horses, 
                                                        
80 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Misti del Senato, reg. 15, f. 50; summary in TR, i. nr. 25 (15 December, 1332). 
81 For the rebellion, see F. Thiriet, ‘Sui dissidi sorti tra il Comune di Venezia e i suoi feudatari di Creta nel 
Trecento’, Archivio Storico Italiano 114 (1956), 699-712, at 702-5. 
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 TR, i. nr. 34. 
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 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 7, pp. 123-4; TR, i. nr. 35-6. 
84 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 15, nr. 12, pp. 111-14; Zachariadou, TC, 26. 
85 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 13, pp. 129-30; Le deliberazioni (Senato), ii. bk. 
16, nr. 235, p. 234; Zachariadou, TC, 28; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 89; TR, i. nr. 
38. Thiriet incorrectly identifies Orkhan as the emir of the Ottomans and not as the emir of Menteshe. 
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animals and wheat to Crete, on the condition that the Hospitallers also took part in the 
treaty.86 Towards the end of the month Marino Morosini, the Captain of the league, 
informed the Senate of another possible pact, this time with an emir named 
Carmignanus, possibly from Germiyan or Karaman.87  At the beginning of December, 
the Senate instructed a Venetian ambassador to the Hospitallers to inform the Order 
that Venice had no objections to this treaty.88 As Zachariadou has explained, the 
proposed treaty with Germiyan, a land-locked emirate, was less strange than first 
thought, as it could provide the Latins with vital assistance by attacking Aydin along its 
eastern landward border.89 In the end the outcome of these negotiations is not known, 
but they do show that even in the midst of forming an anti-Turkish alliance, Venice was 
not adverse to the prospect of allying with one Turkish emirate against the other.  
As well as negotiating with the Turks, Venice also continued efforts to promote 
the league during 1333 and reassure the Hospitallers that the clauses of the alliance 
were still valid.90 By the end of the year the insurrection on Crete was coming to an 
end,91 and the Senate decided that the galleys of the league should be made ready for 
May of 1334.92 At this time, the Serenissima made efforts to extend the league to 
other interested parties. In September 1333 the doge dispatched embassies to Philip 
VI of France to seek French participation in the league and passed on this news to 
Hélion of Villeneuve and Andronikos III.93 In the same month the doge also asked Hugh 
IV, the King of Cyprus, to participate in the league as well.94  
 
                                                        
86 TR, i. nr. 38. The Venetian ban on all trade with the Turks in June 1332 was amended to allow this: 
Zachariadou, TC, 28. Also see ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 14, pp. 130-3, esp. 
pp. 132-3 (16 November). 
87 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 23, p. 138 (29 November); Theotokes, ‘E prôte 
summachia’, 287.  Thiriet and Lemerle state that Carmignanus was the emir of Karaman: TR, i. nr. 39; 
Lemerle, Aydin, 91-3. However, Zachariadou makes a good case for him being the emir of Germiyan: 
Zachariadou, TC, 28-9, using an alliance between the Byzantines and Germiyan from Kantakouzenos as 
her source: John Kantakouzenos, ii. 82. 
88 TR, i. nr. 39 (2 December); Zachariadou, TC, 28, n. 104.  
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 Zachariadou, TC, 28-9. 
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 TR, i. nr. 36; Le deliberazioni (Senato), bk. 16, nr. 232, p. 231 (16 October). 
91 Reports that the rebellion was over had reached Venice before 4 January 1334: TR, i. nr. 42. 
92 TR, i. nr. 37 (11-13 November, 1333). 
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 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5276 (15 September); TR, i. nr. 37(11-13 November). 
94 Edbury, Cyprus, 157. 
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4.3. The Completion of the Anti-Turkish League and the Aegean Campaign, 1333-
1334 
 
4.3.1. Involvement of France and the papacy in the league 
Both John XXII and Philip VI committed to the Venetian led anti-Turkish league at the 
time when their preparations for a crusade to the Holy Land were beginning to bear 
fruit. After months of drawn out negotiations and the customary wrangling over 
finance, Philip VI was appointed as general captain of his crusade by the pope on 26 
July 1333.95 On the same day, numerous letters were dispatched from the Curia 
outlining all aspects of the expedition, from finance to spiritual benefits.96 Zachariadou 
has misleadingly connected these bulls with the anti-Turkish league, when they only 
related specifically to Philip VI’s passagium generale.97 This confusion is 
understandable as the passagium generale and the anti-Turkish league were in the 
process of being incorporated by the French and the papacy into a wider, three tiered 
crusade. It was suggested that the first wave of this crusade was to be the anti-Turkish 
league, this was to be followed by another passagium particulare, to land a provisional 
force of troops in Asia Minor, and finally King Philip himself was to take part in the final 
passagium generale, which was to depart for the Holy Land on 1 August 1336.98 
Evidently, the king and pope recognised that the chance to participate in a league 
against the Turks, for which the Venetians had already done the majority of the 
organisation, was too good an opportunity to miss, especially when, as Venice had 
proposed in 1332, the league could help pave the way for a successful passagium 
generale to the Holy Land. 
                                                        
95 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5207. Full translation in DLC, nr. 18, pp. 68-70. Also see Chronique des quatre 
premiers Valois, 1327-1393, ed. M.S. Luce (Paris, 1862), 5-6; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 29-30. The negotiations 
for papal finance from February 1332 to July 1333 were especially laborious. Philip wanted free control 
of legacies, tithes and other funds raised outside France, while the pope refused to grant the king non-
French revenues. John required constant reassurance of Philip’s sincerity for crusade. Eventually 
agreements were finalised in May and June of 1333: Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 28-30. Philip took the cross in 
October 1333: ‘Chronique parisienne’, 154; William of Nangis, ii. 154-5; Chronique des quatre premiers 
Valois, 5-6; Henry Dapifero of Dissenhoven, ‘John XXII Quinta Vita’, VPA, i. 172-7, at 174; AE, xxiv. nr. 1-
7, pp. 487-90. 
96 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5207-27. 
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 Zachariadou, TC, 30, n. 110-12. 
98 Housley, Avignon, 24, 26. 
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In late August 1333 John XXII took the first active steps in assisting the Venetian 
league by appealing for more rulers to join the Christian alliance, in particular Philip VI 
and Hugh of Cyprus.99 At the same time the pope wrote to the doge that the Latin 
territories in the East were in a perilous position and that clerical ambassadors had 
been dispatched to Venice to discuss the participation of the Curia in the coalition.100 
During this time, the pope also urged Andronikos III to accept the Union of Churches 
and a common front against the Turks.101 Finally, on 10 October John XXII wrote a 
letter warning of the Turkish threat to the archbishop of Embrun, whom he sent to 
negotiate the formation of a league with the doge and Robert of Naples. In it the pope 
lamented the raids of the Turks and wrote that the Christians ought to repel and crush 
their wickedness, arrogance and insults.102 
The embassy from the Curia arrived in Venice in December 1333, where they 
asked the Serenissima three questions: i) how they would resist the Turks; ii) if they 
genuinely wished to save the territories of Romania; iii) whose help would they need 
to succeed. The response to the first question was that a force of fifty horse-
transports, forty galleys and 2,400 mounted soldiers would be needed to defeat the 
Turks.103 To the second question, the Venetians replied that their power was inferior to 
the Turks, but they would defend the faith with all the zeal that their hearts could 
inspire. To the third question, they stated that the aim of the Republic was only to help 
the Christians defeat the Turks, and not to increase the power of their state. For that 
reason they were ready to contribute ten galleys, twelve horse-transports as well as a 
number of transport ships for food, animals and other provisions, which would be 
                                                        
99 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5247, 5324; JXXII Communes, xii. nr. 60781; ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês 
gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 20, pp. 136-8; Zachariadou, TC, 30-1; N. Coureas, ‘Cyprus and the naval 
leagues, 1333-1358’, Cyprus and the Crusades: Papers Given at the International Conference ‘Cyprus and 
the Crusades’, ed. N. Coureas & J.S.C. Riley-Smith (Nicosia, 1995), 107-24, at 107-8. 
100 Full text in AE, xxiv. nr. 13, pp. 511-12; summarised in DVL, i. 115. The document is incorrectly dated 
to 1332 by Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 386, Lemerle, Aydin, 191 and the DVL. It is correctly dated to 1333 in the 
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102
 AE, xxiv. nr. 15, pp. 513-14. 
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 ‘[T]herefore [the doge and his government] believe that fifty horse transports, in each of which there 
should be at least 120 rowers and 20 men-at-arms with the horses and arms they need, and forty armed 
galleys, in each of which there should be 200 men, would suffice to check the Turkish savagery’: DVL, i. 
nr. 124, p. 241; ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 27, p. 140. Partial translation in 
Setton, PL, i. 181-2, n. 88. Also see Theotokes, ‘E prôte summachia’, 287-8. 
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available for the next eight months.104 With these measures taken, the fleet and 
soldiers would be able to attack the Turks on land and sea, meaning that ‘the 
Christians in Romania would be secure, and the power of the Agarenes themselves 
would be almost entirely broken’.105 The Serenissima further encouraged the pope by 
highlighting that the Turks were divided amongst themselves and would not therefore 
be able to help each other: ‘although the power of the perfidious Turks is great, 
nevertheless there are several Turkish states in those regions, of which each one is 
distinct from the others, and one could not quickly render aid to another’.106 From this 
embassy, the Venetians were able to evaluate the interest of the papacy in the anti-
Turkish league. They decided to send Blasio Zeno to the Holy See, who reaffirmed that 
Venice was eager and willing to participate in the league as they had previously stated. 
In the early months of 1334, Venetian and Hospitaller ambassadors at the Curia finally 
settled the arrangements for the league with the pope.107 
On 3 November 1333, after repeated appeals from the Curia and the Venetian 
government, Philip VI also informed the doge that he would assist the Venetians in the 
league against the Turks.  The king claimed that in spite of the burden which the 
preparation of the passagium generale imposed upon him, he would send in the spring 
of 1334 a certain number of vessels to join those of the Venetians, the Greeks and the 
Hospitallers.108 The king probably viewed his participation in the league as a bargaining 
chip by which he could call on Venetian assistance for the passagium generale, as eight 
days later he announced to the Venetians that the pope had made him captain of the 
crusade to the Holy Land, and asked them to send to Paris new ambassadors to help 
with this expedition.109 The Holy Land crusade certainly took precedence over the 
naval league and the king made it clear that he was only willing to participate in the 
league if it did not interfere with the passagium generale.110 
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It has been suggested that Venice had received papal backing for the anti-
Turkish league before this time, but it seems that it is in these months, and not earlier, 
that the anti-Turkish league began to be directed under the auspices of the pope.111  
The complex negotiations do provide evidence, as has been seen earlier, that the two 
sides had undertaken some negotiations pro facto Turchorum before 1333, but the 
actual details of these discussions remain ambiguous and they appear to have come to 
nothing.112 Consequently, there are no sources that specifically link the pope to the 
Venetian plans for a naval league before 1333; John XXII had certainly not agreed to 
contribute galleys for the league, nor had he granted any papal privileges for the 
project before this time. In other words, without concrete papal backing, the league 
cannot be considered to have been a crusade until the very last stage of its 
organisation – up until this point it had been strictly a Venetian-led enterprise.  
Now that the papacy and France had committed themselves to the anti-Turkish 
league and the rebellion on Crete had ended, preparations for the alliance quickly 
progressed.113 In the first months of 1334, the participants agreed that the fleet would 
consist of forty galleys; ten to be provided by Venice, ten from the Hospitallers, six 
from the Byzantines, six from Cyprus (which had entered into the league before 
March) and eight from the papacy and France together. The fleet was to assemble at 
Negroponte in May and serve for five months.114 On 7 March a contract was drawn up 
on behalf of the pope which commissioned the construction and armament of four 
galleys in Marseille for the league. The document outlined in detail the conditions of 
the contract. Amongst other things, each galley was to consist of between 174 and 180 
oars and was to carry 25 marines plus retinues, scribes and other suitable officials, and 
adequate provisions and equipment were to be supplied. The papal chamberlain and 
                                                        
111 For example, Housley, ‘Robert the Wise’, 551, wrote that Venice prepared the league ‘under the 
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treasurer agreed to pay to the knights and people of Marseille 12,000 gold florins over 
the course of five months for the four galleys. Moreover, the crews were expected to 
fight on land and sea and to obey every command of the pope.115 Initially the galleys 
were permitted to carry merchandise, half of the profits from which were to be given 
to the pope. However, in May 1334 John XXII ruled that no goods were to be carried as 
they might hold up the progress of the galleys.116 In the same month John of Cepoy 
was appointed as the captain for the Franco-papal galleys and indulgences were 
granted to him and his followers.117 These indulgences had been requested by John of 
Cepoy and were granted in articulo  mortis for death in battle and wounds received 
thereafter. The bull granting the indulgences lamented the wretched state of Romania 
and other eastern lands and the need to curb the growing power of the Turks.118 
Shortly after these documents were issued the flotilla left for the Aegean where it 
joined with the rest of the fleet in the summer of 1334. 
In the previous year, the Venetians had named Marino Morosini, the former 
duke of Crete as the captain of their galleys for the league. He had acted as Venetian 
ambassador to the French king in 1332, in the Republic’s attempts to secure French 
participation, and had apparently been active against the Turks in late 1333 and early 
1334.119 Morosini was replaced as captain by Petro Zeno sometime in 1334 and in April 
the Venetian Senate decided that the duke of Crete and baillies of Negroponte should 
borrow money for the armament of four galleys for the league.120 In contrast, little is 
known about the Hospitaller and Cypriot preparations for the coalition.121  
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4.3.2. The Battle of Adramyttion 
Whilst the Franco-papal fleet was under construction in France, the Venetian galleys 
already in the Aegean engaged the united Turkish forces of Umur of Aydin, and 
Suleiman, the Emir of Sarukhan, near the Morea.122 On 7 March the Venetian Senate 
commanded Petro Zeno, the captain of the league, and Petro de Canale, the captain of 
the Gulf to sail to Modon to engage a Slavonic pirate named Zassi who was disrupting 
trade there and possibly in league with the Turks.123 Shortly after this, Enveri reported 
that ten Latin galleys, probably those of Zeno or Canale, had attacked the fleet of 
Suleiman, who had needed to be rescued by Umur.124 By the summer of 1334 the 
Franco-papal force had joined that of the Venetians, Hospitallers and Cypriots in the 
Aegean and the anti-Turkish league, which with the exception of Byzantium had now 
reached full strength, embarked on a series of campaigns against the Turks. 
 Although some of the actions of the league are documented in the sources, it is 
hard to recreate a precise chronology of events.125 What is known is that the league 
took part in the burning and seizing of Turkish ships throughout the summer of 1334 
and that the crusaders attacked the emirates of Aydin, Karasi and Sarukhan along the 
north-eastern coast of Asia Minor.126 Smyrna was probably assaulted at some point 
during this time; Umur remained the primary target of the Latins and Enveri reported 
that the Christians attacked the port (incorrectly dating it to late 1333).127 In the 
autumn of 1334 a major battle took place near the Gulf of Adramyttion, opposite 
Lesbos, and on the land nearby, where a fleet belonging to Yashi, the Emir of Karasi, 
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was defeated. Giovanni Villani provides some indication of the numbers involved, 
according to him around 5,000 Turks were killed and 150 ships destroyed.128 Marino 
Sanudo also described the Christian victory in a letter to Hugh of Cyprus. In the 
document, now badly damaged, the author claimed that the crusaders destroyed a 
number of Turkish vessels on the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin (8 September), and 
again on the 11, 14, and 17 of September. In the letter, the son-in-law of Emir Yashi 
was named as one of those killed.129 Laurent has attempted to argue that two battles 
took place at Adramyttion in 1334, one in September and one in November, although 
Laiou has since shown that this was not the case.130 The more Franco-papal oriented 
account of William of Nangis unsurprisingly attributed the success of the league to 
John of Cepoy and emphasised that the purpose of the expedition was to prepare the 
way for the passagium to the Holy Land.131 Interestingly according to the other sources 
the raison d’être of the naval league was to destroy the power of the Turks, rather 
than to pave the way for a Holy Land expedition. These accounts obviously reflect the 
contrasting priorities of those involved.  
The formation of the league, at a time when most other attempts to form any 
kind of coherent front against the Turks had failed, was in many ways a remarkable 
success. It proved that by the 1330s the threat of the Turks had permeated beyond 
those Latin states with a presence in the Aegean, to include France and the papacy. 
However, for both John XXII and Philip VI, a crusade against the Turks was still ranked 
far below a crusade to Jerusalem. Venice had after all been forced to connect the naval 
league to the recovery of the Holy Land in order to secure the participation of the pope 
and king. In terms of spiritual rewards granted to the participants of the enterprise, it 
is also interesting to note that John XXII only granted the participants of the naval 
league indulgences in articulo mortis for death in battle or wounds received thereafter, 
whereas Walter of Brienne’s crusade to the Morea had been granted the full Holy Land 
                                                        
128 Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 12, ch. 18, p. 58. Also see Ludovico Bonconte Monaldesco, ‘Fragmenta 
Annalium Romanorum’, RIS 12 (Milan, 1728), cols. 527-42, at col. 537; AE, xxv. nr. 11, p. 5 (in which 250 
ships were destroyed); Lemerle, Aydin, 97. 
129
 Text in C.B. de la Roncière, & L. Dorez, ‘Lettres inédites et mémoires de Marino Sanudo l'ancien 
(1334-1337)’, BEC 56 (1895), 21-44, at 35-6 (dated after 22 October 1333). Sanudo also mentioned the 
battle in a letter to Louis of Bourbon: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 811-12 (letter 7); Lemerle, Aydin, 98, n. 1; 
Laurent, ‘Action de grâces’, 34-5. 
130
 Laurent, ‘Action de grâces’, 25-41; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 387, n. 58. 
131 William of Nangis, ii. 145. 
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indulgence four years earlier.132 In fact, in spiritual terms, the papal privileges granted 
for the naval league were no different from those granted in Achaia and Chios during 
the 1320s. The real change in the stance of the papacy related to the league was that it 
agreed to contribute and finance four of its own galleys – a commitment which 
suggests this campaign against the Turks was more important than those in previous 
years. 
As Housley has suggested, the 1334 league also constitutes the strongest 
evidence yet of the shift in crusade strategy from complicated and expensive plans to 
recover the Holy Land to expeditions organised first and foremost by the Latin powers 
with a vested interest in the East – in this case Venice.133  It has been shown that this 
anti-Turkish league was a Venetian project up until a few months before it sailed to the 
Aegean, contesting the hitherto overstated role of John XXII in the planning of the 
project.  
Laiou was, therefore, probably overly harsh in stating that the anti-Turkish 
league ‘accomplished very little’.134 Moreover, the formation of the league contradicts 
Atiya’s claim that before 1343-4, ‘no enterprise of worth was undertaken against the 
Muhammadans’.135 In actual fact, when compared to other crusade projects of the 
early fourteenth century, the league accomplished a great deal in a relatively short 
period of time. The number of chroniclers who reported the battle at Adramyttion 
suggest that it was undoubtedly an important Latin victory and in the months that the 
fleet patrolled the Aegean, the Latins enjoyed a level of security not yet experienced in 
the fourteenth century.136 However, as many of the sources suggest, after John XXII’s 
untimely death in December 1334 and the disbanding of the league, the Turks were 
able to reoccupy the Aegean and resume their raiding activities with ease, meaning 
that any successes were quickly reversed.137  
                                                        
132 These indulgences were granted specifically to John of Cepoy and his followers. He was the captain of 
the Franco-papal galleys, so it remains unclear as to whether the Venetians or Cypriots were granted 
indulgences for their participation as well.  
133
 Housley, Avignon, 25; Idem, ‘Franco-papal’, 184. 
134
 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 387. 
135 Atiya, Crusade, 290. 
136 This view is shared by Lemerle, Aydin, 98; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 51. 
137
 This worry was voiced by Sanudo: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 812 (letter 7); Andrea Dandolo, 372; DVL, i. 
nr. 126, pp. 246-7 (this is an extract from: Giorgio Delfino, Chronicon, f. 104). 
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4.3.3. Reasons for Byzantine absence from the league 
From the sources it is likely that the galleys promised by Andronikos III did not 
participate in the operations of the anti-Turkish league.138 The western sources appear 
to be silent as to why the Byzantines failed to take part in the league, but the 
Byzantine author Nikephoros Gregoras perhaps provides a suitable answer when he 
commented that there was insufficient money in the imperial treasury to construct a 
fleet. The empire had after all been wracked by civil war for the past decade and even 
though Andronikos III attempted to levy new taxes, many regions had trouble raising 
the money as they had been devastated by previous Turkish attacks.139 It is also worth 
noting that the Ottoman Turks had made serious inroads into what remained of 
Byzantine Asia Minor in the late 1320s and early 1330s and this undoubtedly diverted 
resources away from the construction of a fleet.140 Furthermore, the emperor had to 
turn his attention to the military conflict in the Balkans and Macedonia in 1333-4.141  
Gregoras also claimed that the Latins blackmailed Andronikos into joining the 
league and threatened to launch a crusade against him if he did not participate. This is 
probably inaccurate, as the Venetians were on friendly enough terms with the 
emperor not to have to resort to blackmail. However, the pope did use the Turkish 
threat and the proposal of a league to try and push the Greeks to accept the Union of 
Churches.142 Thus, it would not be surprising to learn, considering the history of the 
two sides and recent Byzantine alliances with the Turks, that the emperor felt 
compelled to join the league as otherwise he would be labelled as a target for the 
crusade. Nicol has claimed that John XXII effectively blocked Byzantine participation in 
the league, but a close reading of the sources shows that the pope anticipated the 
involvement of Andronikos III as late as May 1333.143 A more plausible reason is given 
                                                        
138 Inalcik is alone is assuming that the Byzantines actually participated in the league: Inalcik, ‘Turkish 
maritime principalities’, 192. 
139 Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 523-5. 
140 Andronikos III had been defeated at the battle of Pelekanon in 1329 and Nicaea had fallen to 
Ottomans in 1331. Umur attacked Gallipoli a year later. In 1333 the emperor made a peace treaty with 
the Ottoman emir Orkhan at Nikomedia. See Nicol, Last Centuries, 175-8. 
141
 Zachariadou, TC, 37-8. 
142
 For example: ‘Ioannis de Fontibus Ordinis Praedicatorum Epistula ad abbatem et conventum 
monasterii nescio cuius Constantinopolitani’, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 30 
(1960), 163-95, at 165-9, esp. 168; JXXII Communes, xxii. nr. 60898-60900; JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5380, 
5410, 5423. Also see Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 386; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 51. 
143 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5485; Nicol, Last Centuries, 177-9. 
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by Zachariadou, who suggested that the Greeks refused to participate because they 
were upset by the seizure of Byzantine Lesbos by the Hospitallers and the Genoese of 
Phokaia in 1333 or early 1334.144 If Gregoras is to believed, Andronikos actually 
managed to raise a fleet of 20 ships for the league in 1335, but by then the coalition 
had disbanded.145 Despite the failure of Byzantium to actually participate in the 
coalition, the proposed involvement of the schismatic Greeks in a Latin crusading 
expedition still signified a major change in western perceptions of Byzantium.   
 
 
Chapter 4 Overview 
 
The formation of the anti-Turkish league owed a lot to the persistence of the 
Venetians. As was shown in the previous chapter, it is they who first set in motion 
plans for a naval league and first considered the Byzantines as possible allies. In 
contrast to what is often assumed, the papacy played little role in the formation of the 
league: the Venetians and the pope had discussed the league in the late 1320s and 
early 1330s, but before the summer of 1333 there is no evidence that the pope had 
agreed to participate in the league or had played any part in its organisation. On the 
contrary, in 1332 John XXII had written to the doge expressing his displeasure at the 
welcome which ‘schismatics and heretics’ were given in Venetian lands. In the context 
of repeated Venetian refusals to cooperate in an papal-endorsed Angevin expedition 
to the Morea, such as Walter of Brienne’s crusade against the Catalans of Athens in 
1331, it is reasonable to assume that the factious Venetian relationship with John XXII 
prevented the papacy from committing to a Venetian-led coalition in the Aegean. In 
the summer of 1333 this changed, but only after Venice had formed a provisional 
league with the Byzantines and Hospitallers.  
The Venetians also successfully secured French participation in the league. For 
this the doge had specifically appealed to the French desire to lead a crusade to 
Jerusalem, by suggesting that the naval league could help pave the way for the general 
crusade to the Holy Land being planned by Philip VI and the pope. This demonstrates 
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 Zachariadou, TC, 37-8; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 89. 
145 Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 524-5. 
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that even at the time of the first Latin coalition against the Turks, a crusade to the Holy 
Land was still the priority for the French. When the galleys of the league eventually 
gathered in the Aegean, they achieved some successes against the Turks, the most 
notable being the naval victory over a fleet from the emirate of Karasi at Adramyttion. 
The league did not attract the same level of spiritual benefits as the Crusade of 
Smyrna, but it still constituted the first instance in which Church funds had been 
contributed for an expedition against the Turks. The successful formation of the league 
is further evidence of how the initiative of organising an expedition for the defence of 
the faith had shifted to the Latins in the East, but the eventual participation of the 
French and papacy also suggests that the Turks were now perceived as a threat in both 
the Latin East and in Europe.  
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Chapter 5. Neglect of the Aegean Crusades under Benedict XII, 1334-
1342 
 
5.1. Benedict XII and the Crusade 
 
5.1.1. Continuation of the anti-Turkish league 
It will be argued in this chapter that the pontificate of Benedict XII (1335-1342) marked 
a reduction in the impetus of the crusade, signified in 1335-6 by the scrapping of the 
second wave of the anti-Turkish league and the Holy Land crusade of King Philip VI. In 
contrast to his predecessor Pope John XXII and his successor Clement VI, Benedict took 
less of an interest in the Aegean and the threat posed by the Turks in the region. 
Consequently, the Latins of the East were forced to continue their struggle against the 
Turks largely without papal support. Benedict XII’s pontificate can therefore be seen as 
an anomaly in the Aegean crusades, standing as it does between the pontificates of 
two popes who were both highly active in promoting a crusade in the Aegean. 
The first year of Benedict XII’s pontificate was the only time when papal policy 
lay was odds with the above statement. It is in this year where the pope adopted and 
continued to support the plans already laid by John XXII for a second wave of the anti-
Turkish league and a crusade to the Holy Land to be led by Philip VI. When Benedict 
was elected pope on 8 January 1335 the planning for the next wave of crusades had 
already reached an advanced stage and as shall be seen, his support of these projects 
was born out of pragmatism more than anything else. Once they had collapsed, 
Benedict was unwilling to devote the time and resources necessary for planning a new 
crusade to the Aegean. 
Details of the second phase of the anti-Turkish crusade had already been 
outlined by John XXII shortly before his death in December 1334. The pope had written 
to Robert of Naples urging him to participate in the forthcoming offensive, which was 
to involve transporting an army across the Mediterranean to fight the Turks on land 
and to deliver aid to Armenia. The force was to consist of a total of 800 men: 400 
provided by the papacy and Philip VI of France, 200 by the Hospitallers, 100 by Hugh IV 
of Cyprus and 100 by the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III, as well as galleys and 
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horse transports to be provided by the same powers, and also from Venice and 
Naples.1 Louis of Clermont, at his own request, was originally appointed to lead this 
expedition, but was replaced by Hugh Quiéret as the captain of the French galleys in 
October 1334.2 
 In March 1335, two months after his coronation, Benedict XII wrote to Robert 
of Naples reiterating the appeal made by John XXII in the previous May. He informed 
Robert that the representatives of the French, the Hospitallers and the Venetians had 
already met with the pope at the Curia to prepare for the new crusade, which was now 
considered as a solely maritime operation against the Turks in the Aegean: 
 
Having heard, not without great bitterness of heart, about the terrible 
oppression which the infidel Turks are striving to inflict, as they have 
hitherto inflicted, on the Christians of parts of Romania, we and the envoys 
of our most beloved son in Christ, Philip, illustrious King of France, as well 
as the members of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem and the 
ambassadors of these beloved sons .. of the doge and the Republic of 
Venice, presently appointed to the Apostolic See, have arranged that 
certain galleys be sent for the defence of those Christians and the 
repression of the aforesaid Turks; under certain ways and means, that has 
been arranged for this year, as it was done for the previous year.3 
 
The interest shown in the project from the rulers of France, Venice and the 
Hospitallers, coupled with the recent success of the 1334 campaign, meant that the 
second wave of the anti-Turkish league had a realistic chance of materialising and thus 
dealing another blow to the Turks of the Aegean. Even if Benedict was not as 
enthusiastic about this crusade as John XXII had been, it would have been 
                                                        
1 The exact numbers of ships are: sixteen horse transports from Philip VI, four horse transports and six 
galleys from Hugh of Cyprus, four horse transports and four galleys from Robert of Naples, ten galleys 
from Venice, six galleys from the Hospitallers, and six galleys from Andronikos III: JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 
5485 (19 May, 1334); also see nr. 5406, 5412. Housley, Avignon, 26; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 37-8. 
2 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5485. According to a letter of Marino Sanudo, King Philip had cancelled Louis’s 
appointment because he required his services for the Holy Land crusade, which is perhaps a reflection of 
the king’s priorities: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 809 (letter 7); Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 5. 
3 BXII France, nr. 28, p. 15; AE, xxv. nr. 29, p. 31; Housley, Avignon, 28; Giunta, ‘Benedetto XII’, 217-8. 
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counterproductive for him to cancel the project at this stage, considering the 
propitious signs coming from other rulers of Europe and the East.4 
To demonstrate his support for this crusade, Benedict ordered the construction 
of four papal galleys in Marseille during April,5  supplemented by five galleys hired by 
Philip VI in Marseille and Nice.6 The galleys were to set out at mid May and serve for 5 
months at a total cost of 11,500 florins, which was an affordable sum considering that 
John XXII had left the papal Camera with a surplus of around 750,000 florins.7 Contrary 
to what Jenkins has written, this fleet was to be used to combat the Turks in Aegean 
and was not intended to travel to the Holy Land as part of the crusade being organised 
by the French king.8 The next month Benedict issued indulgences to the new captain-
general of the French galleys Hugh Quiéret and to those who were to accompany him 
on the expedition.9 The bulls stipulated that Hugh and his followers would receive 
indulgences in articulo mortis for fighting against the Turks in Romania providing that 
they were contrite of heart and had made oral confession. The same participants were 
                                                        
4 Contrary to what Geanakoplos has claimed, there is no evidence to suggest that in 1335, the Greek 
emperor Andronikos III had consented to help the general passage to the Holy Land being organised by 
the papacy and the French Crown: ‘In 1335, in order to demonstrate his good will and at the same time 
to not loose the possibility of future western help, Andronicus III consented to participate in a new 
crusade to recover the Holy Land, being organised under the leadership of the new pope Benedict XII 
and Philip VI, king of France’. Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 53. The only reference the author provides is 
to: Runciman, History of the Crusades, iii. 440. This only concerns the sincerity of King Philip’s crusading 
motivations and not the supposed promise made by Andronikos to help the Holy Land crusade. 
According to Nikephoros Gregoras, Andronikos III did arm 20 ships in 1335-6, but these were almost 
certainly designated for anti-Turkish operations and not for a Holy Land crusade: Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 
524-5; Housley, Avignon, 28, n. 98. Also see above, ch. 4, pp. 154-5. 
5 BXII France, nr. 28, 40, 54; BXII Communes, i. nr. 2467. 
6 A letter from Philip VI to the shipbuilders of Marseille and Nice commissioning the construction of the 
galleys is printed in A. Jal, Archéologie navale, 2 vols (Paris, 1840), ii. 326-33. The fleet was to be 
dispatched apud Rodum sive partes ultra marinis (p. 327). Also see Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 6; Delaville 
le Roulx, France, i. 101. 
7 BXII France, nr. 40 (6,900 florins), 54 (4,600 florins). For papal finances at the death of John XXII, see 
Housley, Italian Crusades, 251; Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 12, pp. 61-3. 
8 H. Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII: 1334-1342 (University of Pennsylvania, PhD 
thesis, 1933), 24. The sources relating to the construction and hire of the fleet only suggest that the fleet 
would be used to fight the Turks in Romania: BXII France, nr. 40, 54; Jal, Archéologie navale, ii. 326-33. 
The correct sequence and destination of these passagia is given by Housley, Avignon, 28. 
9
 Hugh had replaced Louis of Clermont as the captain-general of the French galleys in the previous year: 
Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 809 (letter 7); Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 5. He was the lord of Tours in Vimeu, an 
adviser of the king, and seneschal of Beaucaire and Nimes. The king gave him, in reward for his role 
during the crusade preparations four hundred pounds pension in 1335, and in 1339 this private income 
was allocated on the city and fortress of Hélicourt. Hugh died in 1340 from the wounds received in a 
naval fight against the English: Delaville le Roulx, France, i. 101, n. 1. 
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also granted permission to celebrate divine offices in regions placed under interdict.10 
Although these actions seem to contradict the theory that Benedict was disinterested 
in an Aegean crusade, it must be remembered that the pope was still only enforcing 
the plans originally put in place by John XXII for a second wave of the anti-Turkish 
league.  
Benedict XII also lent support to John XXII’s other crusade plan: the general 
passage being organized by Philip VI to the Holy Land. In January 1335, the pope 
confirmed his predecessor’s bulls relating to the crusade, including the continuation of 
the clerical tenth for the expedition.11 If William of Nangis is to be believed, in this year 
John of Cepoy was dispatched by the French king to the Aegean to secure provisioning 
and reconnoitre the route for the forthcoming passage during which he apparently 
gained some noteworthy victories over the Turks.12 Again, it is not surprising that 
Benedict agreed to support this crusade: the plans had already been drawn up by John 
XXII and King Phillip; the Turks were on the back foot in Romania; and, more 
importantly, a crusade to the Holy Land could be used by the pope as a means of 
distracting the Christian rulers from their quarrels.13 This last point is crucial to 
understanding Benedict’s attitude to the Crusade at this time. As has been outlined, 
the second wave of the anti-Turkish league and the Holy Land crusade together had 
already attracted the participation of the French, Venetians and Hospitallers. To add to 
this, the pope had also made attempts to persuade Robert of Naples to join the 
crusade. Furthermore, it is possible that these crusades were considered by Benedict as 
                                                        
10
 The bulls issuing the indulgences are almost word-for-word copies of those issued to John of Cepoy in 
1334: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 119, ff. 132-3, ep. 343-8 (esp. ep. 343-4, 347). 
Summaries in BXII Communes, i. nr. 2247-50, 2253. The letters do not specify which regions had been 
placed under interdict. These may have been Milan, parts of the empire and the Catalan duchy of 
Athens. The latter, according to Setton, had been placed under interdict before 1347, but no reference 
is provided: Setton, Domination, 48. The Company had certainly been excommunicated by that time, but 
the bulls of excommunication make no mention of interdict. John of Cepoy was also granted permission 
to celebrate divine offices in places under interdict in 1334, but the document does not state who this 
referred to in particular. The Catalans had not yet been excommunicated by this time: Registra 
Vaticana, reg. 107, f. 262v, ep. 839; summary in JXXII Communes, xiii. nr. 63173. For more on the 
interdict, see P.D. Clarke, The Interdict in the Thirteenth Century: A Question of Collective Guilt (Oxford, 
2007), 130-68, esp. 138. 
11
 BXII Communes, i. nr. 2453, 2466, 2469; BXII France, nr. 19, 66. Also see Jenkins, Papal Efforts for 
Peace, 23. 
12 William of Nangis, ii. 145; Delaville le Roulx, France, i. 101. It is possible that Nangis was only 
recounting the victories of the 1334 anti-Turkish league, mistakenly dated to 1335: Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 
37. 
13 Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 23-5; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 45. 
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a way of encouraging enemies of the Church, such as Louis of Bavaria and the Visconti 
of Milan, to reconcile themselves to the new Pope.14 Matthew Visconti had, after all, 
promised to go on crusade in 1321 and Louis of Bavaria included the promise of 
crusade participation in a peace proposal offered to the pope in October 1336.15 When 
these factors are considered, it is not surprising that Benedict made initial efforts to 
support the crusades of John XXII, even if he was to scrap them in the following year. 
 
 
5.1.2. Crusade planning in 1335-1336: diversion and subsequent abandonment 
From a letter of April 1335, it is learned that the French fleet under the command of 
Hugh Quiéret was still on course to be dispatched to Rhodes and other areas of 
Romania.16 However, after this date there is no mention in the sources that these 
French galleys, or the four papal galleys commissioned in Marseille, ever left the French 
ports for the Aegean.17 It is almost certainly the case that the fleet did not embark for 
the East, as it is known that in early 1336 the crusade fleet commanded by Hugh 
Quiéret still lay at anchor in Marseille. At this time Philip VI revealed his true intentions 
for the dormant fleet by commanding Hugh Quiéret to sail to the English Channel to 
pre-empt hostility there.18 Philip had taken the decision to help the Scottish against the 
English in the previous year and his decision to divert the crusade fleet was probably 
taken in the winter of 1335-6.19 By prioritising the war against the English over any 
crusade, Philip VI had effectively put paid to any hopes of a second wave of the anti-
Turkish league sailing to the Aegean. 
                                                        
14 This conformed with the conciliatory attitude adopted by Benedict towards Louis and the Italian 
Ghibellines: Mollat, Popes, 110-19, 221-4. Also see Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 22-3. 
15 Housley, Italian Crusades, 80, 84-5. 
16 Jal, Archéologie navale, ii. 326-33, esp. 327. 
17 Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 131; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 7; Housley, Avignon, 28, n. 100. 
18 Roncière, Maritime Française, i. 389-91; E. Depréz, Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans: La 
papauté, la France et l'Angleterre (1328-1342) (Paris, 1902), 127; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 47; Zachariadou, 
TC, 34; Luttrell, ‘Crusade in the fourteenth century’, 134. For the contrasting priorities of the pope and 
King Philip with regards to the Franco-English conflict, see Mollat, Popes, 252. 
19
 Edward III of England had launched a naval expedition against Scotland in July 1335, Philip VI decided 
to intervene in this conflict soon after. In February 1336 Philip was in Beziers and shortly after, when at 
Marseille, he unveiled his fleet to be used against the English, which included those galleys which had 
been designated for the crusade: Roncière, Maritime Française, i. 389-91; Les Grandes Chroniques de 
France, v. 364. 
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 At this point, the preparations for Philip VI’s general passage to the Holy Land 
also began to founder, predictably on the grounds of finance and the emerging Anglo-
French war. For the papacy and the French Crown, this was a repeat of the same old 
story; King Philip required security with England and sufficient Church finance before 
fully committing to a general passage, but Benedict was unwilling to allow the crusade 
tenth to be used for purposes not directly linked with the crusade, especially when 
Europe was in such a state of disorder. Even if the French considered their own security 
as an integral prerequisite for the general passage, the papacy had shown that it was 
unwilling to grant Church tenths for the defence of France.20 In the previous April 
(1335) the pope had refused to grant Philip access to any crusade tenths levied on the 
Church outside of France,21 and in the following year all preparations for the general 
passage and the crusade tenths associated with it were cancelled.22 Echoing John XXII’s 
words in the early 1320s,23 Benedict informed the French king that the crusade had 
been cancelled because of the situation in Europe – England and Scotland were in 
perpetual conflict, Germany was at war, and Tuscany, Lombardy, Apulia and Sicily, 
were all in a state of anarchy.24  
 Throughout the greater part of 1335 Benedict had clearly supported the 
crusades originally planned by John XXII. This was partly because the processes had 
already been set in motion by the previous pope and also because Benedict realised 
that a successful crusade would help maintain peace within Christendom – especially 
by diverting French attention from the Anglo-Scottish conflict. It seems that Philip VI’s 
decision to help the Scottish against the English in late 1335 and his diversion of Hugh 
Quiéret’s crusade fleet to the English Channel put an end to this. It is probably because 
of these factors that the pope decided to cancel the Holy Land crusade. After this point, 
                                                        
20 For this in general see Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 5-25, 34-5. 
21 BXII France, i. nr. 44; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 44, n. 4. 
22 The letters informing Philip of the cancellation of the crusade were dispatched from Avignon on 13 
March 1336: BXII Autres, 786; CPR, ii. 560 (also published in Depréz, Préliminaires, 410-13). In 
November-December 1336 the collection of the crusade tenth was cancelled and it was decreed that 
the proceeds be restored to the Church: BXII France, nr. 240, 251, 280; BXII Communes, 3954-5, 3998-9, 
5139-40 (January 1337); vol. ii. nr. 6302 (June 1338). Also see Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 23-5; 
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as Tyerman has suggested, the Crusade was considered by Benedict as separate from 
attempts to gain peace in the West and consequently all plans for it were shelved.25  
 Benedict XII’s attitude towards the Crusade was also indicative of his personal 
priorities, which lay in internal Church reform and the eradication of heresy, rather 
than international diplomacy and the defence of Christendom from the infidel which 
had been skilfully pursued by John XXII. Benedict, named Jacques Fournier before his 
coronation, was an ascetic Cistercian and renowned inquisitor. During his time as 
Bishop of Pamiers, he had ardently pursued Waldensian, Catharist and Albigensian 
heretics, presiding over his court of justice for no less than three hundred and seventy 
days between 1318 and 1325. He earned the respect of John XXII and was placed in 
charge of the appeals of the Inquisition at Avignon from 1330-4. When elected pope, 
he turned his attention to reforming the religious orders and implementing a strict 
discipline within the Church.26 Benedict XII’s priorities therefore contrasted to those of 
John XXII and Clement VI. His austere attitude, coupled with the problems affecting the 
crusade plans in 1335-6 provide another reason for why those designs were dropped 
and why a new crusade was not fostered during his pontificate. 
 
 
5.1.3. Benedict XII’s policies in the Eastern Mediterranean 
The collapse of the crusade plans of 1335-6 did not mark the end of joint Christian 
resistance against the Turks in the Aegean, or the requests for papal support in the 
East, but Benedict’s policy was almost always driven by direct appeals from the Latins 
overseas and often lacked a degree of continuity. In some senses, this was not 
dissimilar to John XXII, whose eastern policy had also been largely formulated after the 
initiative others, but in contrast to his predecessor, Benedict XI did not go to great 
lengths to support the defence of those resident in the Aegean against the Turks. 
Instead, when he did take action, this usually reflected his concern over false doctrine, 
such as his dealings with the Armenians, the Catalans and the Byzantines. 
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Consequently, the shift in the impetus of planning for the crusade swung further 
towards the rulers of the East and the maritime republics of Europe.  
 Papal policy towards Cyprus was often driven by the rulers of the island, thus 
Benedict XII took his cue from King Hugh IV of Cyprus on many occasions. This was the 
case in 1336, when the pope was willing to oblige when Hugh called for the cessation 
of preaching for the Holy Land crusade in his kingdom on the basis that it would incite 
the Muslims on the Anatolian mainland.27 The Cypriot prelates were informed that 
preaching for the general passage was prohibited and could only recommence once the 
crusade was ready.28 The fact that the Holy Land crusade did not have the support of 
the rulers in the East may also provide another explanation for why it was cancelled in 
1336. This event also highlights the priorities of the Cypriot rulers, who were busy 
penning the Turks in on the nearby mainland of Anatolia, probably from the emirates 
of Hamid and Karaman, and did not have the inclination to dedicate resources for a 
Holy Land crusade. In 1338, the pope formally recognised the efforts of King Hugh and 
wrote a letter congratulating him on a victory over the Turks. Despite this action, there 
is no evidence to suggest that Benedict ever took measures to support the Cypriots in 
this regard.29  
 Unlike Cyprus, Armenia did benefit from some papal support during the 
pontificate of Benedict XII. In October 1335, in response to King Leo of Armenia’s 
repeated appeals for aid, the pope granted the king a plenary indulgence to cover all 
the occasions where he had fought against Muslims.30 The next year, in May 1336, the 
pope went one step further and issued plenary indulgences to all the Christian faithful, 
from Sicily, Cyprus and the Aegean islands, who would fight for the Armenians or send 
soldiers and money for their aid against the Muslims, but, as was the case in Cyprus, 
the decisions made in Avignon regarding Armenia appear to have been driven by the 
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requests of King Leo, rather than by any foresight on behalf of the pope.31 As Housley 
has convincingly stated, the pope adopted more of a reactionary approach to Armenia, 
rather than forming any clearly defined policy.32 This is illustrated in 1341 where, after 
hearing of widespread errors within the Armenian Church, Benedict refused to send aid 
to the kingdom until orthodoxy was restored.33 
 The indulgences Benedict issued in Cyprus, Armenia and the Aegean in 1336 are 
also informative of where the pope’s priorities lay. Under close inspection, the papal 
bulls granting the indulgences specifically state that full remission of sins was to be 
granted to those fighting against the forces of the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, in and 
around Armenia. It is known that the Cypriots were actively fighting the Turks in the 
region at this time, but the indulgences make no allowance for those fighting anyone 
other than the Mamluks. Since 1334 there had been no indulgence issued to those 
fighting the Turks in the Aegean, and as Benedict did not issue any during his 
pontificate he was potentially diverting men and resources from fighting the Turks in 
the Aegean to fighting the Mamluks further east. Thus Benedict risked indirectly 
discouraging military participation in the Aegean theatre, regardless of whether this 
was his intention or not.34 
 A more explicit example of how papal policy under Benedict XII hindered the 
Aegean crusades is given by the restriction on finances made available to the 
Hospitallers for their Aegean activities. As described in earlier chapters, the Order had 
amassed massive debts during its seizure of Rhodes. This debt was gradually alleviated 
with the help of John XXII, and in 1335 the Hospitallers became solvent once again, but 
despite this, the Order continued to make payments to the Florentine banking houses 
of the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciajuoli.35 Until at least 1339 these houses also acted as the 
official bankers to the papacy and the pope was therefore unwilling to allow the Order 
to expend the credit it had amassed on a prolonged campaign against the Turks, 
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especially considering the difficulties experienced by these banking houses at the 
time.36 Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that Benedict refused to help finance a 
joint Venetian-Hospitaller fleet for the Aegean in May 1336. According to the reports of 
the Venetian Senate, Hospitaller and Venetian ambassadors had been unable to obtain 
aid from the pope for use against the Turks. The Venetians were unable to sustain the 
expenses alone, but with the help of the Hospitallers it was agreed that preparations 
for a fleet should continue.37 Apparently the Venetian and Rhodian ships had 
assembled at Crete in the summer of 1336, but after failing to receive support from the 
West, they undertook no concerted action in the Aegean.38 
 With regards to papal policy in Frankish Greece, Benedict XII maintained 
throughout his pontificate the same aggressive strategy towards the Catalans of Athens 
as that adopted by his predecessor. On the one hand this shows that Benedict was not 
completely disinterested in the defence of Frankish Greece and the Aegean, but on the 
other hand it suggests that the pope’s priorities lay in supporting Walter of Brienne’s 
claim to the duchy of Athens and opposing the Catalan Company, rather than 
defending the region from the Turks. In December 1335, Benedict permitted the 
archbishop of Patras to excommunicate the Catalans.39 This came after they had failed 
to comply with the papal demand, issued by John XXII in the previous year, that the 
Company restore Athens to Walter of Brienne or suffer ecclesiastical censure.40 In the 
following years, the pope continued to support the dynastic ambitions of Walter 
despite the refusal of Venice to participate in any Brienne expedition to the Morea.41 
This is illustrated, in 1339, when Benedict summoned Archbishop Isnard of Thebes to 
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Avignon to stand trial for consorting with Catalans and falsely relaxing their ban of 
excommunication.42 This action seems to have been initiated by a letter to the pope 
from Walter Brienne requesting that Isnard be denounced for failing to enforce the 
previous excommunication on the Company.43 
 There is evidence that during these years, and as a result of Walter of Brienne’s 
continued preparations to launch an expedition to the Morea, the Catalan Company 
called on Umur of Aydin to provide them with military assistance against a Brienne-led 
invasion.44 Enveri, the source for this alliance, goes into some detail. Umur, after 
receiving a plea of help from the Catalan commander and with the help of Ehad beg,45 
sailed with a force of 110 vessels to Athens. However, once he had arrived at the city, 
the Catalan commanders informed Umur that Walter of Brienne had abandoned his 
attack after he had learned of the Turkish reinforcements. Enraged by this news, the 
emir raided the surrounding country belonging to the Brienne and returned to 
Smyrna.46 Considering this evidence, and the Catalan record of allying with the Turks in 
the past, it is surprising to learn that Benedict XII did not make much of the Catalan-
Turkish alliance in his bulls ordering their excommunication. In one letter, that of 1339 
instructing Isnard return to Avignon, the pope did accuse the Catalans of forging a 
partnership with the ‘schismatics, Turks and other enemies of the Christian faith’,47 but 
this accusation is almost a word-for-word copy of that used by John XXII in a bull issued 
in 1334, which in turn, was a small comment in the context of a far longer letter, and 
not overly dissimilar from the rhetoric used in letters condemning the Catalans dating 
back to 1318.48 So it seems that the pope was only repeating and not elaborating on 
the accusations made by John XXII.  
 In 1341, Benedict eventually relaxed his policy towards the Catalan Company 
after it became clear that Walter of Brienne was going to be unsuccessful in recovering 
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his kingdom and that peace with the Catalans was integral for the protection of the 
Latins of Greece. On 10 February, after hearing that the Catalans wished to seek 
reconciliation with Rome, Benedict instructed them to send their officials to Avignon, 
where they would be met with ‘willingness and favour’.49 Benedict’s insistence on the 
orthodoxy of the Armenians, the excommunication of the Catalans and eventual 
eagerness for them to return to the fold of Rome, was perhaps a reflection of his 
priorities – he was, after all, more concerned with Church reform than fighting the 
infidel and because of this, dealing with the schismatic Catalans in the Morea took 
precedence over the Turks.  
 Benedict XII’s desire to combat false doctrine over the infidel is also acutely 
apparent in his policy towards the Byzantines. In 1337 Emperor Andronikos III 
dispatched the Venetian ambassador Stephen Dandolo, followed by the Calabrian 
monk, Barlaam, in 1339, to the papal Curia to reopen discussions of Church Union. 
Their mission was twofold: to convince the pope to hold a general council to discuss 
the filioque question, and to secure aid for the recovery of the Byzantine provinces of 
Asia Minor which had been captured by the Turks.50 With regards to the latter 
objective, Barlaam insisted that the West should send aid to the East, as the Turks were 
not just harming the Greeks, but also the Armenians, Cypriots and Rhodians, who were 
all subjects of the pope. He also informed Benedict that many Greeks in Asia Minor, 
who had been forced to adopt the Islamic faith, would return to Christianity once their 
cities were recovered. Moreover, the defence of the East from the Turks would be 
made far easier with Greek support.51 In short, Barlaam proposed that if the West 
would agree to help the Christians of the East before Union was implemented, then 
Greek minds would be won over, thus making Church Union more palatable for the 
Greek people. This, combined with the ruling of a general council to accept Union, but 
only after the aid had been sent to the East, would provide the best possible way of 
achieving Union. Barlaam also offered another less effective strategy for Union in case 
the first proposals were rejected: that the king of France send aid to the places named; 
that all Greek slaves owned by Latins be freed and the slave trade be stopped; and that 
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the pope should grant the crusade indulgence to all those fighting for the Greeks, 
helping materially, or who died in war against the Turks.52 This might win the trust of 
the Greek people, who would then be more inclined to accept Union even without a 
general council.53  
 All of these proposals were declined by the pope and the cardinals at the Curia. 
They stated that eastern prelates should be sent to the West for instruction, not 
discussion, as the filioque (an article of faith that had already been defined) could not 
be called into question, regardless of Byzantine problems with the Turks.54 This was 
obviously unacceptable to the Greeks and the negotiations crumbled. The papal 
decision was not altogether surprising, nor out of character for this period. However, 
these discussions are especially important to this study because they placed far more 
emphasis on the necessity for aid against the Turks as a prerequisite for Union than in 
previous negotiations. In fact, every proposal was conditional to the immediate 
consignment of help for Andronikos III and therefore overlooked the specific 
theological problems which had hindered negotiations in the past.55 According to 
Geanakoplos, this reflected the papal attitude towards the Greeks at this time: ‘the 
west would not really begin to interest itself in the fate of the east until the Turks had 
approached so close as to begin to threaten the western European territories’.56 This 
may be true to some extent, but it would seem that, considering the active anti-Turkish 
policies of Popes John XXII and Clement VI, Geanakoplos’s remark is more applicable to 
the pontificate of Benedict XII than to the West as a whole during this time: Benedict’s 
refusal to implement a crusade against the Turks at the specific request of the 
Byzantines because of theological differences is, after all, illustrative of where his 
priorities lay. 
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 This discussion of Benedict XII’s eastern policy has confirmed a number of 
things. The pope was made aware of the Turkish attacks in Asia Minor by the appeals of 
the Armenians, Cypriots, Hospitallers and Byzantines, and when he did act, it was 
usually on the recommendation of those rulers. On the rare occasions when the Curia 
did provide aid, such as to Armenia in the mid 1330s, it took the form of a stop-gap 
measure and lacked any continuity. For various reasons, largely related to his 
preoccupation in ensuring the orthodoxy of the Christians of the East, support was not 
often forthcoming. The Turks were, in particular, low on his agenda – he made no 
effort to support the anti-Turkish cause in the East and he possibly weakened it by 
granting indulgences to those fighting the Mamluks in south-eastern Anatolia, but not 
against the Turks elsewhere. More importantly, the pope was asked, but refused, to 
help fund a Venetian-Hospitaller fleet for the defence of the Aegean. 
 
 
5.1.4. The further shift of crusade impetus to the East 
The lack of papal support did not deter the Latins in the East from continuing to defend 
their lands and commercial interests from the expanding Turkish emirates. Hugh of 
Cyprus, in particular, was actively resisting the Turks for some time. According to a 
sixteenth-century continuation of the Liber Pontificalis, King Hugh sent twelve galleys 
and other armed ships against the Turks in August 1336, which caused much damage 
and killed many, and again, in July 1337, he sent another fleet of 21 galleys and other 
vessels, which managed to kill a Turkish captain amongst others.57 Finally, another 
victory (or possibly the same one) is reported in a letter of February 1338 sent by 
Benedict XII to the king. Here the pope congratulates Hugh over a ‘glorious victory 
against the Turks, the blasphemers of the Christian name’ and the ‘degenerate 
Christians and enemies of the Catholic faith’, who had been assisting the them.58 The 
pope may have been responding to news of one of the victories listed in the Liber 
Pontificalis, but the scant details on the battle mentioned in the letter to Hugh render 
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this inconclusive. Nevertheless, it is clear that the king was engaged in fighting the 
Anatolian Turks throughout the later 1330s. He was evidently successful as the travel 
writer Ludolf of Sudheim reported that by 1341 many of the Turkish coastal towns of 
southern Asia Minor paid tribute to him.59 As Coureas has suggested, Hugh’s request 
that the preaching for the crusade to the Holy Land be cancelled in 1336 may have 
been made so that he could concentrate his forces on the more pressing matter of the 
Turks from the nearby Anatolian emirates.60 
 In 1341, because of the increasing threat from the Turks and the lack of support 
from Avignon, Hugh took the initiative of dispatching Lambertino Baldwin della Cecca, 
the bishop of Limassol, to Rhodes and Venice. His mission was to urge the grand master 
and the doge to add their voices to Hugh’s in a joint appeal to the pope for help in 
stopping the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean: 
  
 He [Hugh] clearly indicates to the lord pope the state of Christianity in 
overseas lands and the grave danger of Christianity itself, which on 
account of the power and hostility of the Turks, has grown so much and 
been increased because the said Turks are destroying, looting, despoiling 
and molesting all surrounding lands and the people living in them and 
thus, unless provision can be made for support by our lord pope and 
other faithful, standing firm everywhere, whom the said matter affects, 
all the said lands, being shortly occupied by the said Turks, will be 
destroyed and lost and all Christians dwelling in those same lands 
destroyed; beseeching the said lord our pope that it may please him to 
make provision, in consideration of his duty, for suitable support 
concerning the aforesaid lands, especially since he may look to be 
involved in such support, both for his own part and as the head of the 
whole of Christendom.61 
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The Cypriot king voiced his belief that if the Hospitallers and Venetians should ‘jointly 
with our lord the king himself’ entreat the pope over the matter of the Turks, then he 
would ‘be more quickly and readily urged on’ and more willing to give support ‘on the 
entreaty of three and of many than of one alone’.62 It is also learned that the 
Hospitallers had already sent a message concerning the Turkish problem to the pope, 
and that they would repeat the appeal again after the request from the Cypriot king. 
This need for a combined appeal to Avignon is again evidence of the unwillingness of 
Curia to help defend the East from the growing menace of the Turks. On 22 November 
1341, the Venetian Senate made a favourable reply, albeit in a vague manner, to 
Hugh’s request:  
 
[B]ecause the illustrious lord king desires to foreknow our intention, we 
are declaring it [...] and it can be clear to all that we have been and are 
ready, for the reverence of God and the Holy Mother Church and her 
holy faith, with support of the Christians forthcoming, for our part to 
offer and do to good effect that which will be right and appropriate in 
support of so holy an undertaking and service, as true faithful servants 
and guardians of the holy Christian faith and just as we have always been 
accustomed to do.63  
 
Unfortunately Hugh of Cyprus’s appeal to the pope came too late, and in April 1342, 
before any action could be taken, Benedict XII died. Benedict’s death means that his 
response to Lambertino’s embassy is unknown, or even whether the embassy had 
reached the Curia in time. All that is known is that the unwillingness of the pope to 
contribute to any concerted effort to help defend the Latins of the eastern 
Mediterranean had resulted in the Cypriot king taking the initiative for himself. In a 
sense, this was not dissimilar to the formation of the 1334 anti-Turkish league, where 
Venice negotiated with Pope John XXII for many years before he committed to the 
expedition. Unlike John, who supported other Latin lords in Romania against the Turks, 
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Benedict XII did not implement an alternative strategy for combating them in the 
Aegean region or elsewhere. The nearest Benedict came to action was to offer aid to 
Armenia and support to some of the Latins in the Morea – neither offer was made on 
the grounds of defending the region from Turkish attack. It will never be known if 
Benedict planned to send aid to the East, in response to the Cypriot, Venetian and 
Hospitaller requests, but it seems unlikely that he would have, judging by his previous 
policies. It was not until a new Pope, Clement VI, was elected at Avignon in May 1342, 
that Hugh’s plan was realised.  The formation of this new anti-Turkish naval league in 
the Aegean would eventually form the first wave of the Crusade of Smyrna. 
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5.2. Venice and the Turks, 1334-1342 
 
5.2.1. Continuation of the anti-Turkish league 
The Latin victory at Adramyttion in the autumn of 1334 did not limit Turkish aggression 
in the Aegean for long. In fact the Turkish raiding parties appear to have increased their 
activities after the death of Pope John XXII.64 In response to this, the Venetian Senate 
agreed to dispatch ten galleys to the Gulf and Romania in November 1334, six of which 
were to be used by the league.65 In the following January, the Serenissima also decided 
to send an embassy to Benedict XII urging him to continue John XXII’s support of the 
union, and to renew contact with the king of France if necessary.66 In June 1335 the 
situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the Senate decided to issue a new 
decree prohibiting the import of grain from Turkish territories. This was followed in 
1337 by an unsuccessful petition at the Curia to reopen the prohibited Mamluk trade 
markets to Venetian merchants.67 Over the following years galleys were dispatched to 
the Aegean and castles were re-fortified in the region to help protect the Venetian 
colonies from Turkish attack.68 In April 1335 it is reported that the captain of the 
league, was permitted to arm some small vessels in Negroponte and in February of the 
next year he was to transfer one galley to Crete.69 The concern caused by the Turks to 
the Venetian authorities in the Aegean even gave the Serenissima reason to continue 
their pact with the Catalans of Athens in an effort to counterbalance the threat from 
the Turks.70 The agreement with the Catalans was used by the doge to justify his refusal 
                                                        
64 For example: Andrea Dandolo, 372. 
65 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 16, nr. 52, pp. 154-5; Zachariadou, TC, 33, n. 126. 
66 Le deliberazioni, ii. bk. 16, nr. 726, p. 389 (19 January); ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 
16, nr. 54, pp. 155-6, bk. 17, nr. 1, p. 159; Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 128. 
67 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 13; summary in ‘Thespismata tês 
Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 6, p. 160; Zachariadou, TC, 34. In 1337 Venice petitioned the pope 
for permission to trade in non-war materials with the Mamluks: The Records of the Venetian Senate on 
Disk, 1335-1400, ed. B. Kohl (New York, 2001), nr. 179; Stantchev, Embargo, 242; Ashtor, Levant Trade, 
66; Idem, ‘Observations on Venetian trade in the Levant in the XIVth Century’, Journal of European 
Economic History 5 (1976), 533-86, at 538; Lane, Venice, 130-1. 
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  TR, i. nr. 65 (15 February 1336), nr. 73 (12 July 1337). 
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 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 4, p. 160 (8 April 1335); TR, i. nr. 65 (15 February 
1336); Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 129. 
70 On 26 March the Senate instructed the baillie of Negroponte to renew the treaty with the Catalans: 
TR, i. nr. 58. Later that year, the Senate also instructed the lord of Kythera to recompense the Catalans 
for damages inflicted by his people on Catalan ships: TR, i. nr. 62 (17 October), 103 (28 March 1340).  
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to support Walter of Brienne against the Company in 1335.71 In two Venetian Senate 
hearings concerning the matter it is reported that the Senate could not agree to 
Walter’s request because of the state of Romania, the threat of the Turks and the 
needs of Venetian trade in the region.72 
  
 
5.2.2. Peace with the Turks, 1337-1339 
By 1335 the Venetian fleet in the Aegean had seen almost continuous action for two 
years; many of the participants had fought against the Turks, and some had helped 
suppress the rebellion on Crete. During 1333-4, when the conflict was at its greatest 
and the Venetian galleys joined those of the league, the Republic’s trade in Romania 
had undoubtedly been disrupted. In addition to this, the intense conflict would have 
prevented many galleys from subsidising their expense by partaking in small-scale 
trade. In fact measures had been taken by John XXII in 1334 to prevent the galleys of 
the league from carrying merchandise, as this would slow their progress.73 With this in 
mind, it is reasonable to assume that the continued maintenance of a large anti-Turkish 
fleet in the Aegean was becoming a considerable financial burden on the Republic. 
Perhaps as a response to this, the Senate granted the captain of the league permission 
in 1335 to transport passengers within the Aegean, possibly to subsidise the expense of 
the galleys.74 Furthermore, in 1336 Venice issued new orders which specifically 
instructed the captain of the league to capture as many Turkish ships as possible.75 This 
order was probably issued to help alleviate the expense of maintaining the galleys 
through the increase of prize money gained from the captured Turkish vessels and their 
cargoes.76  
                                                        
71 See above, pp. 166-7. 
72 DOC, nr. 162-3 (both dated 4 November 1335). 
73 See above, ch. 4, p. 150. 
74 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 1, p. 159 (6 March 1335); Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 
129. On 30 August 1335 Nicholas Contarini and his family were granted permission to travel from Crete 
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75 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 21, p. 168. 
76 Naval forces were often expected to partially pay for themselves through the capture of enemy ships: 
J.F. Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in 
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 These financial constraints coupled with the discouraging signs coming from 
Avignon led the Serenissima to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Turks. 
Similarly, the Turks of Aydin and Menteshe, some of whom were severely weakened by 
the operations of the league in 1334, also wished to come to terms with Venice.77 
Consequently in 1337, at a time when the Venetians had been refused permission by 
the pope to trade with Mamluk Egypt,78 Giovanni Sanudo, the Duke of Crete, confirmed 
two peace treaties with the Turks: one with Emir Ibrahim of Menteshe, the other with 
Emir Hizir of Aydin.79 From the treaty with Ibrahim, it is apparent that relations 
between Menteshe and the Venetians were not especially fractious before 1337. The 
two sides were trading in late 1334,80 and although the Senate had introduced a ban on 
trade with the Turks in 1335, the clauses of the Menteshe treaty suggest that the 
Venetian merchants were mostly concerned with amending their trading rights in the 
emirate. Two clauses clearly expressed this. The first stipulated that the capacity of the 
shinik, a local measure used by some of the Turkish emirates for cereals, should be 
restored to its previous status.81 The second was that the Turks cease the construction 
of dwellings in an area allocated to the Venetians in the emirate.82 Moreover, Ibrahim 
promised to abolish the appalto tax,83 on all merchandise except wine.84 From the 
agreement it is also apparent that Ibrahim was more concerned about the threat posed 
by the neighbouring emirate of Aydin rather than from the Venetians. He clearly knew 
that parallel negotiations had been undertaken between the duke of Crete and Hizir of 
Aydin at this time.85 Ibrahim, therefore included a final clause in the Menteshe treaty 
stipulating that Giovanni Sanudo was to remain at peace with his emirate at all times, 
and was not to form an alliance with his enemies (i.e. Aydin) or aid them in any way.86  
                                                        
77 Zachariadou, TC, 35. 
78 See above, p. 174, n. 67. 
79 The treaties are studied in detail by Zachariadou, TC, 35-7, full text at 190-200 (doc. 2-3). 
80 Le deliberazioni (Senato), ii. bk. 16, nr. 697, p. 379-80; Zachariadou, TC, 33, n. 125. 
81 Zachariadou, TC, 35, 146, text at 198 (doc. 3), clause nr. 23. 
82 Ibid., 35, text at 197 (doc. 3), clause nr. 17. 
83 The appalto was a restriction imposed on merchandise in Menteshe and Aydin, similar to the gabella. 
According to Pegolotti the appalto and gabella were the same thing: Francesco Pegolotti, 56; 
Zachariadou, TC, 134. The appalto was not necessarily a monopoly: Fleet, European and Islamic Trade,  
109, n. 125. 
84 Zachariadou, TC, 198 (doc. 3), clause nr. 22; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 246. 
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 For example: Zachariadou, TC, 198-200 (doc. 3), clause nr. 24, 28. 
86 Ibid., 35, text at 200 (doc. 3), clause nr. 29. 
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 Unlike the agreement made with Menteshe, the treaty concluded between 
Giovanni Sanudo and Aydin, addressed to Hizir, but which also included Umur as a co-
recipient, was the first to be made between the two parties. This in itself is evidence 
that since the 1320s the Venetians of the Aegean had mostly been in conflict with 
Aydin and had not engaged in the same level of trade with the emirate, as they had 
done with Menteshe. The majority of the clauses of the treaty refer to settling the 
conditions necessary for commercial exchange, such as the fixing of customs duties, the 
establishment of a consul in Theologo and the granting of an area for Venetian 
merchants.87 As Zachariadou has shown, one clause in particular demonstrated the 
weak position of the rulers of Aydin as a result of the Latin offensives against them: this 
stated that Hizir, Umur and all of their other brothers should ‘not arm nor cause to 
arm, nor sail or cause to be sailed, nor put or cause to be put to sea, any of their ships 
or small boats or any of their vessels for the whole time during which this agreement 
will continue’.88 
 It has already been noted that, through their control of Chios, Phokaia and the 
Egyptian alum market, the Genoese had become the dominant merchants in the alum 
trade.89 This dominance stimulated the Venetians to search for alternative sources of 
alum and thus import the product without the use of Genoese intermediaries. Once 
these imports had arrived in Venice, the citizens had been careful to conserve them. 
The emirates of Menteshe and Aydin which possessed two of the primary maritime 
markets of the Aegean Sea – Altoluogo (Ephesos) and Palatia respectively – provided a 
clear opening to one of the most productive alum mines of the period, that of Kutahya, 
in the emirate of Germiyan.90 The majority of this alum at this time was transported 
from Kutahya to the ports of Altoluogo and Palatia, where it was then exported to the 
West.91 Therefore, the treaties of 1337 provided the Venetians with the perfect 
opportunity to extend their independence in the alum trade. This was reflected in the 
                                                        
87 Ibid., 36, text at 190-4 (doc. 2). 
88 Ibid., 36; text at 190 (doc. 2), clause nr. 3.  
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 See above, ch. 2, pp. 81-5; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 246. Alum shipments to Venice 
were not common enough to have been listed as a taxable commodity in 1334, this was changed in 
1388: Singer, Earliest Chemical Industry, 99. 
90 According to Pegolotti, Kutahya produced around 12,000 cantara of alum per year, compared to 
14,000 in Phokaia: Francesco Pegolotti, 367-70; Lopez & Raymond, Medieval Trade, 353-5. 
91 Francesco Pegolotti, 367-70; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 246. 
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clauses of both agreements where Giovanni Sanudo insisted that neither emirate 
would impose an appalto on the alum passing through its territories, from Kutahya to 
the ports of Altoluogo and Palatia. Menteshe, for its part, had not placed an appalto on 
alum in the past, but it was agreed that Emir Ibrahim could impose one, if the 
Venetians were unable to persuade Hizir to abolish the existing appalto on alum in 
Aydin.92 The duke of Crete was, however, successful in his dealings with Hizir and in 
that treaty the emir consented to abolish the appalto on alum and other food articles 
in his territories.93 Giovanni Sanudo had therefore succeeded in securing free trade on 
alum for Venetian merchants in both Aydin and Menteshe. This is an indicator of the 
strong position of Venice in comparison to the Turkish emirates at this stage and also 
reflects the priorities of the Republic which were to secure the best possible trade 
agreements with the Anatolian Turks, especially with regards to alum.  
 Although the Senate continued to dispatch galleys to defend Romania in the 
following years, it appears that the Venetians had achieved some degree of security in 
the region and were satisfied with the position which their merchants held in the trade 
markets of the Aegean and Anatolia.94  The evidence for this may be found in two 
decisions of the Venetian Senate in the summer and winter of 1338 which rejected a 
Genoese proposal to form a union, presumably against the Turks.95 The documents 
from the Venetian archives do not provide much information regarding this matter only 
that in August the Senate made a reply to an ambassador of Genoa which excused 
them ‘by reason of circumstances and business’ from  holding talks in a neutral place 
with a view to entering into a union.96 In December, the Senate ordered that the offer 
from the Genoese ambassador should again be refused, this time ‘in fine words, 
                                                        
92 Hizir could only impose the appalto on the alum transported from Kutahya to Palatia. The purchase of 
alum would remain free elsewhere in Menteshe. Ibrahim even promised to promote the transport of 
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Lopez, ‘Nuove luci sugli Italiani in estremo oriente’, 89, n. 16. 
179 
 
excusing ourselves from the making of a union’.97 The Serenissima’s refusal to 
negotiate with the Genoese was also a reflection of the contrasting fortunes of 
Genoese and Venetian traders in the Aegean at this time: after the treaties of 1337 the 
Venetian merchants enjoyed beneficial trade privileges in Menteshe and Aydin, and 
access to tax-free alum, whilst the Genoese were enjoying a far less prominent position 
in the Aegean since the loss of Chios in 1329, and the submission of Phokaia to the 
emperor.98 
 
 
5.2.3. Renewed conflict with the Turks and the reappearance of Umur of Aydin 
The security which the Venetians of the Aegean enjoyed following the agreements of 
1337 did not last for long. In the spring of 1339, after hearing that Venetian ships were 
becoming easy prey to pirates in Romania, the Senate instructed crews to take 
measures to defend themselves.99 In the same year, the Senate ordered 30 galleys to 
be sent to the East, with fifteen of them destined for the Aegean.100 Moreover, on 4 
March the Serenissima decided to call upon the Catalans of Athens for assistance in 
defending Negroponte, which appears to have been suffering most from the Turkish 
attacks. The Senate records report that the baillie of Negroponte was authorised to 
receive from the Catalans an amount of money for a fleet which would be used to 
defend the island.101 These sources do not name the Turks specifically as the cause of 
the trouble in Romania, but a selection of letters sent from the governors of 
Negroponte to Venice in the summer of 1339, and preserved in the Senate archives, do 
suggest that the Turks were primarily responsible for inflicting damage on the island 
and for the turmoil in the Aegean. In response, the Senate decided to send 100 men 
                                                        
97 Appendix III, nr. 6; Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 115 (17 
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and 300 lira di grossi to the island. Furthermore, the Senate gave the baillie of 
Negroponte permission to conclude an understanding with certain Turkish bands, 
because the Turks as a whole were too numerous to overcome.102 This was a similar 
tactic to that adopted by the lords of Negroponte in 1332 and provides a clear example 
of the sudden increase in Turkish raiding since the beginning of 1339.103 Evidently, the 
negotiations which the baillie of Negroponte opened with the Turks were fruitless, as in 
1340-1 the situation had worsened further. Around this time Umur apparently 
launched an attack on Niccolò Sanudo’s lands of the Archipelago, and also on the 
Catalan city of Thebes of Phthiotis (near the Pagasitic Gulf, north of Negroponte).104  
 The difficulties the Senate faced in identifying the different bands of Turks 
attacking its colonies also highlights a common problem experienced by the Latins in 
the Aegean in dealing with the Turks: the different emirates were often in conflict with 
one another and some emirs were willing to make agreements with Venetians only for 
their subordinates to break them. For example in the treaty of 1337, Giovanni Sanudo 
had formed a peace with Hizir, as Emir of Aydin, but the agreement had also included 
Umur, his younger brother and lord of Smyrna, as a co-signatory. Umur’s attack on 
Venetian territories in 1340-1 was thus in direct contravention of the treaty, but it is 
unclear as to whether Hizir was compliant in this. Likewise, the pirates attacking 
Negroponte in 1339 may have been under orders from Aydin, but the Venetian sources 
show that the Serenissima was at a loss as to where these Turks originated from. In fact 
they could have sailed from any of the other emirates of the north-eastern Asia Minor 
coast – Menteshe, Sarukhan or Karasi. The unpredictability in dealing with the Turks 
perhaps provides another reason for why Venice was forced to take military action 
against them and also why it had to utilise the crusade in order to defend itself. 
 The Turkish attacks and the failure of diplomacy persuaded the Serenissima to 
consider arming galleys in Crete for the revival of a league against the Turks in the 
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summer of 1340.105 Preparations began on the island but for financial reasons the 
Senate hesitated to take action and it prohibited any immediate attack on the Turks.106 
The following winter the Senate decided to entrust the rulers of Crete with the decision 
to assign ships to those who wished to fight the Turks, if they were willing, but the 
Cretan administration declined this offer.107 Although the Venetian authorities were 
still reluctant to take concerted action against the Turks at this time, some of the 
Venetians in the Aegean were being forced to resist them. As noted, Negroponte was 
bearing the brunt of the Turkish attacks and it continued to receive reinforcements 
from Crete and Venice: the duke of Crete sent soldiers to the island but these were 
apparently of poor quality, so the Senate ordered that 80 more soldiers be dispatched 
from Venice on the galleys destined for Romania, plus 2,000 ducats and military 
hardware.108 A papal document of May 1341 shows that Niccolò Sanudo, in reaction to 
continued attack on his territories, continued to resist the ‘perfidious Turks’ with ‘naval 
vessels and armed galleys’.109 By 1341, the Duke of Naxos had joined with the rulers of 
Negroponte, and in July, together with Bartolommeo Ghisi, Lord of one third of 
Negroponte, a petition was made to the doge for the purchase of one galley from 
Venice, to be used for the defence of that island.110  
 By now the defence of the Aegean was imposing a significant strain on the 
Republic’s resources and had even begun to affect its other policies overseas. In April 
1340, the Serenissima was forced to refuse a request from Edward III of England for a 
subsidy of 40 or more galleys because the fear of a Turkish armada of 230 sails 
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rendered it impossible for the Republic to concede any naval subsidy.111 The severity of 
the Turkish threat was also attested to in several other sources, which confirmed that 
the forces of Aydin had devastated all of Romania. The size of the Turkish armadas had 
increased to such an extent the Venetian government now began to fear the 
permanent loss of its eastern Mediterranean possessions. This is clearly evident in a 
decree of the Venetian Great Council, from 14 January 1341 which stated that: 
 
 
Since the island of Crete is among the best and most honourable 
possessions of our empire and, therefore, the empire has always been 
earnestly watchful for its defence and safeguarding, by providing assets 
and men; and if there is ever a time and need to take care of the 
safeguarding of that island, it is especially pressing now because of the 
Turks, whose power at sea has been greatly increased, with the result 
that they have destroyed all of the islands and districts of Romania and, 
not being able to make gains against the Christians elsewhere, they are 
threatening to come with an armada to the island of Crete and have 
already begun, and, unless provision is made for defence against these 
Turks, grave danger could threaten the island itself and may perhaps 
arise through action wrongly taken belatedly.112 
 
In order to raise the necessary money for the defence of Crete, the Great Council 
decided that a one percent duty tax should be imposed on all imports and exports, 
except cloth, to and from the island: 
 
[I]n order that money may be had on every appropriate occasion for the 
defence and safeguarding of the aforesaid island, let it be passed that all 
foreign merchants and foreign people can come in safety to the said 
island with whatsoever merchandise and articles brought from all parts, 
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except for cloth, paying one per cent on entry and, for merchandise 
which they have taken from the said island, another one per cent on 
departure; such money to be assigned for the expenses necessary for 
the defence and safeguarding of the said island from a surprise attack 
from the Turks, and in all other appropriate cases, as will seem fitting to 
be arranged for our empire.113 
 
But the Serenissima was not yet willing to commit to further action against the Turks. It 
has been shown previously that the Venetian Senate had replied sympathetically to 
Hugh IV of Cyprus’s request for a revival of an anti-Turkish force in November 1341, but 
in reality it hesitated to take any action. The reply to Hugh was in fact very vague; the 
Senate expressed grief for the suffering of the Latins at the hands of the Turks, and 
agreed that the Turks needed to be combated before their power grew out of hand, 
but the Venetian response stopped short at outlining any definite plan of action despite 
hinting at a willingness to participate in another offensive against the Turks.114 This 
ambiguous reply may seem strange considering the plight of the Venetians in the 
Aegean at this time, but it may be possible that the Republic did not wish to jeopardise 
the existing treaties they had with the emirs by attacking Turkish pirates. Nevertheless, 
by 1342 the attitude of the Serenissima had changed and it took steps to fortify 
Crete,115 to send aid to the archbishop of Patras,116 and to help the new Duke of Naxos, 
Januli Sanudo, by granting him license to import arms and naval materials.117 
Nevertheless, the Senate would wait until the beginning of 1343 until formerly 
committing itself to another league in the Aegean. 
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5.2.4. The growth in the power of Aydin 
Kantakouzenos claimed that by 1341 the Turks had managed to reduce many of the of 
the Aegean islands to tribute status and had devastated Thrace, Macedonia, Greece 
and the Peloponnese.118 Many others sources also attest to the supremacy of Aydin, 
which had now surpassed any of the Turkish emirates of the period. This is illustrated 
by the two western travel writers William of Boldensele and Ludolf of Sudheim, who 
travelled to the East between 1335-41. They both commented on the wealth and 
prosperity of Ephesos and its Turkish inhabitants, in contrast to the impoverished 
Christian minority who still resided there.119 Another eyewitness, Matthew, Archbishop 
of Ephesos, commented on the large size of Smyrna, which he said provided the ideal 
refuge for pirates.120 In economic terms Aydin was booming at this time; coins were 
struck at Ephesos for the first time in a thousand years,121 and the emirate regularly 
featured in the Italian trading manual of Francesco Pegolotti, who was one of the first 
to provide specific information about trade with the Turks. He described the weights 
and measures used by the Aydin oglus and compared them to those used in the Italian 
states and the Aegean islands. From his handbook it is known that at Altoluogo the 
Turks sold raw materials, such as alum, grain and rice, and sold finished products, 
especially died European fabrics of azure, vermillion and emerald.122   
 It has been shown that it was Umur, with his aggressive policy towards the 
Latins in the Aegean who really contributed to the growth in the power of Aydin. 
According to Gregoras, Umur was frequently raiding the Latin territories at this time, 
with such severity that he was able to enforce tribute on many of them.123 Enveri, 
when referring to events a year later, even stated, in an exaggerated manner, that 
Umur occupied all of the Morea and the land of the Franks.124 Such were his deeds that 
the cult of Umur, which sprung up after his death and was especially promoted by the 
                                                        
118 John Kantakouzenos, i. 537; Zachariadou, TC, 42, n. 162. 
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Ottomans, continued amongst Turkish sailors of the Aegean for many centuries.125 
Even the Byzantine contemporary Nikephoros Gregoras praised Umur, as being more 
civilized than barbarian and possessing some Hellenic culture.126 It is not surprising that 
Umur and his stronghold at Smyrna would become the objective of the next Latin 
league to be formed in the Aegean. 
 
 
Chapter 5 Overview 
 
It has been shown how Benedict XII’s eastern policy was dictated by events in Europe 
and a preoccupation with internal Church reform, both of which hindered plans for a 
crusade against the Turks in the Aegean. The escalation of the conflict between 
England and France effectively ended the second wave of the anti-Turkish league, 
through the diversion of the crusade fleet to the English Channel. Nevertheless, the 
pope did formulate an eastern strategy that was driven by appeals from the Latins in 
the East, as John XXII’s had been in many instances. However, the crucial difference 
between the two popes was that Benedict rarely, if ever, answered favourably to the 
appeals of those Latins resisting the Turks in the Aegean. He was receptive to appeals 
from Cyprus, Armenia and Walter of Brienne, but refused to support a Venetian and 
Hospitaller league for the Aegean in 1336. In this case, the financial difficulties 
experienced by the Italian banking houses may have prevented the pope from 
committing to any enterprise. 
 The lack of papal support forced the Latins in the Aegean to formulate their 
own strategies independent of papal influence. The Venetians resorted to peace with 
the Turks of Aydin and Menteshe in 1337, after failing to secure papal support for an 
Aegean league. The treaties secured various trade privileges for the Republic’s 
merchants in the Aegean and crucially allowed them to gain a firmer foothold in the 
alum trade. However, these treaties did not guarantee secure trade or the 
safeguarding of Venetian colonies: peace with the Turks was short lived and within two 
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years raids against Venetian lands had resumed. The inability of the Venetian 
authorities to identify the perpetrator of these raids, and the lack of cohesion amongst 
the Turks themselves, meant that the Republic once again turned to the Latins in the 
East for the formation of a new coalition in the Aegean.  
Unlike in the previous decade, in the late 1330s the Cypriots and not the 
Venetians were the ones driving for a new naval league. King Hugh of Cyprus had been 
struggling against the Turks of Hamid and Karaman and sent an embassy to the 
Venetians and Hospitallers in 1341 to encourage them to petition the pope for support 
against the Turks. This coincided with an increase in raids launched from Aydin into the 
Aegean, which threatened Crete amongst other islands. The death of Benedict XII in 
1342 and the cohesion of Cypriot, Venetian and Hospitaller policies lay the ground for 
the resumption of a crusade against the Turks under Clement VI. 
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Chapter 6. The Crusade of Smyrna, 1342-1351 
 
6.1. Sequence of Events for the Crusade of Smyrna 
 
6.1.1. Preparations for the naval league in 1342-1343 
The Crusade of Smyrna, which for the purposes of this study will include the planning 
of the naval league in 1343, Humbert of Vienne’s expedition of 1346-7 and the 
activities of the Christian coalition in the Aegean until the disbanding of the league in 
1351, was one of the main events of the fourteenth century. It can be seen as a major 
Latin success as it reduced the sea power of the emirate of Aydin more than any 
previous crusade had managed. As a result of this, the Crusade has been the focus of a 
considerable number of diplomatic documents and attracted the attention of many 
medieval chroniclers.1 The vast array of sources relating to the Crusade of Smyrna and 
the complexities surrounding the planning and execution of the many facets of this 
enterprise, make it necessary firstly to provide a detailed historical background of 
events before discussing the role of the papacy, the Venetians and the Genoese in the 
expedition. 
The catalyst for the crusade was the election of Pierre Roger as Pope Clement 
VI, to the Apostolic See in May 1342. In the early months of his pontificate the new 
pope wrote to the doge of Venice asking his advice on the best way to combat the 
menace posed by the emirate of Aydin and the other Turkish emirates of Anatolia. On 
10 June the Venetians gave their response. According to their information, Umur of 
Aydin had a fleet of 200 or 300 vessels, including many large galleys; the Senate 
considered that 30 armed galleys and 60 horse transports, with 1,200 horsemen, 6,000 
soldiers and 7,200 rowers, would be sufficient to resist him.2 In November Henry of 
Asti, the Patriarch of Constantinople, arrived at Venice with a letter asking the Republic 
to join a naval league currently being organised by the papacy, Cypriots and the 
                                                        
1
 Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 111. 
2 Full text in ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 20, nr. 9, pp. 216-9; TR, i. nr. 142; Setton, PL, 
i. 183, n. 95; Zachariadou,  TC, 43, n. 169. In 1333 the Senate had replied to the same question posed by 
John XXII, although their estimate then was for: 40 galleys, 50 horse transports, 1,000 horsemen, 8,000 
soldiers and 6,000 rowers. See above, ch. 4, pp. 147-8; DVL, i. nr. 124. 
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Hospitallers.3 In January 1343 the Venetian Senate accepted the offer from the 
Patriarch, but reduced the number of galleys required from 30 to (at least) 25, 
suggesting that it would be able to contribute one quarter of the total amount. The 
Senate suggested that this flotilla should serve in the summer months for three years, 
or at least one full year.4 In July the pope responded favourably to a Cypriot embassy 
regarding the league and began to set in motion plans for the forthcoming campaign.5  
In August a series of letters outlining the need to take action against the 
Turkish emirates was dispatched from the Curia to the Grand Master of the 
Hospitallers, Hélion of Villeneuve, representatives of the doge of Venice, Andrea 
Dandolo, and King Hugh IV of Cyprus.6 In total 20 galleys were to be fitted out for the 
league: four provided by the papacy, six from Venice (one of these from the heir of 
Niccolò Sanudo), six from the Hospitallers and four from Cyprus. A total number 
slightly lower than that originally recommended by Venice. 
Clement VI also approached other interested parties in the hope that they too 
would contribute to the newly formed naval league. Letters were sent in this regard to 
the Angevin Queen Joanna of Naples, Prince Robert of Achaia and their various 
relatives on 8 August 1343.7 Three other letters were sent on 16 September to 
Giovanni Sanudo, Duke of the Archipelago, Giorgino Ghisi, Lord of Tenos and Mykonos 
and one third of Negroponte, and Lady Balzana dalle Carceri, Regent of two thirds of 
Negroponte, asking them to contribute galleys.8 On the same day letters were 
dispatched to Genoa and other cities in northern Italy urging them to make financial 
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 I libri commemoriali, ii. bk. 4, nr. 18, p. 117; Setton, PL, 183, n. 96. 
4 DVL, i. nr. 136; TR, i. nr. 149; Setton, PL, i. 184. Oddly, in this letter the Senate suggested that the 
number of galleys be reduced to no less than 25, but the original number quoted is the same as that 
used in the letter to John XXII in 1333, and not those quoted in the letter to Clement VI in June 1342: see 
above, p. 187, n. 2. 
5 The Cypriot embassy at the Curia had renewed requests previously made to Benedict XII for help 
against the Turkish emirates: CVI France, i. nr. 311; Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 110. A detailed background 
to the formation of the naval league in 1343 is given by Setton, PL, i. 182-90; Gay, Cl ment VI, 32-54; 
Lemerle, Aydin, 180-5; Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 207-13. 
6 Dated 8 August, 1343. Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 157, ff. 1v-3r, ep. 19, 23-4; reg. 
62, ff. 48r, 49v-50r; CVI France, i. nr. 332, 336, 337 (summaries), 341 (full text); ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, 
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8 Giovanni Sanudo had apparently already agreed to supply one galley. Summaries in CVI France, i. nr. 
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contributions to the expedition.9 The fleet was to gather at Negroponte on the Feast of 
All Saints (1 November) 1343.10 
 On 31 August 1343 Clement officially designated the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, Henry of Asti, as Apostolic Legate overseas and placed him as the head 
of the naval league.11 Shortly after, letters were sent to the various ecclesiastical and 
lay authorities involved in the enterprise ordering them to accept the authority of the 
newly appointed papal legate. The captains and patrons of the galleys were instructed 
to accept his authority under penalty of ecclesiastic censure.12 Martino Zaccaria, who 
had been freed from prison in Constantinople in 1337, was appointed as captain of the 
papal galleys for the league.13 Petro Zeno was made captain of the Venetian galleys, 
and Conrad Piccamiglio captain of those from Cyprus.14  
Matters relating to the financing of the expedition were also dealt with. It was 
decided that the Apostolic Camera would pay for the first year of service and the 
proceeds of the tenth levied in December 1343 would be used thereafter.15 The 
Hospitallers would be placed in charge of transferring papal funds to the East and, on 
24 August, Clement informed Hélion of Villeneuve that the necessary wages for the 
first four months of service had been paid to Martino Zaccaria and the owners of the 
galleys. The remaining money for the next eight months service, was to be paid to the 
Hospitallers and to be transferred by them at a later date to Martino Zaccaria and the 
galley owners at the command of Henry of Asti.16  
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To ensure the success of the expedition the pope also made attempts to 
encourage peace within Europe before the fleet set out: he urged the government of 
Genoa to cease hostilities against King Hugh of Cyprus, who was apparently willing to 
make amends for past injustices, in the interests of the faith;17 he wrote to Henry of 
Asti in a similar vein, asking the legate to try and pacify relations between the Catalans 
of Athens and Duke Walter of Brienne;18 he repeatedly called for the Greek authorities 
to put an end to the Church schism;19 and, above all, he urged the kings of France and 
England to respect the recently signed Truce of Malestroit and stem the rising tide of 
war which threatened to engulf great swathes of Europe.20  
On 30 September 1343, after the above measures had been put in place, 
Clement VI issued the bull Insurgentibus contra fidem to the archbishops and bishops 
from the kingdoms of Italy, Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and Romania.21  The 
bull instructed the prelates to begin publicly preaching the word of the cross to the 
faithful in their individual cities and dioceses. The sign of the cross was to be given to 
all of the faithful who wished to receive it, in order that they could ‘rise up manfully 
against the said unbelievers, assume the cause with fervour, and pursue it even more 
fervently’.22 To pay for the fleet, tenths of Church revenues and incomes were granted 
as well as certain other subsidies, but since the matter entailed ‘extraordinary 
expenditure’, even greater assistance was required. It was hoped that this would take 
the form of charitable help from the faithful. Accordingly spiritual rewards, in the form 
of indulgences and remission of sins, were granted to those who wished to participate 
or contribute in another way. Those who accompanied the fleet in person at their own 
expense and who remained on campaign for one year, within the three-year period 
after the Feast of All Saints, were to receive full remission of sins (veniam peccatorum) 
and an additional increase of heavenly reward (salutis eterne augmentum). This was 
the same as the indulgences ‘granted to those who cross over in aid of the Holy Land’ 
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(transfretantibus in subsidium Terre Sancte).23 Those who died whilst on campaign, or 
afterwards from wounds received on the campaign, would also receive the same 
indulgence. In addition to this, and because of the need to secure extra finances for 
the expedition, a similar, but slightly lesser privilege, was granted to those faithful who 
contributed to the expedition but who could not take part in person. This referred 
specifically to those who sent suitable soldiers at their own expense, in accordance to 
their means; those who took part at another’s expense; and those who offered as 
much from their own goods as they would have spent on campaign for one year. The 
difference in this indulgence being that the recipients were promised the same 
remission of sins (concedimus eandem veniam peccatorum), but without the salutis 
eterne augmentum clause relating to an increase in their heavenly reward.24 Chests 
were also to be placed in churches and proceeds collected by papal agents. 
 
 
6.1.2. The first wave of the Crusade of Smyrna: the victory at Pallena, the capture of 
the harbour and fortress at Smyrna and the death of the crusade leaders, 
1344-1345 
Once the league had assembled at Negroponte, concerns arose over the intentions of 
the Captain of the papal galleys, Martino Zaccaria, who may have had his eyes on his 
former domain, the island of Chios. These concerns were certainly voiced by the 
Venetians, who took measures to warn the Byzantine emperor to defend Chios from 
possible attack, and by the Pope, who commanded the legate Henry of Asti not to 
allow the Genoese captain to divert the papal galleys to the island. Clement also gave 
the legate permission to replace Zaccaria if he was not deemed to be acting suitably as 
commander of the fleet.25 Nevertheless, no attack on Chios appears to have been 
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made by the forces of the league and in the spring of 1344 naval operations began 
against the Turks as planned.26  
In the opening months of the campaign, the crusading fleet achieved a similar 
level of success as the anti-Turkish league had done in 1334. In one encounter in May, 
the crusaders won a notable victory against a Turkish fleet at Longos, a harbour on 
Pallena, on the western prong of the Chalkidike peninsula.27 According to John 
Kantakouzenos, the Latin fleet of 24 ships, after learning that sixty Turkish vessels were 
sheltered in the harbour, attacked and captured them. The Turkish troops fled to land 
and the Latins dismantled their boats and burned them.28 The Historia Cortusiorum 
also mentions this battle, which apparently occurred on Ascension Day (13 May). 
According to the author, the Christian fleet ‘burned and sank fifty-two Turkish 
vessels’.29 Another, rather fantastical account of John Winterthur, put the number of 
Christian dead at only 300, compared to over 18,000 on the Turkish side.30 
 It is probably this encounter which led Clement VI to send three letters, in July 
and August 1344, congratulating the crusaders on their progress oversees. On 25 July, 
Hélion of Villeneuve was praised for the support he had shown Henry of Asti in ‘the 
matter of the defence of the faith *...+ against the ferocious rage of the infidel Turks’.31 
On the same day, the Clement wrote to the legate himself who had apparently sent a 
number of letters to the pope updating him on the recent successes of the crusade: 
 
[W]e have attentively acquainted ourselves with the contents of those 
letters, the reading of which has been pleasing to us, and we commend 
abundantly in the Lord the industrious efforts of your vigilance shown 
concerning the aforesaid matters, which, to the praise and glory of God 
and the exaltation of the Catholic faith and to the benefit of the 
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aforesaid Faithful, are not lacking in worthy reward, as the contents 
themselves confirm.32 
 
On 12 August a letter was also despatched to the doge of Venice, who, like Henry of 
Asti, had informed Clement of a recent victory over the Turks, in which the Venetian 
contingent of galleys had apparently played a part.33 
 Then on 28 October 1344 the crusaders achieved their most impressive victory 
by capturing the harbour and harbour fortress of Smyrna from the forces of Umur of 
Aydin. The western chroniclers who mention the event do not provide a sufficient 
explanation as to how the Latins were able to seize such a valuable prize from their 
most feared enemy.34 The Greek and Turkish sources, on the other hand, do provide 
some indication. According to the Düstūrnāme of Enveri, Umur was taken completely 
by surprise by the Latin attack: he had apparently been informed of the danger in a 
letter written to him by Kantakouzenos at Didymoteichon, but by the time this letter 
arrived it was too late as the vessels of the naval league had already entered the Bay of 
Smyrna. Umur did not have enough troops at his disposal to repel the assault and the 
Latins were able to chase the Turks from the fortress of the harbour. They then 
secured themselves in the fortress before reinforcements from Umur’s brothers could 
arrive.35 
 The account of Nikephoros Gregoras also attests to the unforeseen nature of 
the Latin attack on Smyrna. According to him, the crusaders arrived unexpectedly at 
the harbour and, after securing the area, rushed to take the fortress. Gregoras added 
that the Franks believed they could use Smyrna as a foundation to push the Turks from 
the Aegean coast, but that they were unable to do this as future events did not 
progress as well as they hoped.36 Another Greek author, John Kantakouzenos, 
mentioned that after the Latins had captured the harbour and fortress, Umur resisted 
them as best as he could but was unable to gain the upper hand.37 What is clear is that, 
firstly, Umur had been taken by surprise by the Latin attack, and secondly, the 
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crusaders had only managed to capture the harbour and the harbour fortress (Smirnae 
inferiores). The upper city and the Acropolis (Smirnae superiores) remained in the 
hands of Umur and his forces and would do so for the duration of the Latin presence in 
the city. The land between the two castles, consisting of the ancient city, lay in ruins 
and was deserted.38 As one Italian chronicler wrote: ‘The Christians held one small 
place, which is called Smyrna, on the shore of the sea [...] But the Turks held another 
castle above which was similarly called Smyrna’.39  
 News of the victory reached the Curia during the autumn of 1344 and on 23 
December, Clement VI wrote to the doge of Venice congratulating him on the success 
at Smyrna: 
 
We have heard and learned through your letters, which were recently 
presented at our papal court, the happy and celebrated reports of that 
glorious victory concerning the seizure and triumphal and victorious 
capture of that very strong and important castle of Smyrna, together 
with its seaport and fortifications, from the hands of the Turks, infidels 
and enemies of the Christian faith, and the overthrow of the stinking 
people of the nation of those same Turks who dwelt or were in that 
place, just as the letters themselves describe in detail, on the feast of the 
apostles Simon and Jude last. A victory which that high and mighty king, 
who, encompassing all things, both heavenly and earthly, in his palm, 
rules them in His omnipotence, has, by His mercy, conferred on the 
Christian people through the service of our venerable brother, Henry, 
Patriarch of Constantinople and Legate of the Holy See, together with 
our and your galleys and their equipment and those of our beloved sons, 
the master and brothers of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem, sent 
for that purpose a little while ago to those parts, and, of course, the 
vigorous Catholic men on board them.40 
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On the same day Clement VI also wrote to the king of France about the Christian 
victory and on 13 January, he sent a letter to the wife of Edward of Beaujeu, praising 
her husband for the valour he had shown in the attack.41 Two days later, Clement 
wrote to Humbert, the Dauphin of Vienne, commending the deeds of Henry of Asti and 
the army of the faithful: 
 
[F]inally, after various conflicts and encounters held on this side and on 
that between the armies of the Christians and of the aforesaid infidel 
Turks, [...] with that same Umur and the other enemies of the faith 
completely defeated and triumphantly put to flight, the aforesaid 
patriarch, with the victorious army of Catholics, occupied the aforesaid 
castle together with its harbour and fortifications and [still] occupies it in 
our name and that of the Roman Church. There he arranged that the 
castle itself be strengthened for the period of the time during which it 
will seem right for him to reside, hoping, nevertheless, to then be able, 
with the army of the faithful, cavalry and infantry – he is widely known 
to be in need of these – with the aid of divine virtue assisting, to gain 
many other infidel lands of the surrounding area and their observance of 
the Catholic faith, to the praise and glory of the divine name; then with 
the filth of the pagan error eradicated, to extend that castle, although at 
present it may lack fortification and a vigilant and faithful guard.42 
 
Clement closed the letter by suggesting to Humbert that, after hearing of the good 
news, he might be ‘more strongly fired to help, support and pursue such a pious 
endeavour’.43 Indeed, it seems from the communication that Humbert, even at this 
early stage, may have been predisposed to the idea of taking the cross and that 
Clement was aware of this.  
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 On 1 February, Clement also wrote to Edward III of England about the Christian 
victory, almost five weeks after Philip of France had been notified.44 On the same day, 
Henry of Asti was finally congratulated for his efforts in writing by the pope. In this 
letter, Clement reminded Henry of the financial difficulties besetting the crusade, 
especially because the merchants tasked with transporting money from the west to the 
Levant could not navigate well in the winter. The legate was asked whether he could 
make savings by reducing the galley crews, without endangering the expedition. 
Clement also enquired as to whether Martino Zaccaria, the captain-general of the papal 
galleys, had performed with any notable valour in the attack on Smyrna. Henry was 
reminded, as he had been in the previous September, that he was permitted to replace 
Martino Zaccaria with a more suitable commander if he was not performing 
satisfactorily.45 
  As Clement suggested in his letter to Humbert of Vienne, Henri of Asti and the 
rest of the Christian force took up their position firmly in the castle and harbour of 
Smyrna; the Turks were unable to attack them nor were the Christians able to take the 
Acropolis. It is likely that the crusaders ensured the security of the harbour and ships by 
encircling this area with new defences. An anonymous Roman chronicle reports that 
the Venetians constructed a large wall, preceded by a broad trench leading to the sea, 
and adds that under this wall traders, shopkeepers and money changers became 
established.46 The author also recounted the capture of Mustafa, one of Umur’s 
captains, who had attacked the Venetian galleys.47 The possession of the harbour was 
as much an advantage for the Latins, as it was a loss for Umur. Umur’s power and 
wealth were largely derived from his ability to launch raids into the Aegean, the 
restriction of his access to the sea thus compromised the prosperity of his emirate. The 
Düstūrnāme of Enveri is, therefore, probably accurate when it describes the great 
lengths Umur went to in his attempts to expel the crusaders from the harbour of 
Smyrna. According to the account, the Muslim army bombarded the Christian area with 
                                                        
44 CVI France, i. nr. 1462; Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et cujuscumque Generis Acta publica inter 
Reges Angliae et alios quosvis Imperatores, Reges, Pontifices, Principes, vel Communitates, 1110-1654, 
ed. T. Rymer et al., 4 vols (London, 1816-69), iii. 28-9; CPL, iii. nr. 15; Setton, PL, i. 191-2. 
45 CVI France, i. nr. 1464. 
46 Vedesi capanne fare, la piazza, lo mercatale, lo cagno della moneta: Anonimo Romano, 105; Lemerle, 
Aydin, 190; Setton, PL, i. 192. 
47 Anonimo Romano, 108; Zachariadou, TC, 50, n. 194. 
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mangonels, some of which had been constructed by specialist craftsmen drafted in 
from the emirate of Eretna and from Africa. These machines destroyed some of the 
crusaders’ boats and killed many.48 The diversity of Umur’s army is corroborated by 
one western account which claimed that multi infideles from the other emirates of Asia 
Minor had flocked to Umur’s side.49 
 In response to the continued bombardment, the Christians launched counter 
attacks against Umur’s forces. It was during one of these offensives, in January 1345, 
that the crusader army suffered a most disastrous blow when the leaders of the 
Crusade Henry of Asti, Martino Zaccaria and Petro Zeno, were killed by Umur’s men.50 
That the crusade leaders died at this time is certain; numerous sources, in Latin, Turkish 
and Greek, both chronicles and letters, attest to this, but unfortunately the sources are 
less clear as to the exact circumstances of the death of the patriarch and his 
companions. Most of the sources seem to agree that the Latins first launched a 
successful sortie from the harbour walls, during which the Frankish forces, led by Henry 
of Asti, Martino Zaccaria and Petro Zeno burned the poorly guarded Turkish 
mangonels.51 Shortly afterwards, the crusade leaders, led by Henry of Asti, left the 
safety of the harbour fortress to celebrate mass in an abandoned church, which stood 
between the harbour and the acropolis.52 The church may well have been the Church 
of St John, the seat of the ancient bishopric of Smyrna, which might explain the legate’s 
decision to venture beyond the safety of the harbour walls.53 After this point, there 
seems to be two alternative versions of subsequent events.54 In the version related by 
the majority of the sources, Umur appeared unexpectedly with his army as the service 
was being celebrated in the church. The bulk of the Latin force, after seeing the Turks 
advancing, retreated to the harbour fortress, but the patriarch, dressed in the liturgical 
clothes, was slaughtered by the Turks, as well as Martino Zaccaria and the other 
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50 Dated to St Anthony’s day, 17 January 1345, by Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 13, ch. 39, p. 389. 
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 Enveri, verses 2013-86; Lemerle, Aydin, 191. 
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 According to an anonymous Roman chronicler the church stood two catapult shots from the harbour 
walls: Anonimo Romano, 110. 
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leaders objected to the legate’s decision to go to the church as it was deemed too dangerous.  
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crusade leaders.55 In the other seemingly less-reliable version, allegedly from an eye-
witness and retold by the anonymous Roman chronicler, after the sermon, Henry of 
Asti, dressed in rich and elaborate armour and accompanied by the other crusade 
leaders, made a reckless charge on the advancing Turks. Needless to say, this proved to 
be highly imprudent and all were slaughtered.56 According to a letter of the merchant 
Pignol Zucchello, the Turks also suffered heavy casualties. Umur and his brother Hizir, 
the ruler of Ephesos, were apparently wounded and their brother Ibrahim Bahadur was 
killed.57 
 Clement VI was informed of the disaster in a letter from the doge of Venice, 
probably received in February or early March 1345.58 On 17 March the pope wrote to 
the Grand Master of the Hospitallers Hélion of Villeneuve about the ‘lamentable and 
disturbing news’.59 In the letter, Clement informed the Master of his new appointments 
for the crusading fleet. Raymond, Archbishop of Thérouanne, ‘a cautious, virtuous and 
prudent man’, was to be appointed as Legate of the Apostolic See and the Lord of 
Courthezon, Bertrand of Beaux, an expert in the art of war, was to be made captain of 
the papal galleys.60 As well as this, Clement urged the master to console those 
crusaders and Hospitallers who remained in Smyrna and, in order that the progress 
made by the crusading force be not lost, he also exhorted Hélion of Villeneuve ‘to be 
steadfast with all vigilance and diligence concerning the secure defence of the place 
and other matters which need to be done there’.61  
 However, despite Clement’s words, it became apparent in the following months 
that neither Archbishop Raymond of Thérouanne nor Bertrand of Beaux would be able 
to fulfil their appointments as legate and captain of the army at Smyrna. The reason for 
this is given  in a letter sent from Clement to King Philip VI of France on 11 May. In the 
text, it is clear that Philip did not wish Raymond and Bertrand, who were his subjects, 
                                                        
55 This version of events is related by John Kantakouzenos, ii. 582-3; Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 13, ch. 39, 
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 The Cretan administration mentioned the disaster in a deliberation of 24 January: Duca di Candia: 
Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 18. 
59 CVI France, i. nr. 1570, col. 462. Clement also wrote in a similar manner to the doge of Venice on the 
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60
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to travel overseas at a time when war was brewing with England. At Philip’s request, 
the pope had even cancelled the preaching of indulgences in France because of the 
imminent conflict: ‘we will that the indulgences we have granted for those going to the 
aforesaid lands to the aid of the faithful dwelling there be specifically not extended to 
those of your kingdom’.62 However, despite making these concessions to the king, 
Clement clearly voiced his displeasure at Philip’s request, which he implied was 
brought about by various rumours, ‘lacking any basis of truth’, from the royal advisors 
who suggested that the crusade had done more harm than good in the Aegean. In fact, 
Clement’s repost acts as an eloquent example of the growing menace which the Turks 
now posed to the Latins of the Aegean and beyond: 
 
It is in fact certain that the Turks, blasphemers and cruel persecutors of 
the name of Christian, began most harshly to trouble and even assault 
the faithful peoples dwelling in Romania and in other neighbouring 
overseas lands. They came even as far as the lands of our beloved son, 
the noble man Robert, Prince of Achaia, your nephew, so that, with the 
Christians placed in the midst of the devastation of the enemy and 
stripped of their goods by conflagrations of fire and brutal robberies, 
some were led away as captives by those same Turks and sold like cattle 
and were compelled – o anguish! – to abjure the Catholic Faith to the 
dishonour of our Saviour; some in truth were subjected to tributary 
servitude; and thus the said enemy had roused themselves to audacity 
of such great arrogance and were becoming ever more bold that, if they 
had not faced the opposition which the aforesaid fleet of the Faithful 
thither presented to them, not only would they have expunged the 
name of Christianity from those lands, as the view of trustworthy people 
has it, but perhaps, [even] to the shameful undoing of Christianity, they 
would have advanced as far as Naples and beyond; wherefore, with the 
written and oral outcry of the Christian people dwelling both in Romania 
and on Cyprus and Rhodes and in other nearby lands having been heard, 
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and ourselves inwardly moved in sorrow of heart by such great distress 
of the people themselves, paternal compassion has compelled us and 
the duty of pastoral office has prompted us, on account of so many and 
such great afflictions of the same people, to arrange for the support of 
some sort of defence and comfort to be provided to them.63 
 
The pope ended his letter by warning Philip to listen only to those advisors who were 
well versed about happenings in Romania, and by questioning whether it was fitting for 
a monarch to withhold permission for a bishop to travel overseas on such a pious 
endeavour.64 As a result of Philip’s decision, Archbishop Francesco Michiel of Crete was 
appointed as the papal vicelegate overseas, John of Biandrate, prior of Hospitallers in 
Lombardy, was made captain-general of the fleet and Conrad Piccamiglio was 
appointed as the successor of Martino Zaccaria. 65  
 Fortunately for the crusaders, the Aegean powers sent immediate 
reinforcements to Smyrna: Hélion of Villeneuve dispatched war machines and material 
for the defence of the harbour fortress and three galleys carrying ammunition and 
reinforcements were sent from Crete.66 Although these forces appear to have enabled 
the crusaders to maintain control of the harbour of Smyrna, they were unable to 
prevent Umur and his brothers from resuming their raids in the Aegean. In the spring 
and summer of 1345 numerous reports from the Cretan government attest to Turkish 
raids, many launched from Ephesos, against the Latin islands of the Aegean, especially 
Crete and Santorini.67 Thus, despite the crusaders’ resounding success at Smyrna in 
October 1344, less than a year later the crusade had lost its principal leaders, was 
failing in its objective and was in need of revival. 
                                                        
63 CVI France, i. nr. 1704, col. 531-2. 
64 CVI France, i. nr. 1704, col. 532. 
65 CVI France, i. nr. 1582, 1603-9, 1668, 1673-6; Setton, PL, i. 194, n. 163; Housley, Avignon, 290, n. 135. 
66 CVI France, i. nr. 1669 (summary); Pignol Zucchello, nr. 13, pp. 31-2; Duca di Candia: Quaternus 
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67 Reports of attacks on Crete were made in April: Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 34-5. 
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6.1.3. The second wave of the Crusade of Smyrna: Humbert of Vienne’s expedition, 
1345-1347 
It has previously been shown that Clement VI wrote to Humbert, the Dauphin of 
Vienne, in January 1345 and mentioned that he might be inclined to take the cross in 
aid of the crusaders at Smyrna.68 Humbert heeded this request and sent his 
ambassador William of Royn to Avignon to issue a proposal to Clement. In the 
proposal, Humbert offered to lead a force of 300 men-at-arms and 1000 archers, and 
to maintain five galleys, at his own expense, if the pope was willing to name him as 
captain-general of the ‘holy voyage’ against the Turks. If Clement gave a prompt reply, 
then Humbert could be ready to depart on the nativity of St John the Baptist (24 
June).69 Towards the end of April, Humbert made his way to the papal court to discuss 
matters with the pope in person.70 On 26 May, after a month of negotiation, Humbert 
took the cross and was officially named as captain-general of the Christian army against 
the Turks, he was to set out before 2 August and the captains overseas were notified of 
his appointment.71 
 Humbert began to make preparations for his expedition: he hired four galleys in 
Marseille, each of which were to be fully armed and carry 200 men to the East. The 
cost of the galleys would be 650 florins a month, the first two months were paid by the 
Dauphin in advance. In addition, he swore to maintain 100 knights and squires in his 
retinue, they were to serve with him for as long as the naval league stayed in action 
against the Turks, or at least three years.72 Whilst at Avignon Humbert also opened 
negotiations with Venice about the provision of vessels for his passage to Romania.73 
                                                        
68 See above, p. 195. 
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nr. 156-60; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 517-20, 523-6, 554; Setton, PL, i. 197-200. In July and August the pope 
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 After dealing with the logistics of the expedition, Humbert began to plan his 
route from Avignon to Venice, where he planned to set sail for the Aegean. The first leg 
of his journey would take him from Avignon to Marseille, there Humbert, with his 
flotilla of commissioned galleys, would sail to Genoa, after which he would make his 
way across northern Italy to Venice. On 18 July letters were sent by the pope to the 
rulers of the northern Italian communes asking them to receive Humbert 
appropriately.74 Humbert set sail from Marseille on 3 September in his galley Santa 
Crux and arrived in Genoa eleven days later. He left Genoa on 15 September and sailed 
to Porto Pisa, after which he made his way overland through Florence, Bologna and 
Ferrara to Venice which he reached on 24 October.75 
 Humbert sailed from Venice on or around 12 November and reached 
Negroponte in Christmas of that year.76 There he joined up with six galleys from the 
league: the four papal galleys, one from the Hospitallers and one from Venice.77 He 
stayed in Negroponte for the following six months before setting out for Smyrna, 
during which he communicated with the pope over the most suitable course of action 
for the final leg of the Crusade. The letters of Clement VI suggest that he and Humbert 
discussed various different strategies during this time. Firstly, on 18 December, 
Clement wrote to Humbert asking whether he ought to aid the Genoese galleys 
defending the colony of Caffa in the Crimea, which had been besieged by the Tatars 
since 1343, but only if he could do this without jeopardising the position of those 
crusaders at Smyrna.78 This was evidently not carried out, as Humbert’s force was 
never diverted to the Black Sea. After this plan of action had been dismissed, the 
second plan of action was discussed: the utilisation of the island of Chios as a base of 
operations, for which Clement opened up negotiations with the Byzantine emperor. 
However, any hopes of requisitioning Chios were dashed, when on 8 June, the Genoese 
                                                                                                                                                                  
wrote to Robert of St Severino in the hope that he too would lead a flotilla of ten galleys to the east, but 
nothing came of this plan: CVI Autres, i. nr. 725-9, 7345, 739-41; Setton, PL, i. 197 
74 CVI France, ii. nr. 1838. 
75 For more on Humbert’s itinerary, see Setton, PL, i. 197, 199-200; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 520-3. 
76
 CVI France, ii. nr. 2149 (summary); full text in Faure, ‘Humbert II’, doc. 10, pp. 557-8; Setton, PL, i. 201-
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commander, Simone Vignoso, appeared off Negroponte with a fleet of galleys. After a 
skirmish with Humbert’s force, they seized Chios before the Dauphin’s fleet could 
arrive at the island.79 In the same letter, Clement also agreed to suspend the sentences 
of excommunication and interdict imposed on the Catalan Company for three years in 
the hope that they too would contribute to the aid of the crusaders at Smyrna.  In 
addition to this, the pope permitted Humbert to coin money for the use of the league, 
reassured him that he would not recall the papal galleys or replace his vice-legate, and 
informed him that he would urge Venice and Cyprus to continue maintaining their 
galleys for the league.80  
 The anonymous chronicler of Pistoia recounts one battle which Humbert 
supposedly fought against the Turks in February after his arrival at Negroponte. In the 
narrative, Humbert, after travelling from Venice, camped on Lesbos for fifteen days 
before encountering a Turkish force of 1,500 men and 26 vessels. According to the 
chronicler, Humbert with an army of 2,300 infantry and 70 cavalry, defeated the 
Turkish force and burned their ships. The Dauphin later executed 150 Turkish prisoners, 
including a ‘baron’ named Muhammad, after they refused to abjure their faith. 
However, as many have pointed out, this battle is unlikely to have taken place. It is not 
mentioned in any of the correspondence between Humbert and the pope and is 
probably more a product of the chronicler of Pistoia’s lively imagination than anything 
else.81 In fact, according to the letters circulating between Negroponte and the Curia 
during the first half of 1346, it does not appear as if Humbert achieved anything other 
than planning and preparation during his stay on the island. 
 In the end, Humbert had to resort to the original plan of action and set sail for 
Smyrna, where he arrived later in June, 1346. The sources for Humbert’s actions at 
Smyrna are scant, with only the Roman chronicler providing any real detail of events. 
According to him, Humbert arrived with no more than 30 knights: he secured the 
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harbour area, restored order, and launched sorties against the Turkish forces, taking 
many prisoners. Unfortunately after these initial successes the heat of the summer set 
in and the crusaders began to suffer heavily from disease and starvation and many 
died. Humbert re-fortified the harbour area with high walls, towers, gates and ditches 
and, seeing that nothing more could be done, departed from Smyrna to ‘his country’.82  
 The Düstūrnāme of Enveri also gives a similar account of events: according to 
the author, about a month after Humbert's arrival in Smyrna, a battle took place 
between the troops of the dauphin and those of Umur and Hizir. In the battle some 
Frankish knights fell, amongst them was perhaps a close relative or friend of the 
Dauphin. Following this unsuccessful engagement, Humbert was confined to the 
fortress of the harbour and did not advance until he left Smyrna.83 The information 
from other sources, although scarce, does suggest that the accounts of the Roman 
chronicler and Enveri contain some truth: news of one of skirmish in which Humbert 
defeated a Turkish force but lost five knights reached Grenoble in September 1346;84 
and it is known that Humbert himself took no more action in the latter months of the 
summer as he was suffering from illness.85 
 Humbert left Smyrna around September 1346, but went not to his home 
country as the Roman chronicler claimed, but instead to Rhodes where he stayed for 
the winter of 1346-7. In the autumn he discussed with the pope the possibility of 
forming a truce with the Aydin-oglus. The Dauphin wrote letters about this to the pope 
which reached Avignon in October or early November. Clement replied in two letters 
on 28 November. In one letter, matters of finance were discussed and Clement warned 
Humbert that future crusaders were unlikely to be recruited in the West because of the 
wars which consumed the continent.86 In the other letter, Clement reiterated his 
lamentation that the great kingdoms of Europe were consumed by warfare which 
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prevented would-be crusaders from travelling to the East. In regard to the question of 
a truce with the Turks, Clement agreed with Humbert that it was ‘not only expedient 
but also entirely necessary to proceed to make and enter into the truces [...] in the 
best, most honourable and safest way possible’ presumably with the Turks of Aydin. 
Humbert was to discuss the matter with the representatives of the Venetians, Cypriots 
and Hospitallers and to proceed in the best manner he saw fit. One condition Clement 
imposed, was that the truce ought to last no more than ten years, as after that time it 
was hoped that Europe would be at peace. In the meantime the pope could send no 
more money to the East as the tithes and other church subsidies could not be collected 
‘while the evil of the present time persists’. Finally, Clement warned Humbert to keep 
the discussions for the truce confidential ‘because we did not wish to disclose them to 
many or to even any one of your envoys’.87 These two letters were followed by a 
number of others sent to the other parties involved in the crusade in the following 
days, confirming the measures taken by Humbert and the pope.88 On 29 January 1347 
Humbert wrote his will whilst on Rhodes and over the following months he began to 
make plans for his return to Europe. His oath to remain on crusade for three years was 
waived by the pope, who, on 19 March, granted him a confessor to absolve him of the 
vow and gave him safe conduct for his return home.89 In that month, Humbert’s wife 
Mary died, which probably increased his desire to return to Europe. The Dauphin 
departed soon after and arrived at Venice in the last week of May.90 The extent to 
which negotiations for a truce had progressed is not known, but it is clear that in the 
end no truce was ever agreed between Humbert and the Turks of Aydin. 
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6.1.4. The end of the Crusade of Smyrna: the Black Death, economic crisis and truces 
with Aydin, 1347-1351 
Sometime in the spring of 1347, after Humbert’s departure from Rhodes, the galleys of 
the naval league won a notable victory against the Turks of Aydin and Sarukhan off the 
island of Imbros.91 The event is described in a papal letter of 24 June and in the 
deliberations of the Cretan government on 21 June. The Christian flotilla came 
unexpectedly upon a fleet of 118 Turkish vessels off Imbros, they captured the vessels 
and pursued the Turks onto the island where they had fled for safely. The crusaders 
surrounded them and, after receiving reinforcements of ‘horses, arms, foot soldiers, 
men and other appropriate aid’ from the grand master at Rhodes, captured the 
remaining Turks on the island.92 Despite this victory, the support of the crusading force 
in the Aegean and at Smyrna would wind down over the next few years and eventually 
come to an end. One factor which undoubtedly contributed to this was the outbreak of 
the Black Death, one of the most virulent and destructive pandemics in history. The 
Mongol army suffered from this plague during the siege of Caffa in 1346-7. By 1347 it 
had reached the Aegean and Sicily, and by 1348 it was devastating Italy and southern 
Europe.93 Avignon, in particular, suffered heavily from the Black Death, where it is 
estimated that up to half of the population died during a seven-month period in 
1348.94 It is thought that during this time, Clement VI spent over a quarter of his 
revenue on charity, compared to only 5% on war.95  
 Bearing this in mind, it is no surprise that after the victory at Imbros, 
negotiations with Umur over a possible truce, as proposed by Humbert in the previous 
year, were undertaken. Bartolommeo of Tomari, a canon of Negroponte and Octavian 
Zaccaria, possibly the son or nephew of the late Martino,96 had been undertaking 
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negotiations with Umur and his brother Hizir. According to a papal letter of 20 January 
1348, they had reached a provisional agreement whereby the old harbour fortress 
would be dismantled by the crusaders in return for peace. Clement wrote to thank 
them for their efforts in trying to find a compromise, and encouraged them to persist, 
but rejected the current proposal on the grounds that it entailed the destruction of the 
harbour fortress.97 Clement wrote in a similar manner to Francesco Michiel and 
Dieudonné of Gozon on 5 February stressing that the fortress must remain standing if 
any agreement was to be reached, but he added that it was imperative that 
negotiations should continue. To help move matters forward, Clement suggested that 
as part of the truce, the Christians could grant the Turks access to the port for 
commercial reasons if they so wished.98 Nothing seems to have come of these 
negotiations and hostilities between the two sides resumed. In the spring of 1348, 
Umur, who had seen his demand for the dismantlement of the harbour fortress in 
return for peace rejected by the pope, attempted to oust the crusaders by force once 
and for all.99 According to the account of Nikephoros Gregoras, it is during the 
subsequent attack that Umur, the hero of Aydin and bane of the crusaders, was killed 
by a Christian arrow fired from the wall of the harbour fortress.100 
 On 17 August Clement wrote to the archbishop of Smyrna and the captain of 
the city to acknowledge their letters informing him of the death of Umur. It was joyous 
news, but the pope was adamant that any forthcoming truce with the Aydin, now ruled 
solely by Hizir at Ephesos, must not include the demolition of the fortress.101 
Fortunately for the crusaders, Hizir was more inclined to reach a compromise than his 
brother had been and on 18 August 1348 the draft of a truce was agreed between the 
emir and the Latins of the league.102 Hizir stated that he would send his own 
ambassadors to the pope to finalise the treaty. According to the emir, Clement would 
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be allowed to amend the treaty as he saw fit and he swore in advance to accept any 
modifications the pope might make. Amongst the clauses of the draft treaty Hizir had 
agreed to accept were the following generous concessions: to grant the Latins one half 
of the customs dues (commerclum) of Ephesos and the other cities of Aydin; to treat 
the Christians at Smyrna well and with honour; to allow freedom of trade for Christian 
merchants in Aydin; to put the fleet of Aydin in dry dock; to refrain from attacks against 
the Christians; to punish pirates and corsairs from other emirates; to restore to the 
archbishops of Smyrna and Ephesos all their churches and to provide revenues and 
protection for them.103 These generous concessions suggest that Hizir must have been 
hard pressed to agree a truce with the Christians after the death of his brother. 
 Hizir’s embassy, accompanied by Bartolommeo of Tomari and Octavian 
Zaccaria, reached Avignon in March 1349. They remained in the city discussing the 
treaty with papal officials until early July.104 When the Turkish embassy returned to 
Aydin, Clement gave them a letter, addressed to Hizir and dated 1 July 1349, which 
informed the emir that before officially accepting the truce, the pope would need to 
consult with the Venetians and Cypriots, who had not been party to the negotiations, 
meanwhile the emir was to observe the draft treaty until Christmas 1349.105 
Afterwards, Clement wrote to the Venetians and Cypriots, asking them to send officials 
to Avignon for May 1350 to discuss the proposed truce. However, the Venetians 
informed the pope that the Turks of Aydin, now allied with those of Menteshe, had 
already broken the truce and were once again threatening the Latins in Smyrna and the 
Aegean.106 Not surprisingly the Venetian embassy reached Avignon ready to tear up the 
proposed treaty with Hizir and to resume the naval league, despite Clement’s 
assertions that the Curia would no longer help fund an anti-Turkish fleet. In August 
1350 the naval league was officially renewed, but only a few weeks later war broke out 
between Venice and Genoa, thus ending any hopes of a Venetian contribution to the 
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league.107 Due to the Venetian-Genoese war, the lack of funds and the ravages of the 
Black Death, less than a year after it was re-formed, the league was officially dissolved 
by the pope in the summer of 1351 and any mention of it in papal correspondence 
disappeared thereafter.108 On 6 December 1352 Clement VI, who had done so much to 
facilitate the formation of the naval league and the various expeditions to Smyrna, 
died. 
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6.2. The Role of the Papacy, Venice and Genoa in the Crusade of Smyrna 
 
6.2.1. Clement VI and the Crusade of Smyrna 
Many have regarded Clement VI as the key figure behind the successful formation of 
the naval league and management of the Crusade of Smyrna. Mollat has suggested that 
the pope’s qualities of patience and cunning helped progress negotiations for the 
expedition.109 Moreover, Housley has stated that Clement’s role was ‘decisive’ in 
making the Crusade happen.110 Indeed, as may be seen in the large amount of 
correspondence preserved in the papal registers between the pope and the 
participants of the league, the pope’s skills as a diplomat undoubtedly enabled him to 
succeed in launching a successful crusade to the East where many others had failed. In 
fact, this exceptional dedication to the Crusade had been evident in Clement’s earlier 
life when, as Archbishop of Rouen, he had acted as a crusade negotiator for King Philip 
VI of France. He preached a sermon in Paris in 1332, after which Philip took the cross 
for the aborted crusade to the Holy Land in 1333. Moreover, he exhorted John XXII to 
sanction the same expedition.111 It is now appropriate to assess the ways in which 
Clement VI specifically aided the formation of the Crusade of Smyrna; how these 
methods compared to his Avignon predecessors; what the level of response was; and 
what these factors suggest about the changing western perception of the Turks. 
 Firstly, the close personal attachment to the crusade shown during his earlier 
life, combined with an extravagant nature, which was in contrast to that of his frugal 
predecessor Benedict XII, made Clement VI more inclined to raise and contribute papal 
funds towards the crusade.112 In terms of funds, it has been shown that in 1343 and 
1345 the pope levied a tithe on ecclesiastical benefices in over sixty dioceses in Europe 
                                                        
109 Mollat, Popes, 42. 
110 Housley, Avignon, 121-2. 
111 Les Grandes Chroniques de France, ix. 133; Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 207; Housley, Avignon, 122; 
Housley, ‘France, England and the “national crusade”’, 190; Wood, Clement VI, 180. 
112
 According to Mollat, Clement VI was ‘accustomed to live like a lord’ and squandered the wealth 
amassed by Benedict XII. The completion of the papal palace at Avignon, the reconstruction of the 
abbey of Chaise-Dieu, at a cost of 30,000 florins, the upkeep of a luxurious court and loans to the kings 
and lords of France, are all evidence of this. Overall, contemporaries seem to have admired his 
ostentatious way of life: Mollat, Popes, 38-9; cf. Wood, Clement VI, 3-4, 64-8. 
211 
 
and the East for the expedition against the Turks.113 This was greater than any crusade 
tithe levied since the Vienne tenth of 1312 and constituted the first to be levied 
especially for a crusade against the Turks. Clement also went to greater lengths than 
just levying tithes: in the bull Insurgentibus contra fidem, issued in September 1343, 
the pope explicitly expressed that spiritual privileges would be made available to raise 
money for the crusade, as the ‘extraordinary expenditure’ called for larger revenues 
than the tenth alone.114 In particular Clement offered a plenary indulgence to all who 
would make a financial contribution to the expedition equal to that which they would 
have spent if they had campaigned for one year.115 In terms of contribution, according 
to Housley, the money Clement spent on the maintenance of the papal galleys for the 
expedition ‘represented the most substantial papal contribution to the defence of the 
Christian East’ for the entire period of the Avignon Papacy.116 The specific amount 
spent on the Smyrna expedition was probably in the region of 110,000-150,000 florins 
and although considerably less than the amount spent on the Italian wars, it still 
constituted a significant proportion of the overall papal budget.117 In fact, during the 
latter years of the 1340s, Clement claimed that he could no longer continue the 
crusade because ‘the tithes and other subsidies’ could no longer be ‘enforced or 
raised’.118 
 In addition to being used to raise money for the crusade, the indulgences 
granted in the bull Insurgentibus contra fidem were also introduced to encourage a 
specific level of specialist recruitment and not the unmanageable and unwanted level 
of non-combatant participation, such as that attracted to the Hospital passagium of 
1308-10.119 In this sense, many of the concessions made in the bull, such as the 
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indulgence granted to those who sent suitable soldiers at their own expense and those 
who took part at another’s expense, seem to have been introduced in order to attract 
participation from appropriately skilled soldiers and seamen. Although it is extremely 
difficult to measure the response to the 1343 indulgences, they were evidently 
sufficient to necessitate the recruitment of troops to supplement the papal, Venetian 
and Cypriot contingents, as they all appear to have participated at full strength for the 
majority of the campaign.120 They may have also contributed to the widespread 
outbreaks of popular enthusiasm in 1346, which will be discussed later. 
 But perhaps the most striking feature of the indulgences of 1343, was the 
granting of the full crusade indulgence to those who could participate in person on the 
crusade (the same as that ‘granted to those who cross over in aid of the Holy Land’).121 
This degree of indulgence was the greatest yet awarded to those fighting specifically 
against the Turks: the indulgences given to those fighting the Turks in Achaia in 1322, 
for the Zaccaria of Chios in 1323 and 1325, for the anti-Turkish league in 1334, and to 
Hugh of Quiéret and his followers in 1335, were all granted in articulo mortis: they only 
constituted remission of sins for those who died in action and wounds received 
thereafter and not for participation alone. In fact, the full crusade indulgence for 
participation alone had never been issued for a crusade launched specifically against 
the Turks. It had been made available by previous popes, but these were either for 
crusades against the Saracens of the Holy Land, or against the Greeks, Catalans or 
Tartars.122 As it is unlikely that the pope used the full crusade indulgence in 1343 to 
attract a large-scale response of unskilled men, it can perhaps instead be used to gauge 
the importance of the crusade. This factor makes the indulgence of 1343 especially 
pertinent to the understanding of the change in the papal perception of the Turks. If 
the in articulo mortis indulgences of the 1320s and 1330s can be classed as a form of 
lesser crusade indulgence – often introduced as a result of a petition and granted by 
the pope because they required less organisation from the Church – then this suggests 
that at the time when these were issued, the threat of the Turks was deemed as high 
enough to warrant minor assistance from the Church, but not high enough for the full 
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Holy Land crusade indulgence to be issued.123 If this is the case, then granting of the full 
crusade indulgence in 1343 indicated that the expedition against the Turks was now 
considered of the utmost importance. The rising power of Aydin in the years 
immediately preceding Clement’s coronation would support this view. Moreover, 
setting the terms of the indulgence as the same as an indulgence for going to the Holy 
Land, may have been a deliberate move to bring the anti-Turkish league on a par with 
Jerusalem, or at least, to remind would-be crusaders of the importance of the task at 
hand. The pope certainly believed that those fighting the Turks warranted the highest 
level of spiritual support that the Church was able to provide. 
 According to Alain Demurger, the Crusade of Smyrna was not a crusade at all 
but a separate Christian endeavour which ran parallel to the maintenance of the idea 
of a crusade always being centred on Jerusalem. He has argued that Clement VI applied 
the indulgences, and other mechanisms usually associated with a crusade to the Holy 
Land, to the 1343 league primarily for it to be used to implement peace within 
Christendom, with the hope of undertaking a crusade to Jerusalem at a later date.124 
There is no doubt that in the early 1340s, when the situation within Europe was critical, 
Clement would have regarded a naval league as a useful tool to diffuse the conflicts 
raging at the time, and during the Crusade of Smyrna, there is also evidence to suggest 
that he appealed to the rulers of Europe to make peace to facilitate the continuation of 
the Crusade.125 However, Demurger’s theory does not assess the 1343 league in the 
context of previous papal authorised expeditions against the Turks. To say that the 
primary cause of promoting the 1343 league was to promote peace within 
Christendom, and thus make conditions conducive to a crusade to the Holy Land, is 
perhaps underestimating the anxiety in which the pontiff, and those likely to take the 
cross, regarded the growing expansion of Aydin and the other Turkish emirates at this 
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time. The granting of the Holy Land indulgence and the popular response to this, which 
will be shown later, is evidence that the expedition was regarded as a crusade by 
contemporaries. Moreover, there is little to suggest that a parallel crusade to 
Jerusalem was high in the pope’s mind at this time.126 
 During the latter stages of the Crusade of Smyrna, especially during the 
expedition of Humbert of Vienne, Clement continued to show full support for the 
expedition. Towards the end of July, he increased the preaching campaign in support of 
the second wave of the Smyrna expedition led by Humbert. The same indulgence as 
that issued in 1343 was offered to participants or contributors, and Franciscan, 
Augustinian, Dominican and Carmelite friars were ordered to preach the crusade. The 
preaching campaign was also extended to England where it had not taken place as 
yet.127 The response to this preaching campaign was, according to contemporaries, 
exceptionally high. As Housley has pointed out, the Smyrna campaign as a whole, 
especially in the period from the death of the crusade leaders in January 1345 until 
Humbert’s departure from Venice in November, inspired an outburst of widespread 
popular enthusiasm on a similar scale to that shown for the People’s Crusade in 1309 
and the Shepherd’s Crusade in 1320.128 This was partly a result of the crusaders’ 
successful capture of Smyrna harbour and the sale of indulgences for the expedition, 
but also a result of various “miracle stories” which circulated in the west during the 
summer of 1345.  
 One such “miracle story” can be found in a letter, purporting to be written by 
King Hugh IV of Cyprus to Queen Joanna I of Sicily, which was probably disseminated in 
parts of Italy and France at this time. In the letter an exaggerated Christian victory over 
the Turks is described. The story begins on 24 June, when an army of 200,000 
crucesignatis assembled on a plain between Smyrna and Ephesos, massively 
                                                        
126 Clement only twice mentioned the possibility of recovering the Holy Land at the time of the Smyrna 
expedition, in letters of June 1344 and March 1348: CVI France, i. nr. 914; Autres, nr. 1605. It also seems 
unusual that if the league was primarily allocated the Holy Land crusade mechanisms in order to 
promote peace within Europe, that Clement should agree to cancel the preaching of indulgences in 
France in 1345, specifically on the grounds that men were being drawn to the crusade and away from 
the defence of their kingdom. This action seem at odds with one who was trying to use the league to 
alleviate tensions between France and England: CVI France, i. nr. 1704. 
127 CVI France, ii. nr. 1855-6; Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii. 531-2; Setton, PL, i. 
197; Housley, Avignon, 138. 
128 Housley, Avignon, 145-6. 
215 
 
outnumbered by a Turkish force of 1,200,000. The battle lasted until the evening, and, 
as the Turks, thirsting to drink the blood of their enemies, came upon the exhausted 
Christian army, the crusaders prepared to receive martyrdom. They cried out to the 
Lord saying, ‘“Lord Jesus, you who were willing to be crucified for us, give us firm faith 
and strengthen our hearts within us, so that we may be able to receive the palm of 
martyrdom in your name, since we are unable to resist them”’. Then suddenly a figure 
appeared above the army ‘sitting on a white horse, holding a white banner on which 
the cross was of a red colour, remarkable for its astonishing redness’. He was clad in 
camel-hair and had a long thin face, with a flowing beard. He proclaimed in a loud 
voice: ‘“O, faithful, do not fear, because the divine majesty will open the heavens and 
send invisible help to you. Arise, be strengthened and come manfully to battle with me, 
since the few of you who will die will receive eternal life”’. The Christians arose as if 
they had never done battle and attacked the Turks again and again. A ray of light like 
the sun illuminated the battlefield for the whole night and, by divine aid, the crusader 
army prevailed. In the morning, the Christians celebrated mass and the figure appeared 
to them again saying, ‘“What you have sought you have achieved and you will obtain 
more than these things if you remain true to the faith”’. When the crusaders asked him 
who he was, he responded: ‘“I am he who said: Behold the lamb of God, behold He who 
takes away the sins of the world”’. With these words, he disappeared, sending forth a 
very sweet smell, by which the Christians were ‘wonderfully refreshed that whole night 
and day, even without actual food and drink’. The figure was of course St John the 
Baptist. The next day, when the crusaders came to the battlefield to count the Christian 
dead they heard ‘voices without number’ chanting the verse: ‘“Come, blessed of the 
Father, inherit the Kingdom to the very end”’. After the bodies of the Christians had 
been buried, those of the Turks were counted and said to have numbered 70,000.129 
 Another miracle, reported by the chronicler of Pistoia recounts the appearance 
of the Virgin in a small church at L’Aquila in Abruzzo. The Virgin appeared above the 
church altar carrying the infant Christ, holding a cross in his hand. On hearing of this, all 
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of the townsfolk flocked to the church, where the Virgin remained until the third hour, 
more resplendent and beautiful than the sun. According to the chronicler, all of the 
children born that day in L’Aquila had the imprint of the cross on their right 
shoulder.130 These stories no doubt inspired people to take the cross. The letter of the 
exaggerated Christian victory may even have been intended as a recruitment aid for 
preachers.131 After all, St John, like the pope, had promised the crusaders eternal 
reward for their services, as many contemporaries noted.132 
 Indeed, many contemporary authors attest to the large numbers of people 
taking the cross for the second wave of the Smyrna expedition. The chronicler of 
Pistoia mentioned that because of the miracle in L’Aquila, ‘many Aquilani and others 
from the countryside took the cross and went to fight against the Infidels’.133 The 
Florentine author Giovanni Villani wrote that 400 men from Florence, 350 from Siena, 
and many others from Tuscany and Lombardy set out towards the east.134 The 
chronicler from Bologna commented that three groups set out from his city between 
October 1345 to April 1346, the first two consisting of 40 men, the last of over 100.135 
The necrology of the convent of Santa Maria Novella at Florence also named six 
Dominicans who took the cross for the crusade.136 However, the claim of the 
anonymous Roman chronicler that there was not a city, town or state in the whole of 
Christendom from which innumerable men did not flock to take the cross was certainly 
an exaggeration.137  
 As Housley has suggested, Clement VI evidently approved of the popular 
enthusiasm shown towards the crusade and the miracle stories which helped to inspire 
it. On 21 July, Clement wrote in a letter to Edward III of England that ‘it is clear from 
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amazing miracles that the mercy of divine goodness is working in various lands in 
favour of the said task’. The pope went on to describe the appearance of ‘shining 
crosses’ in very many lands, which had given ‘many benefits of health’ to those who 
were ‘burdened with ailments’.138  Moreover, he wrote that an ‘innumerable 
multitude’ of nobles and powerful people, especially from Italy, were preparing to go 
on crusade against the Turks ‘to avenge the injuries of the crucified Redeemer’.139 
Evidently, Clement went to great lengths to foster the enthusiasm for this crusade and 
the high level of response can in part be attributed to him. 
 In addition to this, only days before Humbert was due to set out for the East, 
Clement granted the Dauphin 34 different petitions at the Curia, relating to spiritual 
privileges.140 To bolster recruitment, Clement also wrote to the archbishop of Smyrna 
in 1346, granting him the power to commute vows, except those of religion and 
chastity, to participation in the Smyrna expedition.141 He also made other compromises 
which his predecessors had been unwilling to make in the interests of the crusade. In 
June 1346, at Humbert’s request, the pope agreed to suspend the sentences of 
excommunication and interdict imposed on the Catalan Company for three years in the 
hope that they too would contribute to the aid of the crusaders at Smyrna.142 This is in 
stark contrast to Benedict XII, who obstinately refused to incorporate the Catalan 
Company into any plan for the defence of the Latin East, and in 1339 even summoned 
Archbishop Isnard of Thebes to Avignon to stand trial for falsely relaxing the ban of 
excommunication.143 
 Clement was also not ignorant of the restrictions on trade caused by the 
Crusade of Smyrna and the aggressive Tartar policies in the Black Sea. The effect these 
had on Venetian and Genoese participation in the crusade will be discussed later in this 
chapter, but at this stage it is important to study Clement’s understanding of the 
economic situation in the eastern Mediterranean. As shall be shown, his approach was 
                                                        
138 CVI France, ii. nr. 1844, p. 26; Housley, Avignon, 146. 
139 CVI France, ii. nr. 1844, p. 26; Housley, Avignon, 147. 
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 Dated 6 May, 1346. CVI Autres, i. 980 (summary). 
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pragmatic – in particular, he understood that stable overseas trade was necessary to 
ensure the participation of the Venetians in the expedition. A good example of this is 
found in April 1344, when Clement granted the Republic permission to send six galleys 
and four cogs to Mamluk lands over a five-year period.144 According to Lane, Venetian 
involvement in the Smyrna crusade combined with the large payments for papal trade 
licences moved the pope to grant the Venetians permission to trade with the 
Mamluks.145 Indeed, Venetian participation in the league against the Turkish emirates 
certainly seems to have influenced the papal decision to grant the trade concession. 
This is illustrated in the document issuing the trade licence, where reference is made to 
the Venetian petitioning committee at the Curia who had stated to the pope that the 
Republic had being incurring ‘very great and intolerable labours against the Turks’ in 
the service of the faith. Clement responded to the petitioners that, after considering 
these matters, and wishing the Venetians to ‘proceed favourably in this respect’ (i.e. to 
continue these labours against the Turks) then the requested licence would be granted 
‘in acknowledgement of the sincere zeal and firm purpose which you [the Venetians] 
have held and do hold, with total devotion of heart, for the work of the holy faith and 
also for the exaltation and increase of God’s Church’.146  These laboribus contra Turchos 
were almost certainly a reference to the Venetian participation in the naval league and 
possibly the victories it had achieved in early 1343. 
 Another factor which links the granting of this licence to resistance against the 
Turks can be found in the records of previously refused petitions for trade licences. It 
has already been shown that Popes John XXII and Benedict XII had refused a total of 
four similar requests from Venetian embassies for licences to trade in non war 
materials with Mamluk Egypt (made in 1317, 1319, 1327 and 1337).147 These requests 
were made on the grounds that the Venetians were different from other nations: their 
livelihood stemmed from foreign trade and not from agriculture. Thus they needed free 
                                                        
144 ‘we grant to you, by the apostolic authority of special favour, full and free licence to sail or cause to 
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trade with Egypt in order to survive. Similar words had been repeated in the 1344 
petition, but with the difference being that in the previous, unsuccessful petitions, no 
reference to resistance against the Turks had been made. In fact, Venetian merchants 
were actively engaged in trade with the Turks in the years when the previous petitions 
had been submitted, and in the final unsuccessful petition of 1337, Venice had formed 
a trade agreement with the emirs of Aydin and Menteshe – if this was known to the 
popes, then these factors may well have hindered the petitioners’ cause. If this is the 
case, then Clement VI was effectively expanding the policy adopted by John XXII of 
permitting trade with the Mamluks in order to encourage resistance to the Turks, as 
was demonstrated by the licences for mastic issued to the Zaccaria of Chios in the 
1320s.148  
 The granting of the licence for allowing the Venetians to trade with the 
Mamluks was, therefore, a tool with which the pope facilitated Venetian participation 
in the Crusade of Smyrna.149 It may have also been the motivating factor in the issuing 
of two other licences, one of March 1347, where Clement allowed Humbert’s vessels to 
trade with the lands subject to the Mamluk sultan,150 and another of July 1350, were 
the pope also allowed Octavian Zaccaria to trade with the Egyptians.151 However, 
unlike the licence issued to Venice, these licences do not make the explicit link to 
resistance against the Turks, so it is only possible to speculate in this regard. 
Nevertheless, these concessions still suggest that the Turks had well and truly replaced 
the Mamluks as the greatest Muslim threat in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, 
they provide further evidence that the Avignon popes were willing to use trade 
exemptions to encourage participation in a crusade against the Turks and to perhaps 
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instil a perception that this new foe should be regarded as the primary enemy of 
Christendom. 
 
 
6.2.2. Venetian participation in the Crusade of Smyrna 
As seen in the previous chapter, by 1342 the Venetian government had taken steps to 
reinforce its colonies in the Aegean in the face of the increasing threat posed by Umur 
of Aydin. After the election of the new pope in May 1342, discussions were undertaken 
between the Venice and the Curia over the best way in which to oppose the Aydin 
Turks.152 In August Venice was forced to confront a new revolt on Crete, probably over 
the tax imposed to pay for the Venetian contingent of the forthcoming naval league, as 
had been the case in 1333. The feudatories of the island had previously declared that 
they would pay no more than a third of the expenses, although they were eventually 
forced to pay half.153 Once this matter had been dealt with, the Serenissima agreed to 
contribute six out of a total of 20 galleys for the league and to make the necessary 
preparations: in the autumn and winter of 1343 the Senate decreed that one galley was 
to be armed in Negroponte and the remaining five in the arsenal at Venice.154 At the 
same time, the Great Council elected Petro Zeno as the captain of the Venetian galleys 
for the league, his position was to be reviewed after six months.155 In November more 
preparations were made for the departure of the galleys and in December the Council 
of the Forty took measures to help Zeno in his recruitment of crossbowmen for the 
campaign.156 
 It can be seen from this that the Venetians, although not the instigators of the 
naval league in 1342-3, were eager to participate in it when called to do so by the 
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pope. This is not surprising considering that during the pontificate of Benedict XII no 
support against the Turks had been forthcoming from the pope and the Venetians had 
instead resorted to making peace treaties with the Turks of Menteshe and Aydin, which 
in the case of the latter, lasted for barely two years before piratical raids resumed. It is 
also worth remembering that negotiations with the Cypriots over the revival of a 
league against the Turks had been ongoing since 1340, even though no agreement had 
been made. Thus it seems that the election of an energetic new pope in 1342, who 
showed a dedication to a crusade against the Turks, had given Venice the impetus it 
needed to commit itself to the enterprise. 
 Another factor in the Republic’s eagerness to participate in a league was the 
increasing problem of the importing of grain to Venice and her colonies at this time. As 
Zachariadou has pointed out, ‘the organisation of the crusade coincided with a period 
in which the Christians were cut off from the Black Sea with the result that there was a 
great famine in Romania and the Balkans’.157 Latin traders from Venice and Genoa had 
frequently imported vast amounts of grain from the domain of the Tatars, especially 
Tana and the Crimea, to supply European markets.158 Just as the naval league had 
begun to take shape, in 1343, the Tatar khan had expelled all Latin merchants from 
Tana and his other territories, prohibiting all grain exports. A shortage in grain and 
consequently a general rise in prices were the immediate results.159 To make matters 
worse, the activities of the league in the Aegean rendered grain import from Turkey a 
rarity after 1343. As outlined in previous chapters, reliable grain import from the 
certain Turkish emirates was a serious concern for the Serenissima. The treaty of 1337 
between the Republic and Menteshe, for example, contained a clause which 
specifically stipulated that the shinik, the measure commonly used for cereals, be 
                                                        
157 Zachariadou, TC, 45-6. 
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restored to its previous status.160 It was only when trade in the Black Sea remained 
unhindered, as was the case in 1335, that the Senate was able to decree that all 
merchants be prohibited from importing grain from Turkey to Crete.161 In the early 
1340s there is evidence of the Venetians importing grain from the area of Phokaia in 
Turkey,162 and there is also evidence to suggest that Venetian merchants were allowed 
to continue some limited grain exchange with the emirate of Menteshe, but these 
examples seem to be the exception.163  In October 1344 a group of traders reported to 
Pignol Zucchello that it was impossible to either ‘come or to go’ in Turkey.164 By 
September 1345 the Cretan administration stated that the island was suffering from a 
scarcity of corn.165 
 Two contemporary Italian sources even go as far as to say that the Crusade of 
Smyrna was launched because of fears over trade. The anonymous Roman chronicler 
reported that Umur had begun to raise the taxes on Venetian merchants without just 
cause prior to the crusade.166 Moreover, Marco Battagli suggested that the crusade 
was fought ‘on account of agreements of corn (bladus), which had existed between the 
Venetians and the Turks, and because of other depredations of the Turks carried out by 
them tyrannically’.167 Clement was not ignorant of the economic problems caused by 
the Crusade of Smyrna and on 27 April 1345 he granted the Venetians permission to 
send six galleys and four cogs to Mamluk lands over a five-year period.168 This 
concession was broadened in 1345, when the Venetians obtained permission to send 
seven galleys for every four cogs (because of the greater tonnage of the latter).169 
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According to Jacoby, the relaxing of the trade ban facilitated direct trade between the 
West and Egypt on a grand scale, the level of which had not been seen since the early 
fourteenth century. This was the case in 1346, when the Sienese trader Francesco 
Bartolomei sent 18 barrels and a balle of Egyptian alum from Crete to Venice, weighing 
a total of 17,257 livres gross of Candia, or about 9.1 tons.170  
 However, despite the papal trade licence, some of the actions of the Venetians 
in the Crusade do seem to suggest that these commercial privileges were not sufficient 
for the Republic to commit itself unreservedly to the Crusade. In early 1346 the Cretan 
government once again permitted its merchants to import grain from the emirate of 
Menteshe, although this was sold at a high price.171 According to the account of the 
anonymous Roman chronicler, at sometime before the arrival of Humbert at Smyrna, 
the Venetians also sent an embassy to Umur at Ephesos to seek a truce and demand 
the whole city of Smyrna. In this story, the embassy found Umur reclining on the 
ground, eating abundantly from a golden spoon, his stomach protruding like a barrel. 
After hearing the proposal from the embassy, Umur explained that he had no fear of 
the Christians, as long as the Guelph and Ghibelline factions were still thriving.172 The 
account is obviously fantastical, but after this point it does seem likely that the 
Venetians had cooled in their dedication to the crusade. For example, after Humbert 
had reached Negroponte, the Cretan government found various reasons to refuse him 
vessels to transport his army to Smyrna, before finally agreeing to provide assistance in 
May 1346.173 Similarly, it is known that in November the Venetian authorities had been 
ordered by the pope to stop detaining those who wish to go to fight in Romania.174 If 
the anonymous Roman chronicler is to be believed, they may have even prevented 
supplies from reaching the city and fleeced the crusaders of all their money.175 In the 
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winter of 1346-7 commercial relations between Venice and the Hospitallers also 
declined: after the Order had imposed a new customs duties on Venetian merchants, 
the Cretan government decreed that all trade with Hospitaller islands be prohibited.176 
This may be what the anonymous Roman chronicler was referring to when he added 
that rivalries existed between the Venetians and the Hospitallers, who were preventing 
Venetian ships from coming to Smyrna and providing supplies and weapons to the 
Turks.177  
 It has been shown that the Republic was eager to participate in the league and 
had made a substantial commitment to it, at least up until Humbert’s mission to 
Smyrna in 1346. The granting of the licence to trade with Egypt in 1344 undoubtedly 
eased the restrictions on the Republic’s overseas trade and may have facilitated 
continued Venetian participation at a time when it might have ended. But even the 
capture of Smyrna and the granting of the licence to trade with Egypt were not enough 
to alleviate the dire economic situation. As Zachariadou has stated, the Crusade of 
Smyrna was destined to fail because it coincided with the closing of the Black Sea 
markets by the Mongols.178 To say the crusade was a failure is perhaps too strong a 
suggestion, but full Venetian commitment was obviously hampered by the restrictions 
on trade in the Black Sea. Ultimately these were too great and the Republic and was 
forced to reopen commercial negotiations with the Anatolian emirates when possible, 
which provides a reason for Venice’s rather half-hearted commitment to the crusade in 
1346-7, although even during these years, Venetian participation did not cease 
altogether.  
 So should this affect the view of Venetian involvement in the Crusade of 
Smyrna? Firstly, to say that the Venice had withdrawn from the league altogether at 
this point would be misleading. It is known that in January 1347 the Senate took the 
decision to arm five more galleys for the league and in December two more were 
promised.179 This was probably because of the renewal of Turkish raids in that year.180 
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Similarly, to say that the Venetians lacked long-term commitment to the crusade is also 
probably not true for the Crusade of Smyrna.181 The commitment of the Venetians 
wavered at the time of the greatest economic hardship in 1346-7, but they were the 
ones who pushed for a resumption of the league in 1350, after piratical attacks from 
Aydin had resumed once more. This indicates that at the least, the Venetians must 
have deemed the league to be effective for them to petition for it to be reformed. 
Moreover, Atiya’s claim that the Venetians did not fight for the papal cause, but rather 
for the trade privileges they attained from the Turks after the capture of Smyrna, is 
both overly-cynical and inaccurate, as the initiative in seeking a truce with Aydin did 
not come from the Venetians, but rather from Humbert of Vienne and it was then 
agreed to by Clement VI in November 1346.182 Furthermore, later negotiations 
between the crusaders and Hizir of Aydin in 1348-9 were not undertaken by the 
Venetians, but by the papal representatives Bartolommeo of Tomari and Octavian 
Zaccaria, the latter being a citizen of Genoa.183 At this stage the Venetians were 
suspicious that Octavian would push for Genoese interests and even wrote letters of 
protest to the pope over their exclusion from these negotiations.184 The clauses of the 
treaties certainly benefitted the maritime states in the Aegean, but not specifically the 
Venetians. In reality the treaties mirrored the makeup of the crusade and the interests 
of the participants as they included a mixture of ecclesiastical benefits for the 
Christians in Smyrna and concessions relating to trade in the Aegean. The only source 
which may back of Atiya’s claim is the story from the anonymous Roman chronicler of a 
Venetian embassy sent to Umur in early 1346, but as previously stated, this appears to 
be a highly fantastical tale told by a source which can be of dubious reliability.185 
Zachariadou has claimed that the situation in 1346 gave the chronicler’s account ‘great 
credibility’, but this does not explain why the Venetian archives, which provide so much 
information about Venetian treaties with the Turks, made no mention of what would 
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have been an important decision by either the Venetian or Cretan governments.186 
Having considered these factors it seems that none of the trade privileges gained by 
the crusaders from Aydin were exacted at the behest of the Venetians, and thus, any 
claim that they fought only for these privileges must be treated with caution.  
 In the final years of the crusade, from 1348 until the truce of 1351, Venetian 
participation in the crusade did dwindle and eventually end. But as shall be shown, this 
was partly due to factors out of the Republic’s control. On 5 July 1348, after the death 
of Umur, the Senate ordered that the Venetian galleys for the league be recalled 
because of the heavy expense and a lack of eagerness from other participants to 
support the common cause.187 This must have been a reference to the pope’s 
comments that a truce with the Turks was needed, because of problems in financing 
and recruiting caused by the wars in Europe.188 Shortly after this a temporary truce was 
agreed with Hizir until mid 1349.189 At this time, the Black Death had also begun to take 
its toll on Venetian possessions, making any concerted action against the Turks difficult 
to undertake.190 Although raids from Aydin against Venetian territories did resume in 
1349-50,191 another more serious enemy, the great maritime rival of Genoa had begun 
to prepare for an attack on Venetian colonies.192 This meant that even though the 
Venetians had managed to force the renewal of the league in response to attacks from 
Aydin in 1350, war with Genoa broke out before any action could be undertaken.193 
Consequently, in 1351 the league was officially dissolved.194 
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 Therefore, it seems that Venetian participation in the Crusade of Smyrna was 
dictated by the economic situation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
The initial response and involvement of the Republic in the crusade was high up to 
1344, despite the economic difficulties experienced by Venice at this time, but the 
security of the grain trade was always the primary concern of the Republic. Therefore, 
by the time of Humbert of Vienne’s passage east, during which the economic pressure 
had become unbearable, the commitment of the Republic declined. Even so, Venice 
never withdrew itself from the crusade and when Turkish forces resumed their raiding 
in the later 1340s, it was the one to push for the league to be reformed. But, by this 
time other factors meant that no other state was able to fully commit to a crusade. 
 
 
6.2.3. Genoese participation in the Crusade of Smyrna 
The position of the Genoese in the Aegean was weakened after the loss of Chios in 
1329 and suffered a further blow in 1336, when the Genoese of Phokaia had been 
forced to surrender to the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III after a failed invasion of 
Lesbos.195 Alum was still being mined and exported from Phokaia to Genoa after this 
point, but Genoese traders had been forced to instead expand their trade in the Black 
Sea and elsewhere.196 In these regions, the Genoese had intermittent contact with the 
Turks, but unlike Venice, their concern did not lie in the protection of overseas colonies 
from the raids of Umur of Aydin.197 It is probably for this reason that the Commune of 
Genoa did not fully participate in the Crusade of Smyrna, as Venice had done, despite 
                                                        
195 In 1334, worried by the aggressive strategy of Andronikos III, Domenico Cattaneo, the lord of 
Phokaia, with the help of the duke of Naxos and the Hospitallers, attempted to occupy the island of 
Lesbos. By the summer of 1335 the Latins had managed to seize the port of Mytilene and other regions, 
leaving a garrison at Phokaia. Andronikos allied himself with the emir of Sarukhan, whose son was being 
held hostage in Phokaia, and also with the Turks of Aydin (Umur, Hizir and Suleymanshah). The 
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Turkish hostages to the emir of Sarukhan and sworn obedience to the emperor. For more on this 
episode, see Lemerle, Aydin, 108-15; Zachariadou, TC, 38-9; Balard, Romanie génoise, i. 72-3. 
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Black Sea: Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 12, ch. 117, p. 230; Giorgio Stella, 134. 
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papal appeals for it to do so.198 As a result of this, an assessment of Genoese 
involvement in the crusade will focus on the role of Martino Zaccaria in the naval 
league and of the other notable Genoese influence on the expedition – the seizure of 
Chios by Simone Vignoso.  
 In 1337 Martino Zaccaria was released from prison in Constantinople after eight 
years of incarceration in response to the petition of Pope Benedict XII and King Philip VI 
of France.199 As a condition of his release he had been forced to swear an oath to the 
Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III promising never to attack Byzantine lands. In 1343 
Clement VI absolved Martino from this oath and made him captain of the papal galleys 
for the naval league against the Turks.200 It is likely that Martino saw the crusade as an 
opportunity to recover Chios and he may well have recommended the island to the 
pope as a strategic base for an attack on Smyrna. The island was obviously attractive to 
the crusaders – it commanded the trade routes in and out of the Bay of Smyrna and 
Martino Zaccaria, as Lord of Chios, had successfully resisted the Turks from Aydin and 
elsewhere for over thirteen years from the island.201 
 Martino was certainly focussed on the recapture of Chios and once the league 
reached Negroponte he began planning for an attack on his former domain, against 
papal wishes. The appointment of Martino as captain of the papal galleys and the 
absolution granted to him from his vow not to attack the empire was an 
uncharacteristically naive move by the pope, who seems to have regretted his decision 
once the fleet reached the Aegean. In a letter of September 1344 Clement ordered 
Henry of Asti to prevent Martino from attempting to seize the island. According to the 
letter, Clement had received a ‘displeasing and troubling report’ that Martino Zaccaria 
had directed the fleet ‘for the taking by force of the island of Chios’ rather than the 
defence of the faith. Moreover, Martino had asked the archbishop of Thebes, the 
master of the Hospitallers and the Cypriots ‘to send their own galleys for this purpose’, 
                                                        
198 Some Genoese sailors took the cross in 1344, but deserted after receiving advances of their wages: 
CVI France, i. nr. 815-17; Setton, PL, i. 190. Clement VI also asked Genoa to aid Humbert in his enterprise 
in February 1346: CVI Autres, nr. 911. 
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 BXII, France, nr. 283; Argenti, Chios, i. 68-9; Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 50. 
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 Martino was made captain on 24 August: CVI France, i. nr. 368. He was absolved from his vow on 12 
October: ‘Acta Clementis VI’, Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis, ed. 
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with the archbishop forcing the Cypriots to this by sentences of excommunication. This 
had caused anxiety amongst the Greeks, who had previously been willing to contribute 
to the league and had instead led them to enter into negotiations with the Turks.202 It 
appears that certain Byzantine agents communicated their anxiety to Venice about the 
large Latin force which was active in the Aegean. This led the Venetian Senate to 
declare to the emperor that they had no designs on Chios, but at the same time to 
warn him to defend it properly so that it could not be taken.203  
 Unfortunately, precise details on the actions of Martino Zaccaria are hard to 
trace because of the vagueness of the sources. The wording of the letter from Clement 
VI to Henry Asti makes it unclear as to whether Martino had already made a attack on 
Chios, or was just in the process of organising one. As no other sources mention a 
definite assault on Chios by Martino, which would have been a major event, it can be 
assumed that the pope was referring to Martino’s intentions and not his actions. As it is 
known that the crusade fleet captured Smyrna only weeks after the letter was 
dispatched to Henry of Asti, and that Chios remained in Greek hands until 1346. Still 
from Clement VI’s correspondence with Henry of Asti it is plausible that Martino was 
only serving his own interests in the Aegean, as the pope twice stated to his legate that 
he had not heard of any notable performance from Martino and asked whether he 
should be replaced by the end of the year. The second of these enquiries came after 
the crusaders had captured Smyrna.204 Whether Martino Zaccaria would have been 
replaced as captain will never be known as on 17 January 1345 he was killed outside 
Smyrna, along with the other crusade leaders.205 However, the evidence indicates that 
his actions as captain of the papal galleys were dictated by self-serving interests, 
                                                        
202 CVI France, i. nr. 1113, col. 185. 
203 At this time the Senate also voted against the possibility of purchasing the island from the emperor: 
TR, i. nr. 171 (dated 31 May 1344); Lemerle, Aydin, 187, n. 3. The Venetians even seem to have 
considered purchasing New Phokaia as well, as on 24 July 1345, the Senate instructed the new baillie of 
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since the death of the megadux Apokaukos in June: TR, i. nr. 182; Inalcik, ‘Turkish maritime 
principalities’, 196. 
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captain, Clement had also suggested he could be replaced if needed: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra 
Vaticana, reg. 137, f. 103r, ep. 324; summary in CVI France, i. nr. 405. 
205 See above, p. 197.  
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especially his attempted diversion to Chios, which was considered as being detrimental 
to the outcome of the crusade. 
 The other major Genoese impact on the Crusade of Smyrna was Simone 
Vignoso’s seizure of Chios in 1346. Chios, and the decision whether to use it as a base 
of operations or not, was prominent in the plans of the crusade leaders ever since 
Martino Zaccaria had been appointed as a papal captain of the league. Humbert of 
Vienne also toyed with the idea whether to take the island or not, and wrote to 
Clement VI about this in 1346.206 The pope, at Humbert’s request, then wrote to Anna 
of Savoy, the Dowager Empress and Regent of Emperor John V Palaiologos in 
Constantinople, to ask if the island could be allocated to the crusaders as a base for 
three years, which would also enable Humbert to try and pave the way for future 
Church Union negotiations with the Greeks.207 Humbert has been accused of 
procrastinating over the requisitioning of Chios, but considering Clement’s reservations 
at Martino Zaccaria’s intention to divert the fleet to the island, and the possible harm 
this would do to relations with the Greeks, his reluctance should be regarded as 
prudent. Moreover, Humbert was not to know that during the time of his 
communication with the Curia over Chios, the Genoese commander Simone Vignoso 
would appear off Negroponte with a fleet of 29 galleys, with the intention of capturing 
the island.208  
 According to Giorgio Stella, Vignoso found Humbert’s fleet of 26 galleys, mostly 
belonging to Venice and the Hospitallers, preparing for an attack on Chios. Humbert 
offered the Genoese money and jewels if they would join him in an attack on the 
island, but they refused. After a scuffle with Humbert’s force, Vignoso seized Chios 
before the Dauphin’s fleet could arrive at the island. Within a week, the whole island 
had apparently been conquered, save the castle of Chios Town, which submitted in 
                                                        
206 The importance of Chios in Humbert’s crusade has been discussed in detail by Lemerle, Aydin, 196, n. 
3, 200, n. 1, 202; Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 167; Housley, Avignon, 255, n. 67. 
207 CVI France, ii. nr. 2580-6. 
208 Vignoso arrived at Negroponte on 8 June 1346. His fleet had originally been assembled for an attack 
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September. By 17 September the towns of Old and New Phokaia, along with the alum 
mines had also been taken.209 The administration set up by Vignoso, which became 
known as the Mahona of Chios, was to rule the island until 1566. Although the Mahona 
became a significant force in the Aegean, they do not seem to have played any part in 
last years of the Crusade of Smyrna.210 
 One explanation for the hostility shown by the Genoese towards Humbert and 
the Crusade of Smyrna in general can be found in the composition of the crusade fleet, 
which they may have viewed as being predominantly a Venetian enterprise. This has 
been argued by Atiya, who claims that Vignoso’s fleet was sent specifically for the 
purpose of seizing Chios before Humbert did.211 However, Argenti has argued 
convincingly that the Genoese could not have known of Humbert’s intentions until they 
had reached the Aegean, meaning that Vignoso had not specifically planned to disrupt 
the crusade by capturing Chios.212 Nevertheless, other evidence of Genoese suspicion 
over Venetian participation in the crusade does exist: there is a letter purporting to be 
written by Umur of Aydin and his brothers to Pope Clement VI, which is steeped in anti-
Venetian rhetoric and was certainly written by enemies of the Republic, most probably 
the Genoese. In the letter, the emir explained that the pope should not ‘incite 
Christians, and especially Italians distinguished by the sign of the cross’ to fight him, as 
the ‘Turkish people are innocent of the death and injury of your Christ’ and did not 
occupy ‘the lands and places where there are holy sites’. Instead the Turks were 
ancestors of the Italians ‘because they and their origins stemmed from the bloodline of 
the Trojans’ and maintained a hidden affection for them. The only exception to this 
were the Venetians who ‘by their arrogance and audacity’ had long ago occupied lands 
which were promised to the Turks. Furthermore, the emir wrote that: 
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Because of these and other factors you will justly be able to cease from 
your undertakings, and especially since we have heard that the Venetian 
people themselves are strangers to the way of life and morals of the 
Romans because among themselves they live with neither law nor 
morals, but think that they alone are better than all the surrounding 
peoples, whose frenzy and arrogance [we shall crush]213 by the aid of our 
gods and of Jupiter most high.214 
 
This letter, even though written by a Genoese, does provide an explanation for their 
reluctance to contribute to the crusade: they were maritime rivals with Venice and the 
participation of one city in a crusade meant the alienation of the other. In fact, during 
these years when the Genoese had not yet firmly re-established themselves in the 
Aegean, they were more concerned with trade in the Black Sea than resistance against 
the Turks. After the Venetians began to send ships once again to trade in Tana, which 
the Genoese believed to be in contravention of a joint Genoese-Venetian embargo of 
the port, the doge of Genoa ordered that Venetian ships be seized and war followed.215 
In the following years the Genoese began to directly assault Venetian possessions in 
the Aegean,216 and in early 1351 they attacked Naxos, capturing Duke Januli Sanudo.217 
At this time the Genoese also began to form their own treaties with the Turks. In May 
1351 they sent an embassy to Hizir at Ephesos, and asked the Genoese consul and 
merchants at Ephesos to provisions from the city to Chios when required.218 With the 
                                                        
213 Here a word is missing. The verb has been deduced from ridurre in the Italian version, which reads: La 
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Genoese so willing to undermine the position of the naval league in the Aegean it is 
easy to see why the crusade ended in that year. 
 
 
Chapter 6 Overview 
 
The Crusade of Smyrna signifies the climax of crusading against the Turks in this 
period. Its successful organisation was largely a result of the diplomatic astuteness and 
tenacity of Clement VI. It is true that at the time of the pope’s coronation the situation 
in the Aegean was favourable for a crusade against the Turks: raids from Aydin were 
seriously threatening Latin territories in the Aegean and the Cypriots, Venetians and 
Hospitallers all favoured military action, but the pope went to greater lengths in 
organising the crusade than any of his predecessors. This can be judged by the 
mechanisms introduced for this crusade, many of which had never been used for an 
expedition against the Turks before. This was the case for finance and recruitment, 
where Clement was the first pope to decree that preaching be carried out for a 
crusade against the Turks and that church tithes be used to fund it. Moreover, the 
indulgences Clement granted for the crusade were the most generous yet granted for 
action against the Turks. Although the primary purpose of these indulgences was to 
secure more funding for the crusade, it is also reasonable to suggest that the high level 
of spiritual rewards reflected the importance of the crusade. The fact that the Crusade 
of Smyrna attracted such a high level of Church organisation and financial contribution 
is evidence that the Turks were now considered as the most serious threat the Latins in 
the East. This view was shared by contemporaries in Europe, who responded 
enthusiastically to the call for a crusade against the Turks, most notably Humbert of 
Vienne, a prominent European knight with no vested interests in the Aegean. 
 The pope was also aware of the concerns and interests of the maritime 
republics in the crusade: he granted Venice permission to trade with Egypt in order to 
facilitate her continued participation in the naval league, at a time of economic 
hardship, and was wary of Martino Zaccaria’s designs on Chios. The Venetians, for their 
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part, were eager participants in the league up to 1346 when the dire economic 
situation, due to the closing of the Black Sea markets, made it difficult to maintain a 
consistent level of participation. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the 
Venetians never withdrew from the crusade. Their commitment wavered and they 
came into conflict with the Hospitallers, but they were the ones who pushed for a 
resumption of the league in 1350. The Genoese, on the other hand, at times disrupted 
the crusade. Martino Zaccaria’s motivations were treated with suspicion by the pope 
who thought that he would divert the crusade to Chios and, although this never 
happened, his countryman Simone Vignoso was able to capture the island in 
September 1346; an action which obstructed Humbert of Vienne’s expedition. 
Moreover, the escalating conflict between the Genoese and the Venetians put an end 
to the continuation of the naval league in the early 1350s.  
However, it should be remembered that by this stage the crusaders at Smyrna 
had reached a stalemate with the Turks and as early as November 1346 negotiations 
for a truce with Aydin had been given official papal sanction. From this point it was 
unlikely that the Latins would be able to build upon their foothold in Smyrna. 
Nevertheless, the achievements of the crusade, especially the naval victories at Longos 
and Imbros, and the capture of the harbour of Smyrna in 1345, were all significant 
feats. The fact that the Latins managed to maintain control of parts of Smyrna after the 
death of the crusade leaders in 1345 and throughout a period of economic hardship, 
plague, and wars amongst the Christians in Europe and the East was remarkable.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the period covered in this study various small scale enterprises and major crusades 
were launched against the Turkish maritime emirates. It has hopefully been shown 
that the first half of the fourteenth century was not a period of aborted expeditions 
and idleness, as some have claimed, but one in which the target of a crusade and the 
motivations of those who participated in them changed dramatically.1 In the first half 
of the fourteenth century the western attitude towards the Anatolian Turkish 
emirates, as manifested in crusading strategy, changed from one of ambivalence to 
one of open opposition. In line with this shift in crusade policy, the relationship 
between the papacy and the Latins in the Aegean changed, as they began to be 
regarded as forming the bulwark of Christian resistance to the expansion of the 
maritime emirates. At this final stage it is time to come to some conclusions about the 
motivations to, and response of, the Latins and the papacy to the Aegean crusades. 
Firstly an assessment of the change in papal crusade strategy, and what motivated the 
actions of the different popes will be carried out. After this, the specific role and 
motivations of the Genoese and Venetians in these expeditions will be undertaken. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this study, the first important point to note is 
that papal crusade strategy in the Aegean should not be viewed in isolation and was as 
much dictated by events in Europe as those in the East. This was especially the case in 
the early years of the century when the Turks were noted as posing a threat to the 
Byzantine empire, as documented in various papal letters, but were not yet regarded 
as an adequate justification for a crusade of their own. This is illustrated by the 
crusade bulls of Benedict XI and Clement V; these mentioned that a crusade to recover 
Constantinople would help drive the Turks from western Anatolia, but the rhetoric 
they contained undoubtedly suggested that the primary “target” of the crusade was 
still the schismatic Greeks.2 The focus of these crusades was largely a result of the 
French influence over the papacy, which dictated crusade policy in these years. Hence 
a crusade to Constantinople and to the Holy Land, spearheaded by Philip IV of France 
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and his brother Charles of Valois, took precedence over any other expedition to the 
Aegean. Similarly, in the 1320s, at a time when crusade strategy was beginning to shift 
slowly towards the Aegean, John XXII still harboured hopes of launching a crusade with 
the kings of France to the Holy Land. However, as negotiations with the French became 
increasingly hindered by financial constraints and the escalating conflict with England, 
an Aegean crusade began to be considered as a more likely alternative. Under 
Benedict XII events in Europe became so critical that an Aegean policy was abandoned 
altogether. Hereafter, a pope with political shrewdness and exceptional commitment 
to the Crusade was needed for a expedition to be realised. This was the case during 
the pontificate of Clement VI, but even during the Crusade of Smyrna,  problems of 
finance and recruitment, as a result of the wars in Europe, prevented the pope from 
sustaining a consistent level of support. 
The gradual abandonment of a Franco-papal crusade during the 1320s 
coincided with increased reports of Turkish aggression in the Aegean, especially when 
the Zaccaria of Chios, allied with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, began to oppose raids 
from the maritime emirates in the eastern Aegean. The Zaccaria and Hospitallers won 
several naval battles at this time, such as the defeat of a fleet from Aydin in 1319. This 
triggered a major shift in the Curia’s crusade policy when John XXII granted the 
Zaccaria and other Latins in the East trade licences (1320 and 1325) and indulgences in 
articulo mortis (1322, 1323 and 1325) for fighting against the Turks in Achaia and on 
Chios.3 This signified an important development in crusade thinking as the papacy 
began to recognise that the Latins in the Aegean, who also had mercantile interests, 
needed support in a “temporal” as well as spiritual manner in order to continue to 
defend Latin lands – and trade routes – from Muslim attack. Henceforth, the popes 
showed greater economic awareness towards their strategy in the East. However, at 
this time the papacy was still acting one step behind the Latins in the Aegean as these 
papal privileges were granted on petition and not the at the behest of the Curia. 
Moreover, these privileges were still relatively minor when compared to those granted 
for planned crusades to the Holy Land and elsewhere by John XXII and his 
predecessors. The papacy and the French Crown still harboured hopes of launching a 
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crusade to the Holy Land and this was the priority, but by the 1320s the Turks in the 
Aegean had appeared on the Curia’s “crusade radar” so to speak. 
Interestingly the next instance of papal support against the Turks was not to 
come until 1333, when John XXII agreed to contribute galleys to the Venetian-
organised naval league. There are two clear reasons for this delay: firstly, the Zaccaria, 
whom the papacy had formed close ties with during the early 1320s, had lost Chios to 
the Byzantines in 1329 and were no longer a force in the Aegean; secondly, the 
Venetians, the other major Latin power in the Aegean, were less willing to uphold 
papal policy in the Aegean as the Zaccaria had done. Venice had suffered from raids of 
the allied Turks and Catalans since the summer of 1318, but had repeatedly refused 
offers to join a papal-Angevin expedition to the Morea against the Catalans, made in 
1318, 1322, 1324, 1328 and 1331.4 Instead the Republic had formed a series of truces 
with the Catalans and occasional peace agreements with the Turks. In addition to this, 
they had embarked upon a policy of reconciliation with Byzantium and regarded them 
as a potential ally in the Aegean. John XXII had criticised the Venetians for their soft 
policy towards the ‘schismatics and enemies of God’ in 1332 and it seems likely that 
this factious relationship with the Venetians prevented the pope from committing to a 
naval league against the Turks until 1333.5 The contribution of the papacy towards the 
naval league was an important development in crusade strategy: it now recognised 
that a primarily maritime expedition, organised by the Latins in the East, was the most 
effective form of defence of the region. Nevertheless, the in articulo mortis 
indulgences granted to John of Cepoy and his contingent for the league were still less 
generous than those granted for a Holy Land crusade. Moreover, preaching was not 
ordered and church tithes were not levied for the league. 
 The 1334 naval league did not, however, usher in a period of cooperation 
between the Latins in the East and the papacy in regard to the Turkish threat. As was 
seen in Chapter 5, the escalation of the conflict between France and England and the 
financial difficulties experienced by the Florentine banking houses undoubtedly 
distracted papal attention from the East. That the Turks were posing a threat to the 
Latins is undoubted – the Hospitallers, Venetians, Cypriots and Armenians all 
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petitioned the pope for aid, but this was rarely forthcoming. In particular, Benedict 
made no effort to support the anti-Turkish cause in the Aegean and he potentially 
weakened it by granting indulgences to those fighting the Mamluks in Anatolia, but not 
against the Turks elsewhere. The lack of papal involvement in Aegean affairs was 
further demonstrated by the refusal of Benedict XII to assist the  Venetians and the 
Hospitallers in the formation of  another league against the Turks in 1336. The 
pontificate of Benedict XII thus signified the reversal of the strategy of increased 
involvement in the Aegean, witnessed during the pontificate of John XXII.  
 Benedict XII died before any response could be made to the appeals from the 
Cypriots and the Hospitallers, but his successor Clement VI was quick to take action. 
The Crusade of Smyrna can be seen as the high point of crusading against the Turks in 
this period – both in terms of papal support and the achievement of the crusade, as 
seen in the final chapter of this thesis. Like the Latins in the East, Clement considered a 
naval league as the most effective way of stemming the Turkish advance. Housley is 
right to suggest that the pope’s role in the Crusade of Smyrna was decisive: he secured 
Venetian participation in the league in early 1343 and published crusade bulls for the 
expedition in that summer.6 These bulls announced a level of papal support greater 
than any previously received for a crusade solely aimed at the Turks: preaching of the 
crusade was ordered, church tithes were used to fund it and the full crusade 
indulgence was issued for participation on the campaign alone, or to those who could 
make financial contributions. That the Crusade of Smyrna was allocated such a high 
level of Church involvement was both a reflection on Clement’s commitment to the 
Crusade and of the change of perception of the Turks, who were now regarded as 
representing the most serious threat to Christendom. This was mirrored in the 
enthusiastic response to the crusade which came from those, such as in northern Italy 
and Vienne, who had no commercial interests in the Aegean. Like John XXII, Clement VI 
also recognised the concerns and interests of the maritime republics in the crusade: he 
was aware of the difficult economic situation in the Aegean after the closing of the 
Black Sea markets and granted the Venetians permission to trade with Egypt in order 
to facilitate continued participation in the naval league. 
                                                        
6 Ch. 6, pp. 187-91. 
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The league, like that of 1334, inflicted a number of significant naval victories 
over the Turks and managed unexpectedly to capture the harbour and harbour 
fortress of Smyrna from Umur of Aydin, the main culprit of Turkish maritime 
aggression. Umur’s ability to threaten the Latin presence in the Aegean was greatly 
reduced by the capture of the harbour at Smyrna, but the crusaders were unable to 
build on their initial success. The crusade suffered a massive setback when the leaders 
died outside the city walls in 1345, and although a second wave of the crusade led by 
Humbert of Vienne reached Smyrna in 1346, and Umur was himself killed in 1348, the 
crusade had reached a stalemate. Negotiations for a truce were expedited in the later 
1340s, when the Black Death and the dire economic situation in the Aegean began to 
take its toll on both Turks and crusaders. As the crusade began to peter out, the 
emerging  conflict between Venice and Genoa put an end to the revival of the league. 
The death of Clement VI in December 1352 was the final nail in the coffin for the 
crusade. 
In terms of the role of the Genoese in an Aegean crusade, it is first necessary to 
state that the Genoese government never committed to an Aegean crusade. 
Nevertheless, certain Genoese citizens, such as the Zaccaria family, played a significant 
role in helping to steer papal crusading focus towards the Turks. As was seen in 
Chapter 2, the Zaccaria, often in alliance with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, formed the 
mainstay of Christian resistance to the Turks in the 1320s. Their control of the rich 
island of Chios and the participation of the family in the alum trade bought them much 
wealth, but without the resources of a maritime empire as the Venetians enjoyed, the 
Zaccaria needed papal support in order to maintain a hostile policy against the Turks. 
As a result of this, the Zaccaria petitioned the Curia for a licence to trade with the 
Mamluk sultanate and Martino Zaccaria requested indulgences for himself and those 
who would fight for him.7 For these petitions, the Zaccaria specifically linked the 
maintenance of secure trade with protection of the Christians in the Aegean. Thus for 
both the Zaccaria and the papacy, trade and crusade had begun to be perceived and 
                                                        
7 Ch. 2, pp. 94-7. 
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projected as two complimentary facets in the defence of the faith. They were clearly 
not mutually exclusive as some scholars have maintained.8  
In the following years Martino Zaccaria, probably aided by the close support of 
the papacy, managed to form a small empire in Romania. He enjoyed the acclaim of 
the crusade theorists and made close links with the nobility of Frankish Greece. 
However, by furthering his own personal interests, Martino antagonised his overlord 
Emperor Andronikos III and his own brother Benedetto II, eventually losing Chios to 
the Byzantines in 1329. Martino did reappear during the Crusade of Smyrna as the 
captain of the papal galleys, but his participation was viewed with suspicion by the 
pope, he died outside the city walls in 1345. The involvement of other Genoese in the 
Crusade of Smyrna was similarly undistinguished: Simone Vignoso’s capture of Chios 
caused problems from Humbert of Vienne and Genoese conflicts with Venice in the 
early 1350s eventually ended any hope of re-forming the naval league. Although the 
crusade had reached a stalemate by this point, it is clear that the rivalries between the 
two great maritime republics still remained a potentially devastating obstacle to any 
crusade. 
A consistent Venetian policy towards the crusades in the Aegean, and 
especially towards the Turks, is hard to identify. As outlined in Chapter 3, the Republic 
enjoyed peaceful relations with the Turks, especially from Menteshe, for the early 
years of the fourteenth century. However, after the joint attacks of the Catalans and 
Aydin Turks in 1318 this changed and the Serenissima began to take measures to 
defend its colonies from future depredations. Unlike the Zaccaria of Chios, the 
Venetians were the dominant power in the Aegean – they had significant territories in 
the region, a highly organised administration at the mother city and the power of a 
maritime empire behind them. Thus, unlike the Zaccaria, the Venetians in the Aegean 
did not rely on papal support for the security of their trade in the region. The 
unwillingness of the Republic to participate in papal-Angevin attempts to recover parts 
of the Morea and its willingness to form peace treaties with the Catalans, who were 
the prime focus of papal-Angevin aggression, led to the Venetians forming their own 
policy of resistance to the Turks, independent of papal control. In Chapters 3 and 4 the 
                                                        
8 See Runciman and Atiya’s statements in Introduction, p. 11. 
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formation of a naval league against the Turks was discussed. It was shown that the 
Venetians, acting initially on the advice of Marino Sanudo, were the primary organisers 
of a naval league and, in this sense, they led the way in formulating a new crusade 
strategy. A provisional league was formed with the Byzantines and Hospitallers in 1332 
and the papacy, France and Cyprus joined the league in 1333. The successful formation 
of the league demonstrated that after the Genoese loss of Chios in 1329, a crusade in 
the Aegean depended on Venetian participation. 
However, it is clear that the Venetians did not always oppose the Turks: they 
formed agreements with Menteshe (1318, 1331 and 1337) and Aydin (1337),9 and 
during the Crusade of Smyrna, their commitment also lessened. So what effect does 
this inconsistent policy have on an assessment of Venetian crusade enthusiasm and 
does it justify arguments, held by some, that the Venetians opposed the Crusade, or 
only fought for trade privileges and personal gain?10 Firstly, the Venetians recognised 
that to confront numerous Turkish emirates simultaneously would be militarily 
unsustainable, thus treaties were formed with Menteshe, which was not usually the 
perpetrator of raids against Venetian colonies; secondly, Venice usually supported 
action against the Turks when other allies could participate, such as in the naval league 
of 1334. The continued resistance of Venice alone was often considered too costly and 
counter-productive for maintaining secure trade in the Aegean. Thus the Venetians 
made peace with the Turks in 1337 primarily because papal support for a naval league 
was not forthcoming; thirdly, it has been shown that during the Crusade of Smyrna the 
negotiations for a truce, including trade privileges, undertaken by the crusaders were 
not initiated at the behest of the Venetians, but rather papal representatives. In 
contrast, the Venetians were the ones who pushed for a resumption of the naval 
league in 1350.  
It even seems the case that the Venetians, like the Zaccaria, realised the 
importance of terming their military actions in the Aegean as being motivated by 
defence of the faith. This appears to have been the case when they gained papal 
permission to trade with the Mamluk sultanate in 1344, at a time of Venetian 
participation in the naval league. In this instance, the Venetian petitioners at the Curia 
                                                        
9
 Ch. 3, pp. 106-7; ch. 5, pp. 175-9. 
10 Ch. 6, pp. 225-6. 
242 
 
had lauded the actions of their countrymen in fighting the Turks for the defence of the 
faith, a point not made in previously unsuccessful requests for licences.11  
Bearing these things in mind, it may be necessary for a reappraisal of the role 
of the maritime republics in the crusades. This study has hopefully shown that 
motivations of the papacy, the Genoese and the Venetians towards the Crusade were 
multi-faceted and inseparable. Unlike the seemingly Namierite assertions of Runciman 
and Atiya, it appears that in the fourteenth-century Aegean, as the maritime states 
became the primary participants in a crusade against the Turks, motivating factors of 
religion and commerce became blended together. The Zaccaria and the Venetians 
were no doubt fighting for the preservation of their trade routes, but they were also 
fighting for the defence of the faith. This was understood by the papacy and the 
merchants alike. As Benjamin Braude has explained, the idea of “religious ideology” 
positing consistent fanaticism and zealotry, such as Gibbon’s myth of the possessed 
Muslim riding out of the desert offering the cowering infidel the Quran or the sword, 
seldom reflects the complexity of human religious and material motivations.12 It must 
be remembered that religion can play a variety of roles for confrontation, as can 
commerce, and that motives can rarely be separated.13 In the second half of the 
century, as the Turks increased their expansion into the Aegean and the Ottomans 
emerged as the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean, the maritime republics 
would begin to play an even greater role in the defence of the faith. The strategies and 
motivations developed in the first half of the fourteenth century would henceforth 
come to dominate western thinking in resistance to this new Muslim threat. 
 
                                                        
11 Ch. 6,  pp. 217-20, 222-3. 
12 B. Braude, ‘Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia by Rudi Paul Lindner’, Speculum 62 (1987), 
701-3, at 702. 
13 Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 80. 
243 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
AA Acta Aragonensia: Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, 
spanischen, zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen 
Korrespondenz Jaymes II, 1291-1327, ed. H. Finke, 3 vols (Leipzig & 
Berlin, 1908-22). 
 
AE Annales Ecclesiastici, ed. C. Baronio, O. Raynaldus & J. Laderchi, 37 vols 
(Paris, 1608-1883). 
 
AIM Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi, sive Dissertationes, ed. L.A. Muratori, 
25 vols (Milan, 1723-1896). 
 
BEC Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 
 
BEFAR Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome 
 
BF 
 
Byzantinische Forschungen 
 
BMGS 
 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies  
 
BVIII 
 
Boniface VIII, Registres de Boniface VIII, ed. G. Digard et al., BEFAR, 4 
vols (Paris, 1907). 
 
BXI Benedict XI, Le registre de Benoit XI, ed. C. Grandjean, BEFAR (Paris, 
1903). 
 
BXII 
Communes 
Benedict XII,  ettres communes analys es d’après les registres dits 
d’Avignon et du Vatican, ed. J-.M. Vidal, BEFAR, 3 vols (Paris, 1903-11). 
 
BXII Autres  Benedict XII, Lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que 
la France, ed. G. Mollat & J.-M. Vidal, BEFAR (Paris, 1913-50). 
 
BXII France Benedict XII, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la 
France, ed. G. Daumet, BEFAR (Paris, 1920). 
 
BZ Byzantinische Zeitschrift 
 
CGH Cartulaire général des hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem, 1100-1310, 
ed. J. Delaville le Roulx, 4 vols (Paris, 1894-1905). 
 
CPR 
 
Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and 
Ireland: Papal Letters (1198-1513), ed. W.H. Bliss et al., 19 vols (London 
& Dublin, 1893-1998 in progress). 
 
CSP Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, 
244 
 
Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of 
Northern Italy: 1202-1675, ed. R. Brown & H.F. Brown,  40 vols (London, 
1864-1947). 
 
CV Clement V, Regestum Clementis Papae V, ed. Monks of the Order of St. 
Benedict, 10 vols (Rome, 1885-92). 
 
CVI France Clement VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales du pape Clément VI se 
rapportant à la France, ed. E. Depréz et al., BEFAR, 3 vols (Paris, 1901-
61). 
 
CVI Autres  Clement VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales du pape Clément VI 
intéressant les pays autres que la France, ed. E. Depréz & G. Mollat, 
BEFAR, 1 vol. (Paris, 1960-1). 
 
DLC 
 
Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580, ed. & trans. N. Housley 
(London, 1996). 
 
DOC Diplomatari de l'Orient català, 1301-1409: colleció de documents per a 
la història de l'expedició catalana a Orient i dels ducats d'Atenes i 
Neopàtria, ed. A. Rubio y Lluch (Barcelona, 1947). 
 
Doehaerd Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l’Outremont 
d’après les archives notariales génoises aux XIII et XIV siècles, ed. R. 
Doehaerd, 3 vols (Brussels, 1941). 
 
DVL Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum: sive Acta et Diplomata res Venetas 
Graecas atque Levantis Illustrantia a. 1300-1454, ed. G.M. Thomas, 2 
vols (Venice, 1880-99).  
 
EHR 
 
English Historical Review 
 
HC A History of the Crusades, ed. K. M. Setton, 6 vols (Madison, WI, 1969-
1989). 
 
HVR Housley, N., Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance 
Europe, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2001). 
 
JEH Journal of Ecclesiastical History 
 
JMH 
 
Journal of Medieval History 
 
JXXII Secrètes John XXII, Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Jean XXII (1316-1334), 
relatives à la France, ed. A. Coulon & S. Clémencet, BEFAR, 4 vols (Paris, 
1900-72). 
 
  
245 
 
JXXII 
Communes 
John XXII,  ettres communes analys es d’après les registres dits 
d’Avignon et du Vatican, ed. G. Mollat, BEFAR, 16 vols (Paris, 1904-47). 
 
LVR1 Luttrell, A.T., The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West, 
1291-1440: Collected Studies, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1978). 
 
LVR2 Luttrell, A.T., Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291-
1440, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1982). 
 
LVR3 Luttrell, A.T., The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean 
World, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1992). 
 
LVR4 Luttrell, A.T., The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western 
Provinces, 1306-1462, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1999). 
 
LVR5 Luttrell, A.T., Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306, Variorum Reprints 
(Aldershot, 2007). 
 
LGEM 
 
Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204, ed. B. 
Arbel, B. Hamilton & D. Jacoby (London, 1989). 
 
MGHSS Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 38 vols (Hannover, etc., 
1826-1934). 
 
MGHSSNS Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, Nova Series, 23 vols 
(Berlin, etc., 1922-2008). 
 
NCMH The New Cambridge Medieval History, 7 vols (Cambridge, 1995-2005). 
 
PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome 
 
Porphyrogenita 
 
Porphyrogenita: Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and 
the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, ed. C. Dendrinos, et 
al. (Aldershot, 2003). 
 
PPTS Library of the Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, 13 vols (London, 1887-
97). 
 
RHC Ar Recueil des historiens des croisades: documents arméniens, 2 vols 
(Paris, 1869-1906). 
 
RHC Oc 
 
Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux, 5 vols 
(Paris, 1844-96). 
 
RHC Or 
 
Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens orientaux, 5 vols (Paris, 
1872-1906). 
 
246 
 
RHGF  Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. M. Bouquet et al., 
24 vols (Paris, 1738-1904).  
 
RS The Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland During the 
Middle Ages: Published by the authority of her Majesty’s treasury, 
under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, 97 vols (London, 1858-
91). 
 
RIS Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, ed. L.A. Muratori et al., 25 vols (Milan, 
1723-51). 
 
RISNS 
 
Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new series, ed. G. Carducci et al., 34 vols 
(Bologna, etc., 1904-75). 
 
Setton, PL K.M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant: 1204-1571, 4 vols 
(Philadelphia, PA, 1976-84). 
 
SM Studi Medievali 
 
TD Délibérations des assemblées Vénitiennes concernant la Romanie: 
1160-1463, ed. F. Thiriet, 2 vols (Paris, 1966-71). 
 
TR Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie: 
1329-1463, ed. F. Thiriet, 3 vols (Paris, 1958-61). 
 
VPA Vitae Paparum Avenionensium, ed. E. Baluze & G. Mollat, 4 vols (Paris, 
1914-27). 
 
TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 
 
Zachariadou, 
TC 
E.A. Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates 
of Menteshe and Aydin: 1300-1415 (Venice, 1983). 
 247 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
 
Manuscript Sources 
 
Vatican City, Archivio segreto Vaticano:  
 
Registra Avenionensia, reg. 7, 17, 18, 22, 23, 46, 48. 
 
Registra Vaticana, reg. 66, 73, 74, 78, 79, 98, 107, 113, 115, 119, 129, 137, 140, 143, 
157, 169. 
 
Venice, Archivio di Stato di Venezia: 
 
Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio, reg. Capricornus; Clericus-Civicus; Fronesis; 
Magnus et Capricornus; Presbiter; Spiritus. 
 
Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 15, 17. 
 
 
Published Documents 
 
Acta Aragonensia: Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen, zur 
Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II, 
1291-1327, ed. H. Finke, 3 vols (Leipzig & Berlin, 1908-22).  
 
Acta pontifical suecica, I. Acta cameralia, ed. L.M. Baath, 2 vols (Stockholm, 1936-57). 
 
‘Apophaseis meizonos symvouliou Venetias, 1255-1669’, Istorika krêtika engrafa 
ekdidomena ek tou arheiou tês Benetias, ed. S.M. Theotokes, 2 vols (Athens, 
1933-7).  
 
 ‘Athènes et Néopatras: Régestes et documents pour servir à l’histoire ecclésiastique 
des Duchés catalans (1311-1395)’, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, Archivum Fratrum 
Praedicatorum 28 (1958), 5-91. 
 
Benedict XI, Le registre de Benoit XI, ed. CH. Grandjean, BEFAR (Paris, 1903). 
 
Benedict XII,  ettres communes analys es d’après les registres dits d’Avignon et du 
Vatican, ed. J-.M. Vidal, BEFAR, 3 vols (Paris, 1903-11). 
 
Benedict XII, Lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que la France, ed. G. 
Mollat &  J.-M. Vidal, BEFAR (Paris, 1913-50). 
 
 248 
Benedict XII, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France, ed. G. 
Daumet, BEFAR (Paris, 1920). 
 
Benedict XII, ‘Acta Benedicti XII’, Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris 
Canonici Orientalis, ed. A.L. Tautu, 14 vols (Rome, 1943-80).  
 
Boniface VIII, Les registres de Boniface VIII, ed. G. Digard, et al., BEFAR, 4 vols (Paris 
1886-1939).  
 
Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal 
Letters, 1198-1513, ed. W.H. Bliss et al., 19 vols (London & Dublin, 1893-1998 in 
progress).  
 
Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the 
Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy: 1202-
1675, ed. R. Brown & H.F. Brown,  40 vols (London, 1864-1947). 
 
Cartulaire général des hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem, 1100-1310, ed. J. Delaville le 
Roulx, 4 vols (Paris, 1894-1905).  
 
Clement V, Regestum Clementis Papae V, ed. Monks of the Order of St Benedict, 10 
vols (Rome, 1885-92). 
 
Clement VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales du pape Clément VI se rapportant à la 
France, ed. E. Depréz et al., BEFAR, 3 vols (Paris, 1901-61). 
 
Clement VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales du pape Clément VI intéressant les pays 
autres que la France, ed. E. Depréz & G. Mollat, BEFAR (Paris, 1960-1). 
 
Clement VI, ‘Acta Clementis VI’, Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris 
Canonici Orientalis, ed. A.L. Tautu, 14 vols (Rome, 1943-80).  
 
Commerce et expéditions militaires de la France et de Venise au moyen âge, ed. L. de 
Mas Latrie, Extrait de collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France: 
Mélanges historiques, 5 vols (Paris, 1873-86).  
 
Délibérations des assemblées Vénitiennes concernant la Romanie: 1160-1463, ed. F. 
Thiriet, 2 vols (Paris, 1966-71).  
 
Die Ausgaben der Apostolischen Kammer unter Benedikt XII., Klemens VI. und Innocenz 
VI. (1335-1362), ed. K.H. Sch fer (Paderborn, 1914). 
 
Die Einnahmen der Apostolischen Kammer unter Innozenz VI, ed. H. Hoberg 
(Paderborn, 1955). 
 
Die Einnahmen der Apostolischen Kammer unter Klemens VI, ed. L. Mohler (Paderborn, 
1931). 
 249 
 
‘Die Protokollbücher der p pstlichen Kammerkleriker: 1329-1347’, ed. H. Schröder, 
Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 27 (1937), 121-286. 
 
Diplomatari de l'Orient català, 1301-1409: colleció de documents per a la història de 
l'expedició catalana a Orient i dels ducats d'Atenes i Neopàtria, ed. A. Rubio y 
Lluch (Barcelona, 1947).  
 
Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum: sive acta et diplomata res venetas graecas atque 
levantis illustrantia a. 1300-1454, ed. G.M. Thomas, 2 vols (Venice, 1880-99).  
 
Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580, ed. & trans. N. Housley (London, 1996). 
 
Duca di Candia: Bandi (1313-1329), ed. P. Ratti-Vidulich (Venice, 1965).  
 
Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum (1340-1350), ed. P. Ratti-Vidulich (Venice, 
1976).  
 
Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et cujuscumque Generis Acta publica inter Reges Angliae 
et alios quosvis Imperatores, Reges, Pontifices, Principes, vel Communitates, 1110-
1654, ed. T. Rymer et al., 4 vols (London, 1816-69).  
 
I libri commemoriali della Republica di Venezia regesti, ed. R. Predelli, 4 vols (Venice, 
1876-83).  
 
Innocent III, Die Register Innocenz III, ed. O. Hageneder et al., 8 vols (Vienna, etc., 
1964-2008 in progress). 
 
‘Ioannis de Fontibus Ordinis Praedicatorum Epistula ad abbatem et conventum 
monasterii nescio cuius Constantinopolitani’, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, Archivum 
Fratrum Praedicatorum 30 (1960), 163-95.  
 
John XXII, Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Jean XXII, 1316-1334, relatives à la 
France, ed. A. Coulon & S. Clémencet, BEFAR, 4 vols (Paris, 1900-72). 
 
John XXII,  ettres communes analys es d’après les registres dits d’Avignon et du 
Vatican, ed. G. Mollat, BEFAR, 16 vols (Paris, 1904-47). 
 
Le deliberazioni del Consiglio dei Rogati (Senato): Serie “mixtorum”, ed. R. Cessi & P. 
Sambin, 2 vols (Venice, 1960).  
 
Le deliberazioni del Consiglio dei XL della Repubblica di Venezia, ed. A. Lombardo, 2 
vols (Venice, 1957). 
 
Les Grandes Chroniques de France, ed. J. Viard, 10 vols (Paris, 1820-53). 
  
 250 
Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l’Outremont d’après les archives 
notariales génoises aux XIII et XIV siècles, ed. R. Doehaerd, 3 vols (Brussels, 
1941).  
 
Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont d'après les archives 
notariales génoises (1320-1400), ed. L. Liagre-de Sturler, 2 vols (Brussels, 1969).  
 
 ‘Les Galères génoises dans la Manche et la Mer du Nord à la fin du XIIIe siècle et au 
début du XIVe siècle’, ed. R. Doehaerd, Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de 
Rome 19 (1938), 5-76.  
 
Lettere di Collegio, rectius Minor Consiglio: 1308-1310, ed. G. Giomo, 8 vols (Venice, 
1910). 
 
Mostra Documentaria Genova e Venezia tra i secoli XII e XIV, ed. A. Agosto (Genoa, 
1984).  
 
Necrologio di S. Maria Novella: testo integrale dall'inizio (MCCXXXV) al MDIV, ed. S. 
Orlandi, 2 vols (Florence, 1955).  
 
Nova Alamanniae: Urkunden, Briefe und andere Quellen besonders zur deutschen 
Geschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, ed. E.E. Stengel, 2 vols (Berlin, 1921-76). 
 
'Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll'impero Bizantino', ed. A. 
Sanguineti & G. Bertolotto, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 28 (1896), 
337-573.  
 
Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie: 1329-1463, ed. 
F. Thiriet, 3 vols (Paris, 1958-61). 
 
Registres du Trésor des Chartes, inventaire analytique, ed. M.R. Fawtier, 6 vols (Paris, 
1958-99).  
 
Saggio di codice diplomatico: Formato sulle antiche scritture dell’archivio di stato 
Napoli, ed. A. Minieri Riccio, 2 vols & 1 supplement in 2 parts (Naples, 1878-82).  
 
Sources for Turkish History in the Hospitallers’ Rhodian Archive: 1389-1422, ed. A.T. 
Luttrell & E.A. Zachariadou (Athens, 2008). 
 
The Records of the Venetian Senate on Disk, 1335-1400, ed. B. Kohl (New York, 2001).  
 
‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias: 1281-1385’, Istorika krêtika engrafa ekdidomena 
ek tou arheiou tês Benetias, ed. S.M. Theotokes, 2 vols (Athens, 1933-7).  
 
Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon, ed. M. Huillard-Bréholles, 2 vols (Paris, 1867). 
 251 
Narrative Sources 
 
 
Latin and Vernacular 
 
Adam Murimuth, Continuatio Chronicarum, ed. E.M. Thomson, RS 93 (London, 1889), 
1-276.  
 
Amalric Auger, ‘Clement V Sexta Vita (excerpt from Actus Romanorum Pontificum)’, 
VPA, i. 89-106.  
 
Andrea Dandolo, Chronica Brevis: 46-1342, ed. E. Pastorello, RISNS 12.1 (Bologna, 
1938), 329-73. 
 
Andrea Navagiero, ‘Storia della Repubblica Veneziana’, RIS 23 (Milan 1733), cols. 923-
1216. 
 
Annals of Ghent, ed. & trans. H. Johnstone (London, 1951). 
 
Annales Ecclesiastici, ed. C. Baronio, O. Raynaldus & J. Laderchi, 37 vols (Paris, 1608-
1883).  
 
‘Annales et Notae Colbazienses’, ed. W. Arndt, MGHSS 19 (Hannover, 1866), 710-20. 
  
‘Annales Gandenses’, ed. I.M. Lappenberg, MGHSS 16 (Hannover, 1859), 555-97. 
 
‘Annales Januenses: 1249-1269’, ed. H. Pertz, MGHSS 18 (Hannover, 1825), 226-66. 
 
‘Annales Londoniensis’, ed. W. Stubbs, Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward 
II, RS 76, 2 vols (London, 1882-3), i. 1-252.  
 
‘Annales Lubicenses’, ed. I.M. Lappenberg, MGHSS 16 (Hannover, 1859), 411-29. 
 
‘Annales Paulini’, ed. W. Stubbs, Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II, RS 
76, 2 vols (London, 1882-3), i. 253-370.  
 
Anonimo Romano, Cronica, ed. G. Porta (Milan, 1979).  
 
 ‘Historiae Romanae fragmenta’, AIM 3 (Milan, 1740), cols. 247-550. 
 
Bernard of Gui, ‘E Floribus Chronicorum’, RHGF, xxi. 689-734. 
 
 ‘John XII Secunda Vita (excerpt from Cathalogo Brevi Romanorum Pontificum)’, 
VPA, i. 137-51. 
 
Chronique des quatre premiers Valois, 1327-1393, ed. M.S. Luce (Paris, 1862).  
 
 252 
‘Cronica di Bologna’, RIS 18 (Milan, 1731), cols. 242-792. 
 
‘Chronicon Elwacense’, ed. D. Ottone Abel, MGHSS 10 (Hannover, 1852), 34-51. 
 
‘Chronique parisienne anonyme de 1316 à 1339’, ed. M.A. Hellot, Mémoires de la Société 
de l’histoire de Paris et de l’Ile-de-France 11 (Paris, 1884-5), 1-207.  
 
Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols (Paris, 1891-3).  
 
Chronographia Regum Francorum, ed. H Moranvillé, 3 vols (Paris, 1891-7).  
 
‘Continuatio Canonicorum Sancti Rudberti Salisburgensis’, ed. D.W. Wattenbach, 
MGHSS 9 (Hannover, 1861), 819-23. 
 
‘Continuatio Florianensis’, ed. D.W. Wattenbach, MGHSS 9 (Hannover, 1861), 747-53. 
 
‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, RHC Ar, ii. 367-517.  
 
Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, La Pratica Della Mercatura, ed. A. Evans (New York, NY, 
1936).  
 
Fulk of Villaret, ‘Mémoire de Foulques de Villaret sur la croisade’, ed. J. Petit, BEC 60 
(1899), 602-10.  
 
Giorgio Stella, Annales Genuenses, ed. G.P. Balbi, RISNS 17.2 (Bologna, 1975). 
  
Giovanni Villani, ‘Florentini Historia Universalis’, RIS 13 (Milan, 1728), cols. 1-1002. 
 
Nuovo cronica, ed. G. Porta, 13 books in 3 vols (Parma, 1990-1).  
 
Henry Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle 1337-1396, ed. & trans. G.H. Martin (Oxford, 
1995).  
 
Henry Dapifero of Dissenhoven, ‘John XXII Quinta Vita’, VPA, i. 172-7. 
 
‘Historia Gulielmi et Albrigeti Cortusiorum de novitatibus Paduae, et Lombardiae’, RIS 
12 (Milan, 1728), cols. 767-954.  
 
Humbert Pilat, ‘Memorabilia’, J.P. de Valbonnais, Histoire de dauphine et des princes 
qui ont porté le nom de dauphins, 2 vols (Geneva, 1721-2), ii. 622-7.  
 
Jacob of Verona, Liber Peregrinationis, ed. U.M. Villard (Rome, 1950). 
 
Jacopo of Voragine Continuator, ‘Anonymous Continuation of the Chronicle of Jacopo 
de Voragine: 1297-1332’, ed. G. Monleone, Cronica di Genova dalle origini al 
1247, Fonti per la storia d’Italia 84, 3 vols (Rome, 1941), i. 478-85.  
 
 253 
James of Vitry, Historia Orientalis, ed. F. Moschus (Douai, 1597).  
 
Lettres de Jacques de Vitry: 1160/1170-1240, évêque de Saint-Jean d'Acre, ed. 
R.B.C. Huygens (Leiden 1960).  
 
John Ferrandez of Heredia, Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la 
Morea: Compilado por comandamiento de Don Fray Johan Ferrandez de Heredia 
maestro del Hospital de s. Johan de Jerusalem: Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et 
XIVe siècles (Osnabruck, 1885, reprinted 1968). 
 
John Froissart, Chronicles of England, France, Spain, and the Adjoining Countries: From 
the latter part of the reign of Edward II to the coronation of Henry IV, trans. T. 
Johnes, 2 vols (London, 1857). 
 
John of Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. & trans. M.N. de Wailly (Paris, 1874).  
 
John of St Victor, ‘Exerpta: E Memoriali Historiarum’, RHGF, xxi. 630-76. 
 
John of Winterthur, Chronica, ed. C. Brun, MGHSSNS 3 (Berlin, 1955). 
 
Le Liber Pontificalis: Texte, introduction et commentaire, ed. L. Duchesne, 3 vols (Paris, 
1886-92).  
 
‘Les gestes des Chiprois’, RHC Ar, ii. 651-872.  
 
Ludolf of Sudheim, ‘Ludolphus de Sudheim, De itinere Terre Sancte’, ed. G.A. 
Neumann, Archives de l'Orient Latin, 2 vols (Paris, 1881-4), ii. 305-77. 
 
 Description of the Holy Land, and of the Way Thither, trans. A. Stewart, PPTS 12 
(London, 1895).  
 
Ludovico Bonconte Monaldesco, ‘Fragmenta Annalium Romanorum’, RIS 12 (Milan, 
1728), cols. 527-42. 
 
Marco Battagli of Rimini, Marcha (1212-1354), ed. A.F. Massèra, RISNS 16.3 (Città di 
Castello, 1913). 
 
Marino Sanudo Torsello, ‘Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis’, ed. J. Bongars, Gesta Die per 
Francos, 2 vols (Hannover, 1661, reprinted: Jerusalem, 1972), ii. 1-287. English 
translation: Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross, trans. P. Lock (Aldershot, 
2011). 
 
‘Epistolae’, Gesta Dei per Francos, ed. J. Bongars, 2 vols (Hannover, 1661), ii. 289-
316.  
 
 254 
‘Hopf’s so-called “Fragmentum” of Marino Sanudo Torsello’, ed. R.L. Wolff, The 
Joshua Starr Memorial Volume (New York, NY, 1953), 149-59. Text also in Hopf, 
Chroniques greco-romanes (Berlin, 1973).  
 
Istoria di Romania, ed. & trans. E. Papadopoulou (Athens, 2000). 
 
Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace, ed. & trans. A. Brett (Cambridge, 2005).  
 
Matteo Villani, Chronica con la continuazione di Filippo Villani, ed. G. Porta, 11 books & 
continuation in 2 vols (Parma, 1995).  
 
Paulino Veneto, ‘Clement V Quinta Vita’, VPA, i. 80-106.  
 
Petro Giustinian, Venetiarum Historia Vulgo Petro Iustiniano Iustiniani Filio Adiudicata, 
ed. R. Cessi & F. Bennato (Venice, 1964).  
 
Pierre Dubois, De recuperatione Terre Sancte: dalla “Respublica Christiana” ai primi 
nazionalismi e alla politica antimediterranea, ed. A. Diotti (Florence, 1977). 
 
Pignol Zucchello, Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello (1336-1350), ed. R. Morozzo 
della Rocca, (Venice, 1957). 
 
Ptolemy of Lucca, ‘Historia Ecclesiastica’, RIS 11 (Milan, 1727), cols. 740-1242. 
 
 ‘Clement V Secunda Vita (excerpt from Historia Ecclesiastica)’, VPA, i. 24-53. 
 
Ralphaino Caresino, Chronicon: Cancellarii Veneti, Continuatio Chronicorum Andrea 
Danduli, 1323-1388, ed. A. Pastorello, RISNS 12.2 (Bologna, 1923). 
 
Ramon Muntaner, The Catalan Expedition to the East: from the Chronicle of Ramon 
Muntaner, trans. R. Hughes (Barcelona, 2006). 
 
Ranulph Higden and continuator, Polychronicon, ed. J.R. Lumby, RS 41, 9 vols (London, 
1865-86). 
 
Storie pistoresi (1300-1348), ed. S.A. Barbi, RISNS 11.5 (Città di Castello, 1927).  
 
Vita Edwardi Secundi, ed. & trans. W.R. Childs (Oxford, 2005). 
 
William of Boldensele, ‘Des Edelherrn Wilhelm von Boldensele Reise nach dem gelobten 
Lande’, Die Edelherren von Boldensele oder Boldensen, ed. C.L. Gotefend 
(Hannover, 1855), 18-78.  
 
William Adam, ‘De Modo Sarracenos Extirpandi’, RHC Ar, ii. 519-55. 
 
 255 
William of Nangis and Continuator, Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 a 
1300, avec les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 A 1368, ed. H. Géraud, 2 
vols (Paris, 1843).  
 
William of Rubruck, The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of 
the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1255, trans. P. Jackson (London, 1990). 
 
 
Greek 
 
Athanasios I, The Correspondence of Athanasius I Patriarch of Constantinople: Letters 
to the Emperor Andronicus II, Members of the Imperial Family and Officials, ed. & 
trans. A.-M.M. Talbot (Washington, DC, 1975).   
 
Doukas, Historia Byzantina, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1834).  
 
George Pachymeres, De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis Libri tredecim, ed. I. Bekker, 2 
vols (Bonn, 1835). French translation: George Pachymeres, Relations historiques, 
ed. A. Failler, trans. V. Laurent, 5 vols (Paris, 1984-2000). 
 
John Kantakouzenos, Eximperatoris Historiarum, ed. L. Schopen, 3 vols (Bonn, 1828).  
 
Matthew, Archbishop of Ephesus, Die Briefe des Matthaios von Ephesos im Codex 
Vindobonensis Theol. Gr. 174, ed. D. Reinsch, (Berlin, 1974).  
 
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, ed. L. Schopen & I. Bekker, 3 vols (Bonn, 
1829-55). German translation: Rhomäische Geschichte: Historia Rhomaïke, trans. 
J.L. Van Dieten, 6 vols (Stuttgart, 1973-2003). 
 
 
Arabic and Turkish 
 
Enveri,  e destān d'Umūr Pacha (Düstūrnāme-i Enverī), trans. I. Mélikoff-Sayar (Paris, 
1954).  
 
Ibn Battuta, The Travels, trans. H.A.R. Gibb et al., 5 vols (Cambridge, 1958-2000).  
 
Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki, The Feats of the Knowers of God (Manaqeb al-‘arefin), 
trans. J. O’Kane (Leiden, 2002).  
 
 256 
Secondary Works 
 
Abulafia, D., ‘Venice and the kingdom of Naples in the last years of Robert the Wise: 
1332-43’, PBSR 48 (1980), 186-204.  
 
Ahrweiler, H., ‘L’histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux 
occupations Turques (1081-1317), particulièrement au XIIIe siècle’, Travaux et 
Mémoires 1 (1965), 1-165.  
 
Andrea, A.J., Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade (Leiden, 2000).  
 
Argenti, P.P., The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the 
Island: 1346-1566, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1958).  
 
‘The Mahona of the Giustiniani: Genoese colonialism and the Genoese relationship 
with Chios’, BF 6 (1979), 1-35.  
 
Ashtor, E., Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ, 1983).  
 
‘Observations on Venetian trade in the Levant in the XIVth Century’, Journal of 
European Economic History 5 (1976), 533-86.  
 
Atiya, A.S., The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1938). 
 
Avery, D.M.S., Seville: between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, 1248-1492: Pre-
Columbus Commercial Routes from and to Seville (University of St Andrews, 
MPhil thesis, 2007). 
  
Balard, M., La Romanie génoise, xiie – début du xve siècle, 2 vols (Rome, 1978).  
 
‘The Genoese in the Aegean (1204-1566)’, LGEM, 158-74. 
 
‘Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans in the fourteenth century’, NCMH, vi. 825-
38. 
  
‘Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans (1300-1400)’, The Cambridge History of the 
Byzantine Empire: c.500-1492, ed. J. Shepard (Cambridge, 2008), 834-51. 
 
Balletto, L., Genova Mediterraneo Mar Nero (Secc. XIII-XV) (Genoa, 1976). 
 
Barber, M., The Trial of the Templars (Cambridge, 1978). 
 
‘The pastoureaux of 1320’, JEH 32 (1981), 143-66. 
 
Barry, S., & Gualde, N., ‘La Peste noire dans l’Occident chrétien et musulman, 1347-
1353’, Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 25.2 (2008), 461-98. 
 
 257 
Beazley, R.C., ‘Directorium ad faciendum passagium transmarinum II’, The American 
Historical Review 13.1 (1907), 66-115.  
 
Belles, C., Mastiha Island, trans. C. Sachtouri (Athens, 2005). 
 
Boase, T.S.R., Boniface the Eighth: 1294-1303 (London, 1933).  
 
Boislisle, A. de, ‘Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon (1316-1333)’, Annuaire-
Bulletin de la Soci t  de l’Histoire de France 9 (1872), 246-55.  
 
Boojamra, J.L., ‘Athanasios of Constantinople: a study of Byzantine reactions to Latin 
religious infiltration’, Church History 48.1 (1979), 27-48. 
 
Borchardt, K., ‘Kurie und Orden: Johanniter in den p pstlichen Supplikenregistern 
1342-1352’, Kurie und Region: Festschrift für Brigide Schwarz zum 65. Geburstag, 
ed. B. Flug, M. Matheus & A. Rehberg (Stuttgart, 2005), 17-39. 
 
Boyle, L.E., A Survey of the Vatican Archives and of its Medieval Holdings (Toronto, 
1972). 
 
Briys, E., & Beerst, D.J., ‘The Zaccaria deal: Contract and options to fund a Genoese 
shipment of alum to Bruges in 1298’, Helsinki XIV International Economic History 
Congress (August 2006), 1-133. 
 
Brooke, J., ‘Namier and Namierism’, History and Theory 3 (1963-4), 331-47. 
 
Brown, E.A.R., ‘The ceremonial of royal succession in Capetian France: The double 
funeral of Louis X’, Traditio 34 (1978), 227-71.  
 
Brundage, J.A., Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison, WI, 1969).  
 
Brunetti, M., ‘Contributo alla Storia delle relazioni veneto-genovesi dal 1348 al 1350’, 
Miscellanea di Storia Veneta 9 (Venice, 1916), 1-160.  
 
Burns, R.I., ‘The Catalan Company and the European powers, 1305-1311’, Speculum 29 
(1954), 751-71.  
 
Bryer, A.A.M., ‘The question of the Byzantine mines in the Pontos: Chalybian iron, 
Chaldian silver, Koloneian alum and the mummy of Cheriana’, Anatolian Studies 
32 (1982), 133-50.  
 
Caggese, A., Roberto d’Angiò e i suoi tempi, 2 vols (Florence, 1922-30).  
 
Cahen, C., Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture 
and History c.1071-1330, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968).  
  
Cerlini, A., ‘Nuovo lettere di Marino Sanudo il vecchio’, La bibliofilia 42 (1940), 321-59.  
 258 
 
Chaplais, P., The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325): Gascon Correspondence and 
Diplomatic Documents (London, 1954). 
  
Charanis, P., ‘An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century’, Byzantion 13 
(1938), 335-62. 
 
Chrissis, N.G., Crusading in Romania: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and 
Attitudes, 1204-1282 (University of London, PhD thesis, 2008). 
 
Chrysostomides, J., ‘Venetian commercial privileges under the Palaeologi’, Studi 
Veneziani 12 (1970), 267-356.  
 
Clarke, P.D., The Interdict in the Thirteenth Century: A Question of Collective Guilt 
(Oxford, 2007). 
 
Cocci, A., ‘Le projet de blocus naval des côtes égyptiennes dans le Liber secretorum 
fidelium Crusis (1321c) de Marino Sanudo il Vecchio (1279c.-1343)’, La 
Méditerranée médiévale: Perceptions et représentations (Paris, 2002), 171-88.  
 
Cohn, N.C.C., The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical 
Anarchists of the Middle Ages (London, 1970). 
 
Çolak, M., Thirion-Merle, V., Blondé, F., & Picon, M., ‘Les régions productrices d’alun 
en Turquie aux époques antique, médiévale et modern: gisements, produits et 
transports’, L'alun de Méditerranée: colloque international, Naples, 4-6 juin 2003-
Lipari, 7-8 juin 2003, ed. P. Borgard, J.-P. Brun & M. Picon (Naples, 2005), 59-68.  
 
Coureas, N., ‘Cyprus and the naval leagues, 1333-1358’, Cyprus and the Crusades: 
Papers Given at the International Conference ‘Cyprus and the Crusades’, ed. N. 
Coureas & J.S.C. Riley-Smith (Nicosia, 1995), 107-24.  
 
Curley, M.M., The Conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV, the Fair 
(Washington, DC, 1927).  
 
Delaville le Roulx, J., La France en Orient au XIVe siècle, 2 vols (Paris, 1886). 
  
Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre: 1100-1310 (Paris, 1904).  
 
Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 1310-1421 (Paris, 1913). 
 
Demurger, A., ‘Le pape Clément VI et l’Orient: ligue ou croisade?’, Guerre, pouvoir et 
noblesse au Moyen Âge, Mélanges en l'honneur de Philippe Contamine, ed. J. 
Paviot & J. Verger (Paris, 2000), 207-14. 
 
Depréz, E., Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans: La papauté, la France et 
l'Angleterre (1328-1342) (Paris, 1902). 
 259 
 
Dols, M.W., The Black Death in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ, 1977). 
 
Du Cange, C. du F., Histoire de l’Empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs français 
jusqu’a la conqu te des turcs, ed. J.A. Buchon, 2 vols (Paris, 1826).  
 
Durrholder, G., Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann XXII (Strasbourg, 1913). 
 
Dunbabin, J., A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church 
(Oxford, 1991).  
 
Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth Century 
Europe (London, 1998). 
 
Edbury, P.W., The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades: 1191-1374 (Cambridge, 1991).  
 
Edson, E., ‘Reviving the crusade: Sanudo’s schemes and Vesconte’s maps’, Eastward 
Bound: Travel and Travellers, 1050-1550 (Manchester, 2004), 131-55.  
 
Epstein, S.A., Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996).  
 
Failler, A., ‘Éphèse fut-elle prise en 1304 par les Turcs de Sasan?’, Revue des études 
byzantines 54 (1996), 245-8.  
 
Faure, M.C., ‘Le dauphin Humbert II à Venise et en Orient (1345-1347)’, Mélanges 
d'archéologie et d'histoire 27 (1907), 509-562.  
 
Fedalto, G., La chiesa latina in Oriente, 3 vols (Verona, 1973-8).  
 
Fleet, K., ‘The treaty of 1387 between Murad I and the Genoese’, Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies 56 (1993), 13-33. 
  
Trade relations between the Turks and the Genoese, 1300-1453 (University of 
London, PhD thesis, 1994). 
 
European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa 
and Turkey (Cambridge, 1999).  
 
Forey, A.J., ‘The military orders in the crusading proposals of the late-thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries’, Traditio 36 (1980), 317-45. 
 
Foss, C., Ephesus after Antiquity, A Late Antique, Byzantine and Turkish City 
(Cambridge, 1979). 
 
Fryde, E.B., ‘Italian maritime trade with medieval England (c. 1270–c. 1530)’, Recueils 
de la Société de Jean Bodin 32 (1974), 291-337 (reprinted in E.B. Fryde, Studies in 
Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), item XIV).  
 260 
 
 ‘The English cloth industry and the trade with the Mediterranean: c.1370 – 
c.1480’, Produzione, commercio e consumo de panni dei lana (nei secoli XII – 
XVII), ed. M. Spallanzani (Florence, 1976), 343-63 (reprinted in E.B. Fryde, Studies 
in Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), item XV). 
 
Gatto, L., ‘Per la storia di Martino Zaccaria, signore di Chio’, Bulletino dell’ “Archivio 
Paleografico Italiano”, n.s., 2-3, part 1 (1956-7), 325-45.  
 
Gay, J.,  e Pape Cl ment VI et les a aires d'Orient (1342-1352) (Paris, 1904). 
 
Geanakoplos, D.J., Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258 – 1282: A Study 
Into Byzantine-Latin Relations (Hamden, CT, 1959). 
 
‘Byzantium and the crusades: 1261-1354’, HC, iii. 27-68. 
 
Gerland, E., Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras (Leipzig, 
1903).  
 
Gill, J., Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198-1400 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1979).  
 
Gilmour-Bryson, A., The Trial of the Templars in the Papal State and the Abruzzi 
(Vatican City, 1982). 
 
Giunta, F., ‘Benedetto XII e la crociata’, Anuario de estudios medievales 3 (1966), 215-
34.  
 
Goodwin, G., A History of Ottoman Architecture (London, 1971).  
 
Green, L., Chronicle Into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine 
Fourteenth-Century Chronicles (Cambridge, 1972). 
 
Guilmartin Jr., J.F., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean 
Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1974). 
 
Harris, J., ‘Edward II, Andronicus II and Giles of Argenteim: a neglected episode in 
Anglo-Byzantine relations’, Porphyrogenita, 77-84. 
 
Heers, M.-L., ‘Les Génois et le commerce de l’alun à la fin du Moyen Age’, Revue 
d'histoire economique et sociale 32 (1954), 31-53. 
 
Henneman, J.B., Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War 
Financing, 1322-1356 (Princeton, NJ, 1971).  
 
Heslop, M., ‘The search for the defensive system of the knights in southern Rhodes’, 
The Military Orders: On Land and By Sea, ed. J. Upton-Ward (Aldershot, 2008), 
189-200. 
 261 
 
Heyd, W., Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1885-6).  
 
Hill, G., A History of Cyprus, 4 vols (Cambridge, 1940-52). 
 
Hillgarth, J.N., Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1971).  
 
Holloway, J.B., Twice-Told Tales: Brunetto Latino and Dante Alighieri (New York, NY, 
1993). 
 
Hopf, K., ‘Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit’, 
Encyclopedie, ed. J.S. Ersch & J.G. Gruber, 177 vols  (Leipzig, 1818-89), vols 85-6. 
Reprinted in Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere 
Zeit, 2 vols (Berlin, 1960).  
 
Housley, N., ‘The Franco-papal crusade negotiations in 1322-3’, PBSR 48 (1980), 166-85  
(reprinted in HVR, item XII).  
 
‘Angevin Naples and the defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the naval 
league of 1334’, Byzantion 51 (1981), 548-56  (reprinted in HVR, item XIII). 
 
‘Pope Clement V and the crusades of 1309-10’, JMH 8 (1982), 29-43 (reprinted in 
HVR, item XI).  
 
The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades Against 
Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford, 1982). 
 
‘The Mercenary companies, the papacy and the crusades, 1356–1378’, Traditio 
38 (1982), 253-80. 
 
The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378 (Oxford, 1986).  
 
 ‘France, England and the “national crusade”, 1302–86’, in France and the British 
Isles in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Essays by Members of Girton College, 
Cambridge, in Memory of Ruth Morgan, ed. G. Jondorf and D. N. Dumville 
(Woodbridge, 1991), 183-201 (reprinted in HVR, item VII). 
 
The Later Crusades from Lyons to Alcazar, 1274-1580 (Oxford, 1992).  
 
‘Cyprus and the Crusades, 1291-1571’, Cyprus and the Crusades: Papers Given at 
the International Conference ‘Cyprus and the Crusades’, ed. N. Coureas & J.S.C. 
Riley-Smith (Nicosia, 1995), 187-206. 
 
Contesting the Crusades (Oxford, 2006). 
 
Hunt, E.W., A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550 (1999).  
 
 262 
Inalcik, H., ‘The rise of the Turkish maritime principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and 
the crusades’, BF 9 (1985), 179-217.  
 
‘The Ottoman Turks and the crusades: 1329-1451’, HC, vi. 222-75. 
 
Jacoby, D., ‘Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305-1332): Un nouveau 
témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello’, SM 15.1 (1974), 217-61.  
  
 ‘Social Evolution in Latin Greece’, HC, vi. 175-221. 
 
 ‘From Byzantium to Latin Romania: Continuity and Change’, LGEM, 1-44. 
 
 ‘Creta e Venezia nel contesto economico del Mediterraneo orientale sino alla 
 meta del Quattrocento’, Venezia e Creta: atti del convegno internazionale di 
studi, Iraklion-Chanià, 30 settembre – 5 ottobre 1997, ed. G. Ortalli (Venice, 
1998), 73-106. 
 
 ‘Production et commerce de l’alun oriental en Méditerranée, XIe-XVe siècles’, 
 ’alun de M diterran e: colloque international, Naples, 4-6 juin 2003-Lipari, 7-8 
juin 2003, ed. P. Borgard, J.-P. Brun & M. Picon (Naples, 2005), 219-67. 
 
Jal, A., Archéologie navale, 2 vols (Paris, 1840). 
 
Jenkins, H., Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII: 1334-1342 (University of 
Pennsylvania, PhD thesis, 1933). 
 
Jordan, W.C., The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century 
(Princeton, NJ, 1996).  
 
Jorga, N., ‘Une lettre apocryphe sur la bataille de Smyrne’, Revue d’orient  atin 3 (1895), 
27-31.  
  
 Philippe de Mézières, 1327-1405, et la croisade au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1896).  
 
Kafadar, C., Between the Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, 
CA, 1995). 
 
Kedar, B.Z., Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-
Century Depression (London, 1976). 
 
Kedar, B.Z., & Schein, S., ‘Un projet de “passage particuliare” proposé par l’ordre de 
l’Hôpital, 1306-7’, BEC 137.2 (1979), 211-26.  
 
Kunstmann, F., ‘Studien über Marino Sanudo Torsello den Aelteren’, Abhandlungen der 
Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 7 
(Munich, 1855), 695-819.  
 
 263 
Laiou, A.E., ‘A Byzantine prince Latinized: Theodore Palaeologus, Marquis of 
Montferrat’, Byzantion 38 (1968), 386-410.  
 
 ‘Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: the background to the anti-
Turkish league of 1332-1334’, Speculum 45 (1970), 374-92.  
 
Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282-1328 
(Cambridge, 1972).  
 
Lane, F.C., ‘Venetian merchant galleys, 1300-1334: Private and communal operation’, 
Speculum 38.2 (1963), 179-205.  
 
 Venice: A Maritime Republic (London, 1973). 
 
Langer, W.L. & Blake, R.P., ‘The rise of the Ottoman Turks and its historical background’, 
AHR 37 (1932), 468-505.  
 
Laurent, V.,  ‘Grégoire X (1271-1276) et le projet d’une ligue antiturque’, Echos 
d’Orient 37 (1938), 257-73.  
 
‘Action de grâces pour la victoire navale remportée sur les Turcs à Atramyttion 
au cours de l’automne 1334’, Eis Mnemen K.I. Amantou (Athens, 1960), 25-41. 
 
Lemerle, P.,  ’ mirat d’Aydin, Byzance et l’occident: Recherches sur ‘ a geste d’Umur 
pacha’ (Paris, 1957).   
 
Leopold, A., How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late 
Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (Aldershot, 2000).  
 
Loenertz, R.-J., Les Ghisi: Dynastes vénitiens dans l’Archipel, 1207-1390 (Florence, 1975).  
 
Lopez, R., Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante (Milan, 1933).  
 
Storia delle colonie Genovesi nel Mediterraneo (Bologna, 1938).  
 
‘Majorcans and Genoese on the North Sea route in the thirteenth century’, 
Revue belge le philologie et d'histoire 29 (1951), 1163-79.  
 
‘Nuove luci sugli Italiani in estremo oriente prima di Colombo’, Studi Colombiani 
3 (1953), 337-98 (reprinted in R. Lopez, Su e giù per la storia di Genova (Genoa, 
1975), 83-135).  
 
‘Familiari, procuratori e dipendenti di Benedetto Zaccaria’, Miscellanea di Storia 
Ligure in onore di Giorgio Falco (Milan, 1962), 209-49.  
 
 ‘Venice and Genoa: two styles, one success’, Diogenes 71 (1970), 39-47.  
 
 264 
Lopez, R., & Raymond, I.W., Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative 
Documents (New York, NY, 1967). 
 
Lunardi, G., Le monete delle colonie Genovesi (Genoa, 1980).  
 
Lunt, W.E., Financial Relations of the Papacy with England: 1327-1534, 2 vols (Cambridge, 
MA, 1939).  
 
Luttrell, A.T., ‘Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the fourteenth century’, 
PBSR 26 (1958), 195-212. 
 
 ‘Interessi fiorentini nell'economia e nella politica dei Cavalieri Ospedalieri di Rodi 
nel Trecento’, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa: Lettere, Storia e 
filosofia, ser. II, 28 (1959), 317-26 (reprinted in LVR1, item VIII). 
 
 ‘Emmanuele Piloti and criticism of the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes: 1306-1444’, 
annales de l’Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte 20 (1962), 1-17 (reprinted in LVR1, 
item XXIV). 
 
 ‘The Crusade in the fourteenth century’, Europe in the Later Middle Ages, ed. J. Hale 
(London, 1965), 122-54. 
 
‘The Latins of Argos and Nauplia: 1311-1394’, PBSR 34 (1966), 34-55. 
 
 ‘Feudal tenure and Latin colonization at Rhodes’, EHR 85 (1970), 755-75 (reprinted 
in LVR1, item III).  
 
 ‘The Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1291’, Acts of the I International Congress of 
Cypriot Studies, 2 vols (Nicosia, 1972), ii. 161-71 (reprinted in LVR1, item II). 
 
 ‘The Hospitallers at Rhodes: 1306-1421’, HC, iii. 278-313 (reprinted in LVR1, item I). 
 
‘Corrigenda et addenda’, LVR1 item XXV, 288-9. 
 
‘The Hospitallers’ interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1271-1375’, The Cilician 
Kingdom of Armenia, ed. T.S.R. Boase (Edinburgh, 1978), 118-44.  
 
 ‘The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Prospectives, problems, possibilities’, Die geistlichen 
Ritterorden Europas, ed. J. Fleckenstein & M. Hellmann (Thorbecke, 1980), 243-66 
(reprinted in LVR2, item I). 
 
 ‘The Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks: 1306-1421’, Christians, Jews and 
Other Worlds: Patterns of Conflict and Accommodation: the Avery Lectures in 
History, ed. P.F. Gallagher (Lanham, MD, 1988), 80-116.  
 
 265 
 ‘Latin responses to Ottoman expansion before 1389’, The Ottoman Emirate (1300-
1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 11-13 January 
1991, ed. E.A. Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993), 119-34.  
 
 ‘The Genoese at Rhodes: 1306-1312’, Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed età 
moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino, ed. L. Balletto, 2 vols (Genoa, 1997), i. 
743-61 (reprinted in LVR4, item I). 
 
 ‘The Hospitallers and the papacy, 1305-1314’, Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst-, und 
Landesgeschichte: Peter Herde zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. K. Borchardt & E. Bunz, 2 
vols (Stuttgart, 1998), ii. 595-622 (reprinted in LVR5, item V). 
  
 ‘The Hospitallers and their Florentine bankers: 1306-1346’, Karrissime Gotifride: 
Historical Essays Presented to Professor Godfrey Wettinger on his Seventieth 
Birthday, ed. P. Xuereb, (Msida, 1999), 17-24 (reprinted in LVR5, item VI).  
 
 ‘Cos after 1306’, Istoria – Texne – Archaiologia tes Kw (Athens, 2001), 401-4 
(reprinted in LVR5, item VIII). 
 
 ‘The Finances of the commander in the Hospital after 1306’, La commanderie: 
institution des ordres militaires dans l’Occident M di val, ed. A.T. Luttrell & L. 
Pressouyre (Paris, 2002), 1-7. Reprinted in LVR5, item VII. 
 
 ‘The island of Rhodes and the Hospitallers of Catalunya in the fourteenth century’, 
Els catalans a la Mediterrània oriental a l’edat mitjana, ed. M.T. Ferrer i Mallol 
(Barcelona, 2003), 155-65 (reprinted in LVR5, item XVIII).  
 
 The Town of Rhodes: 1306-1356 (Rhodes, 2003). 
 
Maier, C., Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth 
Century (Cambridge, 1994).  
 
Mas Latrie, L. de, Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le regne des princes de la maison de 
Lusignan, 3 vols (Paris, 1852-61).  
 
Mastnak, T., Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World and Western Political 
Order (London, 2002).  
 
Mazarakis, A., ‘The Chios mint during the rule of the Zaccaria family (1304-1329)’, 
Nomismatika Chronika 11 (1992), 43-52. 
 
 ‘A martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria (1307-1310)’, trans. M.J. Tzamali, 
Nomismatika Chronika 18 (1999), 111-18. 
 
Mazzi, M.S., ‘Pistoia e la Terrasanta’, Toscana e Terrasanta nel Medioevo, ed. F. Cardini 
(Florence, 1982), 103-115.  
 
 266 
Menache, S., Clement V (Cambridge, 1998). 
 
‘The last Master of the Temple: James of Molay’, Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on 
the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar Presented to Malcolm 
Barber, ed. N. Housley (Aldershot, 2007), 229-40. 
 
Meserve, M., Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought (Cambridge, MA, 2008). 
 
Metcalf, D.M., Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum, 
Oxford, 2nd ed. (London, 1995).  
 
Miller, T.S., ‘Chios, Byzantium and the Genoese (1346-1352)’, Byzantine Studies 2.2 
(1975), 132-8. 
 
Miller, W., The Latins in the Levant, A History of Frankish Greece (1204-1566) (London, 
1908). 
 
‘The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios, 1275-1329’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 
31 (1911), 44-55.  
 
 ‘The Genoese in Chios, 1346-1566’, EHR 30 (1915), 418-32. 
 
Mollat, G., The Popes at Avignon: 1305-1378, trans. J. Love (London, 1963).  
 
Moranvillé, H., ‘Les projets de Charles de Valois sur l’Empire de Constantinople’, BEC 51 
(1890), 63-86.  
 
Muldoon, J., Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-
1550 (Liverpool, 1979).  
 
‘The Avignon Papacy and the frontiers of Christendom: The evidence of Vatican 
Register 62’, Archivium Historiae Pontificiae 17 (1979), 125-95.  
 
Namier, L., Personalities and Powers (London, 1955).  
 
Nicholas, D., Medieval Flanders (London, 1992).  
 
Nicol, D.M., Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations 
(Cambridge, 1988).  
 
 The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1993). 
 
 The Reluctant Emperor: A biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and 
Monk, c.1295-1383 (Cambridge, 1996).  
 
 267 
Norden, W., Das Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das 
Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung bis zum Untergange des byzantinischen Reichs 
(1453) (Berlin, 1903).  
 
Odena, J.T., ‘“De Alexandrinis” (El comercio prohibido con los Musulmanes y el papado 
de Avinon durante la primera mitad del siglo XIV)’, Anuario de estudios 
medievales 10 (1980), 237-320. 
 
Omont, H., ‘Projet de réunion des églises grecque et latine sous Charles le Bel en 
1327’, BEC 53 (1892), 254-7. 
 
Ortalli, G., ‘Venice and papal bans on trade with the Levant: The role of the jurist’ 
Mediterranean Historical Review 10 (1995), 242-58.  
 
Ostrogorsky, G., History of the Byzantine State, trans. J. Hussey (Oxford, 1956).  
 
Özgenç, L., ‘Economic geology of Şaphanedağ (Foça – Izmir) alunite deposit’, Bulletin of 
the Geological Congress of Turkey 7 (1992), 64-9.  
 
Papi, M.D., ‘Santa Maria Novella di Firenze e l’Outremer domenicano’, Toscana e 
Terrasanta nel Medioevo, ed. F. Cardini (Florence, 1982), 87-101.  
 
Partner, P., The Lands of St Peter: The Papal States in the Middle Ages and Early 
Renaissance (London, 1972).  
 
Pastor, L., The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages, ed. & trans. F.I. 
Antrobus, et al., 40 vols (London, 1894-1953).  
 
Percy, W.A., ‘A reappraisal of the Sicilian Vespers and of the role of Sicily in European 
history’, Italian Quarterly 22 (1981), 77-96. 
 
Perikos, J., The Chios Gum Mastic (Athens, 1993). 
 
Philips, J.P., The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (London, 2007). 
 
Pistarino, G., ‘Chio dei Genovesi’, SM 10 (1969), 3-68.  
 
‘Duecentocinquant’anni dei Genovesi a Chio’, Genovesi d’Oriente, ed. G. Pistarino 
(Genoa, 1990), 243-80.  
 
Porter, W., A History of the Knights of Malta or the Order of the Hospital of St. John of 
Jerusalem, 2 vols (London, 1858), 
 
Promis, D., La Zecca di Scio durante il dominio dei Genovesi (Turin, 1865).  
 
 268 
Purcell, M., Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy 
and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre: 
1244-1291 (Leiden, 1975). 
 
Queller, D.E. (ed.), The Latin Conquest of Constantinople (London, 1971).  
 
Richard, J., ‘Le royaume de Chypre et l’embargo sur le commerce avec l’Egypte (fin XIIIe-
début XIVe siècle’, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1984), 120-34.  
 
 Saint Louis: Crusader King of France, trans. J. Birrell (Cambridge, 1992). 
 
Riefstahl, R.M., Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia (Cambridge, MA, 1931).   
 
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., What Were the Crusades?, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, 2002). 
 
 The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c.1050-1310 (London, 1967).  
 
 ‘The Crown of France and Acre: 1254-1291’, France and the Holy Land: Frankish 
Culture at the End of the Crusades (Baltimore, MD, 2004), 45-62.  
 
Roncière, C.B. de la, ‘Une escadre Franco-papale (1318-1320)’, M langes d’arch ologie 
et d’histoire publi s par l’École française de Rome 13 (1893), 5-26.  
 
 Histoire de la Marine Française, 5 vols (Paris, 1889-1920).  
 
Roncière, C.B. de la, & Dorez, L., ‘Lettres inédites et mémoires de Marino Sanudo 
l'ancien (1334-1337)’, BEC 56 (1895), 21-44. 
 
Ruddock, A.A., Italian Merchants and Shipping in Medieval Southampton: 1270-1600 
(Southampton, 1951).  
 
Runciman, S.,  A History of the Crusades, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1951-4). 
 
Sarnowsky, J., ‘Die Johanniter und Smyrna 1344-1402 (Teil 1)’, Römische Quartalschrift 86 
(1991), 215-51. 
 
 ‘Die Johanniter und Smyrna 1344-1402 (Teil 2: Quellen)’, Römische Quartalschrift 
87 (1992), 47-98 
 
Schein, S., ‘Gesta Dei per Mongolos: the genesis of a non-event’, EHR 95 (1979), 805-19.  
 
‘Philip IV and the crusade: a reconsideration’, Crusade and Settlement: Papers 
Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the 
Latin East and Presented to R.C. Smail, ed. P.W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), 121-6.  
 
 ‘From “milites Christi” to “mali Christiani”:  the Italian communes in western 
historical literature’, I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di Gerusalemme / 
 269 
The Italian communes in the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem, ed. G. Airaldi and B.Z. 
Kedar (Genoa, 1986), 680-9. 
 
 Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274-1314 
(Oxford, 1991). 
 
Schlumberger, G., Numismatique de l'orient Latin, 2 vols (Paris, 1878).  
 
Setton, K.M., Catalan Domination of Athens: 1311-1388 (Cambridge, MA, 1948).  
 
‘The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380’, HC, iii. 167-224. 
 
 Los catalanes en Grecia (Barcelona, 1975). 
  
 The Papacy and the Levant: 1204-1571, 4 vols (Philadelphia, PA, 1976-84). 
 
Singer, C.S., The Earliest Chemical Industry: An Essay in the Historical Relations of 
Economics & Technology illustrated from the Alum Trade (London, 1948).  
 
Skinner, Q., ‘The principles and practice of opposition: The case of Bolingbroke versus 
Walpole’, Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in 
Honour of J. H. Plumb, ed. N. McKendrick (London, 1974), 93-128.  
 
Spencer, T., ‘Turks and Trojans in the Renaissance’, The Modern Language Review 47 
(1952), 330-333. 
 
Stantchev, S., Embargo: The Origins of an Idea and the Implications of a Policy in 
Europe and the Mediterranean, ca. 1100 – ca. 1500 (University of Michigan, PhD 
thesis, 2009). 
 
Strayer, J.R., ‘France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most Christian King’, 
Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History: Essays by Joseph R. Strayer 
(Princeton, NJ, 1971), 300-14. 
 
The Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton, NJ, 1980).  
 
Tabacco, G., La casa di Francia nell’azione politica di Papa Giovanni XXII (Rome, 1953).  
 
Tanner, N.P. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I to Vatican II, 2 vols (London, 
1990). 
 
Taylor, C.H., ‘The composition of baronial assemblies in France, 1315-20’, Speculum 29 
(1954), 433-59.  
 
‘French assemblies and subsidy in 1321’, Speculum 43 (1968), 217-44.  
 
 270 
Theotokes, S.M., ‘E prôte summachia tôn kuriarchôn kratôn tou aigaiou chata tês 
kathodou tôn tourkôn archomenou tou 14 aiônos’, Epeteris Etaireias Byzantinon 
Spoudon 7 (1930), 283-98. 
 
Theunissen, H., ‘Ottoman-Venetian diplomatics: the Ahd-names. The historical 
background and the development of a category of political-commercial 
instruments together with an annotated edition of a corpus of relevant 
documents’, Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies 1.2 (1998), 1-698. 
 
Thiriet, F., ‘Sui dissidi sorti tra il Comune di Venezia e i suoi feudatari di Creta nel 
Trecento’, Archivio Storico Italiano 114 (1956), 699-712. 
 
La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Âge: Le développement et l'exploitation du 
domaine colonial vénitien: XIIe-XVe siècles (Paris, 1959).   
 
Throop, P.A., Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade 
Propaganda (Amsterdam, 1940).  
 
Topping, P., ‘The Morea, 1311-1364’, HC, iii. 104-140.  
 
Tyerman, C.J., The French and the Crusade: 1313-36 (University of Oxford, D.Phil. 
thesis, 1981).  
 
‘Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade: lobbying in the fourteenth 
century: the Alexander Prize essay’, TRHS 32 (1982), 57-73. 
 
‘Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land’, War and 
Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham & J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 
170-81.  
 
‘Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade’, Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research 57 (1984), 15-34.  
 
‘Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land’, EHR 100 (1985), 25-52.  
 
Valbonnais, J.P. de, Histoire de dauphine et des princes qui ont porté le nom de dauphins, 
2 vols (Geneva, 1721-2).  
 
Viller, M., ‘La question de l’union des églises entre grecs et latins depuis le concile de Lyon 
jusqu’à celui de Florence (1274-1438)’, Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 18 (1922), 20-
60.  
 
Vryonis, S., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of 
Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Los Angeles, CA, 
1971).  
 
 271 
Wittek, P., Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.-
15. Jh. (Istanbul, 1934).  
 
Wood, C.T. (ed.), Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII: State vs. Papacy (New York, NY, 
1967).  
 
Wood, D., Clement VI: The Pontificate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope (Cambridge, 
1989).  
 
Wright, C.F., The Gattilusio Lordships in the Aegean 1354-1462 (University of London, 
PhD thesis, 2006). 
 
Zachariadou, E.A., ‘The Catalans of Athens and the beginning of Turkish expansion in 
the Aegean area’, SM 21.2 (1980), 821-38.  
 
Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin: 
1300-1415 (Venice, 1983).  
 
‘Holy war in the Aegean during the fourteenth century’, LGEM, 212-25. 
  
‘The emirate of Karasi and that of the Ottomans: two rival states’, The Ottoman 
Emirate (1300-1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 
11-13 January 1991, ed. E.A. Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993), 225-36. 
 
Zutshi, P.N.R., ‘The letters of the Avignon popes (1305-1378): A source for the study of 
Anglo-Papal relations and of English ecclesiastical history’, England and her 
Neighbours, 1066-1453. Essays in honour of Pierre Chaplais, ed. M. Jones & M. 
Vale (London 1989),  259-75.  
 
‘The personal role of the pope in the production of papal letters in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries’, Vom Nutzen des Schreibens: soziales Gedächtnis, 
Herrschaft und Besitz im Mittelalter, ed. W. Pohl & P. Herold (Vienna, 2002), 225-
36.  
 
 
Book Reviews 
 
Arnakis, G.G., ‘ e destān d'Umur pacha by Irène Mélikoff-Sayar. L'émirat d'Aydin, 
Byzance et l'Occident: Recherches sur “ a geste d'Umur pacha” by Paul Lemerle’, 
Speculum 33 (1958), 304-8. 
 
Braude, B., ‘Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia by Rudi Paul Lindner’, 
Speculum 62 (1987), 701-7. 
 272 
Appendix I: Map 
 
 
 
 273 
Appendix II: Manuscripts 
 
Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Avenionensia, reg. 18, f. 152v, ep. 209  
 
 
 
Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209 
 
 
 274 
Appendix III: Texts 
1. 
 
Indulgences for three years are granted to those fighting against the schismatic Greeks 
and all infidels in the principality of Achaia  
29 November, 1322 
Vatican, Archivio Segreto, Registra Avenionensia, reg. 18, f. 152v; Registra Vaticana, 
reg. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209 
 
Universalis Christiani fidelibus per principatu Achaye constitutis. 
Inter alia que salutem fidelium operant ad illa libenter dirigimus mentem nostram per 
que fides catholica roboretur et gentes que Deum ignorant et in sua confidunt 
potencia consternantur. Cum itaque sicut ex parte vestra fuit nobis expositum vos et 
Ecclesiae Romaniem fideles [et] aliarum partium adjacencium Romanie a scismaticis 
Grecis, Bulgaris, Alanis et Turchis aliisque permixtis infidelium nationibus, 
impugnatores, depopulatores, captivitatores, servitores, et carceretores et alias 
diversorum generum penas et cruciatus multiplices patiamini, quibus nec obviare 
potestis nec resistere per vos ipsos. Nos huiusmodi vestris tantis calamitatibus, miseriis 
et pressuris, affectu paterno compatientes ab intimis, libenter vobis illo quo possumus 
spirituali subsidio quod cuilibet temporali prevalet misericorditer subvenimus. Ut igitur 
vos aliique Christi fideles ad defensionem catholice fidei contra scismaticos, et infideles 
eosdem, eo amplius animemini, quo temporale in hoc vitam sperabitis in perpetuam 
commutare, nos de omnipotentis Dei misericordia et beatorum Petri et Pauli 
apostolorum eius auctoritate confisi, vobis omnibus, ceterisque Chrisiti fidelibus, quos 
pro defensione catholice fidei in bello, seu pugna in principatu Achaye, aliisque 
fidelium terris et partibus eidem principatu  adjacentibus supradictis, aut vicinis 
eisdem habitis, contra scismaticos Grecos, Bulgaros, Alanos et Turchos aliasque 
permixtas nationes infidelium supradictas, aut ex vulneribus in eisdem bello, vel pugna 
receptis postmodum mori contigerit vestrorum omnium de quibus vere contriti fuistis 
et confessi, plenam concedimus veniam peccatorum. Presentibus post triennium 
minime valituris. Datum Avinione, iii kalendas Decembris, anno septio. 
 275 
2. 
 
John of Cepoy receives plenary indulgences in articulo mortis1 
19 May, 1334 
Vatican, Archivio Segreto, Registra Avenionensia, reg. 46, f. 560v; Registra Vaticana, 
reg. 107, f. 243r, ep. 729 
 
Dilecto filio nobili viro Johanni domino de Cepeyo militi Belvacensem diocesis salutem, 
etc. 
Provenit ex tue devotionis affectu quo nos et Romanam Ecclesiam revereris, ut 
petitiones tuas illas presertim que anime tue salutem respiciunt, ad exauditionis  
gratiam admittamus. Nos itaque tuis supplicationibus inclinati, ut confessor tuus quem 
duxeris eligendum, omnium peccatorum tuorum de quibus corde contritus, et ore 
confessus fueris, semel tantum in mortis articulo, eam plenam remissionem quam 
Romani pontifices consueverunt interdum per speciale privilegium personis aliquibus 
impertiri, tibi in sinceritate fidei, et devotione sancte matris ecclesie persistenti, 
quatinus claves ecclesie se extendunt, et gratum in occulis divine majestatis extiterit, 
auctoritate apostolica concedere valeat, devotioni tue tenore presentium indulgemus, 
sic tamen quod idem confessor de hiis de quibus fuerit alteri satisfactio impendenda, 
eam tibi per te si supervixeris, vel per heredes tuos si tunc forte transieris faciendi 
iniungat, quam tu vel illi facere teneamini ut prefertur. Et ne quod absit propter 
huismodi gratiam reddaris proclivior ad illicita imposterum commitenda, volumus quod 
si ex confidentia remissionis huiusmodi aliqua forte committeres, quo ad illa predicta 
remissio tibi nullatenus suffragentur. Nulli ergo etc. Nostre concessionis et voluntatis 
infringere etc. 
Datum Avinione, xiiii kalendas Junii, anno decimo octavo. 
                                                        
1 This is the standard grant of in articulo mortis indulgences. It was repeated to Hugh of Quiéret in 1335. 
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3. 
 
Martino Zaccaria is made captain of the papal galleys to fight the Turks 
16 Sept, 1343 
Vatican, Archivio Segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 137, ff. 102v-103r, ep. 323 
 
Dilecto filio nobili viro Martino Zacharie civitati Januensi.  
Commotis paterne pietatis visceribus erga fideles in Romanie et aliis partibus et insulis 
adjacentibus commorantes quos diris afflictionibus et persecutionibus Turchorum 
infidelium molestari et lacerari nos sine mentis amaritudine audivimus et audimus pro 
ipsorum defensione ac tuitione fidelium et repressione infidelium eorumdem, certum 
galerarum armatarum et munitiarum subsidium ordinavimus in eisdem partibus, per 
nos, et quosdam fideles alios usque ad certi temporis spacium exhibendum. Cum 
autem pro eodem subsidio quatuor galeas armatas et munitas decenter, viris et 
ecclesie Romane sumptibus et expensis tenendas illuc per unum annum continuum, 
faciamus transmitti. Nos cupientes galeas ipsas una cum aliis que per fideles alios ut 
premittitur destinantur sic prudenter et utili gubernari, quod ad dei laudem et gloriam 
fidei exaltationem catholice ac predictorum consolationem fidelium, fructus exinde 
proveniant uberes et votum, ac de tue fidelitatis et pervie probate in talibus industria 
plenius in domino confidentes, te predictarum quatuor  galearum generalem 
capitaneum usque ad nostrum beneplacitum consistuimus tenore presentium ac etiam 
deputamus faciendi gerendi et exercendi omnia et singula que spectant ad officium 
capitaneatus huiusmodi potestatem tibi plenariam concedentes. Volumus cum quod 
venerabili fratri nostro Henrico Patriarche Constantinopolitano Apostolice Sedis Legato 
cuisque mandatis et beneplacitis, super hiis pareas et intendas. Quocirca nobilitati tue 
per apostolica scripta mandamus quatenus super predictis sic te gerere studens 
fideliter et prudenter, quod exinde preter mercedis perennius premium nostrorum et 
apostolice sedis gratiam uberius merearis.  
Datum apud Villamnovam Avenionensis diocesis, xvi kalendas Octobris, anno secundo.  
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4. 
 
Decision of the Venetian Senate concerning a Venetian-Hospitaller fleet in the Aegean. 
6 June, 1336. 
Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 60v. 
 
Capta. 
Item quod scribatur cum plorabilibus(?) verbis magistro Hospitalis de ambaxatoris 
nostris qui rediit de curia ut non potuit obtinere aliquod subsidium contra Turchos cum 
domino papa, de quo valde doluimus pro reverencia fidei et Christianorum ipsarum 
partium Romanie, sed nos soli non possumus substinere tot omnibus(?) expensis. 
Verum tamen pro bono fidei prelibate, sumus contenti, quod quantumcumque 
videretur ipsi magistro et duche nostro Cretensis de armando contra Turchos, quod id 
fiat et procedat(?) sicut alium extitit ordinatum. Et sic iterum damus in mandatis duche 
nostro Cretensis et baiullo Nigropontis ut pro continue stent ita parati de generalis, ut 
aliis opportunis(?), quod ad laudem Dei id qualis fuerit ordinatum valeat et .. a 
conpleri. 
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5. 
 
Decision of the Venetian Senate concerning a request for a union with the Genoese.  
18 August, 1338. 
Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 82v. 
 
Capta. Quod respondeatur nuncio Communis Ianue excusando nos propter  
conditiones et occupationes nostras cum illis convenientibus verbis que videbuntur, 
qui petebat quod ambaxatores sui et nostri conversarent loco communi pro unione 
tractanda.  
 
 
6. 
 
Decision of the Venetian Senate concerning a request for a union with the Genoese. 
17 December, 1338. 
Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 115r. 
 
Capta. Quod respondeatur ambaxatori Communis Ianue cum pulcris verbis excusando 
nos a facto unionis sicut alias responsum fuit. Nota quod illud quod fuit alias 
responsum est supra in cartis LXXXIII. 
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Appendix IV: Indulgences Table1
                                                        
1
 This is not intended as a complete record of crusading indulgences issued during this period, only those of 
specific relevance to this study. 
 
 
Date 
 
Recipient Location / Against Type of indulgence Source 
1304 
(reissued 1306) 
 
Universi Christi 
fidelibus 
In Romania against the schismatic 
Greeks 
(ad recuperandum [Romanie] 
imperium) 
 
veniam peccatorum [...] quam 
haberant si in eiusdem Terre 
subsidium transfretarent 
BXI, nr. 1007. 
CV, i. nr. 247. 
 
1308 
 
Clergy of Europe and 
the Levant 
In the Holy Land against the 
Saracens 
(pro liberatione Terre [Sancte] de 
manibus impiorum) 
 
plenam veniam peccatorum 
 
- for one year’s service 
CV, ii. nr. 2988-90. 
1312 
 
Philip of Taranto and 
his followers 
 
In Romania against the schismatic 
Greeks  
(ad partes Romanie [...] contra 
scismaticos illarum partium) 
 
illam indulgentiam que 
transfretantibus in dicte Terre 
Sancte subsidium 
 
CV, vii. nr. 7893. 
1322 
 
Universalis Christi 
fidelibus per principatu 
Achaye constitutis 
In the principality of Achaia and the 
surrounding lands 
contra scismaticos Grecos, Bulgaros, 
Alanos et Turchos aliasque permixtas 
nationes infidelium 
 
 plenam veniam peccatorum 
 
- for death on campaign or 
wounds received thereafter 
(postmodum mori contigerit), 
valid for three years 
 
Vatican, Archivio segreto, 
Reg. Aven. 18, f. 152v; Reg. 
Vat. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209. 
 
1322  
 
The faithful in the 
dioceses of Reims, 
Toulouse and Paris 
In Armenia and Cyprus 
against the Mongols, Mamluks 
and Karaman Turks (Haramanus 
Turcomanorum) 
(in succursum et auxilium regnorum 
Armenie et Cipri) 
 
veniam peccatorum [...]  que 
proficiscentibus in Terre Sancte 
concedi per sedem apostolicam 
consuevit 
 
- for one year’s service 
John XXII Secrètes, ii. nr. 
1571-3.  
 
 
 
1323  
(renewed 1325) 
Martino Zaccaria and 
his followers, in the 
lands from Crete to 
Caffa 
 
In Chios and the surrounding area 
against the Turks and other infidels 
(in Chio vel aliis insulis seu terris 
eidem insule Chio adiacentibus [...] 
contra Turchos et infideles eosdem) 
 
omnium veniam peccatorum 
 
- for death on campaign or 
wounds received thereafter 
(postmodum mori contigerit), 
valid for three years 
 
Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 
344-5. 
1330 
 
Walter of Brienne and 
his followers 
 
In Romania against the schismatic 
Catalans 
(ad partes Romanie cum dicto Duce 
contra scismaticos invasores et 
detentores eiusdem ducatus) 
 
plenam veniam omnium 
peccatorum [...] que per sedem 
eandem concedi consuevit 
transfretantibus in subsidium 
Terre Sancte  
 
- for one year’s service 
 
DOC, nr. 150. 
1334 John of Cepoy and his 
followers 
In the Aegean against the Turks 
(pro defensione et tuitione 
christicolarum dictarum partium 
[Romanie]) 
 
omnium peccatorum [...] plenam 
remissionem [...] in mortis articulo  
 
- for death on campaign or 
wounds received thereafter (mori 
contingit) 
 
Vatican, Archivio segreto, 
Reg. Aven. 46, f. 560v; Reg. 
Vat. 107, f. 243r, ep. 729-
30. 
1335 Hugh Quiéret and his 
followers 
As above As above 
 
Vatican, Archivio segreto, 
Reg. Aven. 48, f. 194r-v; 
Reg. Vat. 119, f. 132v-3r, 
ep. 343-7. 
 
1336  
 
All the faithful on the 
islands of Sicily and 
further east 
 
In Armenia against the Mamluks  
(in Armeniorum succursum [...] 
contra [Saracenos]) 
 
plenam veniam peccatorum 
 
- for one year’s service 
BXII France, nr. 175. 
 
 
 
1343 
 
The kingdoms of Italy, 
Germany, Central and 
Eastern Europe and 
Romania 
In Romania against the Turks 
(qui cum dicta armata vel alias in 
succursum et subsidium 
christianorum partium Romanie 
predictarum contra [Turchos]) 
 
veniam peccaminum [...] que 
coceditur transfretantibus in 
subsidium Terre Sancte  
 
- for one year’s service  
DLC, nr. 22, pp. 78-80. 
1345 
 
Citizens and people of 
Genoa 
In the city of Caffa against the 
Tartars and Saracens 
(in succursum et defensionem dicte 
civitatis contra [Tartares et 
Saracenos]) 
  
veniam peccaminum [...] que 
concedi consuevit transfretantibus 
in subsidium Terre Sancte 
 
- for one year’s service  
 
CVI Autres, nr. 847. 
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Appendix V: Photos 
 
 
 
New Phokaia (Yeni Foça) from the Şaphanedağ alum mine, with the island of Lesbos just 
visible in the background. 
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The Turkish coast from Chios Town with remnants of the fifteenth-century Genoese fortress in the 
foreground.  
 
 
 
The Turkish coast from Rhodes Town, with the Palace of the Grand Master in the foreground.
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The Great Mosque at Birgi, constructed by Mehmed Aydin-oglu in 1312.  
 
 
The reconstructed Aydin family türbe, with the headstones of Umur, Mehmed, Bahadur and Isa (left-right). 
